The Warden Collection (merged thread)

[pvebber]

Cliff,

Great points. I hope to be more responsive to them this evening, but to make sure I don't put words in your mouth or build a strawman, what do you think are the key points Warden is making that are new in this most recent paper?
What do you think is being misunderstood about his other points?

What I argree with him on are:

Strategy provides the framework for finding the best means to attain objectives.

This is true almost by the definition of strategy. The issue becomes what is the best approach to strategy and comes down to Jomini vs Clauswitz which at its root gets back to Plato vs Aristotle...

The objective of a conflict is to achieve a future picture, not to kill and destroy.

One must have a 'desired end-state' that one wants to achieve. The issue comes becomes how tightly coupled cause and effect are in the 'systems' involved.

As we consider conflict, we should explore bloodless-force options exhaustively before reverting to traditional war and battle.

Almost a throw away given a desire for "just war", but important not to take to the extreme. The rub is in how you define "bloodless - force"...


What I disagree on:

The best approach to strategy starts with a future picture, determines the systems and centers of gravity that must change to realize that picture, takes into account the impact of time, and preplans an exit.

We should focus on direct, strategic centers of gravity to the maximum extent possible.

Presupposes the existence and determinability of "direct, strategic centers of gravity" and linear cause and effect relationships between them and the desired outcomes. In Real Life, there are few "strategic centers of gravity" that can be determined (implying determinism...) and the cause and effect chains between them are not identifiable, or linear.

Our conflict vocabulary flows from ancient times and traps us mentally and physically into concepts that no longer make sense, so our vocabulary must change.

How does our vocabulary invalidate any of our current Joint Concepts? Which of those concepts no longer make sense and why? How does changing vocabulary (to what, that of business and return on investment?) enable different concepts. Capabilities enable concepts, not vocabulary.

If we want to change our opponent as a system to conform to our objectives, then the most direct approach entails affecting opponent centers of gravity closely related to the objectives.

Assumes not just a linear Newtonian world-view, but one that presupposes relationships between the enemy system and our desires. Who defines "closely related"? Have not seen enough cultural mismatches in our recent wars to put this sort of thinking to rest?

Fast action and short conflicts are imperative and far less expensive than slow, long ones.

There is a missing consideration of intensity. The reductio adsurdum is that all war should then be nuclear because it is the fastest and shortest conflict.

“Battle” is at best an expensive and risky means to a distant end, and we should almost always avoid it.

THis is perhaps where I disagree with Warden the most. "Battle" is used almost pejoratively, but in its barest sense means "competition". To remove "battle" from the vocabulary of conflict is to remove "competition" because what is a "battle" really, but a constrained competition between two or more adversaries?

By removing "battle" from his vocablary, Warden attributes to Airpower the power to act unilaterally and without the "enemy getting a vote", as though our recent abaility to establish and maintain dominance of the air is a given in any future conflict.

If the other guy has an the capability to compete with you in your desire to apply airpower, how can you assume away "battle"?

And this leads to the ultimate hubris:

It also opens another very exciting possibility: conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood.

and no mention of the "5 rings"

[Cliff]

Cliff,
what do you think are the key points Warden is making that are new in this most recent paper?
What do you think is being misunderstood about his other points?

I outlined most of what I think the key points are elsewhere, but his summary is:

• Strategy provides the framework for finding the best means to attain objectives.
• If we want to change our opponent as a system to conform to our objectives, then the most direct approach entails affecting opponent centers of gravity closely related to the objectives.
• Fast action and short conflicts are imperative and far less expensive than slow, long ones.
• As we consider conflict, we should explore bloodless-force options exhaustively before reverting to traditional war and battle.
• “Battle” is at best an expensive and risky means to a distant end, and we should almost always avoid it.

Finally, he is arguing that:

we should at least begin with the presumption that airpower can carry out any military task... After careful consideration of a problem, we may decide that airpower will not work. That is an acceptable answer—for now.

In other words, airpower can do much more than some would have us believe, and we should keep trying to make it work rather than writing it off.

He closes with a plea to folks in the airpower community to work to sell their case, based not on technological promises but actual perforrmance.

One must have a 'desired end-state' that one wants to achieve. The issue comes becomes how tightly coupled cause and effect are in the 'systems' involved.

True, but you can still try to understand them as a system- ultimately there is a cause and effect, it just may be difficult to understand or predict.

Almost a throw away given a desire for "just war", but important not to take to the extreme. The rub is in how you define "bloodless - force"...

He is simply saying that airpower has the potential to reduce the loss of life.

Presupposes the existence and determinability of "direct, strategic centers of gravity" and linear cause and effect relationships between them and the desired outcomes. In Real Life, there are few "strategic centers of gravity" that can be determined (implying determinism...) and the cause and effect chains between them are not identifiable, or linear.

It may be difficult, but CoGs do exist - you just have to identify the correct ones. This may not always be possible, but again Warden is saying the fact that it is tough shouldn't make us give up. For example, Gadaffi probably has some things he cares about, like his life - and these would be CoGs for the current Libyan govt.

How does our vocabulary invalidate any of our current Joint Concepts? Which of those concepts no longer make sense and why? How does changing vocabulary (to what, that of business and return on investment?) enable different concepts. Capabilities enable concepts, not vocabulary.

His point is the focus on battle and attrition that is very much a part of US doctrine limits our thinking on ways to directly affect enemy CoGs.

Assumes not just a linear Newtonian world-view, but one that presupposes relationships between the enemy system and our desires. Who defines "closely related"? Have not seen enough cultural mismatches in our recent wars to put this sort of thinking to rest?

Again, I think you're taking this too literally. I agree on the cultural mismatches- but I think Warden would argue that we need to understand the enemy as a system prior to picking CoGs.

There is a missing consideration of intensity. The reductio adsurdum is that all war should then be nuclear because it is the fastest and shortest conflict.

Disagree, his stated intent is to reduce loss of life using things like precision...

THis is perhaps where I disagree with Warden the most. "Battle" is used almost pejoratively, but in its barest sense means "competition". To remove "battle" from the vocabulary of conflict is to remove "competition" because what is a "battle" really, but a constrained competition between two or more adversaries?

I think he is decrying the fact that to the US battle means "attrition"...

By removing "battle" from his vocablary, Warden attributes to Airpower the power to act unilaterally and without the "enemy getting a vote", as though our recent abaility to establish and maintain dominance of the air is a given in any future conflict. If the other guy has an the capability to compete with you in your desire to apply airpower, how can you assume away "battle"?

I disagree... the point is to avoid having to fight the enemy's fielded forces through attrition if you can. Yes the enemy gets a vote, but shouldn't we try to deny his ability to act if we can? Again, Warden is saying that our way of thinking pushes us in the direction of thought you are advocating - we're programmed to think about beating the other guy's military.

And this leads to the ultimate hubris:

I guess I don't see what's wrong with trying to reduce the loss of life (on both sides) in combat if we can do so while still achieving objectives...

Again, I emphasive that Warden's point isn't just his 5 rings model... it is that we need to change our way of thinking to avoid being focused on battle. You could say that that focus on battle led us to a bad strategy for COIN in Iraq prior to the surge... because a lot of units were enemy-focused in an effort to defeat them. Just a thought.

Great comments pvebber, looking forward to seeing your response.

V/R,

Cliff