PMC / Mercenaries in Iraq (catch all)

[John T. Fishel]

in terms of resoving the immediate and near term problem. His proposal also goes a long way toward defining what should be the proper command relationship between PSCs and the USG in future operations. What he doesn't address - and this is not a criticism - is the proper role of PSCs (and other contractors.

The expanded role of contractors including PSCs was a long time in the making. I watched contracting expand during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations long before the current war. I have seen contractors, including PSCs, performing appropriate roles extremely well. But I have also seen abuse and, more importantly, role expansion into areas that I believe properly belong to the government and the government alone.

One issue in contracting - especially for PSCs - is the terms of the contract. I am quite sure that the terms of Blackwater's contract with DOS are reasonably interpreted to protect their FSO charges against any and all threats by whatever means are necessary. Such a contract - one that is open to this type of interpretation - is certainly a part of the problem. The culprit here is not the PSC but its client (in this case DOS which seems to have forgotten that its FSOs are commissioned officers of the USG and, therefore, can be required to take risks that other civilian employees do not have to take). At the same time, the PSC should not be off the hook for overzealous (at best) behavior in what appears at first glance to be a "shoot first and ask questions later" approach to personnel security. Mr, Nance's proposal would go a long way toward resolving this problem as well as providing time to develop appropriate policies and roles for government contractors and, especially, PSCs.

[SteveMetz]

in terms of resoving the immediate and near term problem. His proposal also goes a long way toward defining what should be the proper command relationship between PSCs and the USG in future operations. What he doesn't address - and this is not a criticism - is the proper role of PSCs (and other contractors.

The expanded role of contractors including PSCs was a long time in the making. I watched contracting expand during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations long before the current war. I have seen contractors, including PSCs, performing appropriate roles extremely well. But I have also seen abuse and, more importantly, role expansion into areas that I believe properly belong to the government and the government alone.

One issue in contracting - especially for PSCs - is the terms of the contract. I am quite sure that the terms of Blackwater's contract with DOS are reasonably interpreted to protect their FSO charges against any and all threats by whatever means are necessary. Such a contract - one that is open to this type of interpretation - is certainly a part of the problem. The culprit here is not the PSC but its client (in this case DOS which seems to have forgotten that its FSOs are commissioned officers of the USG and, therefore, can be required to take risks that other civilian employees do not have to take). At the same time, the PSC should not be off the hook for overzealous (at best) behavior in what appears at first glance to be a "shoot first and ask questions later" approach to personnel security. Mr, Nance's proposal would go a long way toward resolving this problem as well as providing time to develop appropriate policies and roles for government contractors and, especially, PSCs.

It's amazing that attention is just now falling on this. T.X. Hammes made the same point about security details several years ago. Ricks quoted him in Fiasco (which, incidentally, I'm currently re-reading as research for my book. )

[John T. Fishel]

And I thought that my comments were 'original" since they were based on experiences and observations as a soldier, a contractor, and a DOD civilian.
It is interesting that others made similar observations earlier. Since my education is sorely lacking in that I have never read Hammes and haven't gotten around to Rick's yet, would you be good enough to provide the full Hammes citation and the Ricks page citation?

Thanks

JohnT

[Tom Odom]

I almost find it amusing in that I worked the same issue in Goma in 94 with Stan and we were trying to improve security in the camps for international organizations and NGO workers, The solution was to get a Zairian-Israeli security firm to take on the job and that happened over time and some metamorphisis.

State was against given anyone the authority to shoot as needed because they were not in the camps. My DCM declared the folks I was recruiting to be "thugs."

Now it seems it is shoot anyone who even seems a threat to an FSO.

Tom

[John T. Fishel]

the times they are a'changin'. Although, it was clear in the 80s in Panama that State was more concerned about threats to the precious bodies of their FSOs (and their comforts) than running any personal risk. (Perhaps, I am being too harsh.)

[Stan]

I almost find it amusing in that I worked the same issue in Goma in 94 with Stan and we were trying to improve security in the camps for international organizations and NGO workers, The solution was to get a Zairian-Israeli security firm to take on the job and that happened over time and some metamorphisis.

State was against given anyone the authority to shoot as needed because they were not in the camps. My DCM declared the folks I was recruiting to be "thugs."

Now it seems it is shoot anyone who even seems a threat to an FSO.

Tom

Hey Tom,
Indeed, they were our thugs and considering the local situation, mst likely the best to handle said.

Distasteful I recall from the embassy right about the point John JA JA directed us into a war zone with an Izuzu Trooper, so he and his better half (the blonde bomb shell from K-town) could report first hand...the war was over What a Delta Hotel he was.

I'd bet your retirement (no, not mine just yet), that John would fully employ BW or even our Israeli/Civil Guard if we had to do it all over again.

They had already paid a family off with $20K to preclude embarrassment when a drunk officer ran a push cart flat. There are no limits

[Tom Odom]

They had already paid a family off with $20K to preclude embarrassment when a drunk officer ran a push cart flat. There are no limits

That must have been before I arrived. Certainly sounds correct though...

Indeed, they were our thugs and considering the local situation, mst likely the best to handle said.

That was what Gerald said, "Tom, they are thugs,' in that fake Brit accent of disdain. To which I replied, "Of course they are and that is why I want to hire them."

But always remember, John and his mate wanted us -- you and me --as their escorts when they braved crossing the border into Rwanda for 300 yards...

That must mean they thought of us --you and me --as thugs...

So true

Best

Tom

[Stan]

That must have been before I arrived. Certainly sounds correct though...

That was what Gerald said, "Tom, they are thugs,' in that fake Brit accent of disdain. To which I replied, "Of course they are and that is why I want to hire them."

But always remember, John and his mate wanted us -- you and me --as their escorts when they braved crossing the border into Rwanda for 300 yards...

That must mean they thought of us --you and me --as thugs...

So true

Best

Tom

From by-God oʊkləˈhoʊmə together with his nanny (err wife) from the UK, I could barely take the 15 minute rides in the bubble

Yep, J...JJ approved the 20K and swiftly sent the (ahem) Communications assistant on R&R just 5 weeks prior to your arrival

[SteveMetz]

And I thought that my comments were 'original" since they were based on experiences and observations as a soldier, a contractor, and a DOD civilian.
It is interesting that others made similar observations earlier. Since my education is sorely lacking in that I have never read Hammes and haven't gotten around to Rick's yet, would you be good enough to provide the full Hammes citation and the Ricks page citation?

Thanks

JohnT

I also quote T.X. on that point in my Rethinking Insurgency monograph. Guess you haven't gotten around to THAT either!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!


The passage is on pages 370-371 of Fiasco.

I have to pass on an anecdote about Fiasco though. On pp. 323-324 Ricks wrote, "'Rotating nearly the entire force at once degraded capability, [and that] may have contributed to loss of control over several cities in the Sunni Triangle,' wrote the Iraq Stabilization Study Team, a group at the [Army War] college's Strategic Studies Institute that has produced some of the military establishment's most insightful work on the Iraq war."

Let me tell you who was on said "team": me. We did a two part study in 2003. The main part dealt with the conventional ops. When the professor who prepared it briefed our Commandant, he was berated for putting the names of the analytical team on the first slide. He was told that you don't put individual names on tasked studies. Lesson learned. I ran up to the office and took my name off of the first slide of my briefing (which dealt with the "postconflict" period). I had to put something there, so I made up the name "Iraq Stabilization Study Team."

Actually, my briefing was never official released, so someone leaked it to Tom. But I need to fill him in on this next time I see him.

[Tom Odom]

Actually, my briefing was never official released, so someone leaked it to Tom. But I need to fill him in on this next time I see him.

Be sure and get the team's approval before you do....

[goesh]

This whole business is about like throwing rocks at cats - you scare 'em a bit and in a flash they are in the weeds laying low or they are sprinting off out of range. Public perception is about like the thrown rock, it seldom does any damage and the thrown rock is what the cat responds to - it doesn't need to make the connection between thrower and rock. State projects its own image of being distinct and separate from the military by not being surrounded with uniforms. The Public hears of these murdering mercenaries then sees them surrounding Condi and others, protecting them from murdering jihadis. They hear Generals and other wagging heads tell them that there should have been more troops in Iraq to begin with, they hear constantly that the Military's mission is not succeeding, that all is chaos doom and gloom but the military can rein in the mercenaries and everything is going to be fine once this happens. The Public should be told too how many more billion it is going to cost to manage mercenaries, since the latter can get mini-Ops up and running with but a few words or some texting or one call or one email. What's the cost comparative/efficiency ratio here anyway? 50-1? That may be conservative. It reminds me of the hearing some Congressman had when Halliburton was gouging plywood prices during the Kosovo dust-up. Halliburton Reps entered the meeting, sat down and told them if they didn't like the prices being charged, they were free to hire someone else then walked out. The cost of any reconstruction projects would horrifically increase if a military security bill were attached to the total overhead. Throw another rock at that cat, he is only 35 meters away in heavy cover, he should be easy to kill.

[Mark O'Neill]

This whole business is about like throwing rocks at cats - you scare 'em a bit and in a flash they are in the weeds laying low or they are sprinting off out of range. Public perception is about like the thrown rock, it seldom does any damage and the thrown rock is what the cat responds to - it doesn't need to make the connection between thrower and rock. State projects its own image of being distinct and separate from the military by not being surrounded with uniforms. The Public hears of these murdering mercenaries then sees them surrounding Condi and others, protecting them from murdering jihadis. They hear Generals and other wagging heads tell them that there should have been more troops in Iraq to begin with, they hear constantly that the Military's mission is not succeeding, that all is chaos doom and gloom but the military can rein in the mercenaries and everything is going to be fine once this happens. The Public should be told too how many more billion it is going to cost to manage mercenaries, since the latter can get mini-Ops up and running with but a few words or some texting or one call or one email. What's the cost comparative/efficiency ratio here anyway? 50-1? That may be conservative. It reminds me of the hearing some Congressman had when Halliburton was gouging plywood prices during the Kosovo dust-up. Halliburton Reps entered the meeting, sat down and told them if they didn't like the prices being charged, they were free to hire someone else then walked out. The cost of any reconstruction projects would horrifically increase if a military security bill were attached to the total overhead. Throw another rock at that cat, he is only 35 meters away in heavy cover, he should be easy to kill.

True perhaps, but that does not make it right or desirable.