Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Dayuhan]

Mike from Hilo pointed this out on a recent post in the SWJ Blog where he corrected some folks who implied Ho was legitimate and the Gov of S. Vietnam wasn't. S. Vietnamese forces actually fought hard after we left because they didn't want to fall under the "legitimate" rule of Uncle Ho. My point is the ability to apply force matters, and if the government retains control of their military and police then the vague concept of legitimacy (legitimacy for who?)

Legitimacy is not an all-or-nothing construct; a Government is not 100% "legitimate" or "illegitimate". There's little doubt that Ho's successful expulsion of the French endowed him and his movement with a substantial perception of legitimacy. That perception was not universal, especially among those who had a personal vested interest in maintaining the dwindling perception of their own legitimacy, but it was sufficient to attract support and sustain his movement until those who opposed him saw their own perceived legitimacy dwindle (largely through their own actions) to an unsustainable level.

Certainly the capacity to apply force matters, but that capacity, as well as the ability to sustain that capacity through foreign and local support, depends largely on how the balance of perceived legitimacy shifts. That was true in Vietnam and it's true in Afghanistan or Syria.

[Bill Moore]

Legitimacy is not an all-or-nothing construct; a Government is not 100% "legitimate" or "illegitimate". There's little doubt that Ho's successful expulsion of the French endowed him and his movement with a substantial perception of legitimacy. That perception was not universal, especially among those who had a personal vested interest in maintaining the dwindling perception of their own legitimacy, but it was sufficient to attract support and sustain his movement until those who opposed him saw their own perceived legitimacy dwindle (largely through their own actions) to an unsustainable level.

Certainly the capacity to apply force matters, but that capacity, as well as the ability to sustain that capacity through foreign and local support, depends largely on how the balance of perceived legitimacy shifts. That was true in Vietnam and it's true in Afghanistan or Syria.

I question Uncle Ho's legitimacy on a lot of levels. I don't distract from what he accomplished, but challenge the common perception of how he accomplished it.

http://www.historynet.com/ho-chi-min...nam-leader.htm

First, however, Ho ruthlessly consolidated his power in the North. Evidencing the fact that behind his carefully constructed faade of the kindly and gentle 'Uncle Ho' he was in reality (in Susan Sontag's particularly descriptive words) a 'fascist with a human face,' Ho massacred his countrymen by the thousands in a Soviet-style 'land reform' campaign. In November 1956, when peasants in his home province protested, some 6,000 were murdered in cold blood. With such actions, Ho proved he was a worthy contemporary of Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung, who had also built their empires with the blood of their countrymen.

How legitimate were the communists in S. Vietnam?

http://vnafmamn.com/fighting/massacre_athue.html

Besides more than two thousand persons whose deaths were confirmed after the revelation of the mass graves, the fate of the others, amounted to several thousands, are still unknown.The 1968 massacre in Hue brought a sharp turn in the common attitude toward the war. A great number of the pre-'68 fence sitters, anti-war activists, and even pro-Communist people, took side with the South Vietnamese government after the horrible events. After April 30, 1975 when South Vietnam fell into the hand of the Communist Party, it seems that the number of boat people of Hue origin takes up a greater proportion among the refugees than that from the other areas.

Most people heard of My Lai atrocity, but a few would know of Hue massacre. Today some Hanoi's sympathyzers have even tried to whitewash the war crime by saying the Hue massacre never happened. It sounds just like the neo-nazis saying the Holocaust is a myth. The two following articles will offer you a better perspective (thanks to the recent opening of LIFE photo's archive, we found the original pictures of Hue massacre related photos that were thought ever lost).

http://vnafmamn.com/VNWar_atrocities.html

Hue Massacre, 1968, when the VC/NVA systematically executed as many as 5,000 civil servants, teachers, etc. who were sytematically rounded up and executed, some buried alive in mass graves, some tied up and shot in the back of the head, around Hue City during 25 day NVA occupation of the city-NO entries.

Of course after S. Vietnam surrendered the S. Vietnamese must have celebrated in the streets that they were finally liberated.

http://www.matus1976.com/vietnam/free_vietnam.htm

As is usual with communist governments, the losers faired horribly. The killing did not end with the surrender of South Vietnam in 1975, a year after the congressional abandonment of Indochina by the US. Uprisings continued in the south where another 160,000 lives were lost. In fact, more lives were lost in the six months following the fall of Saigon then were lost in the entire war! Vietnam was invaded by Cambodia and China, and in turn Vietnam invaded Cambodia and Laos. The total killed is estimated to be at 150,000 and, amazingly, an estimated 3 million were killed by the Vietnam governments proxy regimes.

...In fact, more lives were lost in the six months following the fall of Saigon then were lost in the entire war!
Vietnamese concentration camps, deportations to 'new economic zones', and the people rounded up and shot for various reasons has been estimated to be 250,000. A quarter of a million people.

One of the most telling signs of the brutality of the North Vietnamese Communist party was the fleeing of nearly 1 million Vietnamese people, most took of into the South China sea in make shift rafts. Of these "Boat People" it is estimated that nearly 500,000 drowned trying to escape this murderous regime.

Who are the good guys in Syria again? How much do we really understand the actors, their objectives, their legitimacy? Once we start, if we start, to get involved we will heroify and villianfy the various actors and that will skew our true understanding. Once we realize no good will come out of our involvement and we tire of treading water we'll withdraw and let history take its course. I have no compelling evidence we should pick a side at this time. We may have to intervene for other reasons, and we may desire to create safe havens for the refugees, but until we understand what the heck is really going on we shouldn't leap.

[Dayuhan]

I'm not talking about legitimacy in the abstract, or about our perception of legitimacy, but of domestic perceptions of legitimacy.

In countries where colonial occupiers or hated dictators have to be expelled by force, those who did the expelling typically earned a significant perception of legitimacy simply by expelling the colonial power or hated dictator. In many cases those governments did perfectly awful things: taking power through armed struggle often means that the most ruthless and aggressive people in the movement end up running it. The awfulness of what those governments did when they gained power does not change the reality that success against an occupying colonial power or hated dictator does typically - at least initially - earn a movement a significant degree of perceived legitimacy. Similarly, those who supported the colonial power typically earn a degree of illegitimacy, even if they are in many ways more able to run the country.

One of our consistent problems in the Cold War in the developing world was identifying conflicts as "communist vs non-communist" while local populaces identified the same conflict as "colonial power vs national liberation movement" or "detested dictator vs those who fight the dictator" or "foreign intruder vs local resistance", with very little emphasis on or understanding of whether anyone was a communist or not. While for us the identity of those who were "communist" was of surpassing importance, it often meant very little to those who saw the insurgent as the enemy of their enemy.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I'm not talking about legitimacy in the abstract, or about our perception of legitimacy, but of domestic perceptions of legitimacy.

In countries where colonial occupiers or hated dictators have to be expelled by force, those who did the expelling typically earned a significant perception of legitimacy simply by expelling the colonial power or hated dictator. In many cases those governments did perfectly awful things: taking power through armed struggle often means that the most ruthless and aggressive people in the movement end up running it. The awfulness of what those governments did when they gained power does not change the reality that success against an occupying colonial power or hated dictator does typically - at least initially - earn a movement a significant degree of perceived legitimacy.

I don't think successfully throwing out a colonial regime earns you legitimacy. In the initial phase of the fight it will earn you an allegiance in a "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" sort of way, but that is a far cry from legitimacy, as the events after the fall of the colonial regime often prove. Once the common enemy is gone then the true beliefs and their associated loyalties and legitimacy show themselves. By then, it is often too late.

What it can earn you is respect: the kind of respect born out of fear. That can be turned into power, but it is still not legitimacy. We had the power after the fall of Saddam but we were not going to use it as some others (i.e. Ho) would to consolidate their governments. As you say, no government (even, or perhaps especially, the U.S.) garners legitimacy from 100% of its population. Of course, it is easier to up your legitimacy numbers if you simply kill off those people who don't see you as legitimate - a method you are unlikely to see in the new, updated 5-34.

Similarly, those who supported the colonial power typically earn a degree of illegitimacy, even if they are in many ways more able to run the country.

This just goes to prove that efficiency does not create legitimacy, despite what some of our current COIN ideas tend to espouse.

[davidbfpo]

A few updates, some of uncertain veracity, others from reliable sources.

Via Twitter a purported film of Chechen fighters in Syria, that is on You Tube. IIRC reports of Chechen fighters outside the Caucasus have appeared before, who have reputation for fighting almost of mythological status. Links:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZsYXy_0t0Qc and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h-IIC...e_gdata_player

There are small Chechen communities in Jordan and Syria - so probably not from the Caucasus.

Syria's regime have used Scud SSM before, it now appears a number have been fired at rebel-held districts of Aleppo:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21563669

Finally there is a Bruce Reidel commentary:http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...offensive.html

[TheCurmudgeon]

I don't think successfully throwing out a colonial regime earns you legitimacy. In the initial phase of the fight it will earn you an allegiance in a "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" sort of way, but that is a far cry from legitimacy, as the events after the fall of the colonial regime often prove. Once the common enemy is gone then the true beliefs and their associated loyalties and legitimacy show themselves. By then, it is often too late.

An example from Syria

A recent confrontation between liberal protesters and Islamists in the northwestern Syrian city of Saraqeb, which was caught on video, set off a heated online debate. These weekly demonstrations have become a battle of symbols. Most demonstrators carry the green, red, black and white flag that was adopted by the secular opposition in the early days of the revolt.
But these days, a black banner also flutters at Friday demonstrations. It represents Salafists who embrace an ultraconservative brand of Islam that is new in Syria.The chants and counterchants are telling: The secular liberals shout for unity, freedom and a civil state. Democracy is what they say they want.The Islamists turn up the volume with calls for religious rule. An Islamic state is what they demand.

http://www.npr.org/2013/02/27/172989...re?ft=1&f=1001

The Islamists and the Secularist are fighting a common enemy, but they have two completely different concepts of what a legitimate government should consist of.

The basics of this cultural transition can be seen in almost all of the Arab Spring states as well as places like Thailand where royalists fight democracy advocates.(http://www.economist.com/node/15719095)

The history of each country adds unique flavors to these fights, but they are founded in human nature. They represent a transition from a belief in collective identity to individualistic identity. The use of force is only one tool, and one of limited "utility".

[davidbfpo]

From Jihadica:

Read in full, Shumukh’s “comprehensive strategy” for Syria presents an unmistakably grim prognostication for jihadism’s future in Syria—indeed a grim prognostication for Syria’s future in general. It is an attempt to think realistically about the challenges to true jihadi success in Syria in the coming months and years.

Link to a summary and a translation:http://www.jihadica.com/al-qaeda-adv...%9D-for-syria/

Interesting contrast with the AQIM document found in Timbucktu; see SWC thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...038#post145038

Also taking a pessimistic view on events in Syria is Professor Bruce Hoffman, in a short interview, which covers more than Syria:

Al Qaeda sees Syria generally and its unconventional weapons stockpiles in particular as offering the best chance for it to revive its waning fortunes and once again become as threatening and consequential as it appeared in the aftermath of the September 11th 2001 attacks. Indeed, I would argue that al Qaeda has pinned its faith and hopes to the demise of the Assad regime and, in turn, its acquisition of deadly weapons from that country’s vast unconventional weapons arsenal.

Link:http://www.middleeast-armscontrol.co...rorism-threat/

[TheCurmudgeon]

Three Russian warships anchored in Beirut en route to the port of Tartus in Syria, Sky News reported Friday.

According to the report, the ships carry hundreds of Russian soldiers as well as advanced missile systems.The reports have given no information so far regarding the ships’ intent.

Moscow has operated the naval facility at Tartus since signing an agreement with Damascus in 1971. Although it is merely a ship repair and refueling station with a limited military presence, it is the sole remaining Russian military base outside of the former Soviet Union.

In January, a flotilla of five Russian warships laden with hundreds of troops, headed toward Syria, as a show of force meant to deter Western armies from intervening in the war-torn nation, the London-based Sunday Times reported.

Previous reports cited Russian diplomats to the effect that the vessels were being put in place in order to evacuate thousands of Russians who still remained in Syria, if the situation in the country called for it.

However, a Russian intelligence source was quoted in the London Times as saying that the presence of over 300 marines on the ships was meant as a deterrent to keep countries hostile to the Bashar Assad regime — a key ally of the Kremlin — from landing special forces in the country.

http://www.timesofisrael.com/three-r...ed-for-syrian-