The Army Capstone Concept: the Army wants your comments

[Ken White]

We choose to remember things how we want to see them.

I have been telling people for over 50 years: "Fulfill that airborne myth to the best of your ability -- but don't believe a word of it; that BS'll get you killed..."

That, in essence means I agree with Marc's answer to his own question which Mike further expanded -- and I'd posit two more factors. One is Ego. The cultural belief that guys fix things takes hold and people will try to fix things that do not need fixing. Conversely, they will waste little to no effort on an item that they do not believe (or believe their Boss believes) needs fixing...

It's a whole lot easier to worry about Eward Heebley's haircut, vehicle registration or his wife's erratic behavior than it is to train a Platoon to cross open ground (n.b. Pics still show Troops in Afghanistan way too close together in most situations) and it's also easier to let SGT Phugabosky tell the Troops that 50m between individuals is BS, 5 is enough than it is to challenge him on his logic -- or laziness. The 5 makes it easier for him to control things, no more. The 50 might avoid a Purple Heart or two. If he trained his troops well, he wouldn't have to worry about control. So ego drives us to do the things that are easy and prone to get attention. It also drives doctrine and AAR writers to leave out important things because, as they don't understand the need, it must not be necessary. Dealing with it causes good leaders not to do things they think they should because a hassle with an ego is usually fruitless...

The second factor is self confidence. A leader with an adequate amount will study the writings of a five year old if he thinks they have merit. He'll steal ideas from anyone. One with a lack of self confidence will insist he needs no help, he knows it all...

Those are two gross oversimplifications and the actuality is far more nuanced but ego and inadequate self confidence pair together in strange ways to affect actions and reactions -- and those with an excess of the first and a shortfall in the latter are amazingly prevalent in the US Armed Forces and most eschew research, history and the ideas of others lest they appear 'weak.' The actuality, of course, is that they're fooling no one but themselves. They're also a detriment to better training and performance. Those two factors lead to an attitude that believes "I am in charge. I must never appear weak. I will not accept advice from others for I will seen as unsure or hesitant and my senior rater will not like that..." Hyperbole but there's much truth there.

Those factors are why we do not have eight years of experience in Afghanistan. Averaging tour lengths across the services and for the period, we have about 10 to 14 short tours there. It is perhaps noteworthy that the Asymmetric Warfare Group noted in both Iraq and Afghanistan that loss of continuity between rotations was a major problem. Schmedlap has here outlined errors in the process he saw. My son's three tours, in each case, the new unit wanted NO help or advice. FWIW I saw the same thing in the Marines in Korea and in the Army several places sround the world in the 56- 79 period. It's a human factors thing and we should correct for it which we could easily do but then what would that say about some of our icons...

Egos; can't bruise the old self confidence.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Marc,

I would be a touch happier if I saw a QC feedback loop built right into it .

Marc, this is just the basic graphic - designed to either talk to, or for those who require things to be served up as such. I think when you see what really goes into making the logic work, you'll be satisfied that indeed there are QC loops. Plenty from our discussions has made it into the PG.

Best, Rob

[marct]

Marc, this is just the basic graphic - designed to either talk to, or for those who require things to be served up as such. I think when you see what really goes into making the logic work, you'll be satisfied that indeed there are QC loops. Plenty from our discussions has made it into the PG.

Cool ! I'm a QC loop junky.....

[William F. Owen]

Those are two gross oversimplifications and the actuality is far more nuanced but ego and inadequate self confidence pair together in strange ways to affect actions and reactions -- and those with an excess of the first and a shortfall in the latter are amazingly prevalent in the US Armed Forces and most eschew research, history and the ideas of others lest they appear 'weak.' The actuality, of course, is that they're fooling no one but themselves.

I see no gross oversimplification. Maybe useful reductionism?
Does this speak to an inability to be able to write short, clear and concise Concepts and Doctrine notes? - in that long, turgid, complex document are perceived to be more insightful that 3 page of clearly expressed ideas?

Does describing your future enemies as "hybrid," make you seem more accepting of challenge, and thus able to ask for more money?

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

I see no gross oversimplification. Maybe useful reductionism?

That's an interesting, and probably very useful, distinction IFF the difference were spelled out in the document . For example, the "term "adaption" (and its variants "adaptive", "adaptability", etc.) are used fairly often in the ACC, but there is no specific definition for what that is supposed to mean. Now, I happen to use both the term and concept fairly often ('sides that, I spend a fair bit of time drinking with biologists and occasionally lecture in Biotechnology classes), so I know what the term means in biology as well as in sociology / anthropology.

While the term isn't defined, the "meaning" that can be ascribed to it based on both immediate and total context is closer to a Spencerian idea of the concept (he's the dude who coined the phrase "Survival of the Fittest" with all of the Eugenicist implications). However, as the term is used by people who have been in the field, the implied meaning is much closer to that of Darwin's concept, i.e. the ability to sort through multiple options quickly and select one that should work and, if that fails, to create one on the spot.

In Spencer's version of the concept, there is an implied teleology of "this is the best", while in Darwin's concept, it's closer to "it works and didn't cause a catastrophic failure" (no implied teleology).

So, what does this have to do with "gross oversimplification" vs "useful reductionism"? Well, a gross oversimplification leaves implied meaning wide open to interpretation, while a useful reductionism restricts interpretation of key characteristics (NB: usually by pointing towards an expansion of them in other documents). In the case of "adaption" in the ACC, we have a case of gross oversimplification, since the teleological implications of the two main interpretations have radically different implications for training and organization.

Does this speak to an inability to be able to write short, clear and concise Concepts and Doctrine notes? - in that long, turgid, complex document are perceived to be more insightful that 3 page of clearly expressed ideas?

I'm not sure that it is an "inability" in the classic sense of "they don't know how to do it", so much as "they are structurally unable to do it" because of the functional requirements for the document. From what I can gather, the ACC is not only supposed to be a model of how the US Army currently views future warfare, it is also a PR piece in budget negotiations, a guideline for future training / mobilization requirements, and a venue for politically powerful factions to argue for their pet projects. In short, it is written by a committee that does not have either a single goal or a single vision.

Personally, I think they are making a critical error in the way it is written. I would argue that they could still achieve their PR (and budgetary) goals while writing a concise, if not short, document. I think we can certainly see that some of the people are trying to do just that, while others are obfuscating parts of the document and still others are attaching "earmarks" to it.

Does describing your future enemies as "hybrid," make you seem more accepting of challenge, and thus able to ask for more money?

As far as I can see, the term is a mere buzz word to increase the fear reaction in political readers and with the public. Analytically, it is silly since I can't think of a fight in the past millennium (at least!) that didn't involve "hybrid" factors (including Frederick the Great).