The Taliban collection (2006 onwards)

[davidbfpo]

Amidst a news round up are a couple of paragraphs (shortened), with links, on the state of the Taliban armoury in Helmand, after the Marja fighting:

Have you ever wondered what an insurgent’s gun locker looks like? The New York Times has for some while been looking at what weapons the Taliban and associated groups have at their disposal, how they equip themselves, and what each might tell us about their ability to function as a fighting force. The area of Marja, in Helmand Province...captured 26 firearms – of which twelve were variants of the Kalashnikov, eight were fifty-year-old bolt-action assault rifles, four were variants of the PK machine gun, and two were semi-automatic pistols...

According to the New York Times, the weapons collected – and in particular the presence of a growing number of ancient bolt-action rifles in the regions – fit a broader pattern which suggests arms supply issues may well be starting to affect militant groups’ attack capabilities – though at the same time, the report stresses that an apparent decline in the prevalence of assault rifles should not be taken to indicate a dramatic drop in the availability of all types weapons across Helmand.

The report’s author also draws attention to the repairs carried out on a number of the captured weapons – repairs that, while certainly hindering their overall accuracy, render them usable nevertheless. A testament to their owners resourcefulness or, again, to increasingly limited supplies? The answer, it is suggested, probably lies somewhere between the two...

..Old they may be, but together they have helped some of the poorest and least well-equipped forces in the world stand up to one of the biggest, best funded and most technologically sophisticated armies ever seen.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensec...utm_campaign=0

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den:

The latest report from the Institute for the Study of War on the Haqqani network in Eastern Afghanistan is a tour de force by author Jeffrey Dressler. The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan explains how this formidable fighting organisation, based on two generations of fighters, has become the most dangerous element of the Afghan Taliban.

Ends with:

Dressler's report is full of facts and details and essential reading for anyone who wants to follow the military campaign.

Link:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....i-network.html

Report, as yet un-read:http://www.understandingwar.org/file...ni_Network.pdf

[carl]

David:

The article from Open Democracy was mostly a rewrite of one a long series of works C.J. Chivers has done over at the NYT regarding Taliban weapons and weapons use. They are very good.

Regarding this quote from the Open Democracy piece:

"eight were fifty-year-old bolt-action assault rifles"

Bolt action assault rifles! Will wonders never cease. The NYT story said "bolt action rifles." That wasn't dramatic enough for Open Democracy I guess.

[JMA]

Amidst a news round up are a couple of paragraphs (shortened), with links, on the state of the Taliban armoury in Helmand, after the Marja fighting:



Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensec...utm_campaign=0

Before we get shot away and turn the Taliban into some over hyped mythical super human force as a result of the above I suggest rather than read into that how well the Taliban are performing given poor weapons against best equipped forces in the world today (US and Brit) see it as an indication of how poorly the tactical approach from ISAF has been. The more I learn about the Taliban the more I agree with Fuchs that in this war soldiering standards among ISAF are dropping precipitously to the extent when they come against a competent enemy in the near future or in the next war they will be in for a nasty surprise.

[davidbfpo]

The headline from an article in The Australian, which struck me as different, but started to wonder when I read one cited source:

The best Taliban commanders are dead or captured. Their men are harried and subject to constant attack and betrayal. They are under-equipped, overwhelmed and demoralised. In a word, the Taliban are losing....

"The Taliban are broken and defeated here," Ahmed Wali Karzai, the brother of the President and the south's most powerful Afghan leader, told The Times yesterday.

"They are in a miserable state. Their best commanders are all dead and their fighters run here and there. Their casualties are high and they can barely fight."

Link:http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news...-1225935962365

Or The Washington Post, by retired General Keane after a two week visit:

First, most commanders with whom he spoke said they are encountering Taliban who want to stop fighting and reintegrate into Afghan society. "That's a big deal," he said.

Second, "There's evidence of erosion of some of the will of the Taliban. We pick it up in interrogations, and we also pick it up listening to their radio

traffic and telephone calls in terms of the morale problems they're starting to have."

Link:http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/...-afghan-surge/

Both reports up via a previously un-heard UK website, which in a comment added this:

Three thousand captured or confirmed killed in pre planned raids over 90 days, thats new.

Citing an article in The Daily Telegraph, not yet id'd.

Is this "spin" or a reality the usual media recoil from? Reading a "boots on the ground" perspective provided by http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/ I wonder.

[davidbfpo]

Speaking in London, at RUSI, today General Petraeus, two selected paragraphs:

the US general, who was answering questions at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, denied that there had been a change of tactics away from trying to win over the population as part of a “counter-insurgency” strategy and towards a targeted “counter-terrorism” strategy.

He said the increase in targeted attacks was part of a general “civilian-military” strategy that also included increasing the capacity of the government to provide services and trying to persuade the Taliban to defect, as part of what he described as a “comprehensive” approach.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...-al-Qaeda.html

The full speech is not yet on the RUSI website, will add a link when available.

[JMA]

Or The Washington Post, by retired General Keane after a two week visit:

Link:http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/...-afghan-surge/

Gen. Keane states the blindingly obvious (quote below) and one is left wondering why it has taken years for this action to be taken?

"Support zones are up in the mountains, where they use villagers to help hide their weapons caches. Safe havens are up there, too, usually away from everybody, and we are denying them the use of those. We are interdicting and disrupting their operating areas, which had a tendency to focus on the roads quite a bit, and we're interdicting what they're doing there."

[davidbfpo]

After the post above with the title 'Taliban on verge of collapse, NATO and Afghan officials believe' comes report by the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office:
http://www.afgnso.org/2010Q/ANSO%20Q...Q3%202010).pdf

The first paragraph:

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) counter-offensive is increasingly mature, complex and effective. Country-wide attacks have grown by 59% while sophisticated recruitment techniques have helped activate networks of fighters in the North where European NATO contributors have failed to provide an adequate deterrent. Some provinces here are experiencing double the country average growth rate and their districts are in danger of slipping beyong any control. Clumsy attempts to stem the developments, through the formation of local militias and intelligence-poor operations, have served to polarise communities with the IEA capitalising on the local grievances that result. In the South, despite more robust efforts from the US NATO contingents, counter-insurgency operations in Kandahar and Marjah have similarly failed to degrade the IEA's ability to fight, reduce the number of civilian combat fatalities or deliver boxed government.

The report has graphs and maps - worth a browse.

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den.

[anna]

The fact is:
the Talian IS winning!
Taliban fighter have more support in the public that ISAF.
Under the Taliban, there was order, now there is chaos caused by western forces.
You do the math!

You guys can post any interview or article with this Gen. or that politician.
All are liars, all trump their pro-invasion view and dismiss reality.

Soon, the west will run out of money and steam. Just look at Europe right now, at time of this posting.

The us and a is bankrupt, prints money at time of this post.

"Allies" departing from Afghanistan, Canada will stop fighting in a few month (will keep approx. 1000 personal there, most ast trainers).

There is a new war on the horizon.
Nobody will have the time, resources and money to keep going in Afghanistan.

[JMA]

There is a new war on the horizon.

OK, so who will it be this time?

[davidbfpo]

A short briefing paper by the London-based Quilliam Foundation, starts well IMHO, but tails off in the recommendations:http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/im...,2Q5RQ7,WFU2,1

[Jedburgh]

SWP, 23 Dec 10: Escalation in the Kunduz Region: Who Are the Insurgents in Northeastern Afghanistan?

Although approximately 5,000 US soldiers were transferred into Northern Afghanistan in the first half of 2010 and there have been initial military successes, the intensity of the insurgency in the Kunduz region has not diminished. Instead, there has been a continuing escalation of violence there in recent months. The unabated strength of the insurgency is based primarily on highly diversified leadership and logistical structures. The insurgency in the northeast consists of several groups, which follow different strategic objectives, but maintain close tactical cooperation. The main groups are the Afghan Taliban, the Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Additional groups include the Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda. It is important to assemble precise information about the ideological and strategic characteristics of these groups as only then can effective military action be taken and only then can decisions be made about which groups must be approached as negotiation partners.

[carl]

Jed:

This may be off topic but that photo of Santa's demise is GREAT!

[SWJ Blog]

Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Changing Face of Uzbek Militancy

Entry Excerpt:

Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Changing Face of Uzbek Militancy
by Jeffrey Dressler and David Witter

Download the Full Article: Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Changing Face of Uzbek Militancy


Although Uzbek militants have been active in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the late 1990s, little attention has been paid to these fighters. Principally, the Islamic Movements of Uzbekistan—formed in 1998 by Toher Yuldashev and Juma Namangani—is the main organization which organizes and directs these militants. The group’s main focus has always been ousting Uzbek President Islam Karimov in favor of installing an Islamist regime. Over the past several years however, the IMU has strengthened its ties with the likes of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, focusing not just on northern Afghanistan but internationally as well—a particularly troubling development that has managed to fly under the radar.

The IMU has maintained close ties with the Taliban and al-Qaeda since the late 1990s, meeting with Taliban officials and Osama bin Laden in 1997 and later, agreeing to set up a base of operations in northern Afghanistan while Yuldashev resided in Kandahar with Taliban senior leadership in 1998. In exchange for using northern Afghanistan as a launching pad into the central Asian states, the IMU provided militants to the Taliban to battle the Northern Alliance, led by Ahmed Shah Massoud. In 2000, the group was designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, who noted the group’s close association with al-Qaeda. After fighting losing battles with invading U.S. forces in the north and east in 2001, the IMU relocated to South Waziristan in Pakistan where it reconstituted, partially shifting its focus to assist a clan of Waziri tribal militants in fighting against the Pakistani government.

Download the Full Article: Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Changing Face of Uzbek Militancy


Jeffrey Dressler is a analyst focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan security dynamics at the Institute for the Study of War in Washington, DC. David Witter assists with research at ISW and is the author of the ISW Backgrounder, “Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan’s Tribal Region.”



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[SWJ Blog]

Negoitiating with the Taliban

Entry Excerpt:

Conflict resolution and peace negotiations will be highlighted over the coming months as the United States begins a shift in President Obama's comprehensive counterinsurgency plan towards transition. Here is one empirical study that is of significant note.

Negotiating with the Taliban: The Timing and Consequences of Settlements in Foreign Power COIN Wars
by Andrew J. Enterline and Joseph Magagnoli

The emergence of a negotiated settlement as the goal of the American-led allied military mission in Afghanistan raises several questions: How likely is a negotiated settlement with Taliban insurgents? How long will it take to conclude negotiations with the Taliban? What is the likely long-term byproduct of negotiating with the Taliban? How close will the post-settlement facts on the ground be to American goals in Afghanistan? How will the recent strategy change in OEF influence negotiations and the resulting short- and long-term consequences? We investigate these questions by exploring patterns of negotiations between foreign powers and insurgents in COIN wars during the twentieth century. Our analysis serves as a probe of the aforementioned policy questions, such that we are merely querying the historical record to gain an understanding of how counterinsurgent armies fared in negotiations with insurgents. This probe provides a foundation from which to develop a theory of COIN negotiations that we intend to pursue subsequently.

Much more at The Culture & Conflict Review



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[SWJ Blog]

Beating Back the Taliban

Entry Excerpt:

Beating Back the Taliban by Dr. Seth Jones, Foreign Policy / RAND. BLUF: "Despite all the political hand-wringing in Washington over the war in Afghanistan, it's the Taliban who are now on the defensive on the military battlefield. Indeed, there is a growing recognition among senior Taliban leaders that they are losing momentum in parts of southern Afghanistan, their longtime stronghold. This is more than the normal winter lull of senior Taliban fighters migrating to Pakistan: The Taliban have definitively lost territorial control in parts of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and other southern provinces."



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[SWJ Blog]

U.S., Taliban Not Ready For Peace Talks

Entry Excerpt:

U.S., Taliban Not Ready For Afghanistan Peace Talks by David Wood, Huffington Post. BLUF: "... prospects for peace talks seem remote, and international diplomats and others say any actual settlement is years away."



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[SWJ Blog]

Are The Taliban And Al Qaeda Allies?

Entry Excerpt:

Are The Taliban And Al Qaeda Allies?
by Paul Overby

Download the Full Article: Are The Taliban And Al Qaeda Allies?

"In my view" should preface every statement here. It is likely the situation in Afghanistan is understood perfectly by no one, certainly not I. So I present these remarks as a prolegomenon or an extended suggestion to which others may compare their own thoughts. Any figures, for instance, are approximate. I combine references to some of my favorite books with personal experience garnered from a total of about two and a half years on the street as an independent observer in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the first nine months of which are described in my book Holy Blood.

Download the Full Article: Are The Taliban And Al Qaeda Allies?

Paul Overby went to Peshawar independently in 1988 to witness the struggle of the Afghan Freedom Fighters; spent 6 months talking to exile Afghans; finally, for a brief moment, fought alongside the mujahideen in the hills of Kunar. In 1993, Holy Blood was published. That same year he returned to visit the major commander Mullah Naqeeb in Kandahar (and helped push start his Mercedes) and interviewed Ahmad Shah Massoud in Kabul. Since late 2007 he has made four trips to AfPak for a total of 20 months. Talking to hundreds of people on the street, staying as a special guest of his old friend Governor Sayed Fazlolah Wahidi in Kunar, and interviewing a few important figures, his goal was to understand the American position in Afghanistan and to find Osama--whom he tentatively placed in the Yarkhun Valley.



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[SWJ Blog]

Headway in Taliban Talks Months Off

Entry Excerpt:

Re:

Karzai Announces Peace Talks with Taliban - VOA
Karzai: US in Peace Talks with Taliban - WP
Lashing Out, Karzai Says US Talking to the Taliban - NYT
US Contacted Taliban about Afghan Peace Deal - LAT
Karzai: US in Peace Talks with Taliban - BBC
As Karzai Confirms Taliban Talks, Attack in Kabul Kills 9 - AP
Afghan Leader Says US in Contact With Taliban - Reuters
US Ambassador Responds to Karzai’s Criticisms - NYT

Gates: Headway in Taliban Talks May be Months Off - Reuters. BLUF: "It could be months before efforts to broker a peace deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban bear fruit, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in an interview aired on Sunday."



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[SWJ Blog]

The Third Way of COIN: Defeating the Taliban in Sangin

Entry Excerpt:

The Third Way of COIN: Defeating the Taliban in Sangin by Dr. Mark Moyar, Orbis Operations.



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