The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[J Wolfsberger]

My question is, does Clausewitz have too much influence?

Drop thermonuclear questions much?

I think both too much and not enough.

Too much in the sense that, as Bob points out, CvC wasn't addressing the elements of conflict that lie more in the area of political and social relationships and maneuvering. (For that, see Machiavelli.)

Not enough in the sense that the principles he was developing (remember that Vom Kriege was an incomplete first draft published after his death) haven't really changed.

As an example, I don't think CvC helps arrive at an understanding of the Anbar Awakening. The Prince, on the other hand, helps a great deal

[Firn]

Drop thermonuclear questions much?

I think both too much and not enough.

Too much in the sense that, as Bob points out, CvC wasn't addressing the elements of conflict that lie more in the area of political and social relationships and maneuvering. (For that, see Machiavelli.)

As an example, I don't think CvC helps arrive at an understanding of the Anbar Awakening. The Prince, on the other hand, helps a great deal

His most important point in this regard might indeed be that as war is the continuation of Politik (polity, politics, policy) with the inter-mixtion of other means one should also take a good hard look at that pesky Politik. Fighting a war does not mean politik stops and other means disappear. In this case a good reading of him should open minds and ways and not close them down. It is quite ironic that the man which blasted others for trying to ignore the political context of military problems should be a problem in this regard.

Given that the inner tendency of war tends to spiral out of control, as he observed, to heavy military means might not be in the interest of a country which wants to limit violence to be able to withdraw while reaching most of it's political objectives. As usual doing the right thing in this difficult context was the hard part. In Anbar it seemed to work.

Firn

[M.L.]

Michael C-

I posted this on your blog, but here are my thoughts:

Two points. You said on your blog:

"The most common definition of war--Clausewitz’ definition--is that war is the continuation of politics by other means. War has two parts: the political and the violent. His definition doesn’t specify which should be primary--the politics or the violence--but from what I understand, he views politics, or grand strategy, as the most important factor in war."

First, Clausewitz defined war as "an act of violence to compel the enemy to do our will" He also said that warfare has three elements, not two. Those elements are policy (or the nation), violence (or the military) and the people. He said these three elements were a "paradoxical trinity" and that a theory which ignores any of the three isn't much of a theory. Clausewitz said any one of them might be the most important at any given time, but that they all play a part.

Second point. Clausewitz first defined war (as stated above) within the context of "total war." In other words, what is the true, unconstrained nature of war? It is violence and death to the last man. However, he later defines war as a "a continuation of policy" as an acknowledgment that war always serves a political objective, and is therefore constrained. Clausewitz stated that defining the political objective was the first and most important question to be answered before starting a war, however, that doesn't mean that politics is the most important part of the "paradoxical trinity."

So, back to the central question, what is the nature of war? Its pure nature is violence and death to the last man. However, we constrain war to serve political objectives. Discussions of armed social science, ROE, et. al, are questions of how far we constrain war to meet political ends.

[Michael C]

I have gone away from using/reading forums, but one of the best parts of discussion boards like this is using them as a sounding board for one's ideas. So thanks again everyone for the comments.

@Bob-I'll agree that Clausewitz himself isn't the problem. Like all philosophies or dogmas that are overused, the founder is often not the problem so much as the disciples who put too much faith into one solution. And I agree that our political system way too often passes the buck to the military, then lets them fail in situations that are politically impossible, or at least really, really difficult.

@Slapout- I plan to use that definition of warfare in a future post on defining war(fare). I hadn't heard it before the last post, and I think it raises interesting problems and arguments.

@J Wolfsberger- I mentioned that On War was unfinished at CvC's death, and I think that fact is undermentioned when it comes to CvC.

@ML- I got your comment but haven't responded to it. As I cautioned in the CvC post, I am no expert on CvC. While I bemoan the simplification of CvC's ideas in the post, I also participate and simplify his ideas for our readership. Thanks for the clarification and I will try to incorporate that into anything I write on Clausewitz in the future.

[Global Scout]

I'm a big advocate for expanding our view and doctrine for conflict, but to be frank I have been very disappointed with all the new ideas since 9/11 that have gotten us no where (it takes a network to defeat a network, human terrain, you have to change their political system, we have to develop their economy, then they'll stop fighting, etc.). All of these views and many more have simply distracted us from our objective of defeating the enemy.

We tend to hold up several of these ideas as validated principles for COIN and small wars, even though we continue to suffer set back after set back when employing them. I don't alway agree with Wilf, but I do agree there have been very few great military theorists since Clausewitz.

[William F. Owen]

I don't alway agree with Wilf, but I do agree there have been very few great military theorists since Clausewitz.

If Wilf gave that impression, then he was having one of his less useful days....

Actually I would submit though CvC is the Gold Standard, there are others of notable merit, but you have to be pretty widely read to make an effective judgement.

What tends to set the high standard amongst most of the useful theorists, is that they all start from Clausewitz, or come back to him eventually. The test is when you have to translate the THEORY into PRACTICE. Clausewitz's guidance on critical analysis still provides one of the best routes to do that. - IMO.

[Firn]

@ML- I got your comment but haven't responded to it. As I cautioned in the CvC post, I am no expert on CvC. While I bemoan the simplification of CvC's ideas in the post, I also participate and simplify his ideas for our readership. Thanks for the clarification and I will try to incorporate that into anything I write on Clausewitz in the future.

After reading your first blog post I have to agree. M.L gave a pretty good quick primer. Perhaps you should go to the www.clausewitz.com page and read some of the introductionary stuff before going further.

"War is the continuation of Politik (polity, politics, policy) with [the inter-mixtion] of other means" is a very subtle description. Economy, Culture, Technology, Religion do all shape both politics and military matters in many many ways but only through political (and social) intercourse will the military means be organized and inter-mixed. War has especially due to those specific military means it's own ruleset or grammar, but not his own logic. That social and human logic permeates all human existence.

[Taiko]

Some helpful tips for reading CvC:

1. Understand that his work was unfinished. He had discovered the theory that war is a continuation of politics rather late in his life and was in the process of rewriting his thesis when he died.

2. Make a clear distinguishment between what CvC wrote about 'war' and 'warfare'. CvC's writing on 'war' is universal and still relevant today. CvC's writing on 'warfare' is context specific and subject to time and space. Hence, war never changes, but warfare constantly changes with time and space. If we do not learn to adapt to those changes then we will surely be at a disadvantage in shaping the conflict environment.

3. Be very weary of what 'commentators' say about CvC. He is subject to constant misinterpretation and can be taken grossly out of context. Detractors such as Martin Van Creveld are a classic example. CvC advocates are also guilty of taking what CvC wrote out of context with Helmuth von Moltke being another classic example.

4. As per usual, one reading of CvC is simply not enough to understand how he interposes an ideal of war and warfare with the reality of war and warfare. To fully appreciate CvC, and ensure that you do not misinterpret what he has writen, you will need to understand the theoretical methodology of the time. For this Kant is your best starting point.

Good luck with unraveling the mind of the best western militery theorists of all time.

[jmm99]

Back from an extended vacation ?; or

were you lost in the Outback doing anthropology ?; or

did you become engrossed in studying this device:



which has something to do with trinities (IIRC) ?

Agree, of course, with your four points re: studying CvC.

Regards

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Some helpful tips for reading CvC:
....................

Good luck with unraveling the mind of the best western militery theorists of all time.

I generally agree (as I would!) BUT - beware! 90% of what is useful about Clausewitz can be explained in a quite a brief way. Also 90% of the discussion and argument about Clausewitz is concentrated on about 20-30% of his writing. Books 4,5,6 and 7 are rarely.... if ever discussed or commented on.

Given deep understanding, a lot of what Clausewitz said, IS quite simple and thus accessible. What most folks here need to avoid is the "Literary Criticism" school of thought, that strays far from practical application.

To apply Clausewitz in a useful and practical way, you don't even have to know how to spell "Kant."