Mechanization hurts COIN forces

[Schmedlap]

1) If General Petraeus commanded the 4th ID and General Odierno the 101st in OIF1, would each division's performance have been the same?

I'm not sure how one could say one way or the other. I would just say that a Division Commander's leadership style, personality, reputation, et cetera, is no match for the organizational culture of the unit that he commands, the existing informal procedures that are the real SOPs, and the social networks within the unit by which tasks get accomplished and decisions are made. Those things can change, but they are not likely to change during the short time period that spans the commander's tenure.

[Cavguy]

I'm not sure how one could say one way or the other. I would just say that a Division Commander's leadership style, personality, reputation, et cetera, is no match for the organizational culture of the unit that he commands, the existing informal procedures that are the real SOPs, and the social networks within the unit by which tasks get accomplished and decisions are made. Those things can change, but they are not likely to change during the short time period that spans the commander's tenure.

Okay, then explain 101st performance delta between 2003 and 2005? If not leadership, then what? I was in 1AD when it shifted from MG Sanchez to MG Dempsey, and within a month it was a different division in attitude and morale.

Or for an alternate example, how did GEN Ridgeway turn Korea around in a few short months in 1951?

Niel

[jkm_101_fso]

Okay, then explain 101st performance delta between 2003 and 2005? If not leadership, then what?

Exactly.

[Steve Blair]

Okay, then explain 101st performance delta between 2003 and 2005? If not leadership, then what? I was in 1AD when it shifted from MG Sanchez to MG Dempsey, and within a month it was a different division in attitude and morale.

Or for an alternate example, how did GEN Ridgeway turn Korea around in a few short months in 1951?

Niel

Or the turnaround in the 1st ID in 1966 when DePuy took over. There are too many examples of a strong, dominant commander being able to in essence remake a division in his image (for good or ill) to discount the idea. DePuy fired a high percentage of his brigade and battalion commanders if memory serves, but there are other examples (the 1st Mar Div in World War II after Rupertus left command) where the organization has simply responded with a will to a change in leadership.

[Schmedlap]

Okay, then explain 101st performance delta between 2003 and 2005? If not leadership, then what?

I didn't suggest that it is not leadership. I only pointed out that it is not just the Division Commander's leadership. I suspect that from 2003 to 2005, almost all leadership rotated, from Div down to Plt, along with NCO billets. Also, the operating environment was significantly different, making comparison even more difficult.

That said, the past few comments have poked some pretty good holes in my original comment. My only hesitation in agreeing is to imagine the role reversal of Odierno and Petreaus. If 4ID units were out of control, I don't see how that could significantly be attributed to the Div Cdr leadership (unless he actually endorsed and supported it). He might have been a minor catalyst, but there are layers of leaders between the General and the Riflemen. Those leaders are not mere relay stations for the orders of the General. A good Div Cdr will have some bad platoons. A bad Div Cdr will have some good platoons. In OIF I, I had a Company Commander who I thought should have been relieved. He was all in favor of doing anything that 4ID was doing, or worse. It was only because the PLs and PSGs did not agree that those things did not occur. Now suppose the opposite were true - good CO and bad Plt leadership. He could not have prevented everything.

In regard to org culture, not sure if this is a rebuttal or a stream of consciousness, but here goes... Back when we broke down the firewall between 11B and 11M, most NCOs would tell you that going from a light unit to a mech unit, or vice versa, was like entering a different universe. Even now, after that integration, 101 is different from 82 and 3ID is different from 4ID. I've seen Commanders at all levels come and go, but the unit's culture remains. Different cultures will be more or less prone to committing shenanigans and atrocities. Leadership can impact that, but I would argue that it needs to be leadership at all levels. One guy with two stars on his hat? I just don't see it.

I think Shek is on the right track regarding the different terrain, different task organization, and question of what kind of plan each would have come up with. Choosing a course of action is a small part of leadership.

[Ken White]

and about five in another similar Division, in both in peacetime service as well as in combat, I saw them when they were as good as anyone if not better than most -- and in the pits, literally unable to perform even marginally well and several levels in between.

Biggest single difference? The Division Commander.

There were other factors that affected things but the (1) professional competence, (2) personality [specifically a disinclination to micro manage], (3) command presence and (4) willingness to demand proper performance oh his subordinate commanders by the Division Commander made all the difference in the world.

There is in certainly a unit culture -- the 82d and 101st (and the 11th) Airborne Divisions back in the day when all were on parachute status were different; lot of similarities but also some notable differences. The two Parachute RCTs, the old 187 and the 508th were similar in size and orientation but were different cultures. SF Groups differ in culture -- considerably.

However, I'm still firmly convinced that the Commander makes a significant difference in how a unit performs on a day to day basis.

In my recollection, the ADCs and intervening Commanders also had an effect. I can recall one particularly good BG as ADC Ops who carried a mediocre Division Commander pretty well. However, generally the Divisions as a whole reacted to the Commanders -- Subordinate units within the Divisions at time transcended that Division norm but that was also in my observation very much dependent on their Commanders.

That's why command selection is extremely important and should not be the 'whose turn is it?' operation it now is. That's true at all echelons above Company; who commands a Company is only really important in the Reserve Components where leadership is required and distance makes proper selection more important than is true in a co-located and consolidated AC Battalion.

[jkm_101_fso]

I didn't suggest that it is not leadership. I only pointed out that it is not just the Division Commander's leadership. I suspect that from 2003 to 2005, almost all leadership rotated, from Div down to Plt, along with NCO billets. Also, the operating environment was significantly different, making comparison even more difficult.

That is true, mostly. Many of the OIF I leaders went again with us in 05-06, as did most of the Soldiers. For many of us, we did not forget the lessons of OIF I and were frustrated by some of the decisions of our leaders during the second tour. This mainly applied at the company level because that is where the continuity was. Most of the personnel changes were battalion level and above, where decisions are made.

My only hesitation in agreeing is to imagine the role reversal of Odierno and Petreaus. If 4ID units were out of control, I don't see how that could significantly be attributed to the Div Cdr leadership (unless he actually endorsed and supported it). He might have been a minor catalyst, but there are layers of leaders between the General and the Riflemen.

Again, I disagree. There are only 3 layers (BDE/BN/CO). What Petraeus did was make his intent very clear to Bn leadership. I saw him on more than one occasion at our BN TOC. Our leaders at the BN level did an outstanding job briefing us at the Platoon level about what it was that the DIV doing, and in turn our CO made sure that the Rifleman understood the mission and plan.

Those leaders are not mere relay stations for the orders of the General.

True, but it is an important aspect of leadership to explain "why" to the Soldiers. It's only one aspect of their job, but it's an important one.

A good Div Cdr will have some bad platoons. A bad Div Cdr will have some good platoons.

No doubt.

In OIF I, I had a Company Commander who I thought should have been relieved. He was all in favor of doing anything that 4ID was doing, or worse. It was only because the PLs and PSGs did not agree that those things did not occur. Now suppose the opposite were true - good CO and bad Plt leadership. He could not have prevented everything.

I had the exact same situation. Bottom line was the the BN CDR recognized this CO was "less capable" and kept in very good contact with the 1sg, PLs and PSGs of our Company, to make sure we stayed on task until he changed command half-way through the deployment. My second CO was awesome.

Different cultures will be more or less prone to committing shenanigans and atrocities. Leadership can impact that, but I would argue that it needs to be leadership at all levels.

Disagree with the first half. I'd argue culture has far less impact on a unit "committing shenanigans and atrocities" than leadership. Take 101st for example. OIF I, there were no major issues. OIF IV...different story. Steele's Rakkasans had their issues and 2nd BDE of course had Steven Greene & Co raping teenagers and murdering families. Culture didn't have much impact there, but leaders sure did; leaders at all levels...so you are right on that one.

One guy with two stars on his hat? I just don't see it.

I can and have. BDE commanders will obey, as will all commanders and leaders all the way down, for the most part. Sure, there will be rogues along the way, but in most cases, people get "on board" with the CG's vision, intent and expectations (if he relays them). At platoon level, we understood that in OIF I. I can't say the same in OIF IV. Which is sad because even my lowly BN MiTT had "face time" with the CG, DCSM, ADCO and ADCS on almost a dozen occasions. I still came away confused on what the plan/intent was. Of course it's entirely possible that I'm a dummy

[Schmedlap]

Many of the OIF I leaders went again with us in 05-06, as did most of the Soldiers. For many of us, we did not forget the lessons of OIF I and were frustrated by some of the decisions of our leaders during the second tour.

In the same duty positions? I deployed the second time with a lot of the same leaders as the first, but the guys who commanded moved to staff and vice versa.

Again, I disagree. There are only 3 layers (BDE/BN/CO). What Petraeus did was make his intent very clear to Bn leadership. I saw him on more than one occasion at our BN TOC. Our leaders at the BN level did an outstanding job briefing us at the Platoon level about what it was that the DIV doing, and in turn our CO made sure that the Rifleman understood the mission and plan.

That sounds like the primary virtue of the Division Commander was in formulating a plan and articulating it.

I'd argue culture has far less impact on a unit "committing shenanigans and atrocities" than leadership. Take 101st for example. OIF I, there were no major issues. OIF IV...different story. Steele's Rakkasans had their issues and 2nd BDE of course had Steven Greene & Co raping teenagers and murdering families. Culture didn't have much impact there, but leaders sure did; leaders at all levels...so you are right on that one.

That seems like apples and oranges to me - kind of what I was getting at earlier when I pointed out the two vastly different operational environments. I would add to that expectations. Just a few differences between OIF I and later deployments, off the top of my head...
- Greater reluctance to report incidents in OIF I; there was a much more adversarial relationship between media and military and the instinct of the military was deny first, investigate, and then damage control, from what I observed
- Similar to the point above, some of us just had a warped mindset in OIF I and wouldn't have known to report most misdeeds. After a unit spends three weeks slaughtering adversaries, suddenly pushing people around, pointing weapons at people, and being belligerent don't seem like a big deal. I cringe when I think about how we behaved in OIF I. At the time, we truly didn't realize how counterproductive our behavior was. It wasn't until we'd been patrolling for about two months that my interpreters were able to reign us in (one tremendous benefit of having older, educated, indigenous terps). On later deployments, when we had a better idea of what was expected of us, we were more likely to report incidents.
- There were better reporting procedures in place in later deployments. In OIF I, we would get into a firefight, kill the assailants, and leave their bodies in the street. Sometimes we'd forget to even report it. In OIF III and later, we must have done at least one 15-6 per week to document engagements where there might be even a hint of something not being kosher.
- More stable operating climate in later deployments; Soldiers got to know their AOs better and developed more comfort working in them. While most leaders have a better idea of what behavior is proper, a more stable and predictable environment is conducive to rogues within a unit being able to come up with dingbat ideas, like raping/killing or other nonsense
- Significantly greater resistance and dissatisfaction with the war back at home in later deployments, which influences Soldiers' attitudes and, imo, makes them more likely to rationalize doing dumb things out of frustration
- Soldiers behave differently when they are waiting on word for when they will redeploy (next week? next month? three months?) and when they know that they are in country for the next 10 months

Just to be clear - the above points are not rebuttals to the original assertion regarding the impact of a Division Commander. Just a few variables to point out why OIF I vs later deployments is, imo, not a good basis for comparison.

[jkm_101_fso]

I'm not sure how one could say one way or the other. I would just say that a Division Commander's leadership style, personality, reputation, et cetera, is no match for the organizational culture of the unit that he commands, the existing informal procedures that are the real SOPs, and the social networks within the unit by which tasks get accomplished and decisions are made. Those things can change, but they are not likely to change during the short time period that spans the commander's tenure.

I agree with the premise, but specifically for OIF (101 vs 4th), post-MCO, I disagree completely. I'm telling you that Petraeus' vision went down to BN level. It was executed and understood at the company level. He pretty much had it right from the get-go...whereas Ordierno had it wrong. His units and their leaders were arguably out-of-control in OIF I. Ordierno had to learn, which he did; thank goodness.

[Shek]

I'm not sure how one could say one way or the other. I would just say that a Division Commander's leadership style, personality, reputation, et cetera, is no match for the organizational culture of the unit that he commands, the existing informal procedures that are the real SOPs, and the social networks within the unit by which tasks get accomplished and decisions are made. Those things can change, but they are not likely to change during the short time period that spans the commander's tenure.

While only a brief snapshot, having worked alongside both 101ABN and 4ID at the end of OIF I, I'd say that the descriptions forwarded by Ricks in Fiasco match up with what I experienced and reflect the portrayal offered of GEN Petraeus and GEN Odierno.

While I agree that organization culture may be difficult to overcome, I think that this is a red herring in this context, as actions in my mind did reflect their commander's approach, and so for me, the only question is how much did the terrain influence each commander towards the path they took. Given GEN Petraeus' background and GEN Odierno's background, I think the issue comes back to their educational paths to division command, and while both possessed graduate education, GEN Petraeus' lended itself to "getting" COIN from the get go.

As the counterfactual and a different angle to the thesis of mechanization/COIN, absent his particular graduate schooling/education path, would GEN Petraeus, growing up through the ranks in light/airborne formations, have developed the same campaign plan?