U.S. Special Operations: Personal Opinions

[Ken White]

The "us versus everybody else" comment really hit home. This is our primary national security challenge in my opinion, because it limits our ability to effectively apply our elements of national power. It is a problem throughout the government, not just within Defense. It will require a substantial culture change to fix it, and the change have forced upon legacy organizations by the right leaders.

True and well said. I also agree with the rest and would suggest that this

"... Now we have SF NCOs and officers who have seen nothing else (than a lot of DA), so our next generation of SF leaders may continue to pull SF into DA/SR/CT fold. Like everything else SF does, they'll do it well, but who is going to do COIN/UW well?

Good question -- REALLY good question...

Having had a great deal of fun (well, more often than not...) doing both missions in various environments with varied opposition, I am firmly convinced that the two missions are not compatible. There is no question that some people can switch between the two and do both equally well (not me, too impatient for a good FID worker) nor is there any question the Groups have done that over the years -- and pretty successfully so. That does not change the fact that each mission IDEALLY would have operators that were psychologically and emotionally attuned to that particular mission.

Far more importantly, each type of mission requires extensive training. Attempts to make Teams adept at both will unavoidably and adversely affect capability in both mission sets. Not to mention adverse impacts on operational employment...

And those kinds of impacts can have inadvertent and bad strategic effects...

[120mm]

I was witness to some brilliant SF guys during OIF I, who basically collected up a bunch of underused NG assets and used them as "force multipliers". They had to train them a bit, but I think they got good use from them.

On CSS; in my experience, as a Combat Arms guy who spent a year in the desert with them, they don't HAVE a "brightest and best". The CSS officer development in the US Army is so broken that even the "best" were bloody awful.

I think a tour with SF would help fix that "broken-ness".

[Bill Moore]

I am firmly convinced that the two missions are not compatible. There is no question that some people can switch between the two and do both equally well (not me, too impatient for a good FID worker) nor is there any question the Groups have done that over the years -- and pretty successfully so. That does not change the fact that each mission IDEALLY would have operators that were psychologically and emotionally attuned to that particular mission.

This has been a debate in our community for as long as I have been a part of it (only since 1979), and of course there is the argument that if you can do UW you can do everything, which an argument that quickly falls apart when seriously examined.

There are several challenges in trying to produce an ideal FID force, and we seem to simply gloss over them, or come up with recommendations that probably will be less than helpful on the tip of the spear.

1. Credibility: maintaining credibility with your foreign students or counterparts can be a challenge, if you don't have real experience in the subject you're teaching. A SF Soldier who was an infantry platoon Sgt or a Team Leader who commanded an infantry Co prior to coming in SF carries some credibility when we're trying to train and advise an infantry unit. Not everyone in SF has that experience, so we seem to fall back on what we know, which is door kicking skills, which is now a skill set common to all in SF, but not always the most useful skill set in a COIN environment.

2. Language/culture: definitely value added, but only if you have the right language. I have seen to approaches in SF, one is where the entire ODA is focused on the same language, which means the team has a capability in the countries that speak that language. The other is assign different languages to each individual on the team, in hopes that whereever they deploy someone will at least have some language capability. While better than none, what does this really give the force? Let's say we're in Thailand, my medic speaks Thai, everyone speaks a Chinese, Russian, Arabic, Korean, etc. Do I really have a Thai language capability? My medic needs to teach his own classes, take care of medical issues, etc., I can't use him as a full time translator. There is still a benefit, but the traning management challenge is based on a guess (on where we might deploy). Assuming we guessed correctly, and we deploy to assist country X by conducting FID, and my whole team speaks X'ish. That is extremely powerful, at least until it is time to rotate out. How many teams speak X'ish? How do we sustain operations with the appropriate language capabilities? If it is a major operation like OIF or OEF-A then everybody needs to play to sustain the effort, not just those regionally oriented to the area, so the second order effect is the guys from out of the region are losing their regional expertise.

The point is how much effort should we invest in language? How much do we really get in return on our investment with the way we're currently employed? Change the way we're employed, then it is a different matter.

3. The other issues have to do with authorities, leadership, task organization, etc.

Far more importantly, each type of mission requires extensive training. Attempts to make Teams adept at both will unavoidably and adversely affect capability in both mission sets. Not to mention adverse impacts on operational employment...

Go back to challenge 1, how do you train to be an advisor in a skill set if you haven't done it? It can be done, we do it all the time, but what trainer is better? The one who is an expert in his field, or the one who's knowledge on the topic is text book deep, but he has the right mind set to be a good teacher? To be honest, it can be argued either way, and is highly situation dependent.

Getting back to the larger issue of DA, SR, CT, FID, UW, etc., I think it is much bigger than the individual, a lot of the capability is resident due to the unit's task organization. Obviously the Rangers are much better organized and equipped to conduct large scale DA than SF. SF is task organized to do UW from the ODA to the Group. Rangers are task organized to do DA from the squad to the Bn. And there is more to the unit than its organization that enables a capability, it is the unit's culture, its collective training, it's C4I structure, etc. We need to get over the rice bowl fights and focus on winning the fight. Assigning the right forces to the right mission makes sense to everyone, but in reality it is so hard to do.

[max161]

"Unconventional Warfare (UW) … remains uniquely Special Forces'. It is the soul of Special Forces: the willingness to accept its isolation and hardships defines the Special Forces soldier. Its training is both the keystone and standard of Special Forces Training: it has long been an article of faith, confirmed in over forty years of worldwide operations, that "If you can do the UW missions, you can do all others." The objective of UW and Special Forces' dedication to it is expressed in Special Forces' motto: De Oppresso Liber (to free the oppressed)."

Robert M. Gates, Remarks at the dedication of the OSS Memorial, Langley, VA, 12 June 1992, quoted in The Special Forces History Society's The Special Forces Regimental History Calendar, 1994, (Fort Bragg, NC: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Special Operations Command).

[Ken White]

"... it has long been an article of faith, confirmed in over forty years of worldwide operations, that "If you can do the UW missions, you can do all others." The objective of UW and Special Forces' dedication to it is expressed in Special Forces' motto: De Oppresso Liber (to free the oppressed)."

and having watched the effort since then with some care as well as having friends and relatives to this day involved in doing both missions, I respectfully disagree to an extent with what the SecDef said in 1992. I wonder if he still feels the same way today...

I'll say again what I said earlier:

""...nor is there any question the Groups have done (both the DA and FID missions) over the years -- and pretty successfully so. That does not change the fact that each mission IDEALLY would have operators that were psychologically and emotionally attuned to that particular mission.

Far more importantly, each type of mission requires extensive training. Attempts to make Teams adept at both will unavoidably and adversely affect capability in both mission sets. Not to mention adverse impacts on operational employment...""

That's the kind of thing SecDefs, even those who were former Intel Analysts and who are cheerleaders sometimes miss. As Bill Moore said, that's been an argument for longer than he's been in the field, I can assure you it went on hot and heavy in 1960-61 in the Team Rooms and all over the Hill but then as now -- can do and should do are different things.

I know it is not an ideal world and mission demands do their thing. I also know the SecDef is right -- it is an article of faith.

The question remains however; should that be so?

[Bill Moore]

Being capable of doing UW means you "should" be capable of executing, coordinating, training, and advising a resistance movement on a wide range of activities ranging from guerrilla tactics (harassment, raids, ambushes, which are not DA) and a host of other activities. At the leadership level, it means the leaders understand what psychological and political warfare is, and how to manage its complexities. That same education and mindset should also enable them to develop well thought out and functional FID/COIN campaign plans, if they could only be put in charge. UW is by far the most complex SOF mission, which means it requires the most training, which in turn means minimizing the distractions (like chasing other missions). It does not mean that SF is ideally organized, trained, or equipped to conduct SR, CT, or CWMD. They can have done all the above, but SF in its normal organizational mode was not the right force to attempt a hostage rescue in Iran in 1980, to do so SF would have had to conduct significant reorganization and training so they could conduct that operation at the skill level required. In effect they would morph into something else that might look like the Rangers. Any unit, even conventional units, can be tasked to do anything, that doesn't mean they should be.

I’ve been invited to view a hostage rescue operation after supper tonight. Army Special Forces troops are well trained and equipped in such regards, but I wonder why any commander would waste area oriented, foreign language qualified, high cost, low density UW and FID specialists on direct action missions except in emergencies.

SF used to do Gabreil demonstrations, which demonstrated a wide range of capabilities to various audiences. Admittedly hostage rescue demonstrations are exciting, especially to those to don't understand special warfare, so had it to the new Gab demonstration.

Maybe when the argument is over with the reality will be that SF does need to focus on DA/CT based on way we conduct war, and the way DoD prioritizes funding, so in the end, maybe the focus on DA isn't wrong? However, our SECDEF is trying to change that mindset in DoD with the focus on IW, which doesn't mean DA/SR/CT etc. are not important, they are more important, but the other skills, legacy SF skills are the grease which will enable them to work in our new security environment. The debate will continue, and the meantime our Soldiers will do the best they can downrange based on the guidance given to them. If there are any problems, they are not on the tip of the spear.

[Ron Humphrey]

True and well said. I also agree with the rest and would suggest that thisGood question -- REALLY good question...

Having had a great deal of fun (well, more often than not...) doing both missions in various environments with varied opposition, I am firmly convinced that the two missions are not compatible. There is no question that some people can switch between the two and do both equally well (not me, too impatient for a good FID worker) nor is there any question the Groups have done that over the years -- and pretty successfully so. That does not change the fact that each mission IDEALLY would have operators that were psychologically and emotionally attuned to that particular mission.

Far more importantly, each type of mission requires extensive training. Attempts to make Teams adept at both will unavoidably and adversely affect capability in both mission sets. Not to mention adverse impacts on operational employment...

And those kinds of impacts can have inadvertent and bad strategic effects...

So are you saying we do need GPF that are reasonably good at all types of warfare in tandem with SF that are very very good at one or the other type and who can help to lead said GPF through whichever one they end up with?

[Ken White]

So are you saying we do need GPF that are reasonably good at all types of warfare in tandem with SF that are very very good at one or the other type and who can help to lead said GPF through whichever one they end up with?

However, a couple of minor tweaks on that...

These are just my opinions and they're sorta like armpits, everyone has a couple but these weren't arrived at in a vacuum or in a flash of light. Took 45 years for this to gel.

We need GPF trained primarily for MCO (Heavy Bdes) and for FID, etc (LtInf). I'm agnostic on the Strykers. The training tasks are too different for one unit to be total spectrum trained. Bdes should be specialized and train for their specialty for the near future. That specialization needs to be reassessed at every QDR (and left alone between them to avoid jerking units around).

We need SF that do the UW and SFA missions AND we need DA SOF elms, not SF for the DA stuff (we also need separate strat recon but that's another ball of wax...). Again, the training tasks are too different for BEST proficiency in either if a unit tries to do both. I've seen too many beanie wearers killed because they were doing something they weren't totally proficient at. They will give it their all, no question but it is not smart.

The issue of who works for who (GPF for SOF or SOF for GPF) should be totally mission based and the parochial BS should go. We must fix the unity of command problem in the US armed forces...

I'd personally go for an Inf Bn working for an A Team or a B Team working for a Rifle Co but that's probably a step too far for most.

I'll also tack on to something that appeared up-thread. Not only are there some SOF Generals out there -- real SOF, not Ranger Regt graduates -- but they are some sharp cookies and their integrity quotient seems to be ahead of the conventional Generals nowadays. That's not a plea to put them in command of Division (I don't even agree with Artillery types getting Div cmd or Mech guys getting Lt Inf and vice versa) but it does suggest they can certainly command TFs that mix SF, DA elms and GPF.

[sapperfitz82]

If I understand your general direction, Ken.

They are right up the street, attract/cultivate some great leadership, have a small unit culture and big unit assetts, are pretty much have given up on FLS forced entry as a mission. At least if one counts the amount of training they can devote to that.

My thought was to have a BDE per group and focus them regionally. Get the NCO's to language training and send the O's to some SWC course on FID. The benefit is a very large reinforcement of SF very rapidly, a quick bridging of the cultural divide at the lower level, and CONUS geography (pretty close to SWC already, as well as to the CA/PSYOP guys.)

Down side is the cultural divide at higher levels, as well as some turf issues on who works for whom. But they follow orders, right?

This is pretty much what is going on in theatre in Afghanistan anyway (minus some of the lower level coordination) with SF taking point and GPF providing support. In my experience, the lack of formal relations made for redundent and often conflicting missions. (SF makes contact with a tribe, GPF comes through a week later and does an on-your-face cordon and search.)

[Cavguy]

This is pretty much what is going on in theatre in Afghanistan anyway (minus some of the lower level coordination) with SF taking point and GPF providing support. In my experience, the lack of formal relations made for redundent and often conflicting missions. (SF makes contact with a tribe, GPF comes through a week later and does an on-your-face cordon and search.)

As far as who screws up the other's coin efforts - plenty of examples on both sides - I was the recipent of several Black SOF raids gone bad in my sector, where I had to do the consequence management afterwards.

We consistantly violated unity of effort with SF in Iraq until I left in Feb 07. GPF has little SA on SF ODA ops and vice versa. The "Black SOF" is the worst offender, conducting independent raids into sectors and more often than not leaving a mess for the GPF commander to clean up. Plenty of discussion on the consequence management aspect of SOF raids gone wrong over at company command.

I never understood why the ODA in a BCT sector was not OPCON or TACON to the BCT or even vice versa. Both sides stepped on each others' toes constantly in SOIs and missions because of the parallel chains of command. Relations were highly dependent on the SF team leader and BCT/BN commander personalities to work well. I have seen examples of both sides failing to work with the other due to personality issues.

[ODB]

As far as who screws up the other's coin efforts - plenty of examples on both sides - I was the recipent of several Black SOF raids gone bad in my sector, where I had to do the consequence management afterwards.

We consistantly violated unity of effort with SF in Iraq until I left in Feb 07. GPF has little SA on SF ODA ops and vice versa. The "Black SOF" is the worst offender, conducting independent raids into sectors and more often than not leaving a mess for the GPF commander to clean up. Plenty of discussion on the consequence management aspect of SOF raids gone wrong over at company command.

I never understood why the ODA in a BCT sector was not OPCON or TACON to the BCT or even vice versa. Both sides stepped on each others' toes constantly in SOIs and missions because of the parallel chains of command. Relations were highly dependent on the SF team leader and BCT/BN commander personalities to work well. I have seen examples of both sides failing to work with the other due to personality issues.

I'm so tired of the who has the biggest d*ck on the block mentality on all sides. When an ODA and BCT get along great things come from it, when they do not we all might as well sit that rotation out. SF feels the same pain of those middle of the night unannounced raids. You'd think with the information highway what it is there would be better communication on all levels.

My thought was to have a BDE per group and focus them regionally. Get the NCO's to language training and send the O's to some SWC course on FID. The benefit is a very large reinforcement of SF very rapidly, a quick bridging of the cultural divide at the lower level, and CONUS geography (pretty close to SWC already, as well as to the CA/PSYOP guys.)

Much easier done by integrating both sides early on. Up until GWOT there was very little if any training/operations done between SOF and conventional forces. We sometimes have to sleep in that bed we have made. Coming SF with 14 years infantry experience I had little to no exposure to SF before hand. This can be remedied in multiple ways. CTC rotations, school house, local training, ones imagination is the limit. I do not believe we need set BCTs dedicated to supporting SF Groups, takes too many out of the fight. Big problems arise when you start dedicating troops to one specfic mission, then they always get held back for that just in case we need them excuse. The good thing coming out of the GWOT is the SOF/conventional integration and the experiences being learned. My fear of being OPCON/TACON to a BCT is much like any other attachment; under utilization and misuse. Many conventional and unconventional commanders forget or do not know how to utilize assests properly. My fear goes the same way for conventional forces being OPCON/TACON to ODAs or Group.

One of my good idea fairies thinks one of the best solutions would be cross pollination so to say. With many younger less experienced soldiers in SF today at some point in their career you kick them back to big Army to be SL/PSG, then they get the feel for conventional ways and nothing wrong with bringing a few SSG/SFC Infantry guys to be an extra bravo on the team. Send SF Majors to conventional staffs and conventional majors to SF staffs. Just a thought and a HRC nightmare but might just get us the most bang for our buck in the long run.

[reed11b]

SOF MP's I think this article is relevant. I am kind of surprised something similar has not been suggested seeing the difficulty we have had in both A-stan and Iraq training competent police forces.
Reed

[jkm_101_fso]

I'm so tired of the who has the biggest d*ck on the block mentality on all sides. When an ODA and BCT get along great things come from it, when they do not we all might as well sit that rotation out. SF feels the same pain of those middle of the night unannounced raids. You'd think with the information highway what it is there would be better communication on all levels.

I'll note some of the same habitual problems as Cavguy; my BN owned an AO in Iraq, but an SF team worked indepedently inside a city in our AO. It wasn't that we had a poor relationship with them, but that we weren't privy to all of the operations and "deals" they made with Iraqi leaders inside the city. When they left the AO, all we heard from the local leaders was "Captain Jimmy (SF TL) said this, Captain Jimmy said that". It was a very frustrating obstacle to try and work through. Additionally, the SF team "hired" their own militia that continued independent ops after the SF team left. They even occupied the SF team safehouse as their HQ. Deconflicting their ops (because they weren't IA) was hard, because they had been empowered by the SF team to do so. I will say that the SF team did a fairly good "battle handover" with us when they left, but it was hasty and we didn't get all the details we should have. Our fault for not asking all the right questions and getting all the info we should have.

One of my good idea fairies thinks one of the best solutions would be cross pollination so to say. With many younger less experienced soldiers in SF today at some point in their career you kick them back to big Army to be SL/PSG, then they get the feel for conventional ways and nothing wrong with bringing a few SSG/SFC Infantry guys to be an extra bravo on the team. Send SF Majors to conventional staffs and conventional majors to SF staffs. Just a thought and a HRC nightmare but might just get us the most bang for our buck in the long run.

Agree with much of this. What would be the willingness of the SF officers and NCOs to "go back on the line"? I'm assuming that they wouldn't prefer that. I guess it could be DA mandated. I think there would be much to gain from putting 18 series guys back into 11 series formations.

In the the field artillery world, we send non-SF majors/post-command CPTs to SF groups to be FSOs. Granted, they are on staff and not with the teams, but still learn from their experiences. I think it's a great program and one that the Army will continue. Of the former SF FSOs that I've seen come out of Group, they are great assets to the FA BNs they go back to, because of what they learned with Group.

I believe (but don't know for sure) that 13F/13A from the Ranger BNs also support Delta missions, but aren't Operators. I assume they bring great knowledge and experience base back to Rgr BN and other FA BNs they eventually go to.

[Cavguy]

I'm so tired of the who has the biggest d*ck on the block mentality on all sides. When an ODA and BCT get along great things come from it, when they do not we all might as well sit that rotation out. SF feels the same pain of those middle of the night unannounced raids. You'd think with the information highway what it is there would be better communication on all levels.

ODB,

We're in violent agreement.

[Bob W.]

Good discussion all around.

People talked a great deal about the ability of plugging into enablers throughout this thread; additionally, it is important to note the amount of organic enablers that are now part of SF Groups, or coming on line: dogs, UAVs, Signal, not to mention the CSS discussed earlier.

[ODB]

Good discussion all around.

People talked a great deal about the ability of plugging into enablers throughout this thread; additionally, it is important to note the amount of organic enablers that are now part of SF Groups, or coming on line: dogs, UAVs, Signal, not to mention the CSS discussed earlier.

As of late this new buzzword "SOF enablers" has been a hot topic around the team room beer fridge. Sorry the beer fridge has taken the place of the proverbial water fountain. Personally my verdict is still out there, I'm voting present right now. I see good and bad but don't know if the good out weighs the bad. Instead of streamlining our processes and adding the things we need, we keep getting handed more technology we don't need. I already have too many UAVs watching my every move so arm chair quarterbacks can question the decisions. Additional to this is many know we work the gray areas to get things done, where is my gray area?

When I think of enablers I think in terms of policies and requirements that are streamlined to enable me to do what it is I'm trained to do. Not add additional requirements and more hands to the pot for me to deal with. Enable me to do what needs to be done!

I have not yet had the dogs in country, have trained with them and again admittingly there are growing pains. UAVs I see no gain, sorry but the picture from 10,000 feet looks a lot different than the picture on the ground.

Perhaps others can shed some light that I and others are missing on this.

[Voodoun]

So I'm brand new to this board, and relatively new to the military in general. I recently went through AIT at the exceedingly broken A/3/1 SWTG for PSYOP, and having just read the article this thread is addressing, I think its just applicable, perhaps even more so, to the little sisters who train across the hall from our Green Beret wearing big brothers at the schoolhouse.

Soft Power one thing that distinguishes the special operations community from the big Army, and in a time when UW and soft power capabilities are more critical than they ever have been, it seems that we've been just crippling our capacity in that arena through sub par training, shortened timelines, and organizational screw ups.

Now, maybe I'm wrong, maybe I don't know what I'm talking about, its a possibility, but as an academic consumer of security policy from my undergraduate years through grad school, I have some inkling into whats required of policy actors. And now as a policy actor myself, I think I've gained a wee bit more insight.

Now, to revisit my point, what happened in this thread is exactly what seems to be happening at SWTG, USASOC, and now USAR - two primary components of SOF, CA and PSYOP, go from being heavily discussed in the article, to virtually ignored in the discussion. Why is that? Is CA not sexy enough? Is PSYOP too much of an unknown commodity?

Or is it that SF is really the only thing people care about?

[Culpeper]

That was part of Kerry's platform when he ran for president. Much more SOF and SF. First thought that came to my mind was lowering the bar.