Syria: a civil war (closed)

[JMA]

So who should in your opinion intervene? The Americans were the only ones crazy enough to sink trillions of dollars in the ability to beat up a medium-sized, very distant country that has a large and obsolete military.

Good summary.

Most can't while those who could either won't or should not.

How does this, if at all, detract from the need curb the excesses of the Assad regime?

[Fuchs]

Good summary.

Most can't while those who could either won't or should not.

How does this, if at all, detract from the need curb the excesses of the Assad regime?

Which need?

3,000 people died in inter-tribal violence in province Pibor, South Sudan, at the beginning of this year. We didn't even notice, much less did a Western public discuss the prospect of intervention.

Why is there a need for action in Syria, but not in other places?

Looks to me as if it's not a need, but a personal preference.
The Syrians are having a civil war. I can resist the urge for calling for an involvement.

[J Wolfsberger]

Which need?

3,000 people died in inter-tribal violence in province Pibor, South Sudan, at the beginning of this year. We didn't even notice, much less did a Western public discuss the prospect of intervention.

Why is there a need for action in Syria, but not in other places?

Looks to me as if it's not a need, but a personal preference.
The Syrians are having a civil war. I can resist the urge for calling for an involvement.

And as Rod Liddle pointed out, by asking an obviously rhetorical question, we know very little about who the people in rebellion really are, while we know a great deal about Assad, the Ba'ath Party, the Alawite minority in power, and so on. If events in Egypt and Libya are any indication, regardless of the current gush-gush over the insurgents in many quarters, only the hard core, radical Islamist groups have sufficient organization, resources and clarity of goals to shape the end state after the overthrow of the the Assad regime. The rest will be sidelined.

At least for the present, the situation seems to be that the Arab League would like somebody to intervene, so that the "somebody" will be the bad guy rather than them. Otherwise, those Saudi and Jordanian aircraft, tanks and infantry would already be on the scene.

Meanwhile, the choosing of sides is leading to a rift between Hamas and Iran - which I think most rational people would consider a Good Thing.

I'm with you, Fuchs. Resisting the temptation to intervene is proving very easy.

[JMA]

And as Rod Liddle pointed out, by asking an obviously rhetorical question, we know very little about who the people in rebellion really are, while we know a great deal about Assad, the Ba'ath Party, the Alawite minority in power, and so on. If events in Egypt and Libya are any indication, regardless of the current gush-gush over the insurgents in many quarters, only the hard core, radical Islamist groups have sufficient organization, resources and clarity of goals to shape the end state after the overthrow of the the Assad regime. The rest will be sidelined.

At least for the present, the situation seems to be that the Arab League would like somebody to intervene, so that the "somebody" will be the bad guy rather than them. Otherwise, those Saudi and Jordanian aircraft, tanks and infantry would already be on the scene.

Meanwhile, the choosing of sides is leading to a rift between Hamas and Iran - which I think most rational people would consider a Good Thing.

I'm with you, Fuchs. Resisting the temptation to intervene is proving very easy.

It is important that the US does not intervene.

Ron Liddle was just filling space and providing fodder for those looking for reasons to oppose any intervention. His work is apparently necessary to help those unable to think for themselves.

So I guess you are right then... lets all just sit back and watch 1,000s of people being butchered. I wonder what that makes us?

[Entropy]

I'll go ahead and lay out my view and analysis regarding military intervention, specifically the use of military means toward a political end.

First of all, I think there are three "categories" in which military force could be used:

1. Regime change, by whatever means.
2. Change the balance of power between Assad’s forces and the opposition so that Assad’s forces cannot conduct mass killings.
3. Compel Assad to make a political decision to stop the mass killings or reconcile with the opposition.

Let’s examine the utility of military force in each case:

First, regime change:

• Regime change is something military force can achieve by following, very roughly, the Libya model. Another example is the post Desert Storm counter-factual where the Iraqi Shia rebels receive a proxy air force to finish Saddam off after we decimated his conventional forces. The US does have a lot of experience at this sort of thing - see also Afghanistan in 2001-2002.
• The problem is, however, that whatever the circumstances, we can’t control how regime change occurs or turns out in the end. It’s a pretty big gamble and the odds are good that the result will not be pretty. The stakes are a lot greater in Syria than Libya because Syria is bigger, more populous, better armed, has chemical weapons, is more geographically strategic, and plays an important regional role with it's alliance with Iran and involvement in factional Lebanese politics. It's not clear at all how things would turn out if we upset that apple cart, but I think the result would look a lot more like Iraq circa 2006 than Libya 2011.
• The best case for regime change is a successful coup, but that’s not something we can create or control through military force. It's also not clear that an Alawite successor would view the rebels any differently than Assad and it's highly unlikely anyone but another Alawite could stage a sucessful coup.
• Even if Syria transitions smoothly to a new government, the effect will likely be that Syrians will still die, they'll just be different Syrians. A Marine officer over at Tom Rick's blog said: "Killing several thousand Syrians so they don't kill several thousand other Syrians only to leave the nation knowing that several thousand more will die is not protecting anyone." That sums it up IMO.
• The worst case is an open and brutal civil war in a highly militarized country rife with internal divisions that also happens to have a lot of chemical weapons.

The second option is to use military force to change the balance of power between Assad and the opposition. There are two basic ways to do this.

• First is to create no-fly/no-drive zones, (using the Southern/Northern watch model) or something similar like "humanitarian corridors" which some advocate for. A bigger version of this the Bosnia partition model which would require an enduring ground-force commitment to separate the warring parties. Any of these options could be accomplished militarily, but there are some serious downsides. The most obvious problem is that such measures are inherently temporary. At some point the NFZ or enforced partition will end. Perhaps a political solution could be negotiated while the parties are separated, but that is not likely for a whole host of reasons I won't belabor here. If a political solution isn't reached, and the political will to continue spending resources enforcing the "peace" ends, then the situation would likely return to the status-quo ante.
• The second option involves attriting Assad’s military and security forces while strengthening the opposition so that Assad no longer has the capability to conduct the mass killings even if he still has the intent. This is a task the US military could accomplish, though it would take a long, sustained air campaign. The problem with this option, however, is what then? Either the situation will slide again into Assad’s favor (a return to the status quo ante), or the opposition will be strong enough to overthrow Assad (see regime change), or you end up with a stalemated civil war in which neither side has a decisive advantage. None of these options sound very good to me and they would all involve killing a lot of Syrians, not protecting them.

The third option is to use military force to compel Assad to come to a political solution with the opposition instead of using violence. This seems the least-realistic of the options and the one least-likely to be accomplished with military force. Is Assad the kind of man who can be bullied into compliance? It's possible I suppose, but it would be uncharacteristic for the typical dictator in Assad's circumstances. And if the interventions in Libya and Iraq are any guide, the political mission creep will tend to try to box Assad in and provide no option but to fight until the bitter end. There's also no guarantee that the opposition would accept any offer from Assad (much less agree among themselves), especially since their primary demand is that Assad step down from office. In my judgment, this option is mostly fantasy abetted by wishful thinking.

There is a fourth option which focuses on punishment as the goal. Although it wouldn't prevent mass killings, it would "send a message." I'm talking, of course, about the tried and true punitive raid. For Syria it would have to be pretty big and would likely last a couple of days - look at Operation Desert Fox for an example of what it might look like. The operation would likely strike regime targets and key strategic facilities. It won’t stop the killings, won’t topple the Assad regime, but at least we could be satisfied that we “did something" even if that "something" is counterproductive.

So in the end, I don't think a military intervention is, at this point in time, justified when compared to the risks and consequences, both intended and unintended.

[J Wolfsberger]

I'll go ahead and lay out my view and analysis regarding military intervention, specifically the use of military means toward a political end.

...

Nicely done.

One thing to add to your appreciation of the military options is that in both Libya and Iraq, the regimes were politically and geographically isolated. That is clearly not the case with Syria. As a result, it seems that any military action would likely draw in other actors.

That touches on jmm99's post:

The Turkish preference (based on what TZ and its columnists have been saying for the last few months) appears to be a Turkish-brokered diplomatic deal involving Turkey, Iran and the Arab League (Saudi and the Gulf states as the money partners) being the "peacekeepers" and guarantors of limited negotiated external interests (Russia-China; US-NATO) - a reverse Sykes-Picot, in effect.

I can almost see Turkey and the Arab League working together, but the Iranians are much more likely to be spoilers, and would definitely get involved on Syria's side if there were any military intervention.

[JMA]

I'll go ahead and lay out my view and analysis regarding military intervention, specifically the use of military means toward a political end.

First of all, I think there are three "categories" in which military force could be used:

1. Regime change, by whatever means.
2. Change the balance of power between Assad’s forces and the opposition so that Assad’s forces cannot conduct mass killings.
3. Compel Assad to make a political decision to stop the mass killings or reconcile with the opposition.

Let’s examine the utility of military force in each case:

First, regime change:

• Regime change is something military force can achieve by following, very roughly, the Libya model. Another example is the post Desert Storm counter-factual where the Iraqi Shia rebels receive a proxy air force to finish Saddam off after we decimated his conventional forces. The US does have a lot of experience at this sort of thing - see also Afghanistan in 2001-2002.
• The problem is, however, that whatever the circumstances, we can’t control how regime change occurs or turns out in the end. It’s a pretty big gamble and the odds are good that the result will not be pretty. The stakes are a lot greater in Syria than Libya because Syria is bigger, more populous, better armed, has chemical weapons, is more geographically strategic, and plays an important regional role with it's alliance with Iran and involvement in factional Lebanese politics. It's not clear at all how things would turn out if we upset that apple cart, but I think the result would look a lot more like Iraq circa 2006 than Libya 2011.
• The best case for regime change is a successful coup, but that’s not something we can create or control through military force. It's also not clear that an Alawite successor would view the rebels any differently than Assad and it's highly unlikely anyone but another Alawite could stage a sucessful coup.
• Even if Syria transitions smoothly to a new government, the effect will likely be that Syrians will still die, they'll just be different Syrians. A Marine officer over at Tom Rick's blog said: "Killing several thousand Syrians so they don't kill several thousand other Syrians only to leave the nation knowing that several thousand more will die is not protecting anyone." That sums it up IMO.
• The worst case is an open and brutal civil war in a highly militarized country rife with internal divisions that also happens to have a lot of chemical weapons.

The second option is to use military force to change the balance of power between Assad and the opposition. There are two basic ways to do this.

• First is to create no-fly/no-drive zones, (using the Southern/Northern watch model) or something similar like "humanitarian corridors" which some advocate for. A bigger version of this the Bosnia partition model which would require an enduring ground-force commitment to separate the warring parties. Any of these options could be accomplished militarily, but there are some serious downsides. The most obvious problem is that such measures are inherently temporary. At some point the NFZ or enforced partition will end. Perhaps a political solution could be negotiated while the parties are separated, but that is not likely for a whole host of reasons I won't belabor here. If a political solution isn't reached, and the political will to continue spending resources enforcing the "peace" ends, then the situation would likely return to the status-quo ante.
• The second option involves attriting Assad’s military and security forces while strengthening the opposition so that Assad no longer has the capability to conduct the mass killings even if he still has the intent. This is a task the US military could accomplish, though it would take a long, sustained air campaign. The problem with this option, however, is what then? Either the situation will slide again into Assad’s favor (a return to the status quo ante), or the opposition will be strong enough to overthrow Assad (see regime change), or you end up with a stalemated civil war in which neither side has a decisive advantage. None of these options sound very good to me and they would all involve killing a lot of Syrians, not protecting them.

The third option is to use military force to compel Assad to come to a political solution with the opposition instead of using violence. This seems the least-realistic of the options and the one least-likely to be accomplished with military force. Is Assad the kind of man who can be bullied into compliance? It's possible I suppose, but it would be uncharacteristic for the typical dictator in Assad's circumstances. And if the interventions in Libya and Iraq are any guide, the political mission creep will tend to try to box Assad in and provide no option but to fight until the bitter end. There's also no guarantee that the opposition would accept any offer from Assad (much less agree among themselves), especially since their primary demand is that Assad step down from office. In my judgment, this option is mostly fantasy abetted by wishful thinking.

There is a fourth option which focuses on punishment as the goal. Although it wouldn't prevent mass killings, it would "send a message." I'm talking, of course, about the tried and true punitive raid. For Syria it would have to be pretty big and would likely last a couple of days - look at Operation Desert Fox for an example of what it might look like. The operation would likely strike regime targets and key strategic facilities. It won’t stop the killings, won’t topple the Assad regime, but at least we could be satisfied that we “did something" even if that "something" is counterproductive.

So in the end, I don't think a military intervention is, at this point in time, justified when compared to the risks and consequences, both intended and unintended.

You have put some time and effort into this so I will be gentle.

I ask you again to start at the beginning.

It is the politicians who decide to intervene and generally place a whole string of limitations on such intervention.

The Pentagon (in the case of the US) then usually don't have the balls to say no (meaning that under those circumstances with those limitations the aim is unlikely to be achieved). Its all about not putting one's pension at risk you see.

Then the planning staffs get hold of it and begin to play. And out pops a plan of sorts... think "Bay of Pigs", think "Operation Eagle Claw" think "Son Tay Raid" and any other of the cock-ups these "planners" (or what passes for them) produce. Then the 'fine tuning' starts with input normally from people who have never been exposed to more than Hollywood movies and BB guns.

Then they send the troopies out to die.

After the dead are buried they dish out a gongs (medals) to the survivors and praise the patriotism and bravery of those involved... but never a word of apology for sending soldiers to their death on some incompetently conceived and ineptly planned operation/intervention.

So all that said ... don't plan for options you at your level will not be asked to decide on.

Next I would like to comment on that (idiotic) quote from that Marine officer. (I hope he is a Lt at most otherwise the USMC is in a lot of trouble)

(In Rumsfeld style)... if there are bad guys (which no doubt Assad's military are) killing opposition groups and their families (even if these opposition groups include some nasties) then the killings by the regime of mainly unarmed men, women, children supporter of the opposition is quite simply a crime against humanity.

So if a guardian angel starts to take out 1,000s of the bad guys (being from Assad's political and military hierarchy) is not the same as killings civilians (men, women, children) in Homs with artillery, mortars, armour and then by firing squad.

Now one wonders why a Marine officer can't connect the dots in order to protect civilians (regardless of their religious or political persuasion) from being butchered by Assad's thugs (can't call people who do that soldiers) it is clearly necessary to kill a lot of Assad's thugs. Now this killing of Assad's trigger men must be swift and extremely violent because (as reports state) if they refuse to kill civilians and oppositions groups they themselves will be killed by the regime's enforcers. So to tip the balance in favour or defection/flight/whatever one needs to send them a very serious message.

So ignore that idiot Marine officer. Sadly though he seems to have influenced your thinking because you come up with this: "None of these options sound very good to me and they would all involve killing a lot of Syrians, not protecting them." So think it through again I suggest and understand that to save Syrian civilians a lot of "bad guys" are going to have to be killed.

Finally I suggest that your "gut feel" is not what counts here. When you arrive at what you think will or won't work consider the basis on which you arrived at that decision. In appreciations the deductions and conclusions are not 'plucked' out of the air but are arrived at through your discussion of factors. So "in my opinion" and "but I think" and "the odds are" have no place in an appreciation.

For example your man Wolfsberger states that if Assad is taken out it "would lead to complete chaos". Where did he pluck this from? Sadly he states this opinion (his opinion) as a fact. He gives no inkling as to how he is able to state this with such certainty. You should not fall into this trap as well.

[Dayuhan]

So if a guardian angel starts to take out 1,000s of the bad guys (being from Assad's political and military hierarchy) is not the same as killings civilians (men, women, children) in Homs with artillery, mortars, armour and then by firing squad.

Now one wonders why a Marine officer can't connect the dots in order to protect civilians (regardless of their religious or political persuasion) from being butchered by Assad's thugs (can't call people who do that soldiers) it is clearly necessary to kill a lot of Assad's thugs. Now this killing of Assad's trigger men must be swift and extremely violent because (as reports state) if they refuse to kill civilians and oppositions groups they themselves will be killed by the regime's enforcers. So to tip the balance in favour or defection/flight/whatever one needs to send them a very serious message.

Since there is no guardian angel, how exactly do you propose to accomplish this? What specific steps would you recommend, what outcome do you expect those steps to achieve, and why do you expect that those steps would lead to that outcome?

If you, as a military expert, were to propose a course of action to civilian leadership, you would presumably be asked those questions or something very much like them. How would you convince them that your proposed course of action would work?

When you arrive at what you think will or won't work consider the basis on which you arrived at that decision. In appreciations the deductions and conclusions are not 'plucked' out of the air but are arrived at through your discussion of factors.

That's exactly what I've been asking you to do.

For example your man Wolfsberger states that if Assad is taken out it "would lead to complete chaos". Where did he pluck this from? Sadly he states this opinion (his opinion) as a fact. He gives no inkling as to how he is able to state this with such certainty. You should not fall into this trap as well.

He can speak for himself, but he would probably look at prior cases, recent and otherwise, where dictators have been removed by outside force (Iraq, Libya, etc). He'd likely listen to what people who study Syrian politics have to say. He'd probably at least consider the possibility that various factions would contend to fill the power vacuum left by Assad's removal, and the possibility that the contention would involve violence.

What do you think would happen if Assad were "taken out", and why do you think that?

You stated this opinion:

Two cruise missiles is all it will take

That opinion certainly looks like it's being stated as fact, as much as anything J. Wolfsberger said. You also give no inkling of how you are able to state this with such certainty. What's the basis on which you arrived at that conclusion?

The same might be asked of comments like this:

What will restrain any temptation to intervene is the opposition of Russia and China.

Again, stated as fact without any inkling of how you are able to state this with such certainty.

Why criticize others for doing what you do so readily yourself?

[JMA]

Which need?

3,000 people died in inter-tribal violence in province Pibor, South Sudan, at the beginning of this year. We didn't even notice, much less did a Western public discuss the prospect of intervention.

Why is there a need for action in Syria, but not in other places?

Looks to me as if it's not a need, but a personal preference.
The Syrians are having a civil war. I can resist the urge for calling for an involvement.

I see where you are coming from... but I did not say intervention in other areas/places is not needed. This is a thread about Syria, we are talking about Syria.

Would you agree that there are scales of potential involvement/intervention?

[Fuchs]

Would you agree that there are scales of potential involvement/intervention?

Is the country under attack?

If not: Their defence is no topic for our security policy.
If yes:

Are they allied (by treaty!)?

If yes: Collective defence, we are all under attack.
If not:

Are we really sure they are becoming victim of a genocide?

If not: Keep an eye on the topic, all else is an issue for the UNSC.
If yes: Check whether we can do something about it.

Can we do something about it?

If not: Go back one step.
If yes: What can we do about it? (Military intervention is just on possibility.)

...

[JMA]

Is the country under attack?

If not: Their defence is no topic for our security policy.
If yes:

Are they allied (by treaty!)?

If yes: Collective defence, we are all under attack.
If not:

Are we really sure they are becoming victim of a genocide?

If not: Keep an eye on the topic, all else is an issue for the UNSC.
If yes: Check whether we can do something about it.

Can we do something about it?

If not: Go back one step.
If yes: What can we do about it? (Military intervention is just on possibility.)

...

Understandable but too simplistic I suggest.

Most such decisions are driven by a mix of political and emotional motivations. There are a lot of factors which lead to a given set of circumstances being pressed home into the national psyche resulting in action being taken and those can safely be ignored.

[davidbfpo]

Professor Paul Rogers commentary:http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-ro...ost-of-failure

It has nothing new or surprising and is a good summary of the position. Noteworthy as it does not discuss intervention.