The General's Report

[SteveMetz]

Pace and Meyers seemed to be empty suits. They just parroted the party line over and over. Maybe that's what the politicians want for a CJCS.

I believe they are both men of tremendous honor, personal integrity, and intellect. It's just that both held a view of civil-military relations that stressed complete subservience. That combination is precisely why they were selected but, from an historical standpoint, they were the wrong guys at the wrong time. --the nation needed frankness, not subservience. To some extent, I'm withholding judgement because it is at least possible that they were brutally frank with Rumsfeld in private but felt their duty was to be subservient in public. But that remains to be seen.

The bigger (and more important) question is whether our system can generate senior leaders who do NOT fit this mold. Can one get four stars without being totally subservient to civilian leaders?

[Ski]

I don't disagree with you Steve. You don't become a 4 Star without brains at the very least.

But as you state, they were completely subserviant in a position where they shouldn't have been. We are paying for their lack of moral courage, at least from their public personas.

To answer your question, I think the answer is no, as long as political leaders continue to use the military as the primary instrument of foreign policy. Because of the political pressures derived from military force, these 4 Stars in the future will be even more scrutinized than they are today. If a future President shifts foreign policy back into Diplomatic or Intelligence spheres of influence, then its possible that a 4 Star who questions authority may indeed rise. But I remain skeptical...

I believe they are both men of tremendous honor, personal integrity, and intellect. It's just that both held a view of civil-military relations that stressed complete subservience. That combination is precisely why they were selected but, from an historical standpoint, they were the wrong guys at the wrong time. --the nation needed frankness, not subservience. To some extent, I'm withholding judgement because it is at least possible that they were brutally frank with Rumsfeld in private but felt their duty was to be subservient in public. But that remains to be seen.

The bigger (and more important) question is whether our system can generate senior leaders who do NOT fit this mold. Can one get four stars without being totally subservient to civilian leaders?

[Dr Jack]

The bigger (and more important) question is whether our system can generate senior leaders who do NOT fit this mold. Can one get four stars without being totally subservient to civilian leaders?

The key word in Steve's question seems to be "totally." It's a matter of degree -- we want our military leaders to be subordinate to civilian control, but we also want them to provide sound advice and counsel to the civilians who are the constitutional leaders. We certainly don't want our four stars (or any other leaders) to be totally subservient... but, at the end of the day, we also want our military leaders to stand up and salute when a decision has been made by the civilian leadership -- hopefully after the military's sound advice and counsel has been considered.

The Taguba article brings home the additional consideration -- when leaders (civilian or military) act in such a way that is illegal or immoral. This is the time for subordinates to depart from subservience and to stand up for what is right and moral. The Taguba article ends with such a situation:

Taguba went on, “There was no doubt in my mind that this stuff”—the explicit images—“was gravitating upward. It was standard operating procedure to assume that this had to go higher. The President had to be aware of this.” He said that Rumsfeld, his senior aides, and the high-ranking generals and admirals who stood with him {Rumsfeld} as he misrepresented what he knew about Abu Ghraib had failed the nation.

“From the moment a soldier enlists, we inculcate loyalty, duty, honor, integrity, and selfless service,” Taguba said. “And yet when we get to the senior-officer level we forget those values. I know that my peers in the Army will be mad at me for speaking out, but the fact is that we violated the laws of land warfare in Abu Ghraib. We violated the tenets of the Geneva Convention. We violated our own principles and we violated the core of our military values. The stress of combat is not an excuse, and I believe, even today, that those civilian and military leaders responsible should be held accountable.”

[Steve Blair]

I think what we're seeing (again) is a CJCS that is very similar to what we had in Vietnam, at least in terms of the lack of open dissent when it comes to policy.

[SteveMetz]

I think what we're seeing (again) is a CJCS that is very similar to what we had in Vietnam, at least in terms of the lack of open dissent when it comes to policy.

I've asked H.R. McMaster who he thinks will write the next Dereliction of Duty. He just smiled.

[Tom Odom]

I've asked H.R. McMaster who he thinks will write the next Dereliction of Duty. He just smiled.

Paul Yingling I hope

[Doug Ollivant]

I think what we're seeing (again) is a CJCS that is very similar to what we had in Vietnam, at least in terms of the lack of open dissent when it comes to policy.

I think it is important to remember that just five years ago, it was very in vogue to believe that there was a "crisis in civil military relations" and that public, or perhaps even emphatic private, disagreement with "civilian" leadership (left very unspecified as to just who this included) was disloyal, or "shirking."

I state this not to absolve those indicted by Paul Yingling, but rather to expand it to include those who promoted academic theories that encouraged flag officers to view their informed professional opinion as just another policy preference.

I'm certain this was not the intent of the academics. There was considerably more nuance in the original books and articles than what percolated into the conventional wisdom of policy circles, but ideas have consequences.

Doug

[Tom Odom]

I think it is important to remember that just five years ago, it was very in vogue to believe that there was a "crisis in civil military relations" and that public, or perhaps even emphatic private, disagreement with "civilian" leadership (left very unspecified as to just who this included) was disloyal, or "shirking."

I state this not to absolve those indicted by Paul Yingling, but rather to expand it to include those who promoted academic theories that encouraged flag officers to view their informed professional opinion as just another policy preference.

I'm certain this was not the intent of the academics. There was considerably more nuance in the original books and articles than what percolated into the conventional wisdom of policy circles, but ideas have consequences.

Doug

Doug,

You are correct and that was very much in play when SecDef Rumsfeld set about busting Pentagon broncos--at least that is how it was played out by him in the press. It bears remembering how important it was to suddenly rename the CINCs of the Unified commands to Combatant Commanders because the SecDef was in his own words "in command". This entire theme played out in the planning for OIF and the lacvk of planning for the aftermath--at which point the "in command" SecDef suddenly became less in charge and more of a self-described advisor.

The bottom line in this at least to me is that at the end of the day one has to be able to look at oneself in the mirror and answer, yes, to the question, "did I do my duty truthfully, honorably, and professionally" without the mirror shattering in disgust.

There is much food for thought in this Hersch piece on the SOF side as well, especially the linkages between SOF and the agency. The ends justifies the means school of thought soon gets coupled with the secrecy covers all sins. Ultimately it is the military partner that gets left twisting in the wind when things get out of control.

Tom

[Stevely]

Doug,

You are correct and that was very much in play when SecDef Rumsfeld set about busting Pentagon broncos--at least that is how it was played out by him in the press. It bears remembering how important it was to suddenly rename the CINCs of the Unified commands to Combatant Commanders because the SecDef was in his own words "in command". This entire theme played out in the planning for OIF and the lacvk of planning for the aftermath--at which point the "in command" SecDef suddenly became less in charge and more of a self-described advisor.

I hate to be seen defending Rumsfeld, but in this matter, I don't believe this is a correct statement of the facts as regards the CINC -> combatant commander issue. As I recall it, and we had memos up for about a year in the workplace from the SECDEF explaining the change, his point was that there was only one "Commander in Chief" in the US Armed Forces, and that's the President. Hence the name change for the unified commanders. I actually think his reasoning on this one was correct.

This does not absolve him of the atrocious errors of judgment that marked his tenure nor his meddling in the business of said combatant commanders, but this issue is not really a part of that.

[Tom Odom]

I hate to be seen defending Rumsfeld, but in this matter, I don't believe this is a correct statement of the facts as regards the CINC -> combatant commander issue. As I recall it, and we had memos up for about a year in the workplace from the SECDEF explaining the change, his point was that there was only one "Commander in Chief" in the US Armed Forces, and that's the President. Hence the name change for the unified commanders. I actually think his reasoning on this one was correct.

Thanks for that. It is the first time I have heard that this change came from below. In any case, would you agree that he seemed to see the military as minimally non-compliant if not openly defiant?

Tom