Burma: catch all thread

[Backwards Observer]

A target-rich environment.

The dictator and his stakeholders / supporters are fundamentally fearful of loss of profit, loss of image, loss of economic opportunity, fear of increased insurance costs, fear of media and fear of the truth of what is going on in the shadows.

I could be mistaken, but a significant source of the Junta's revenue seems to flow from the gas pipeline. How feasible would a dedicated effort to sabotage the pipeline be? How would you describe or imagine the effect cycle of such a course of action? What about the assassination of military and civilian leadership, to include outside enablers of the regime? Would such activities be helpful or unhelpful? Thanks.

[anonamatic]

I could be mistaken, but a significant source of the Junta's revenue seems to flow from the gas pipeline. How feasible would a dedicated effort to sabotage the pipeline be? How would you describe or imagine the effect cycle of such a course of action? What about the assassination of military and civilian leadership, to include outside enablers of the regime? Would such activities be helpful or unhelpful? Thanks.

I don't know how helpful they'd be if they came from external sources. In that situation it's entirely possible that China could see them (understandably too) as a threat. That even when their own interests would be better served by regime change. In a lot of respects they're stuck, and that in unpleasant ways. On one hand if they want to get rid of a failed regime, they're stuck knowing that if they replace it with something that looks exactly like the last pile of thugs they'll end up with just a new pile of thugs, on the other toleration of corrupt regimes means that they're never going to realize the sort of trade and prosperity with their neighbors that they really want. In some ways (and this is a very bad & limited comparison), the US has been facing a somewhat similar problem with Mexican cartel violence. The most recent solution that the involved parties there have turned to has been intensive training of Mexican forces by Columbian police & military forces. That effort while very promising, is just getting underway, so the outcomes from it are as yet to be determined. In Burma, it might be possible for China to cut it's ties to the junta & put some support behind their opponents directly without falling into a trap of needing to create ideological and dogmatic models out of any new regime. It would be enough to say that they support self-determination for the people without insisting what that should look like. Such a stance might likely be politically palatable where other, more witlessly complex options would not be.

In part some of the key enablers are corporations like Chevron too, & even trying to get them to grow some ethics is a wretched can of worms. They'll quite happily buy their way out of any criticism, & it's because they're so intractably unethical that they're turning themselves into a valid target.

In terms of the opium trade, as far as I know 90% of it does come from Afghanistan, and an awful lot of it ends up in Arab states too. Iran for instance has a not very well reported serious problem with young people becoming addicted to opium that originates from there. I wouldn't be at all surprised if that has been a factor in muting the natural political opposition there.

[Backwards Observer]

In a lot of respects they're stuck, and that in unpleasant ways.

I appreciate that you took the time to whip up the diplomatic voodoo. Thanks for your thoughtful response.

[Dayuhan]

The degree to which the Chevron and Total stakes in the Yabama pipeline "enable" the military regime is I think substantially exaggerated. It's appealing stuff for the knee-jerk anti-corporate crowd but the argument doesn't stand up to scrutiny. The pipeline exists, and the Thais are going to buy the gas in any event: they don't give a hot round one about human rights abuses in Burma. If Total and Chevron tried to influence the Burmese government they'd simply be forced to sell their stakes, which would be bought by Chinese or Thai interests and business would go on as usual. If Total and Chevron backed out the same would happen. If retrospectively, Total and Chevron had refused to build the pipeline, someone else would have. No shortage of oil companies in Russia and China willing and able to take on a project like that. Burma's energy reserves, and the willingness of the neighbors to buy the product, are enabling factors, but placing the blame on those contracted to build the infrastructure doesn't accomplish much.

I don't see how the Chinese are in any way "stuck" by current circumstances. The status quo is acceptable to them. They don't have a US or western ally on that part of their border. The disorder in Burma has no major adverse impact on them. Burma would not be a major market for Chinese goods in any event and an open Burmese economy could emerge as a competitor in industries demanding cheap labor. The Chinese will be perfectly happy to deal with what is. Like the Thais, they don't care about the human rights abuses, any more than they do in Angola, the DRC, or Sudan. They will develop energy resources and build pipelines no matter what anyone else thinks. Of course there's a risk that pipelines could be sabotaged during a rebellion, or that a new government could cancel existing deals and nationalize projects, but the Chinese are taking similar risks in many places and apparently see them as acceptable.

I could be mistaken, but a significant source of the Junta's revenue seems to flow from the gas pipeline. How feasible would a dedicated effort to sabotage the pipeline be? How would you describe or imagine the effect cycle of such a course of action? What about the assassination of military and civilian leadership, to include outside enablers of the regime? Would such activities be helpful or unhelpful?

You'd get some publicity by whacking the CEOs of Chevron and Total, but there wouldn't be much impact on Burma. You could certainly wreck the Burmese economy (in a loose sort of way I suppose you could call it an economy) by sabotaging energy projects, or create a leadership vacuum by killing officials... but really, who cares enough to bother? There would be all manner of legal implications and risks, and whose interests are sufficiently threatened by the status quo to take them? As in many other backwaters, Burma's leaders are protected largely by their nation's economic and strategic irrelevance: lots of people will preach and deplore, but at the end of the day nobody is willing to do something about it.