Because of the dispersion of the artillery shells as is natural, there were too many 'overs' and 'unders', missing the objective on the narrow ridgeline. Such overs and unders would also affect the attacker since it (the attack) was on mountain slopes.
The Bofors were used in Direct Firing Role to achieve pin point accuracy with devastating effect, as also conservation of ammunition - an important logistic issue given that the single lane precipitous road was under direct enemy observation.
It maybe mentioned at these High Altitude heights there is no cover. Cavalier assault were also not feasible owing the the lack of oxygen which made movement slow and laboured. Therefore, close support was an absolute necessity till as long as possible and so safety distances of Direct Firing infantry weapons were reduced. Artillery in the classical mode of firing would have a greater safety distance owing to the natural dispersion pattern of shells being fired. Direct Firing of Bofors allowed one to overcome the natural disadvantage of the dispersion of artillery shell fired in the classical manner. This allowed the infantry to close in with close support of the Artillery in direct firing mode. The Bofors being capable of greater pin point accuracy than the other guns, having a greater devastation effect of its shell and being capable of faster loading, the number of shells effectively delivered were more and relentless. This had a devastating effect on the physical integrity of the defender's post and also on the enemy's morale. At the same time, it allowed the attacker to close in onto the objective closer with this devastating close fire support and in relatively greater safety.
The credit for deviating from the standard artillery practice goes to Lakhwinder, the Commander Artillery and then Maj Gen Mohinder Puri.
Last edited by Ray; 10-01-2012 at 07:56 AM.
Bofors Haubits FH77/B Swedish 155 mm howitzer is the one used in Kargil.
HIGH ALTITUDE WARFARE: THE KARGIL CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE
THE INDIAN ARMY AND ITS ARTILLERY
Howitzers on High Ground: Considerations for Artillery Employment in Southwest Asia
An Analysis of Kargil
The first paper is especially instructive. I will comment in detail later.
... "We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates"
General Ludwig Beck (1880-1944);
Speech at the Kriegsakademie, 1935
I shall have to re-name this thread, 'Airpower at 18k’: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War' we have moved away from air power to the "queen of the battlefield". Some good gains here too, SWC at it's best and good to see our Indian contributions too.
The new name: The Kargil War (all aspects) and will be merged with an old thread 'Restraint as a Successful Strategy in the 1999 Kargil Conflict'.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 10-01-2012 at 08:45 PM.
davidbfpo
From the US thesis mentioned above.The Indian Air Force’s (IAF) efforts, Operation Safed Sagar (White Sea),
produced mixed results. Thin air diminished weapon accuracy and hindered aircraft
performance. Adverse weather and the heightened SAM threat hampered the IAF’s
attempts at close air support (CAS). Aircraft proved unreliable in rapidly changing
weather, and a lack of pilot training for CAS in the mountains further diminished the
IAF’s ability to provide firepower in coordination with ground maneuver. The IAF
eventually adapted and enjoyed some success, primarily against fixed targets. The
introduction of laser-guided munitions (LGM) increased accuracy and contributed to the
fight on Tiger Hill. IAF pressure on NLI soldiers had a significant psychological effect.
Unconventional techniques, such as using aerial munitions to create avalanches over
trails, isolated Pakistani defensive positions and destroyed supply sites.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 10-02-2012 at 08:26 AM. Reason: Fix quote
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