Like Jon C. I have delved into the Rhodesian War and so from my "armchair" the big difference is the lack of intelligence to identify and fix the farmer, sorry Taliban fighter.

The Rhodesians had a variety of methods to get their intelligence and I suspect some is still not known. Whatever the criticism of the Rhodesian war effort for not understanding their Africans, they found alternatives - notably informants at the start, later on covert observations and the Selous Scouts in their recce role.

In Afghanistan we appear to have a mass of information and little intelligence. As Ken W. has posted there are successful operations that have identify and fix, they are the exception IMHO. All too often we appear to know little beyond a few hundred metres (as I have remarked before).

It is important to note that when the Rhodesians mounted external operations it removed almost all air assets for up to a week and in that time the internal kill rate slumped. Probably not an issue in Afghanistan air assets, where it is an issue is having "boots on the ground" that as RR says are simply not there.

For those who want a contrary viewpoint J.K. Cilliers book 'COIN in Rhodesia' from 1985 is worth a peek (and is listed in Ken's Post No.9).

Thinking and remembering now. The tactics used in South West Africa, now Namibia, by the Koevoet (a police unit), did not involve air assets, but armoured trucks, tracking and more.