"A Different Kind of War - The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM October 2001 - September 2005". Dr. Donald P Wright, May 2010. Link:http://www.amazon.com/Different-Kind...2087775&sr=1-1
If you want a peek into the details, from the Army perspective, of how we got where we are today, the actions taken, the thinking and intentions, the early signs that we were on the wrong track, etc, this is a fascinating read and a great resource.
Not sure where they are available, I was fortunate to pick up a copy while at Leavenworth last week.
The sections on Pages 268-9 on "Measuring Progress" and "Enabling Good Governance: The Constitutional Loya Jirga" discussing the era (where I believe we made a hard right turn in the wrong direction on a road paved with good intentions) of late 2003 and early 2004 are telling.
The Bush Administration saw the accelerated development of Afghan security forces in January 2004 as the key to transition, funding the $2.2B "Accelerating Success in Afghanistan;" the key to "begin decreasing the number of US troops in Afghanistan as soon as possible."
Meanwhile no one seemed to question why Karzai had a Constitutional Commission prepare a constitution in ADVANCE of the Dec '03 Loya Jirga:Then, following a summary of the successes of building greater ANA security forces, the Constitutional Loya Jirga, and:Tensions flared over the strength of the presidency in the new system to be established by the constitution. But the disconnect was ultimately ratified by consensus (my translation, by the Northern Alliance majority seeking to secure their monopoly on governance) rather than by individual ballot.(emphasis added).the creation of a new strategic-level headquarters in Afghanistan that introduced a new approach. CFC-A's counterinsurgency campaign focused on winning the support of the Afghan people to ensure that much of the progress made since 2001 was not undone by a growing enemy threat"
You can't make this stuff up. We had just put legal authority to illegitimate, Karzai-led, Northern Alliance based ATA, and were ramping up our efforts to create a centralized security force to secure this centralized system of governance; all with unprecedented powers vested in the new President. Successes. Yet the insurgency grew in response. We were deluding ourselves then, and we continue to delude ourselves today and refuse to make the cause and effect connections between our actions and their results as we are so blinded by our own good intentions.Despite these successes, Taliban and al-Qaeda forces continued to oppose the Coalition and the ATA as the spring of 2004 ended. As the summer began, the number of attacks continued to rise..
This is a good resource, and appears to be candid, detailed and accurate. Also filled with dozens of naive incongruities such as the ones laid out on these critical two pages.
Bookmarks