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Thread: Everything You Know About Counterinsurgency History Is (possibly) Wrong!

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  1. #1
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    The "Nouveau-COIN," is like the MW crowd, they don't just cherry pick, but they are also generally poor military historians, in that they assume there is something distinct called "Counter-insurgency," -which you can study in isolation, and that from that you can develop "COIN Theories."

    The worst thing they try to tell you is that military force isn't the primary method by which insurgencies are defeated, and as evidence cite cases where military force was stupidly or badly applied, or ignore and denigrate it's absolute necessity in creating the conditions where the political solution could be achieved - so none of them read Clausewitz either.
    From this we see, in the last 7 years, is body of literature emerging , that says nothing new or insightful, about so called "counter-insurgency."
    Once again Wilf you jump on the same soap box and start the "they" and "Nouveau COIN" labeling in the interest of bludgeoning anyone who might have a different idea than you or your near idolic worship of CvC.

    Careful reading of Kilcullen, Nagl etc does not state that COIN is won without force; they do state that COIN campaigns are lost by an overapplication of force. That I definitely agree with and have watched it happend from the ground.

    As for assuming that you can study COIN as a distinct element in warfare, perhaps. It is part of a spectrum of operations and as such boundaries are unclear. That I would say is better than ignoring it or worse banning it as a subject to consider.

    Is all the scholarship of the past 7 years wasted? Hardly and as for the good professor, his own assumptions are equally glaring.

    Tom

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Tom Odom View Post
    Once again Wilf you jump on the same soap box and start the "they" and "Nouveau COIN" labeling in the interest of bludgeoning anyone who might have a different idea than you or your near idolic worship of CvC.
    ...and once again we are back into this!
    I fail to see how attempting to clearly state my case counts as "bludgeoning," or being consistent counts as a soap box. I would have thought it entirely normal that I should seek to argue against ideas I see as unhelpful or poorly presented.
    "Nouveau-COIN" is a set of ideas, and not necessarily people. I don't worship CvC. I merely suggest folks would benefit from the insights he gives, and revisit some of their ideas in that light. I am no more wedded to CvC than most Physicist are to Newton - and merely because of the subject matter, War.

    Careful reading of Kilcullen, Nagl etc does not state that COIN is won without force; they do state that COIN campaigns are lost by an overapplication of force. That I definitely agree with and have watched it happend from the ground.
    I would agree with 100%. They are correct, and that observation is at least 60 years old. My concern are the statements such as
    • "80% Political. 20% military" -
    • "Can't kill or capture your way to success" -
    • "COIN is armed social work" -
    • "You out govern. You don't out fight."

    Those are the simplistic, context free, and misleading ideas I seek to challenge.

    As for assuming that you can study COIN as a distinct element in warfare, perhaps. It is part of a spectrum of operations and as such boundaries are unclear. That I would say is better than ignoring it or worse banning it as a subject to consider.
    I grew up in an Army doing COIN and with a strong COIN tradition. My grandfather did COIN Operations. At no time have I ever suggested it should be ignored. Quite the opposite. I consider "COIN" as what armies mostly do, which is why the "woolly thinking" is so dangerous. Insurgencies should be studied, but that is very different from creating a distinct field of military study, which holds "COIN" to be a distinct and unique military problem.

    Is all the scholarship of the past 7 years wasted? Hardly and as for the good professor, his own assumptions are equally glaring.
    I don't have a problem with the scholarship. It's the agendas and the ideas that the instances of poor scholar ship has spawned.
    To whit, what great insights have we gained, that did not exist already?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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