Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[Dayuhan]

Holding that line took rather a lot of effort, millions of men, tens of thousands of small war machines like tanks and planes and thousands of large ones like ships and fleets of big bombers. It took decades and decades and it took on the part of the West a clear resolve to actually go to war with all those men and machines if the need arose. It also took demonstrations of that resolve through things like the Berlin Airlift, the Berlin Crisis, fielding the Pershing II missile whether the Soviets liked it or not, US and British submarines constantly on the back of Russian boats and on and on and on. It took Ron and Maggie and the Saudis agreeing to increase oil production to break the Soviet economy, Pope John Paul II carrying on after the Russians tried to have him killed, Solidarity and a lot of brave, brave Poles (we still may have those)and on and on again.

Yes, mostly... except for this:

It took Ron and Maggie and the Saudis agreeing to increase oil production to break the Soviet economy

...which is a complete crock: the reasons behind the oil glut are many and complex, but it was never a deliberate construct targeting the Soviets.

I think you missed the point, though.

First, it needs to be stressed that all the talk about how all is lost if the Ukraine is lost is a load of bollocks. There is no reason to suppose that drawing a line will get suddenly more difficult if things continue to go badly in the Ukraine. Arguably the Ukraine is a poor place to draw a line: there's no functional government, the armed forces are in disarray, and there is a very substantial Russian population, much of which really does want reunion. All of that makes enforcing a drawn line a lot more complicated.

Precisely because drawing a line takes money and will, it's best done when allies (without whom any line-drawing exercise is going to be pretty fluffy in this case) and the domestic audience are really committed to the exercise.

Controlling Putin will of course be a lot easier than controlling the Soviet Union was: this is not Cold War 2.0. Still it will require will on the domestic front and cooperation in Europe. If we don't have those, it's a bad time to start a confrontation.

I don't see any of this as a function of who's in the White House. I don't think any administration in recent memory would have responded much differently.

It is very true that the analyst community missed a great deal here. The Maidan revolution was seen as an unqualified good, a way of sticking it to Putin without risk, and the regional watchers were too busy gloating and trying to figure out how to spread the joy to Belarus that they failed to see that the same revolution was opening the door wide for a Russian move. There's a lesson to be learned there, and I'm not sure it has been.

One obvious takeaway from all this is that Putin is an opportunist. If you give him a break, he'll take it. Among all the talk of deterrence and sanctions, one thing that's being missed is that when you're facing an opportunist, it's best not to give him opportunities. I certainly hope that the other frontline states are watching their borders carefully, monitoring pro-Russian groups, and keeping close tabs on any efforts to kick up a fuss. A few Russian provocateurs arrested and paraded before the media before being kicked unceremoniously back across the border will be a useful thing.

Putin is not Stalin. He wants an excuse, a lever, a justification, no matter how thin. Denying him those opportunities is as important and a whole lot less expensive than the big chest-thumping displays that so many are demanding. A lot of fuss gets made, for example, about how the withdrawal of US armor in Europe opened the door for the Ukraine move. I don't think that meant squat: whatever assets you have nearby mean nothing if you aren't going to use them, and I expect Putin would have reasoned (correctly, and again not specific to this administration) that the US wasn't going to go to war over the Ukraine, and rolled right ahead.

In short it took the West actually doing something and continuing to do something for a very long and expensive time. The reason we did all this was that we realized appeasement doesn't work. Appeasing just means you will have a much harder struggle on your hands later if you don't do what is needed to be done now.

You could argue that in the case of the Cold War in Eastern Europe, appeasement did work. Space was traded for time, an enforceable line was found, and the opponent was effectively contained. The argument that the struggle was harder than it would have been if initiated earlier is not being logically supported here. How does recognizing that we're in a poor position to draw a line at the Ukraine make the defense of Poland more difficult?

Those are real live breathing people with families and friends and goofy hobbies. Real live people that backs may be turned to when they ask for help. That means something.

Yes, the world is a ####ty place. All over the world, real live breathing people with families and friends and hobbies are getting smacked around. Many of them you don't know or care about: I've yet to hear you demand US action to protect, say, the Rohingya, who are getting it from people who make Putin look like Mother Teresa.

This is where you say "so because we can't help everyone, we shouldn't help anyone?" and I reply "no, because we can't help everyone, we have to decide who to help and when based on our own interests, capabilities, and needs".

[TheCurmudgeon]

Despite all the calls for direct action now least the West be seen as emboldening Putin or appeasing him, I think that is misreading the situation. Putin's aspiration are clear to those that can see things through the his eyes, but they are nominal ... limited.

Of course, the Russian empire and the Soviet Union were not harmonious multicultural paradises, nor is the Russian Federation, but the ideal is still an influence in Russian thinking and policy. At the same time, Putin contradicts this simple vision in worrisome ways. A good example is how he wavers in his March speech between defining Ukrainians as a separate “people” (narod, which also means “nation”) or as part of a larger Russian nation. Until the twentieth century, very few Russians believed that Ukrainians were a nation with their own history and language, and many still question this. Putin works both sides of this argument. On the one hand, he expresses great respect for the “fraternal Ukrainian people [narod],” their “national feelings,” and “the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state.” On the other hand, he argues that what has been happening in Ukraine “pains our hearts” because “we are not simply close neighbors but, as I have said many times already, we are truly one people [narod]. Kiev is the mother of Russian [russkie] cities. Ancient Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other.”

Putin’s frequent use of the ethno-national term russkii for “Russian,” rather than the more political term rossiiskii, which includes everyone and anything under the Russian state, is important. Even more ominous are Putin’s suggestions about where such an understanding of history should lead. Reminding “Europeans, and especially Germans,” about how Russia “unequivocally supported the sincere, inexorable aspirations of the Germans for national unity,” he expects the West to “support the aspirations of the Russian [russkii] world, of historical Russia, to restore unity.” This suggests a vision, shaped by views of history, that goes beyond protecting minority Russian speakers in the “near-abroad.”

Putinism often tries to blend contradictory ideals—freedom and order, individual rights and the needs of state, multiethnic diversity and national unity. Dismissing these complexities as cynical masks does not help us develop reasoned responses to Putin.

While the author views this statement as an ominous threat to Germany, I could read it as an attempt to get Westerners to understand his mostly ethnic motivations. In the earlier paragraph he refers to the Ukrainians as a separate, people. This could be a ruse, but I see it more as a view into how he thinks. As the rest of the statement says, he expects Westerners to understand what he sees as an ethnic minority/majority seeking to join their brethren. Just as Westerners feel the need to help fledgling democracies, he feels the need to help repressed Russians. Our SF are designed to go in and help freedom fighters; his are doing the same.

From that perspective the best tact might be to pursue stabilization and self determination. Agree to the peacekeepers and establish elections. If Putin is confident then he will agree (but hedge his bets by keeping his spetsnaz in place). Still, it creates a defacto line. If he does not agree than it is an indication of more to come (beyond the obvious ethnic enclaves in places like Estonia).

[Dayuhan]

...he expects Westerners to understand what he sees as an ethnic minority/majority seeking to join their brethren. Just as Westerners feel the need to help fledgling democracies, he feels the need to help repressed Russians. Our SF are designed to go in and help freedom fighters; his are doing the same.

There has been some discussion on SWC over the years of the possibility that borders are often irrationally drawn and need not be sacrosanct, especially when they are poorly aligned with ethnic, tribal, or cultural reality on the ground. What I find interesting is that the reaction to this possibility is generally quite accommodating when the discussion is about Africa, and very much less so when the discussion is about Europe!

[OUTLAW 09]

There has been some discussion on SWC over the years of the possibility that borders are often irrationally drawn and need not be sacrosanct, especially when they are poorly aligned with ethnic, tribal, or cultural reality on the ground. What I find interesting is that the reaction to this possibility is generally quite accommodating when the discussion is about Africa, and very much less so when the discussion is about Europe!

Dayuhan---I would go a step further and state a vast majority of African and ME borders were drawn in the interests of the colonial powers and decisions made in 1919 as to who was responsible for what under the post WW1 decisions and League of Nations decisions.

The current problem for Europe is vastly more complex---the SU before is dissolution was in fact comprised of over 136 different language and ethnic groupings held together by Stalin.

Then the breakup---which followed the more traditional method of if it existed in 1994 then so be it and no attempt was made to correct the boundaries nor were Europeans and Russians of a mindset to actually change them.

Then came along the OCSE (with 53 members) and the INF (US/Russia)coupled with the small thing called the Treaty of Westphalia (the former European colonial powers) which tended to treat borders as final---then along came Kosovo which the Russians now use as their premier example of how the West violated all of the above.

Now we have the Putin doctrine which states that is a single country "feels" that it's cultural, ethnicity, and language brothers in a neighboring country are being "mistreated" well then we as the defenders of the defined faith (as we define it) have with emphasis on the have the ultimate right to acquire our fellow brothers and annex them into the "motherland".

That is a serious change of the entire European area as it calls into question the concept of relative peace/economic development since 1989/1994 as seen by many Europeans.

Now what is really interesting is that the Ukraine threw in the face of Russia ie Putin that he should take care of his own "ethnic" minority rights issues as Russia has the same exact problems within her borders as say the Ukraine.

Now super surprisingly Putin announces today that the Russian government needs to pass laws protecting the rights of ethnic minorities ie Germans, Poles, Tartars or any other minority living inside Russia.

Now the question tap tap do I hear a woodpecker in the forest meaning did Putin realize that his own ethnic nationalism driving what I call the Putin doctrine can come back to haunt him in the far eastern regions of Russian which has a high Chinese Russian speaking/Chinese speaking ethnic majorities in some areas that say China could in theory using the Putin doctrine actually "claim" for China?

But if I am "protecting" them via laws then China cannot claim "protection rights".

Following the Putin doctrine in fact opens the gates to border changes in over 300 current hot spots many of them in Asia and Africa.

That is way Europe is up tight.

By the way an interesting small article from the Moscow Times on ethnicity and language and how Putin is misusing the two.

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinio...rs/498581.html

[TheCurmudgeon]

Seems like the Russians are getting what David Maxwell on the blog side calls UW and political warfare.

Title taken from today’s' NYTs

Military Analysis Russia Displays a New Military Prowess in Ukraine’s East

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Russian forces skillfully employed 21st-century tactics that combined cyberwarfare, an energetic information campaign and the use of highly trained special operation troops in its annexation of Crimea.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/wo...etType=nyt_now

They are, and I applaud their use of UW where appropriate, but I think the article makes a number of mistakes imputing Putin's reasoning based on our reaction.

For its intervention in Crimea, the Russians used a so-called snap military exercise to distract attention and hide their preparations.

Was that really a faint, or was it the back-up plan in case additional assistance was required?

While the Kremlin retains the option of mounting a large-scale intervention in eastern Ukraine, the immediate purposes of the air and ground forces massed near Ukraine appears to be to deter the Ukrainian military from cracking down in the east and to dissuade the United States from providing substantial military support.

I believe that is imputing motivation based on the results.

We tend to see what we think is there rather than what is there.

My second point is that, while the UW strategy used was effective, it has limited utility outside of this situation. It would not work in locations without a substantial sympathetic population. The artilce both makes that point and avoids it.

Admiral Stavridis agreed that Russia’s strategy would be most effective when employed against a nation with a large number of sympathizers. But he said that Russia’s deft use of cyberwarfare, special forces and conventional troops was a development that NATO needed to study and factor into its planning.

“In all of those areas they have raised their game, and they have integrated them quite capably,” he said. “And I think that has utility no matter where you are operating in the world.”

UW is a tactic that requires some depth of knowledge about the human domain. So, without an accurate assessment of the sentiment of the local population, something we are not good at, UW should probably not be seen as a magic bullet. That said, it is a very powerful tactic in the right situation.

[Dayuhan]

My second point is that, while the UW strategy used was effective, it has limited utility outside of this situation. It would not work in locations without a substantial sympathetic population. The artilce both makes that point and avoids it.

Is it not also the case that the revolution in the Ukraine provided an exceptional opportunity to put a plan like this into operation? I have no doubt that the Russians have long considered the possibility of agitating ethnic Russians in neighboring countries as an excuse for intervention; that's too obvious a ploy to overlook... but the general breakdown in order and government capability certainly provided an exceptional opportunity to move.

It struck me the other day that if the Ukrainian government believes that a substantial majority in the east wants to remain part of the Ukraine, wouldn't it make sense to preempt the Russians by having their own referendum, with international observers (including Russians) and a real effort to assure that only Ukrainian citizens vote? Obviously the would have to be confidence in the outcome, but if you have the confidence, it could be a useful proactive step.

[TheCurmudgeon]

It struck me the other day that if the Ukrainian government believes that a substantial majority in the east wants to remain part of the Ukraine, wouldn't it make sense to preempt the Russians by having their own referendum, with international observers (including Russians) and a real effort to assure that only Ukrainian citizens vote? Obviously the would have to be confidence in the outcome, but if you have the confidence, it could be a useful proactive step.

It would, which makes me feel that they are not confident of the outcome.

The only way this could work is with a third party (i.e. UN) presence to ensure that the vote is fair (unlike the vote in the Crimea). Still, it is the kind of thing that could buy time and cool down passions … at least until the votes are counted and someone loses.

[wm]

There has been some discussion on SWC over the years of the possibility that borders are often irrationally drawn and need not be sacrosanct, especially when they are poorly aligned with ethnic, tribal, or cultural reality on the ground. What I find interesting is that the reaction to this possibility is generally quite accommodating when the discussion is about Africa, and very much less so when the discussion is about Europe!

The first part of this post goes to point I made recently about the difference between nations and peoples.

[OUTLAW 09]

Outlaw cited NYT.



I'm not very educated in history, but to me Crimea operations reminds this operation in much less favourable environment.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1924_Es...%A9tat_attempt

Back then the Soviets used communist parties to make trouble, today it seems that they are using Russian nationalist narrative to do the same.

This book seems to be interesting. Price starts from 100 USD!?! :-0

http://books.google.be/books?id=buS6...vedupr&f=false

kaur---by the way you were correct in finding the Russian special ops guy with the beard whose picture was also released by the Ukrainians as having been in the Crimea as well as in Georgia in 2008.

[kaur]

Outlaw, if you look at the beard then you see that those beards are different. GRU Chechen Vostok guy has read beard, Slavyansk guy has grey/black. IMHO this Slavyansk guy is Crimea cossack. During first day they even had cossack hats. Today the specific hats are gone.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...-ukraine-slips

[kaur]

This guy on the left was in Slovyansk.

[OUTLAW 09]

I have mentioned here a number of times and used a number of times the term ethnic nationalist which seemed to not be well liked by mirhond.

I have also used the concept that Russia foreign policy is really composed of four legs 1) the military, 2) the security services, 3) the oligarchs and 4) the Russian mafia and related gangs.

This weekend I had an opportunity of meeting a number of French think tank guys working in Strasbourg (who had a number of years in both Russia and the Ukraine and were fluent in Russian) that opened my eyes to an overriding layer that sits on top of the four groups.

Namely the Russian Orthodox Church which they claim has far more influence/input that many in the West fully understand especially if one understands the relationship between the Church and Stalin in the dark days as Germany raced towards Moscow---there was an alliance recreated that allowed the Church to grow and actually survive nicely all the years under so called Communist control.

Then today this comes up in a Foreign Policy article that goes in the same direction that the think tank guys were talking about--namely the influence of the Church on Putin and the Russian population in general--they even indicated that one must do a thorough review of the Church and it's relationship to the Soviet Communist Party and how it actually grew in power during those times when the West felt it had been oppressed.

"The Russian Orthodox Church thus comes increasingly to the fore as a symbol and bastion of these traditional values and all that they mean for the new imperialism. Russian Orthodoxy was never an especially evangelical faith, concentrating on survival and purity over expansion, and much the same could be said of Putin's worldview. In Putin's previous presidency, the church was supportive, but just one of many of his allies. Now, though, from the pulpit to television news programs, the church is one of the most consistent and visible supporters of Putin's state-building project. When interviewed on the subject of Crimea, Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, one of Putin's cassocked cheerleaders, asserted that the church has long believed that "the Russian people are a divided nation on its historical territory, which has the right to be reunited in a single public body."

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...ia_geopolitics

[carl]

Despite all the calls for direct action now least the West be seen as emboldening Putin or appeasing him, I think that is misreading the situation. Putin's aspiration are clear to those that can see things through the his eyes, but they are nominal ... limited.

While the author views this statement as an ominous threat to Germany, I could read it as an attempt to get Westerners to understand his mostly ethnic motivations. In the earlier paragraph he refers to the Ukrainians as a separate, people. This could be a ruse, but I see it more as a view into how he thinks. As the rest of the statement says, he expects Westerners to understand what he sees as an ethnic minority/majority seeking to join their brethren. Just as Westerners feel the need to help fledgling democracies, he feels the need to help repressed Russians. Our SF are designed to go in and help freedom fighters; his are doing the same.

From that perspective the best tact might be to pursue stabilization and self determination. Agree to the peacekeepers and establish elections. If Putin is confident then he will agree (but hedge his bets by keeping his spetsnaz in place). Still, it creates a defacto line. If he does not agree than it is an indication of more to come (beyond the obvious ethnic enclaves in places like Estonia).

I didn't see anything in the article you cited nor do I see anything in the actions of Putin's Russia that suggests their goals are limited. Indeed immediately after the sentence you put in bold comes this sentence "This suggests a vision, shaped by views of history, that goes beyond protecting minority Russian speakers in the “near-abroad.”" The entire article spoke of how Putin seems to be filled with visions of a glorious Russian past and strongly suggests that restoring that glory is his prime motivation. That is not a limited goal.

I don't see anything in Russian actions that suggest Putin's goals are limited either. The moves into Crimea and east Ukraine were very well organized moves by Russian military forces. There was nothing extemporized about any of it. This suggests they were the result of very long term planning and practice. That includes all the actions from Russian soldiers pretending to be Ukrainians to the propaganda about ethnic repression and Nazis running amuck. None of that existed in any important way last year. It all started after his man in Kiev got booted out and the Sochi Olympics ended. This statement of yours "Just as Westerners feel the need to help fledgling democracies, he feels the need to help repressed Russians. Our SF are designed to go in and help freedom fighters; his are doing the same." indicates a willingness to accept Putin's propaganda at face value when all the evidence indicates that everything that has happened is the result of pre-meditated Russian aggression.

There is no reason at all to believe that Putin intends to stop, especially since ha is meeting no real resistance. He is only about 60 so he has a lot of years to become Vlad the Great through conquest. But at the same time he is around 60 already so if he wants to be Vlad the Great he had better keep moving.

[kaur]

Somebody has done good job. It seems that Russian hard core nationalists are fighting for Ukraine. Main declared opponent is Right sector, Ukrainian nationalists. Crazy ...

http://inforesist.org/znakomtes-bliz...y-na-donbasse/

[davidbfpo]

Somebody has done good job. It seems that Russian hard core nationalists are fighting for Ukraine. Main declared opponent is Right sector, Ukrainian nationalists. Crazy ...

http://inforesist.org/znakomtes-bliz...y-na-donbasse/

Kaur,

A good catch that, leaving aside the website's views and readers should note the article can be transalted on the website to English (small US flag icon).

Perhasp someone in Kiev will note the rather odd - to say the least about those depicted as a patriots or 'men in green' wearing this badge:

The website says:

For clarity’s sake, the symbol is that of Andrei Shkuro‘s ‘Terek Wolf Company’, a detachment of White emigre Cossacks who fought for Nazi Germany during the second world war.

Wiki on Andrei Shkuro:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrei_Shkuro

I note his anti-Semitism, could this group's presence explain the handing out of leaflets requiring Jewish registration?

Incidentally Shkuro, along with many others surrendered to the British in Austria in 1945 and was handed over to the KGB, he was later executed.

[carl]

Yes, mostly... except for this:

...which is a complete crock: the reasons behind the oil glut are many and complex, but it was never a deliberate construct targeting the Soviets.

A complete crock? Perhaps, but I think not. That is not the point though. The point was the Soviet Union broke up because it was opposed, as you conceded.

I think you missed the point, though.

First, it needs to be stressed that all the talk about how all is lost if the Ukraine is lost is a load of bollocks. There is no reason to suppose that drawing a line will get suddenly more difficult if things continue to go badly in the Ukraine. Arguably the Ukraine is a poor place to draw a line: there's no functional government, the armed forces are in disarray, and there is a very substantial Russian population, much of which really does want reunion. All of that makes enforcing a drawn line a lot more complicated.

Precisely because drawing a line takes money and will, it's best done when allies (without whom any line-drawing exercise is going to be pretty fluffy in this case) and the domestic audience are really committed to the exercise.

Controlling Putin will of course be a lot easier than controlling the Soviet Union was: this is not Cold War 2.0. Still it will require will on the domestic front and cooperation in Europe. If we don't have those, it's a bad time to start a confrontation.

Saying if Ukraine goes all is lost is a load of bollocks. But that is not what is being said, at least not by me. I have said that it will be a lot easier to actively work to save Ukraine now thereby stopping Russian aggression now than it will be to let it go under and then having to stop Vlad later. It will be harder because if he gets away with this, Vlad's Russia will be materially stronger and much more confident therefore much harder to fight and stop.

'Europe' doesn't matter. Poland matters. Sweden matters. The Czech Republic matters. The Ukraine matters. All of those countries and others have plenty of motivation to resist strongly. All they need from us are money and weapons and a little evidence of backbone. We've supplied none.

I don't see any of this as a function of who's in the White House. I don't think any administration in recent memory would have responded much differently.

Foreign policy is who is in the White House. Reagan is part of my recent memory and I wouldn't think he would stand passively by. My opinion only of course. Bush II initiated the Surge in Iraq in the face of great opposition, that is in my recent memory too.

One obvious takeaway from all this is that Putin is an opportunist. If you give him a break, he'll take it. Among all the talk of deterrence and sanctions, one thing that's being missed is that when you're facing an opportunist, it's best not to give him opportunities. I certainly hope that the other frontline states are watching their borders carefully, monitoring pro-Russian groups, and keeping close tabs on any efforts to kick up a fuss. A few Russian provocateurs arrested and paraded before the media before being kicked unceremoniously back across the border will be a useful thing.

Yes, exactly. In order to stop an aggressive thug like Putin, you actually have to do something.

Putin is not Stalin. He wants an excuse, a lever, a justification, no matter how thin. Denying him those opportunities is as important and a whole lot less expensive than the big chest-thumping displays that so many are demanding. A lot of fuss gets made, for example, about how the withdrawal of US armor in Europe opened the door for the Ukraine move. I don't think that meant squat: whatever assets you have nearby mean nothing if you aren't going to use them, and I expect Putin would have reasoned (correctly, and again not specific to this administration) that the US wasn't going to go to war over the Ukraine, and rolled right ahead.

Two things about this statement. First, unless you want to freeze the world in place as it is at this second, Putin will always find an excuse to aggress. If he can't find one he'll just send in the provocateurs you mentioned above and create one, as he is doing now.

Second, you are right about him having reasoned that the US won't do anything. But you are wrong about that not being peculiar to this administration. After having rolled the chief executive with a word over the ABM system in east Europe and made a fool of him in Syria I think he concluded that fecklessness is a prime characteristic of this chief executive. My opinion only of course.

You could argue that in the case of the Cold War in Eastern Europe, appeasement did work. Space was traded for time, an enforceable line was found, and the opponent was effectively contained. The argument that the struggle was harder than it would have been if initiated earlier is not being logically supported here. How does recognizing that we're in a poor position to draw a line at the Ukraine make the defense of Poland more difficult?

Appeasement does not refer to the Cold War. It refers to Europe pre-WWII.

Yes, the world is a ####ty place. All over the world, real live breathing people with families and friends and hobbies are getting smacked around. Many of them you don't know or care about: I've yet to hear you demand US action to protect, say, the Rohingya, who are getting it from people who make Putin look like Mother Teresa.

This is where you say "so because we can't help everyone, we shouldn't help anyone?" and I reply "no, because we can't help everyone, we have to decide who to help and when based on our own interests, capabilities, and needs".

How lightly you dismiss all those real live people asking our help who live in a country being invaded by the Russians or looking at threat on the horizon.

Rohingya is not a nation being invaded by another, it is sad thing within a nation. Therefore there is not threat to the international order that comes when nations invade others; which goes then goes to your statement about our interests, capabilities and needs, all of which apply to Ukraine and not so much to Burma. Besides, we can always tell the Rohingyans "the world is a ####ty place."

I wasn't going to say that. I was going to say that you help when and it isn't wrong to do so just because you can't always help.

(You gotta go a long way to make a KGB guy look like Mother Teresa. Tens of millions of dead Russians attest to that.)

[kaur]

David, this cossack/KGB victim episode shows once again what kind of ideological mess is there.

Stan, I think they have even this kind of Glocks. Irony is again that West basher Rogozin is involved to Glock business in Russia.

http://www.breitbart.com/system/wire...1-abcfc3d22dea

Ps Costa has regular model 17 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zNMGh7sDFtI

[TheCurmudgeon]

It could just be that it takes more time to get everyone in NATO to agree to a plan. This report of addtional NATO troops moving to Eastern Europe is three weeks old ...

Nato planners are currently looking at options including situating permanent military bases in the Baltic states to reassure members in Eastern Europe.

Russia's actions in Ukraine have caused concern in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - all Nato members which were part of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Nato jets will take part in air patrols in the region later in a routine exercise that analysts say has taken on added significance because of the crisis. Several Nato countries, including the UK, US and France, have offered additional military aircraft.

But Mr Lavrov accused Nato of exaggerating the importance of Russian troop movements on the borders of eastern Ukraine.

He said Russia had the right to move troops within its territory, and that the forces currently near the border would return to their permanent bases after completing military exercises.

Moscow also announced that some of its special forces would be taking part in a joint military exercise in Belarus later this month.

Russia's defence ministry said a unit of its paratroopers will join their Belarusian counterparts to rehearse assault operations from 15-18 April in the north of the country.

Meanwhile, Germany's ambassador to Russia was summoned by the Russian foreign ministry on Thursday after Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble likened Moscow's moves in Crimea to Adolf Hitler's 1938 annexation of German-speaking regions of Czechoslovakia.

"We consider such pseudo-historical references by the German minister provocative," the Russian foreign ministry said in a statement. "The comparisons by him are a gross manipulation of historic facts."

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26866989

Yesterday's actions appear to be more a stopgap untill a unified course of action could be agreed to.

Soldiers from the 173rd, based out of Vicenza, Italy, witnessed some of the harshest combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. The gritty actions of its 2nd Battalion in the Korengal Valley were documented in the 2010 documentary, “Restrepo.” They will be engaged in “infantry training exercises,” with troops from the four countries, all NATO treaty signatories, according to Kirby.

The Pentagon’s decision is more than just a gesture to reaffirm solidarity with its NATO allies, Kirby said.

“Any time you put troops on the ground ... it’s more than just [symbolism],” he said.

The USS Taylor will also steam into the Black Sea, where the USS Donald Cook remains. The Taylor had been there in February during the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, and had to be retrofitted in a Turkish port after running aground. The Donald Cook made headlines earlier in April when a Russian fighter jet buzzed it. Kirby confirmed there have been no further interaction with Russian forces since.

The deployment of the 173rd will be strictly on a bilateral basis with those four countries, not through a larger NATO action. Concerns have circulated, including through a report from the Atlantic Council, that some other members of NATO are reticent to get involved militarily in action clearly designed to test the Russian resolve.

Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, NATO’s top general and the commander of U.S. European Command, remains in discussions with other NATO leaders over further plans, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said last week.

http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/...poland-baltics

Perhaps the WH is rethinking there stand on any chance of a negotiated settlement with Russia .....

The Obama administration appears to have all but concluded that a diplomatic agreement struck last week to try to deescalate the Ukraine crisis isn’t working. The White House already has announced more new non-lethal assistance to Kiev, and the next step could be new rounds of sanctions on Russian leaders.

http://www.politico.com/story/2014/0...ia-105910.html

[Stan]

It could just be that it takes more time to get everyone in NATO to agree to a plan. This report of addtional NATO troops moving to Eastern Europe is three weeks old ...

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26866989

Stan,
Using this search string, I can't find anything more than at the below link.

Belarusian counterparts to rehearse assault operations from 15-18 April

Russia, Belarus to Conduct Joint Aircraft and Air Defense Exercises


Did it ever happen? Seems like press manipulation targeted at wire feeds. No pictures, no war hounds, no nothing.

Yesterday's actions appear to be more a stopgap untill a unified course of action could be agreed to.

http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/...poland-baltics

Perhaps the WH is rethinking there stand on any chance of a negotiated settlement with Russia .....

http://www.politico.com/story/2014/0...ia-105910.html

So, in a word, we unilaterally jumped the gun again ?
I love the numbers game in the press BTW. We throw around 600 as if it was a huge number.

[Stan]

Ukraine Crisis Could Impact Chernobyl Radiation Shield

“The reactor is leaking as it is, that’s the worry. The current shield is not enclosing the leak fully, not preventing it,” Camrody said, reiterating the concern that geopolitics might interfere with the construction schedule.