Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[Dayuhan]

I personally suspect that the peace jirga has nothing to do with establishing legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans and everything to do with establishing legitimacy in the eyes of Americans. I expect Karzai to do everything in his power to pack the jirga with his supporters and exclude, co-opt, or coerce potential dissenters. I expect him to pull every trick in the wily Pathan repertoire to assure a rousing endorsement of his administration, which he will then run up a flagpole and wave in the general direction of Washington DC, hoping that it will call forth a new wave of goodies.

I may be overly cynical, but that's what I expect.

[Bob's World]

I personally suspect that the peace jirga has nothing to do with establishing legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans and everything to do with establishing legitimacy in the eyes of Americans. I expect Karzai to do everything in his power to pack the jirga with his supporters and exclude, co-opt, or coerce potential dissenters. I expect him to pull every trick in the wily Pathan repertoire to assure a rousing endorsement of his administration, which he will then run up a flagpole and wave in the general direction of Washington DC, hoping that it will call forth a new wave of goodies.

I may be overly cynical, but that's what I expect.

Americans see Elections as the key to legitimacy; this Jirga thing is confusing or off the radar all together for "Americans", and not well appreciated for its full potential by many of our senor leaders either, IMO.

But you are right, Karzai may well blow it, he may stack the deck with his cronies, excluding oppositions voices. If he does, it should be a Regis Philbin moment for the US, as in asking "Is that your final answer?"

If he says "yes" then he has released us from any moral obligation to stay.

[Dayuhan]

Americans see Elections as the key to legitimacy; this Jirga thing is confusing or off the radar all together for "Americans", and not well appreciated for its full potential by many of our senor leaders either, IMO.

Yes, the American electorate sees elections as the measure of legitimacy, but they're not the target. The target is the level of American military and civilian officialdom, and the global commentariat, that is actually engaged with the issue, specifically those who are questioning his legitimacy. At this level there's enough awareness of the jirga system to give it some leverage: an endorsement from the jirga will allow him to respond to any American pressure by claiming that Afghans have confirmed his legitimacy using their own method. In any event he can't hold another election; the jirga is about the only device he has to regain the ground he's lost. It may or may not succeed, but his options are limited.

But you are right, Karzai may well blow it, he may stack the deck with his cronies, excluding oppositions voices. If he does, it should be a Regis Philbin moment for the US, as in asking "Is that your final answer?"

If he says "yes" then he has released us from any moral obligation to stay.

We could argue that the open manipulation of the last election released us from any moral obligation to stay. Unfortunately we're not there out of moral obligation, we're there because we don't want the Taliban to return to power. If we fail to achieve that objective, we have to classify the whole effort as a defeat. I hope Karzai doesn't stuff it, because if he does we're in the scheisse whether we stay or go... but as I said, I'm not optimistic.

[Steve the Planner]

Reports are that this semi-jirga is crumbling to dust before it even starts. It was just for us anyway.

If Abdullah and the other non-Pashtuns are not adeqautely and appropriatly represented, and the structure, focus and authority is more like a Karzai supporter brain storm session about "key questions" (TBA), then the whole thing is already beneath the level of justifying any credible outcomes. Just a side-show on the continuing path....

[Steve the Planner]

PS: It is against this backdrop (one meaningless show after another), that folks really need to get focused on the events in the Gulf of Mexico.

Commentators from both sides of the political spectrum have raised the issue about needing the troops, resources, and focus on this home-grown problem, the scope and dimension of which is only beginning to unfold.

The foreign wars are going to be more and more pivoted against this disaster.

[Dayuhan]

Commentators from both sides of the political spectrum have raised the issue about needing the troops, resources, and focus on this home-grown problem, the scope and dimension of which is only beginning to unfold.

Certainly the Gulf situation is a major problem, but I don't see how it competes with Afghanistan for resources or focus. The resources required and the individuals and institutions whose focus is needed are very different: the Gulf oil spill is not a military problem and the personnel and equipment in Afghanistan are not of a type that would be of much use in the Gulf.

[Steve the Planner]

Don't disagree about alignment, but the linkage is being made, and the pretext is inherent.

It is actually quite staggering to hear folks comment about "what the government" either should or is going to need to do when, it reality, the government is no more structured or tasked to provide serious regional relief/reconstruction/environmental clean up, than is the military to, say, build schools in Afghanistan...

Ricks wrote yesterday about the Pentagon beginning to come to terms with economic realities (ie, the end of the blank check), and the President spoke of a new (?) concept of national power grounded in the power of the nation's own stability/prosperity (pre-Gulf, and shifting the signal away from foreign entanglements).

But we keep coming back to problems, like Haiti, where the military is shown to be the only tool available.

Pre-war Iraq's army was, in fact, not that unusual in being the entity responsible for bridge reconstruction and other civil works, following a tradition back to the Legions.

As the clock ticks down in Afghanistan, I will find it interesting to watch how the emerging redefinition of the military's role to the US government evolves.

That it is evolving is inherent in the COIN approach (at least, as COIN is advertised)...segue to COIN for America.

[AdamG]

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37865973...new_york_times

Officers and enlisted soldiers and Marines, typically speaking on the condition of anonymity to protect their jobs, speak of “being handcuffed,” of not being trusted by their bosses and of being asked to battle a canny and vicious insurgency “in a fair fight.”

Some rules meant to enshrine counterinsurgency principles into daily practices, they say, do not merely transfer risks away from civilians. They transfer risks away from the Taliban.

[AdamG]

Strategy vs. Tactics in Afghanistan
Good counterinsurgency can't make up for the lack of a political plan.

BY ANN MARLOWE
Gen. Stanley McChrystal has embraced Hamid Karzai as part of the Obama administration's startling about-face on the Afghan president. Until recently, the Obama team seemed to understand that Mr. Karzai was "not an adequate strategic partner," in the well-chosen words of our ambassador (and former general) Karl Eikenberry. Mr. Karzai's refusal to name cabinet ministers in the wake of the August 2009 election (as required by the constitution) so angered his own parliament that for several days last month they refused to conduct any business, instead sitting silent in protest.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...ditorialPage_h