"Pentagon Adviser: Dump Big War Training, Learn New Languages Instead"

[Ken White]

...Instead of putting the leaders in the class, we asked for volunteers in the ranks of E-5 and below, to include some mechanic and admin types that didn't go out of the wire that often. Wrong answer. The training should have been for leaders. The training was also conducted after duty hours, so the incentive was low to participate. If it truly was a priority, we would have done it during duty hours and made it mandatory for leaders...but how realistic is that when there are so many pre-deployment tasks? It was a half-ass attempt at "looking like" we cared about COIN, but not really.

You shot yourselves in the foot. Seems to me in the situation you describe the "we" stops at Battalion.

As for your Corporals and what they know, one way to look at it. I'll simply suggest that like the Generals, they'll do what they're trained to do. Note that the Generals who went into Iraq did well, even great, at what they'd trained to do -- clobber the evil enema -- and didn't have a clue what to do with looters or setting up a secure environment...

[jkm_101_fso]

You shot yourselves in the foot. Seems to me in the situation you describe the "we" stops at Battalion.

As for your Corporals and what they know, one way to look at it. I'll simply suggest that like the Generals, they'll do what they're trained to do. Note that the Generals who went into Iraq did well, even great, at what they'd trained to do -- clobber the evil enema -- and didn't have a clue what to do with looters or setting up a secure environment...

Yes, I refer to "we" as the battalion collectively, primarily the leadership. I was a lowly 1LT at the time and was opposed to the way the class was established, but had little influence. I was one of the few officers in the class, but I was going on a MTT assignment, so it was appropriate for me to be there. Unfortunately, in many cases, the language class was the last priority, trumped by FRG meetings, ranges and the like. I heard the BN instituted the same language class before their next tour (I had PCS'd) and made several appropriate changes, to include: making leaders attend, holding class during duty hours and making it priority over other training. That is good and I hope it was more successful for them.
I will concur with the majority of your second point; however, I don't think COIN is really that difficult, from a common sense perspective. I'd argue the INF BN I was a part of in Mosul/2003 got it right. Of course, our CG was Petraeus, we executed his tactics; he had COIN right from the get-go.

[Ken White]

is a constant process and all of us make errors, particularly when confronted with something we haven't done before -- the key is to not make the same mistake twice

My broader points were that, as we all know, people will do what they're trained to do; that the leaders have to be trained in order to train their people correctly -- and thus, that an oversight in what is is to be trained and how it is to be trained can have really significant effects downstream. Training too often gets lip service and falls in priority to other 'important' but really slightly less so programs.

What the troops do and how well they're employed is one of my pet rocks. The US Army does, IMO, a very poor job of learning from the mistakes of others (a separate thread...) and in productively and sensibly employing its largest batch of human capital. Joe is generally capable of doing a whole lot more than the Army will allow him to do. There are exceptions, of course but most troops try to do the right thing most of the time and most are capable of doing a whole lot more than the zero defects, fear of failure, fear of having the troops show up their nominal betters (that last being far more significant than many realize) average chain of command will let them do. It is, again IMO, a borderline disgrace and a sad commentary on many leaders that this syndrome is not only allowed but tacitly encouraged.

Yet another residual of WW II and a draftee Army. Sad.

These kids are sharp; the current high reenlistment rate indicates what every leader in the Armed forces should know -- let people do their jobs, encourage and challenge them to do more and avoid mind numbing make-work and dumbing things down and people will stay in. The kind of guy or gal we want will respond to challenges; treat 'em like cannon fodder and not terribly bright pawns and they'll leave -- as they should.

I mention the troops but that applies to all ranks and I'd suggest that overlarge and thus underemployed (or make work comfort level reinforcing overemployed...) Staffs have a deleterious effect on Officer retention (also another thread... ).

[Rex Brynen]

Note that the Generals who went into Iraq did well, even great, at what they'd trained to do -- clobber the evil enema -- and didn't have a clue what to do with looters or setting up a secure environment...

I had always heard the Iraq war justified in terms of WMDs, or maybe transforming the Middle East. Now I find out it was all about those evil enemas...

[Ken White]

I had always heard the Iraq war justified in terms of WMDs, or maybe transforming the Middle East. Now I find out it was all about those evil enemas...

You're supposed to know better than to listen to what Politicians say...

It was indeed really about them, the evil ones. One could even say the issue was the product and not the tools employed...

[Rank amateur]

As an outside observer, I'll say that I've become convinced Gian isn't "beating a dead horse." You can't interact with the population while "holding," if you get killed while "clearing."

[RTK]

As an outside observer, I'll say that I've become convinced Gian isn't "beating a dead horse." You can't interact with the population while "holding," if you get killed while "clearing."

I'm using that in my next brief...

[Rank amateur]

I'm using that in my next brief...

I'm honored and glad that I could make a small contribution.

[Maximus]

As an outside observer, I'll say that I've become convinced Gian isn't "beating a dead horse." You can't interact with the population while "holding," if you get killed while "clearing."

The video of BLT 1/6 shows this exactly. A balanced approach to training is essential. You can't "clear" if you haven't mastered the kinetic basics (i.e., employing your weapon, fighting within a team and squad, coordinating indirect and close air support, etc.). And you can't "hold" if all you know is the same because you'll continue to piss people off, make more enemies, not understand why security for the people is vital, etc.

[Steve Blair]

The video of BLT 1/6 shows this exactly. A balanced approach to training is essential. You can't "clear" if you haven't mastered the kinetic basics (i.e., employing your weapon, fighting within a team and squad, coordinating indirect and close air support, etc.). And you can't "hold" if all you know is the same because you'll continue to piss people off, make more enemies, not understand why security for the people is vital, etc.

Quite so. The trick is knowing when to flow from one to the other, or how to synchronize them so that both activities take place at the same time, although in different locations. And if you don't train properly, and in both areas, you'll only learn this (if it's learned at all) through very expensive trial and error. Since setting up constabularies or gendarmes doesn't seem to be an option these days, regular troops need to be prepared for those roles...at least until the host nation can take over. Otherwise you end up training a force for another Korea when that might not be the proper response at all...

Breaking out of "either/or" is essential.