Selective Use of History in the Development of American COIN Doctrine

[iveschris]

An American military historian now working in Australia wrote of the British Army in WWI that they had an ethos rather than a doctrine: embedded behaviors from the collective memory of the regiments. No, the British Army didn't have a COIN doctrine going into their participation in the Iraq War even after decades of hands-on "war among the people" or COIN in N' Ireland. I suspect it is different to find a serving officer or long-service NCO who has not served multiple rotations in N' Ireland (like the US Army and Marines now with multiple tours in a GWOT theater). This embedded, tacit knowledge is perhaps more valuable than all the doctrine written. Such knowledge didn't keep them from their issues in Southern Iraq I suspect. The internal BA study on their historical experiences and learning about COIN did not paint a pretty picture.

One reason the joint US COIN manual had little new in it was that the old knowledge was largely unknown. Even in army special forces in the '80s and '90s I found there was very little in the way of historical discussion possible about anything other than Vietnam or El Salvador because there was almost no venue for professional, serious study. It is interesting that McMasters and Petreaus both did Vietnam War dissertations outside of the military during their advanced civil schooling. The only officer, at the risk of injecting an anecdote, I recall a historical conversation with about small wars with was the now-USASOC commander when he was a battalion XO. We discussed SF and the Montagnards in VN.

The TRADOC history of the period immediately following the Vietnam War makes pretty clear - as does Conrad Crane's monograph for SSI - that the army seized upon the 1973 war in the Middle East with its high intensity and combined arms requirements with notable zeal. This institutional decision - rather than studying the recent, long return from Vietnam - resembles very much the British Army's decision to return to real soldiering on the frontiers of the Empire in the 1930s rather then study WWI for knowledge.

[William F. Owen]

An American military historian now working in Australia wrote of the British Army in WWI that they had an ethos rather than a doctrine: embedded behaviors from the collective memory of the regiments.

Well for WW1 they had a published Doctrine Manual in 1909. "The Field Service Regulations." I have a copy, and it's pretty good. Yes, it is strongly imbued with "opinion." - The section on Cavalry is very telling.

No, the British Army didn't have a COIN doctrine going into their participation in the Iraq War even after decades of hands-on "war among the people" or COIN in N' Ireland. I suspect it is different to find a serving officer or long-service NCO who has not served multiple rotations in N' Ireland

The UK did have COIN doctrine. It just didn't reside in one manual. The CATOM was published in 12 different Editions, and specific to Malaya. There was published doctrine for each theatre.
Actually by 2003 in Iraq, very few men had real pre-cease fire NI experience, but everyone understood that doing COIN was what all armies did and it was not an option to ignore it.

The internal BA study on their historical experiences and learning about COIN did not paint a pretty picture.

Concur, but more importantly the problem would not have been solved by having a "COIN Doctrine."

[iveschris]

Perhaps we've come down to whither doctrine.

Were the historical doctrine examples we've noted, beginning with Gentile's, trailing indicators or leading indicators of battlefield chalenges the respective armies faced?

How does doctrine influence on balance how the force faces its war? Imperial policing and the Boer War had a decisive influence on the British doctrine before WWI. To what extent did that doctrine influence the British response to what the army found in Flanders? By the end of 1915 much of the Old Army was dead.

Countering insurgents for the Army and Marines in Vietnam was countering guerrillas until after 1970. Did the consistent emphasis on find/fix/fight/finish doctrinal solutions address the tactical problems of the ARVN/US Army-Marine Corps? Both guerrillas and beginning in 1965 PAVN units offered lots of fighting but the tactical solution set based on the doctrine couldn't drive operational or strategic actions to defeat the enemy. Experimentation did finally address the "other war" with no small amount of borrowed military manpower.

[Pete]

... the British Army's decision to return to real soldiering on the frontiers of the Empire in the 1930s rather then study WWI for knowledge.

Wait a minute, I was under the impression that the field sports of British cavalry regiments during the interwar years encouraged bold maneuver and decisive action. Maybe the U.S. Army Armor Center and School should be moved to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, where there are lots of wild boars.

[William F. Owen]

Wait a minute, I was under the impression that the field sports of British cavalry regiments during the interwar years encouraged bold maneuver and decisive action.

Do not even get me started. "Cavalry Traditions" are reason why Britain has only ever produced 2 good tanks in 90 years.

[Rex Brynen]

Do not even get me started. "Cavalry Traditions" are reason why Britain has only ever produced 2 good tanks in 90 years.

Perhaps three, if you include the Firefly variant of the Sherman. What were the other two?

[William F. Owen]

Perhaps three, if you include the Firefly variant of the Sherman. What were the other two?

OK, fair one. It was the best of the WW2 Shermans. (for some reason the US has never produced good tanks guns) The other two would be Centurion and Challenger-2.

I could have a real "Airfix versions of history" debate some of the others, but I do not wish to be that geek today!!

[Infanteer]

Interesting. As Bob's World alludes to, Afghanistan (and COIN theory in general) seem to suffer from a "Strategy of Tactics"; no amount of securing the population is going to win the war. We seem to take historical examples of tactical successes like Tel Afar to hold them aloft as avatars of how to prosecute campaigns and design strategy. Maneuver Warfare suffered heavily from this - some good leadership principles were bundled up into an entire flimsy doctrinal concept.

As an aside on uses of military history - which may or may not be relevant - I had a fellow soldier expounding COIN doctrine and pointing out how Vietnam was a failure and COIN is the response to this failure. Being contrary, I asked where failure was with a US Military which won most tactical engagements, destroyed the VC as a guerrilla force, stemmed the NVA tide and left South Vietnam in one piece; a South Vietnamese state that would fall to a conventional invasion as opposed to a insurgent army of sandal wearing guerrillas. He didn't have much to say (although there probably is alot) - the profession seems to have an unfortuate trend of accepting things at face value without a critical eye.

[Granite_State]

Do not even get me started. "Cavalry Traditions" are reason why Britain has only ever produced 2 good tanks in 90 years.

The British cavalry has mostly gotten a bad rap for its 20th century performance. As an admirer of Allenby I'm sure you'd see that in WWI. Bad designers and some of the "RTC avant garde" had a lot more to do with poor British tanks than the cavalry.

Stephen Badsey has pointed out that the "cavalry spirit" shared many features with the much more celebrated auftragstaktik.

http://www.amazon.com/Doctrine-Refor...988342&sr=8-10
(Very expensive but worth it if the subject is of real interest).

[William F. Owen]

The British cavalry has mostly gotten a bad rap for its 20th century performance. As an admirer of Allenby I'm sure you'd see that in WWI.

Correct. I'm very much admire Allenby, but he was good because he was good. Nothing to do with Cavalry

Bad designers and some of the "RTC avant garde" had a lot more to do with poor British tanks than the cavalry.

Almost. I'm doing my Masters on this very subject. No firm conclusions yet but the "mechanising of the cavalry" is an issue. They see tanks as armoured horses. That may have had negative flow down effects.

http://www.amazon.com/Doctrine-Refor...988342&sr=8-10
(Very expensive but worth it if the subject is of real interest).

Thanks!