Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[Firn]

---------------

Dayuhan and Ulenspiegel are correct that the Silk Road will never regain it's relative importance. It ran mostly on luxury goods which had a long life span and an attractive bulk/value ratio for slow, land-based transport. Think drugs and diamonds today. The current era is dominated by vast global value chains integrated by huge container ships on the physical side.

I will leave it there.

------------

[Dayuhan]

Have you even walked the Silk Road?, dug up the IEDs on the Silk Road or chased Sunni insurgents down the Silk Road ---sketch an outline of the road and then in turn sketch the outline of the Shia global community and then tell me they do not match---heck even trace the towns in Iraq it ran through starting in Mandali and now especially go back and sketch in the towns exactly today where the Sunni tribes, Sunni insurgent groups and ISIS are sitting.

I've walked the other end... the end where the silk came from. Stop and ask yourself how it got the name "Silk Road". Where does silk come from? Hazard a guess. It's not anywhere in the Middle East.

The Silk Road was a conduit for the trade of goods from east to west. It is irrelevant because there is no more land based transit of goods from east to west, nor is there any reason for such transit or practical potential for such transit. No matter who controls the western end of what was once the "Silk Road" there still won't be any goods moving through. No silk, no spices, no mobile phones or tools or computers or cranes or any other thing. There's just no reason for them to move by land.

That territory may be strategically and economically significant in other ways. The roads are of course tactically and strategically relevant: roads always are - but as a Silk Road - as a conduit for the traffic of goods from east to west - it's meaningless. There aren't any goods to move. They're all on ships. There may indeed be some potential for intra-regional commerce and movement along portions of the old "Silk Road", but that's not a "Silk Road" any more. The whole identity and function of the "Silk Road" was in moving the products of the east to the markets of the west... and that's gone elsewhere, never to return.

Glad you at least admit that the "private" conversations between the KSA and Russia in protecting the Russian oil prices in turn for kicking out Assad did in fact occur---Russia did not accept simply because they feel Assad is now in a secure place and they get to keep their naval port in Syria.? What would the impact have been. You realize until I sent you the link into the discussion even you "knew" nothing about it.

Now Dayuhan admit you would have never known about the conversation as you rightly state it was private---just how much of the international media "knew" about it and say what if it had been "accepted"

You mean this "secret" conversation?

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/n...ops-Syria.html

I know you've seen that article, because on another thread you cut/pasted directly from it in reference to the supposedly "secret" deal, though without citing it. That "secret" was leaked almost immediately, and the deal stopped on the spot.

The KSA doesn't "protect Russian oil prices", they protect their own price. Of course that means the Russians also benefit, but that's not the purpose. The Saudis will do all they can (quite a bit) to keep oil above $100 a barrel, because that's where they want it to be, for their own reasons. That of course keeps the price up for the Russians too, but that's not about "secret deals", that's just the Saudis lookin' out for #1.

See Dayuhan here is another problem---regardless of what the world thinks and or does not think about Saddam 1) he was a Sunni secularist, 2) he "held" Iraq together, and lastly from a geostrategic view 3) he was a "buffer" between the Sunni and Shia and via Iraq Iran was boxed in. Notice the word "secularist" critical these days in a "radicalized Salafist world.

The US with the overthrow of Saddam released the Iranian Shia to expand and rival the KSA within the Muslim world and the regional hegemony game began then notice how often the term "Shia Crescent" starts getting mentioned in the ME.

Yes, I know that. It's one of the reasons I thought the Iraq war was a bad idea from the start. Of course Saddam would eventually have fallen, if only to old age, and civil war and dissolution would be a strong possibility in any post-Saddam scenario. We just blundered in and jump-started the process, fired by the illusion of "installing democracy".

[OUTLAW 09]

---------------

Dayuhan and Ulenspiegel are correct that the Silk Road will never regain it's relative importance. It ran mostly on luxury goods which had a long life span and an attractive bulk/value ratio for slow, land-based transport. Think drugs and diamonds today. The current era is dominated by vast global value chains integrated by huge container ships on the physical side.

I will leave it there.

------------

Then we need to get Khomeini to redefine his statements concerning the "Green Crescent" and the King of Jordon to redefine his statements on the "Shia Crescent" and we then need to get the top Commander of the Quds Force to redefine his statements concerning the Shia global community he made two years ago in a rally in Tehran concerning the Silk Road.

Never did if I recall my comments state it had relevance for trade but it does have extreme significance for the concept of the "Green Crescent". It is though one heck of a smuggle route these days and always has been since 1600 by the way.

That is often the problem--some individuals hear and or read words and then jump with comments having never been there nor actually ever physically walked the Road nor know the names of towns along the Road that have significance say with the fighting now between the ISIS and Baghdad in say the town of Muqdadiyah.

Those towns of the Road that make up the Sunni triangle have relevance to those fighting there ---believe me and history makes up a lot of that significance.

Google the town name Muqdadiyah ---scenes of heavy fighting 2005 through 2009 between Shia, Sunni and on occasions Kurds with the US Army in the middle---check the significance of the town historically between the three groups and historically in Islam and Mohammed.

Google the historical Islamic significance of Mandeli, Muqdadiyah, Baqubah, Balad, Tikrit, and Mosul both from a Shia perspective and then from the Sunni perspective and then on top of it from a Kurdish/Arabic perspective. The Silk road became the preferred AQI and Sunni insurgency rat run out of Syria and into the Sunni triangle and that has no relevance?

Example of poor American understanding of that area and "ME history"---there was a historical figure from Muqdadiyah that if one looks at his name appears to be Shia but in fact was historically Arab Sunni tied to Mohammed ---in early 2006 a new insurgent group was setup in Baghdad, using that name as their new logo for recruiting purposes and pushed from there into Baqubah and when we captured their leader in Baqubah I had a hard time convincing the national level IC that in fact the group was Sunni not Shia based on the name and the significance of the name as tied to Muqdadiyah.

Now go back and trace the heavy US/Sunni/AQI/Shia fighting in those towns from 2004 through to 2010 and now with ISIS taking them over and then tie them to the comments of Khomenei and you will understand why I did not talk trade relevance.

Sometimes what we define as irrelevance has in the eyes of those that currently reside there a far deeper relevance.

Again trade in 1600 has nothing to do with the current geopolitics of the Sunni/Shia global clash and the various players in that clash and believe me religiously the Road has significance to those players.

[OUTLAW 09]

I've walked the other end... the end where the silk came from. Stop and ask yourself how it got the name "Silk Road". Where does silk come from? Hazard a guess. It's not anywhere in the Middle East.

The Silk Road was a conduit for the trade of goods from east to west. It is irrelevant because there is no more land based transit of goods from east to west, nor is there any reason for such transit or practical potential for such transit. No matter who controls the western end of what was once the "Silk Road" there still won't be any goods moving through. No silk, no spices, no mobile phones or tools or computers or cranes or any other thing. There's just no reason for them to move by land.

That territory may be strategically and economically significant in other ways. The roads are of course tactically and strategically relevant: roads always are - but as a Silk Road - as a conduit for the traffic of goods from east to west - it's meaningless. There aren't any goods to move. They're all on ships. There may indeed be some potential for intra-regional commerce and movement along portions of the old "Silk Road", but that's not a "Silk Road" any more. The whole identity and function of the "Silk Road" was in moving the products of the east to the markets of the west... and that's gone elsewhere, never to return.



You mean this "secret" conversation?

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/n...ops-Syria.html

I know you've seen that article, because on another thread you cut/pasted directly from it in reference to the supposedly "secret" deal, though without citing it. That "secret" was leaked almost immediately, and the deal stopped on the spot.

The KSA doesn't "protect Russian oil prices", they protect their own price. Of course that means the Russians also benefit, but that's not the purpose. The Saudis will do all they can (quite a bit) to keep oil above $100 a barrel, because that's where they want it to be, for their own reasons. That of course keeps the price up for the Russians too, but that's not about "secret deals", that's just the Saudis lookin' out for #1.



Yes, I know that. It's one of the reasons I thought the Iraq war was a bad idea from the start. Of course Saddam would eventually have fallen, if only to old age, and civil war and dissolution would be a strong possibility in any post-Saddam scenario. We just blundered in and jump-started the process, fired by the illusion of "installing democracy".

Dayuhan-- I have physically fought from the end of the Road starting in Lebanon in the 80s to the towns of Khalais, Muqdadiyah, Baqubah and Mandeli in 2005/2006/2007 up to the Iranian border itself.

Never once if you check my comments did I mention trade did I?

So let us get back to the significance of the Road with or without the word Silk and focus on the Sunni/Shia global clash that does in fact concern the "Road".

Comments I made to Firn concerning this misconception of trade follow for you to read and think about.

Then we need to get Khomeini to redefine his statements concerning the "Green Crescent" and the King of Jordon to redefine his statements on the "Shia Crescent" and we then need to get the top Commander of the Quds Force to redefine his statements concerning the Shia global community he made two years ago in a rally in Tehran concerning the "Road".

Never did if I recall my comments state it had relevance for trade but it does have extreme significance for the concept of the "Green Crescent". It is though one heck of a smuggle route these days and always has been since 1600 by the way.

NOTE: Dayuhan check the symbols carried on Shia "battle flags" by the way that were carried into the Bakka Valley when the 3000 Iranian Shia "volunteers" who came to fight in Lebanon somehow never made it to the fighting, but are still there. Those battle flags had the only symbol "Green Crescent" on them---and I am betting you understand the significance. By the way those "volunteers" left Tehran after their were blessed by none other than Khomeini personally---any significance to that? Notice the same type of "Green Crescent" flags carried by Shia into the Spanish Sahara.

That is often the problem--some individuals hear and or read words and then jump with comments having never been there nor actually ever physically walked the Road nor know the names of towns along the Road that have significance say with the fighting now between the ISIS and Baghdad in say the town of Muqdadiyah.

Those towns of the Road that make up the Sunni triangle have relevance to those fighting there ---believe me and history makes up a lot of that significance.

Google the town name Muqdadiyah ---scenes of heavy fighting 2005 through 2009 between Shia, Sunni and on occasions Kurds with the US Army in the middle---check the significance of the town historically between the three groups and historically in Islam and Mohammed.

Google the historical Islamic significance of Mandeli, Muqdadiyah, Baqubah, Balad, Tikrit, and Mosul both from a Shia perspective and then from the Sunni perspective and then on top of it from a Kurdish/Arabic perspective. The Silk Road became the preferred AQI and Sunni insurgency rat run out of Syria and into the Sunni triangle and that has no relevance? When we began to block it they just created rat runs parallel to it.

Example of poor American understanding of that area and "ME history"---there was a historical figure from Muqdadiyah that if one looks at his name appears to be Shia but in fact was historically Arab Sunni tied to Mohammed ---in early 2006 a new insurgent group was setup in Baghdad, using that name as their new logo for recruiting purposes and pushed from there into Baqubah and when we captured their leader in Baqubah I had a hard time convincing the national level IC that in fact the group was Sunni not Shia based on the name and the significance of the name as tied to Muqdadiyah.

Now go back and trace the heavy US/Sunni/AQI/Shia fighting in those towns from 2004 through to 2010 and now with ISIS taking them over and then tie them to the comments of Khomenei and you will understand why I did not talk trade relevance.

Sometimes what we define as irrelevance has in the eyes of those that currently reside there a far deeper relevance.

Again trade in 1600 has nothing to do with the current geopolitics of the Sunni/Shia global clash and the various players in that clash and believe me religiously the Road has significance to those players.

[OUTLAW 09]

Interesting take on Iran in Iraq.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...r-in-iraq.html

[OUTLAW 09]

JWing---this is what I meant when they are striking similarities between the QJBR/AQI/ISI now ISIS from 2006 to the ISIS of today 2014.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archiv...is_allies.php#

Thus the same similarities of the IAI/JRTN of then and now today.

The article on the security belts is highly accurate and was doable by ISI/IAI in 2006 just as it is today.

Even if everyone jumps in ie Iraqi Army stiffens, the Iranians jump in and the US unleashes drones and improves the ISR and the ISIS is either slowed and or stopped----the Sunni's have flipped and there is no going back as they truly do feel that that Malaki will never compromise thus it is better to fight and than to talk.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan/Firn---this is why the Silk Road as it exists in Diyala province is critical as are the other parts of the Silk Road in Iraq. If you do the research of Zarqawi's belts concept for attacking Baghdad in 2006 you will notice portions of the Road were involved.

Notice now who is fighting and dying in Diyala-where the Road runs through and remember what Khomeini said about the Road.

"On Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked (often these pages are run directly by the IRGC for internal and narrative purposes) social media networks–which run the gambit from Twitter and Facebook to Google Plus and YouTube—have cast Moshajari as an IRGC fighter who had been “martyred” in the IRGC deployment to Iraq.

It is possible that Moshajari was actually killed in an accident while deploying with IRGC units to sections of Iraq bordering Iran. CNN reported that 500 IRGC had been deployed to Diyala, an Iraqi province on the border with Iran.

In Diyala Province, Kata’ib Hizballah and other Iraqi Shia Islamist groups backed by Iran have also reported being engaged in combat against units belonging to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)."

Also an interesting background article on why ISIS headed back to Diyala.

Jessica D. Lewis, “The Islamic State of Iraq Returns To Diyala,” April 2014

[davidbfpo]

This may sit better in the Syria thread (so cross-posted) where allegations of the Assad regime having a "Nelson's eye" to ISIS have been made.

So from Twitter (so maybe a "pinch of salt") just:

Seems Assad's army of terror finally started striking ISIL bases after largely ignoring, rather, aiding them, for more than a year. Assad is certainly not working on his free will. Either Iran ordered the strikes, or he realized if he doesn't strike, someone else/US will.

[OUTLAW 09]

This may sit better in the Syria thread (so cross-posted) where allegations of the Assad regime having a "Nelson's eye" to ISIS have been made.

Assad is seriously concerned with the news that heavy arms and more fighters using US MRAPS and 114s for protection against Hezbollah and JAM are on the move back to Syria along with heavy artillery.

Assad's Army never on their own made gains on the ground until Hezbollah and JAM arrived.

It also appears that ISIS has MANPADs as well which will be going back to Syria eliminating the Syrian air side of the war.

[ganulv]

Now, if you have some enlightening discourse to set us on a course that is different and what I failed to understand, I assure you I shall be delighted if you can clear the cobwebs.

Your thing is that the essential nature of Islam explains it all. It has been pointed out to you that it does not in the case of Indonesia. That is more than a stray data point considering Indonesia has more Muslim residents than any country in the world. You went to great lengths to massage the data into your model. You fell back on historical particularity to do so.

Now, let’s say that colonial administration were to be my magic bullet explanation for why democracy has not succeeded in most countries with majority Muslim populations. I am sure that it would be not very difficult for someone to come up with a nation which gives the lie to my one-size-fits-all explanation. I could do exactly the same thing you have and say, “Yeah, but. They don’t count because [laundry list of historical factoids].”

Now, if one chooses to dig into the historical background of all of the cases under consideration, one finds that all of them involve historical complexity. Freud said that sex explains everything; it doesn’t. Marx said capital explains everything; it doesn’t. You say religion explains everything about governance in the societies under discussion here; it doesn’t. That’s not to say that religion -- or sex or capital -- don’t matter, it’s to say that no one thing alone explains it all. (Feel free to say that that isn’t what you have been saying, but only if you are willing to go back and show me where you said otherwise.)

[OUTLAW 09]

Your thing is that the essential nature of Islam explains it all. It has been pointed out to you that it does not in the case of Indonesia. That is more than a stray data point considering Indonesia has more Muslim residents than any country in the world. You went to great lengths to massage the data into your model. You fell back on historical particularity to do so.

Now, let’s say that colonial administration were to be my magic bullet explanation for why democracy has not succeeded in most countries with majority Muslim populations. I am sure that it would be not very difficult for someone to come up with a nation which gives the lie to my one-size-fits-all explanation. I could do exactly the same thing you have and say, “Yeah, but. They don’t count because [laundry list of historical factoids].”

Now, if one chooses to dig into the historical background of all of the cases under consideration, one finds that all of them involve historical complexity. Freud said that sex explains everything; it doesn’t. Marx said capital explains everything; it doesn’t. You say religion explains everything about governance in the societies under discussion here; it doesn’t. That’s not to say that religion -- or sex or capital -- don’t matter, it’s to say that no one thing alone explains it all. (Feel free to say that that isn’t what you have been saying, but only if you are willing to go back and show me where you said otherwise.)

I personally have no interest in the Indonesian Muslim environment as it developed totally different from the ME as did the Indian Muslim environment and right now it is the ME that impacts the global Muslim community not vice versa.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---as I mentioned the symbolism of the Silk Road and how it is was used by the Shia---I will give you another tip.

Symbolism was a major part of both the Shia and Sunni insurgency and their various groups including first QJBR, then AQI then ISI and finally ISIS while for AQI certain symbolism has remained the same from 2004 to 2014.

One of the first and about only symbolism studies was done by the West Point Counter Terrorism Center---was never ever really used by the US Army in Iraq. It was never really updated after they completed the study.

This symbolism was especially used in their logos which was found on their videos and press releases. Symbolism is a critical part of the Shia/Sunni conflict in the ME and especially in Iraq and is a critical element in "radicalization" and recruitment.

Symbolism was also a form of communication between the various Islamic groups and lend creditability to each group.

The US IC never really paid any attention to the logos as they viewed it simply as propaganda---I was one of the few that could define groups simply by the logos as the logo says a lot about the thinking of the groups and their position on Islam---even the insurgency starting using logos of one group to put blame on any group during some of their internal "disagreements" in 2006/2007.

Example:

Saraya al-Dafa’ al-Sha’bi: Kata’ib Hizballah’s New Force in Iraq

SDS’s Symbolism

One of the first, and thus far only, pieces of imagery to come out regarding SDS has been their logo. The symbol features elements common to most Iranian-backed Shia Islamist organizations. These include the extended fist clenching a Kalashnikov-style rifle (in this case coming out of the final alif in “Saraya”). Underneath the rifle rests a globe with a map of Iraq in its center. It is likely that the globe, as with the symbol for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanon’s Hizballah, represents the hope for global expansion of the ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution. The map of Iraq in its center, as with Kata’ib Hizballah’s and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s logos demonstrates the group’s primarily Iraq-focused agenda.

[Bill Moore]

Back to Iraq

I realize the following claim may not be accurate, but it would explain a lot if it is. Why would Maliki order his army to surrender/withdraw? One theory is to create conditions where he could declare a state of emergency, which would assist him during the upcoming elections. Its that part of the world, everything is possible.

http://www.trackingterrorism.org/art...ul-insider-job

Was ISIS's Plunder of Mosul an Insider Job?

"As Iraqi government forces crumbled in disarray before the assault [on Mosul], there was speculation that they may have been ordered by their superiors to give up without a fight. One local commander in Salahuddin Province said in an interview Wednesday: 'We received phone calls from high ranking commanders asking us to give up. I questioned them on this and they said, This is an order.”

TRAC sources in the region confirm that the retreat by the Iraqi soldiers was well planned, perhaps at the highest level of government.

This attempt to show the various actors and how they interact is helpful, but far from complete.

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2...ties.html?_r=0

In Iraq Crisis, a Tangle of Alliances and Enmities

The major players in the Iraq and Syria crisis are often both allies and antagonists, working together on one front on one day and at cross-purposes the next. Here are brief sketches of some of the confluences and conflicts in the deepening crisis

.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/wo...icks=true&_r=0


Rebels’ Fast Strike in Iraq Was Years in the Making

When I read through this I have to wonder if our intelligence was actually broken, or if the administration decided to white wash the intelligence on ISIS because it didn't fit their narrative?

In 2007 the group published a pamphlet laying out its vision for Iraq. It cited trends in globalization as well as the Quran in challenging modern notions of statehood as having absolute control over territory. Mr. Fishman referred to the document as the “Federalist Papers” for what is now ISIS.

Under this vision, religion is paramount over administering services. Referring to citizens under its control, the pamphlet states, “improving their conditions is less important than the condition of their religion.” And one of the most important duties of the group, according to the pamphlet, is something that it has done consistently: free Sunnis from prison.

“When you go back and read it, it’s all there,” Mr. Fishman said. “They are finally getting their act together.”

The group’s recent annual report, wrote Alex Bilger, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, makes clear that, “the ISIS military command in Iraq has exercised command and control over a national theater since at least early 2012,” and that the group is “functioning as a military rather than as a terrorist network.”

In short they're expanding their control in both Syria and Iraq, and while extremely violent they're able to generate support by directing the people's ire against the Shia. We're focused now on Mosul, but don't forget they still control two big cities in Western Iraq and a good part of Eastern Syria.

[OUTLAW 09]

Back to Iraq

Bill ---you might be right about the martial law bit---he attempted it right after the collapse of the 4 divisions---but the parliament refused to pass the martial law bill by simply not showing up to vote---still has not been passed.

It is the last thing that stands in the way of Malaki becoming the "new" Saddam and some of the Shia leaders openly say that about Malaki.

US intel was broken for a number of reasons---all of the Sunni insurgent groups including AQI always released their battle videos, IED strike videos, thinking, manifests, ideas etc. on the web and even carried on massive conversations amongst themselves all on the web.

They even once released an IED training video depicting exactly where to place the IED strikes on every mine road clearance vehicle being used in Iraq in 2008/2009 and then released a series of actual strike videos over the next few days--all as hands-on learning via the net for the insurgent groups to watch in their various safe houses. There was a lot of cross sharing among the various groups.

At times it reminded me of US Army Special Forces UW training.

They never really cared if we watched, listened, and or downloaded---I was able to inject into the NTC training scenarios things seen in a 0200 battle video taken off one of the jihadi web sites ie say the RKG 3 anti tank grenade released in a single AQI video and roll it into the next day BCT scenario along with the battle videos as learning materials.

Most of the officers though felt, thought, and openly disliked using the videos because they would openly state we were being used by the enemy---as it was "propaganda".

[davidbfpo]

The following is meant to provide an overview of the military situation in Iraq for non-experts.

Link:http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-fr...xm5MgY.twitter

Very good explanation and the caveat is well worth it too:

Caveat. It is exceptionally difficult to understand the dynamics of ongoing military operations. Oftentimes, the participants themselves do not know why they are winning or losing, or even where they are in control or where their troops are. For non-participants, it is often equally difficult to gain more than a rudimentary sense of the combat without access to the sophisticated intelligence gathering capabilities—overhead imagery, signals intercepts, human reporting, etc.—available to the United States and some other governments. As one of the CIA’s Persian Gulf military analysts during the 1990-91 Gulf War, I noted the difficulty that many outside analysts had in gauging the capabilities of the two sides and following the course of operations because they did not have access to the information available to us from U.S. government assets. Consequently, readers should bring a healthy dose of skepticism to all such analyses of the current fighting in Iraq, including this one.

[OUTLAW 09]

Bill M---this was taken from the today's NYTs article on Iraq which goes to the heart of a lot of the IC failures in Iraq that are coming home to roost.

It refers to battlefield reporting and that simply amazes me because from 2008 onwards the major Sunni insurgent group IAI and AQI released via the internet jihadi sites a monthly rollup of activities broken down by type much as this article reflects.

Now if one reads the NYTs article it seems that the US "wakes" up and says wow amazing that they are acting like a military.

I kept passing on these monthly reports for months and no one absolutely no one took interest as the responses were about the same every time---it is just propaganda, the numbers they are providing are fakes, they are trying to make themselves look bigger than they are, and they are just outright lying.

Now it seems everyone "wakes up" and thinks this stuff is new when it has been there for one and all to read and it was not even classified and it came from the horses mouth directly via the internet delivered to your desktop and free.

What is equally amazing is that the Army and the IC now makes anything taken literally from "open source" and unclassified now classified at least at the Secret and many times TS levels---can anyone explain to me the reasoning behind that move as it is totally dumb since the insurgency released it publicly ---what are we then trying to hide via the classification process.

Taken from the NYTs article:

More recent annual reports, including one that was released at the end of March and ran more than 400 pages, list in granular detail the group’s successes, through suicide attacks, car bombs and assassinations, on the battlefield.

The group’s recent annual report, wrote Alex Bilger, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, makes clear that, “the ISIS military command in Iraq has exercised command and control over a national theater since at least early 2012,” and that the group is “functioning as a military rather than as a terrorist network.”

This last paragraph is amazing---from late 2005 early 2006 onwards all the insurgent groups were functioning as a military we just never wanted to admit what we were seeing daily.

Example---the first use of the RCIEDs (purchased as toys in the local markets) were used against the Army three months after we arrived in Baghdad--(when did we finally recognize the seriousness of the IED threat?)-did anyone ask themselves then just how was it possible that a supposedly ragtag group of "crazies" were that well organized?

The problems currently in Iraq cannot be placed alone on the ISIS or Malaki.

[OUTLAW 09]

[QUOTE=davidbfpo;157427]Link:http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-fr...xm5MgY.twitter

David--the Brookings article is actually a solid primer especially agreeing in what I have been commenting on ---that the old Sunni insurgency side was never out of business ie IAI now JRTN and Ansar al Sunnah.

Agree the Anbar is worth watching ---but I am betting on Diyala being the next launch point as that was always the center of gravity for the entire insurgency from 2005 onwards-- but the US Army never recognized it nor did they ever recognize that Diyala was the R&E center for the insurgency as a whole as the families of many of the insurgents resided in Diyala province.

Especially the Diyala river valley areas.

A former SWJ Editor Mike Few made the Thunder Runs through that area and it was the scene of some of the heaviest face to face fighting seen up to that point. AQI/IAI did not back down even in the face of US armor.

[Dayuhan]

Never did if I recall my comments state it had relevance for trade

If you're talking about the "Silk Road", you're talking about east/west trade, because the "Silk Road" was by definition an east/west trade corridor. The term never referred to a single physical road, but to a network of routes. The roads from Shanghai to Xinjiang trace part of the old "Silk Road". They still exist, and they are not insignificant, but to call them a "Silk Road" in the modern context would be a ridiculous anachronism, because there is no more Silk Road. Believe me, you're not gonna see a whole lot of silk going from Shanghai to Xinjiang, let alone beyond.

Americans do seem to have a certain infatuation with the term, judging from its frequent and generally absurd resurrection in the Afghanistan discussion. Possibly the historical romanticism associated with the term appeals. It would probably be better to simply discard the term, as it causes nothing but diffusion and confusion. Many of the regional transport routes that once constituted parts of the "Silk Road" still exist, and as transport routes always do they maintain local and regional relevance. They are not in any sense a "Silk Road" or part of one, because there is no more "Silk Road", owing to the silk having gone elsewhere.

[JMA]

If you're talking about the "Silk Road", you're talking about east/west trade, because the "Silk Road" was by definition an east/west trade corridor.

Enough already!

Outlaw stated this early on:

Notice how the Silk Road follows the "Green Crescent" or global Shia "communities".

Try - as difficult as it may be for you - to accept his use in that context... and for heavens sake move on.

[AmericanPride]

In US COIN doctrine, it mirrors Mao Zedong's model of insurgency with three phases: the incipient phase, the guerrilla warfare phase, and the war of movement. In the first phase, Al Qaeda struck the United States through terrorism - USS Cole, embassies in Africa, 9/11, et. al. As a consequence of the Iraq War, Al Qaeda and its affiliated forces transitioned to the second phase and waged a bloody guerrilla war against the US and the Iraqi government. Now, after the US withdrawal and the failure of the central Iraqi government to consolidate its power (and emboldened by the opportunities in Libya and Syria), the insurgency has entered the third phase, the war of movement, with the outright occupation of much of northern Iraq. If the purpose of the War on Terrorism as a counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq was to prevent this process from occurring, then it has failed.

Warnings about this possibility were made before 2003 and were ignored. What did the war in Iraq accomplish?