The UK in Afghanistan

[Tukhachevskii]

Though perhaps this might warrant a new thread or movement to an existing one I think the issues are as relevant to Afghanistan as they were to Iraq especially given that the missions are broadly similar (i.e., reconstruction, nation-building and COIN) even if the opponent/s are not (in terms of the complexity and variety of opponents encountered by the allies in Iraq). In a PhD thesis written by Col. Alexander Alderson for the Defence Academy College of Management and Technology, University of Cranfield, United Kingdom, entitled The Validity of British Army Counter Insurgency Doctrine after the War in Iraq, 2003-2009 he states that British COIN doctrine was sound but only fully assimilated and practiced by the US. As he states in the Acknowledgements...

The idea for this thesis stemmed from a presentation I gave to Headquarters Multi-National Force-Iraq in March 2004 as it prepared to move to Baghdad from Camp Doha in Kuwait. I was a member of the directing staff at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, and the presentation was about British counterinsurgency doctrine. To prepare for it, I spent a weekend at home reading Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Counterinsurgency Operations and writing the script. What struck me from the whole experience was not that the Commanding General in Kuwait challenged the idea that his forces in Iraq faced an insurgency – “Damn it, we’re warfighting!” – but how well constructed and well-written the Field Manual was. The main outcome of this exercise was, as events transpired, that I actually read the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine. As I have discovered, I was, and remain in a minority. (p.ii)

Personally I don’t rate Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Counterinsurgency Operations very highly, on the whole because of a number of methodological, political and cultural/ethnographic issues. Alderson’s comments regarding British reticence to train and fight with Iraqi forces under their supervision until 2008 has more than likely led to the OMLTs (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team) that Doug Beattie participated with Afghanistan (see above review post). Nonetheless, Alderson’s conclusions are quite damning IMO; British officers were largely ignorant of British COIN doctrine; the political framework and goals stated by the UK government resembled moving goal posts and precluded the proper implementation of COIN; that British forces simply couldn’t generate enough combat power on the ground to implement a COIN plan fully anyway; and, that UK forces were not as well trained or briefed as US units were (post-2004) on how to implement a COIN doctrine that was, ironically, of British provenance.

In overall terms, the issue at stake for the British campaign in Iraq was that policy rather than doctrine or conditions on the ground determined how it developed. Until Iraq’s civil war took the campaign to the brink of defeat, the imperative was to hand over security to Iraqi forces as quickly as possible. This gave some credence to the reverse Ink Spot. When Bush and Petraeus turned the whole U.S. approach on its head, the weaknesses of the British method were exposed. While British forces had a base from which to operate, the Iraqi government was unable to demonstrate its ability to govern in Southern Iraq; the population was not secured from insurgents, the insurgents were the authority until defeated in April 2008; there was no ‘Controlled Area’, nor was there any attempt to consolidate or expand it. Petraeus introduced conditions-based transition, and emphasized that transition not based on security conditions would result in chaos. The British withdrawal from Basrah City in 2007 took little account of the actual security conditions in the city, and it left Baswaris exposed to militia violence and coercion. Whitehall did not agree to the conditions-based plan, and contrary to doctrine and Kitson’s guidelines for working with allies, MND(SE) deferred to London and not to the Coalition chain of command in Baghdad.]

A principal compounding problem in the campaign was the failure to identify the true character of the problem correctly. The question was raised at the beginning of this thesis; what happens when doctrine is relevant but it is not understood? In the case of Southern Iraq, it meant that otherwise highly competent, well-trained officers misjudged the problem they faced. In comparison to the violent insurgency which flared up in and around Baghdad, the relative early calm in the south fostered the view that Iraq was a stability operation akin to what went on in the Balkans model. Yet the presence from an early stage of militias, prepared to resort to violence in pursuit of their aims, met the doctrinal definition of insurgency. The fact that the Iraqi government and British forces were confronted by powerful, violent militias meant that a comprehensive campaign plan was required. Doctrine explained that a national plan should be nested within the objectives of the host nation and the multinational force. This was not the case in Southern Iraq. The Army did not understand its own doctrine, and did not follow its own precepts. This created a condition which was beyond the influence of those with experience from Northern Ireland or the Balkans. In campaign terms, the British operation became more one of making a manageable contribution to the Coalition effort rather than making a decisive contribution.

One counter-balance might have been the development of Theatre or Operation Instructions. They were of proven value in Malaya, Kenya and, eventually, Northern Ireland, where they set general doctrine in the context of the operational theatre. Yet no such doctrine was written for Iraq. Why? The campaign in Iraq was highly complex and multi-faceted with a wide range of cultural, political and ethno-sectarian influences. The political situation was particularly volatile. The U.S. taught every brigade and battalion its counterinsurgency doctrine from December 2004. By comparison, although every British brigade was taught the tactics for company-level operations, they were not taught doctrine in the same way as their U.S. counterparts. It took initiative from individual commanding officers once they had deployed to realize that something was missing from their preparation and called for in-theatre counterinsurgency education.

Practical constraints placed on the British force, in particular troop numbers, meant that from the very start, the British operation could only have a limited effect on the security situation. What followed was the Ink Spot in reverse: instead of building a security infrastructure from which governance could be established, the British operation consistently scaled down efforts from its high water marks of presence and influence in summer 2003. [...] By comparison, the U.S. not only trained and equipped Iraqi forces but its forces fought alongside them, and provided crucial enabling capabilities of intelligence, firepower and logistic support. When British forces adopted the same model in March 2008, it proved to be highly successful, just as it had been when used in the past. There was nothing new in embedding training teams with indigenous forces; Counter Insurgency Operations explained its importance, principally because of the success the approach had had in the campaigns in Malaya and the Oman. Attention to the doctrine and some knowledge of the lessons from history were missing from the campaign.

Doctrine has traditionally been viewed as ‘that which is taught;’ if doctrine is not taught, does the Army have a doctrine? Without the philosophy contained in doctrine being assimilated, where is the central idea? There was none. The view of what the campaign was changed with every new commander. Some came closer to recognizing the reality than others. There is, however, no evidence that there was anything wilful or incompetent in this; as the campaign rolled on, so successors had to live with decisions made or the effect of indecision from previous tours, often being desperately frustrated by the conditions which they faced. Continuity, the watchword in Northern Ireland, became institutionalized discontinuity as the campaign veered from being cast as nation-building, to peace support, to stability operations, to – eventually – counterinsurgency, and then counter-corruption, crucially, with no underpinning intelligence database, or established connections with the Baswari population. With every change came a further reduction in forces available to commanders in Iraq, not matched by a commensurate increase in the capacity or capability of the Iraqi security forces, nor linked to the security situation in Southern Iraq.
(all emphasis mine, pp.267-69)

[Kiwigrunt]

For those with far too much time on their hands, this thread is a bit of a photo fest, mainly of Brits in A-stan.

For what it's worth, scrolling through a number of pages, I have not seen a single L86 in A-stan, just on ex. in UK.

[Red Rat]

Ah... the DS solution

Had a good look at Sangin and other areas on Google Earth, still baffled as to what is being attempted there. When I raised the issue of air recce by mark-1 eyeball or drone I got the of course its going on but can't talk about it routine (OPSEC I suppose) If it is then surely that reduces the need for wandering around? One could deal with all this as a hypothetical of course... but there does not seem to be the interest.

Air ISTAR is used an awful lot, but sometimes it is not suitable or available and things have to be done on foot; 'wandering around' implies small bands of determined yet aimless men which just is not the case.

Again with respect the DS solution. The main question would be of course on which ground this overwatch is being maintained? Open ground? poppy fields? mud walls? people?

Hmm, not sure that I follow this question. The ground which is being overwatched is ground that requires to be overwatched for a variety of reasons. Can you elaborate on what you mean?

Again this "time on the ground" what was being achieved?

If the ANSF are on the ground then (if they are being mentored) ISAF troops need to be deployed with them. Time on ground also results in intelligence. Again (and I could just be having a bad day here) I am slightly confused as to what exactly the nature of your query is.

[Red Rat]

Nonetheless, Alderson’s conclusions are quite damning IMO; British officers were largely ignorant of British COIN doctrine;

Correct. The situation is better now, but while more have read it few are yet understanding it to any great degree.

the political framework and goals stated by the UK government resembled moving goal posts and precluded the proper implementation of COIN;

Yes, however it can be argued that the changing goal posts did not require the UK to implement an effective COIN strategy in order to achieve strategic success. If your definition of strategic success was a time based drawdown from Iraq with minimum casualties then...

that British forces simply couldn’t generate enough combat power on the ground to implement a COIN plan fully anyway;

Correct.

and, that UK forces were not as well trained or briefed as US units were (post-2004) on how to implement a COIN doctrine that was, ironically, of British provenance.

Correct, although the major failings were at formation HQ level training. At all levels the training and understanding of individuals and teams in Influence Ops was terrible and our ability to harness money as a weapon system correspondingly woeful.

[William F. Owen]

Correct, although the major failings were at formation HQ level training. At all levels the training and understanding of individuals and teams in Influence Ops was terrible and our ability to harness money as a weapon system correspondingly woeful.

Please do not tell me that you have brought into Influence Ops. It's twaddle of the worst sort.

[Ken White]

I do know from harsh experience they will believe little or nothing you say, take all you offer, ask for more and change little if at all. Many will even change to harden their opposition to you...

Not to mention that your opponents, generally decentralized with far less bureaucracy and no over cautious senior people to placate plus the ability to use terror and intimidation will generally out-influence you...

[JMA]

I do know from harsh experience they will believe little or nothing you say, take all you offer, ask for more and change little if at all. Many will even change to harden their opposition to you...

So the question is why do people still keep on doing this?

[William F. Owen]

So the question is why do people still keep on doing this?

Keep doing what? If you mean why are modern armies not very good at irregular warfare, then that's the question we are all trying to answer.
My firm opinion is because that many modern armies are socially uncomfortable with the idea of killing, capture and destruction as being the primary tools by which you set forth violence via policy.

[Ken White]

So the question is why do people still keep on doing this?

from which they come. Since World War II the world population, generally, has softened its stance on many things -- and warfare is one of those. The urge for no war at best or for painless and deathless war at worst is strong in most people. Foolish, I know but it seems to be a developing norm.

So, per Wilf, "...many modern armies are socially uncomfortable with the idea of killing, capture and destruction as being the primary tools by which you set forth violence via policy" because the populations from which they recruit broadly are opposed to said killing and destruction.

That creates an interesting dichotomy. As I wrote on the Combat Shotgun thread:

"...we in the west really need to ask ourselves exactly what we think we're doing in our interventions?

Most such interventions by general purpose western forces are undertaken due to a small 'l' liberal desire to make things better -- those same people then turn around and criticize such interventions as militaristic neo-colonialism etc. etc. and cry for them to end prematurely. That makes no sense. Not only is it not ideal -- doesn't need to be, BTW -- it's dumb.

Right off the top of my head, I cannot think of a single such intervention by western forces that was truly worth the cost and effort..."

I added there were other ways for the west to be involved and possibly achieve more success but the real issue is simply using the wrong tool -- or, in most nations, the only tool which happens to be available but which is ill suited -- for the COIN / FID effort. The result is generally a lackluster, half hearted effort to do things on the cheap (in all senses of the word...) without doing any or at least little damage to people or things. That obviously isn't going to work so we try to devise other means to accomplish the task.

Academics and other 'thinkers' are then asked to provide solutions and suggestions to achieve minor modern miracles, "win hearts and minds" -- and, oh, by the way, turn oil into water.

It all comes back to the politicians -- also products of the society from which they spring -- who put on blinders in an effort to be all things to all people.

And make everyone happy. That's what politicians try to do with no hope of success and that's why we keep trying to do things that do not work...

[davidbfpo]

A busy weekend for the reform of UK defence policy, notably around Afghanistan and as reported on SWJ Blog the top military commander is to go: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=10609

This is a BBC News report, after the Secretary of Defence was on midday TV:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/politics/10304840.stm

On the 9th a retired general adds his comments:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10271619.stm

On the 12th an admiral too: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10300703.stm and commenting on the 2006 decision to deploy to Helmand:

At the time, I think we had an immature approach to what is now known as counter-insurgency. We didn't realise the complexity and the character of the context in which we were going to fight. In fact, we didn't envisage we were going to fight.

As they say the atmosphere has changed with a new government and some criticism being aired. One wonders when the "stay calm, we're OK" faction will respond.

[William F. Owen]

As they say the atmosphere has changed with a new government and some criticism being aired. One wonders when the "stay calm, we're OK" faction will respond.

There's a "stay calm, we're OK" faction? Where?
Everyone I know keeps saying "F*ck, F*ck, oh F@ck."

The problem children are the "Influence and New COIN" (The Admiral) bunnies who think that you can buy success. History says otherwise.

[Red Rat]

Please do not tell me that you have brought into Influence Ops. It's twaddle of the worst sort.

There could be a whole different thread starting here...

It depends on what you see Influence Ops being a means to an end or an end in itself. I err towards the role of armed forces being to kill the enemy thereby either solving the issue (you can't have a conflict if one side to the conflict no longer exists) or creating the necessary conditions whereby other organs of state can step in and start to solve the conflict. On that analysis then Influence Ops is a means to an end.

If on the other hand you regard the focused use of violence as one of several 'Influence' tools (the - AQ does Influence Operations with a kinetic element' analysis) then Influence becomes the end in itself with use of force one of the means.

I don't think you can write off the full panoply of Influence ACtivities and I also think that we (UK Armed Forces plc) remain mired in confusion as to what we want from Influence Activities at all levels; and by staffing (in true British fashion) with sometimes enthusiastic amateurs we do what little we do badly...

By Influence Activities/Ops I certainly do not mean that we can apply pressure or inducements with any degree of certainty as to what the 'influencing effect' will be (if x then y); most of us have problems understanding our wives let alone strangers in a foreign culture.

[Red Rat]

On the 12th an admiral too: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/10300703.stm and commenting on the 2006 decision to deploy to Helmand:

At the time, I think we had an immature approach to what is now known as counter-insurgency. We didn't realise the complexity and the character of the context in which we were going to fight. In fact, we didn't envisage we were going to fight.

I think our doctrine was pretty good at the time, our knowledge of said doctrine was appalling and our hubris was colossal in its scope!

If I were a betting man I would see the UK Army looking slightly smaller in a few years with:

• Less heavy armour (Challenger 2)
• Less heavy artillery (AS 90)
• Less armoured infantry (Warrior)
• Fewer infantry bns (but more men in each, reflecting closer the structures and manning in place in Afghanistan)
• More Military Police - leaning towards police mentoring and rear security tasks as the US MPs do

A complete restructuring of the UK regional infrastructure (4 x non-deployable div HQs and almost a dozen regional brigades) into a much leaner organisation (and also resulting in considerable cost savings in terms of infrastructure and manpower).
Looking slightly wider it would be nice to have a root and branch reform of our procurement and management structures as neither are currently fit for purpose.

Sensible reform would see a smaller army but with ability to deploy more people in the field - there is a recognition that we need numbers as well as smart gadgets to be able to fight effectivly.

[Fuchs]

"...we in the west really need to ask ourselves exactly what we think we're doing in our interventions?

Most such interventions by general purpose western forces are undertaken due to a small 'l' liberal desire to make things better -- those same people then turn around and criticize such interventions as militaristic neo-colonialism etc. etc. and cry for them to end prematurely. That makes no sense. Not only is it not ideal -- doesn't need to be, BTW -- it's dumb.

Right off the top of my head, I cannot think of a single such intervention by western forces that was truly worth the cost and effort..."

The French seem to have a good Africa interventions track record after they were done losing wars of independence in their colonies.

[Ken White]

have generally not intervened for humanitarian or social nicety reasons but simply to keep the Francophonie orderly and their own export capabilities at a good level. They also do not send massive forces but rather just enough to do the job; frequently just a Legion Bn or so (which gives La Legion problems like a high desertion rate...).

None of that changes the fact that you're correct, they are generally successful to the extent that while they may not be a total win on cost-benefit ratio, they are seldom a significant loss.

And there was Sierra Leone...

[William F. Owen]

I think our doctrine was pretty good at the time, our knowledge of said doctrine was appalling and our hubris was colossal in its scope!

I would re-zero that to the Hubris of some, not all.
Knowledge of our doctrine is poor because we DO NOT TEACH IT! Doctrine is what is taught. There is this bizarre idea in the UK, that you just read Doctrine and "Voila" - you get it. Not so.

• Less heavy armour (Challenger 2)
• Less heavy artillery (AS 90)
• Less armoured infantry (Warrior)
• Fewer infantry bns (but more men in each, reflecting closer the structures and manning in place in Afghanistan)
• More Military Police - leaning towards police mentoring and rear security tasks as the US MPs do

The problem isn't numbers. It's structure, and application. EG, we keep waffling on about the number of infantry BN's and not the number of fully manned Rifle Companies we can deploy.
IRRC, there are about 27,000 men in the UK infantry, and if you crunch the numbers, <50% are in rifle platoons. Others feel free to check.

Sensible reform would see a smaller army but with ability to deploy more people in the field - there is a recognition that we need numbers as well as smart gadgets to be able to fight effectivly.

It would. That's why I doubt it, in my life time. It's also not the vibe coming out of main building. People want to slash manpower and keep "capability" in terms of "systems".

[JMA]

Keep doing what?

As Ken said, keeping throwing money at the populations caught up in these insurgencies.

[William F. Owen]

As Ken said, keeping throwing money at the populations caught up in these insurgencies.

On that we agree. Why involve the poor bl**dy civilians?

[JMA]

From the Independent on Sunday:

Taliban doubles number of bomb attacks on British troops

Some harsh realities coming home to the Brits now.

This equates to 21 incidents a day in the part of the country where Britain's 10,000-strong force is based, and is 78 per cent of all IED attacks overall. It represents a 236 per cent increase in attacks compared to the same period last year.

Then there is some good news from the TimesOnline:

Defence chief to be axed

BRITAIN’S most senior military officer, (Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup), is to be axed as the new government seeks to draw a line under past failures in Afghanistan.

Starting at the top a good shake-up of the general staff will lead to an improvement on the ground. The problem is that it will take so long to implement that the desired effect may be lost.

[Red Rat]

I would re-zero that to the Hubris of some, not all.

The hubris of most, not all

Knowledge of our doctrine is poor because we DO NOT TEACH IT! Doctrine is what is taught. There is this bizarre idea in the UK, that you just read Doctrine and "Voila" - you get it. Not so.

I agree. RMA Sandhurst is trying to improve on this area and there is recognition that the cutting of AJD (junior captain's staff course) and its replacement by distance (on-line) learning was a fatal mistake. There is also the in-built cultural bias within the army that we have traditionally been a 'doing' organisation, and not necessarily a thinking army. Even when we did read doctrine we did not discuss or understand it. patently we need to conduct an Influence Campaign to correct this!

The problem isn't numbers. It's structure, and application. EG, we keep waffling on about the number of infantry BN's and not the number of fully manned Rifle Companies we can deploy.
IRRC, there are about 27,000 men in the UK infantry, and if you crunch the numbers, <50% are in rifle platoons. Others feel free to check.

I have not checked the numbers but that sounds about right. Much of the talk at the moment is about making infantry structures more robust (larger companies) and not getting so hung up on the number of battalions.

It's also not the vibe coming out of main building. People want to slash manpower and keep "capability" in terms of "systems".

There is an element of wanting to 'have your cake and eat it', but less Lieutenant Colonels and above I have not heard on any wish to slash numbers. There is wide spread acceptance however that structures will need to change.

There is a lot of appetite in the army for bold sweeping reform within the army and across defence. As ever however in the MOD it is all about protecting service and branch turf; it will be interesting to see how the political team deal with the military.