Found this from 1998. Kind of an update of Wyly's fundamentals of tactics.
http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/notes/FundTactics.pdf
Found this from 1998. Kind of an update of Wyly's fundamentals of tactics.
http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/notes/FundTactics.pdf
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Gentlemen (and I use that term loosely),
MCDP 1 Warfighting was in place in 1989 and revised in 1997 under Chuck Krulak - his comment (20 June 1997):
So spake the oracle of that time.Since Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, was first published in 1989, it has had a significant impact both inside and outside the Marine Corps. That manual has changed the way Marines think about warfare. It has caused energetic debate and has been translated into several foreign languages, issued by foreign militaries, and published commercially. It has strongly influenced the development of doctrine by our sister Services. Our current naval doctrine is based on the tenets of maneuver warfare as described in that publication. Current and emerging concepts such as operational maneuver from the sea derive their doctrinal foundation from the philosophy contained in Warfighting. Our philosophy of warfighting, as described in the manual, is in consonance with joint doctrine, contributing to our ability to operate harmoniously with the other Services.
That said, I believe Warfighting can and should be improved. Military doctrine cannot be allowed to stagnate, especially an adaptive doctrine like maneuver warfare. Doctrine must continue to evolve based on growing experience, advancements in theory, and the changing face of war itself. It is in this spirit that Warfighting has been revised, and this publication, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual 1. I have several goals for this revision. One goal is to enhance the description of the nature of war — for example, to emphasize war’s complexity and unpredictability and to widen the definition of war to account for modern conflict’s expanding forms. Another goal is to clarify the descriptions of styles of warfare. A third goal is to clarify and refine important maneuver warfare concepts such as commander’s intent, main effort, and critical vulnerability. It is my intent to do this while retaining the spirit, style, and essential message of the original.
Very simply, this publication describes the philosophy which distinguishes the U.S. Marine Corps. The thoughts contained here are not merely guidance for action in combat but a way of thinking. This publication provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight. This book contains no specific techniques or procedures for conduct. Rather, it provides broad guidance in the form of concepts and values. It requires judgment in application.
Warfighting is not meant as a reference manual; it is designed to be read from cover to cover. Its four chapters have a natural progression. Chapter 1 describes our understanding of the characteristics, problems, and demands of war. Chapter 2 derives a theory about war from that understanding. This theory in turn provides the foundation for how we prepare for war and how we wage war, chapters 3 and 4, respectively.
Experience has shown that the warfighting philosophy described on these pages applies far beyond the officer corps. I expect all Marines—enlisted and commissioned—to read this book, understand it, and act upon it. As General A. M. Gray stated in his foreword to the original in 1989, this publication describes a philosophy for action that, in war, in crisis, and in peace, dictates our approach to duty.
MCDP 1-1 Strategy, MCDP 1-2 Campaigning and MCDP 1-3 Tactics were 1997 publications - MCDP 6 Command & Control was a 1996 publication - all under GEN Krulak's imprimatur.
Regards
Mike
Last edited by jmm99; 07-08-2010 at 12:37 PM.
my backgrounder and question, Warfighting and Maneuver Warfare; and here is Polarbear's answer, Oh remembering the Battles!:
I'd consider the Magnus Albus Ursus to be pretty much definitive; unless Chuck Krulak waltzes out of the woodwork with something different.Really they are all the same. 1981 to 1985 Lind and Wyly were rebels sowing an insurgence at the grass roots level (Captain level). There was no offical support for the thing until General Grey got involved when he was the 2nd Division Commander. At one point Wyly would be sent to the career "plenalty box" and later released by Grey. Of course, when Grey became Commandant MW became a done deal. I think it was 82-83 the Commandant (Kelly maybe) make a public statement that MW folks needed to stop meeting in the cellars of DC. That was a direct reference to the unoffical AWS MW seminar that met at Lind's house once a week. The Wyly and Lind stuff "evolved" into the 1989 version of Warfighting.
I found a little difference in chap. 4 (1989 vs 1997); but didn't really do a good comparison on chaps 1-3. You do.
Cheers
Mike
In a book by Winford Holland, “Red Zone Management: Changing the Rules for Pivotal Times”, the author states that there are six phases to any major project:
1. Enthusiasm
2. Disillusionment
3. Panic & Hysteria
4. Search for the Guilty
5. Punishment of the innocent, and
6. Praise and Honor for the non-participants
Having watched many outstanding comrades go through phase 4 and 5, IMHO, because of the 1998 date, this is part of Phase 6. It is hard to tell for sure because of all the background noise of lips smacking upon butts.
I have seen and participated in a lot of debates concerning the Boyd Theory (Maneuver Warfare) on this blog. I have seen the Boyd briefings on two separate occasions (Amphibious Warfare School - 1981 and USMC Command and Staff College in 1989). When I sat through the first brief (Patterns of Conflict) I received a copy of the slides. Months later when I went through the slides again I realized that a major portion of the brief was missing. The missing part being the Boyd narrative…the Col would bark at you during the brief like an M-60 machine gun for over eight hours. I became convinced that in order to fully understand the brief you needed both the slides and the narrative.
Realizing my mistake and returning to C&S, when I got to listen to Col Boyd for the second time, I taped the Col’s “Discourse on Winning and Losing” that contains his discussions on “Patterns of Conflict”, “Organic Design for Command and Control”, and “The Strategic Game of ? and ?”. I also remember a number of other recorders on the table besides mine. I recently realized during a discussion on this blog that few if any of those recordings exist today.
I managed to find my cassettes (8 – 90 minute tapes) and made a decision to convert them to CDs. If anyone is interested I have establish a way for you to get a copy of those now 8 CDs (10-12 hours). I need to add a disclaimer here that this is a recording I made with a small old portable cassette player over multiple meetings that was sitting in the middle of a conference room table. The quality is not the best but the discussion can be heard. There is considerable back ground noise and Col Boyd was never one to stand still. In any event, if you are interested in obtaining a set please contact me (polarbear1605) with your email address and I will get the particulars to you. I will also be a this weeks Boyd Conference in Quantico if you want addition information about the CDs. Thanks, Polarbear
So Martin Scorsese and Francis Ford Coppola are rubbish? Are you saying that Goodfellas and The Godfather were crap because they came in at over 90 mins? Or, for that matter, am I to assume that Tolstoy's War and Peace should be edited down to 100 pages? You must have attention deficiet disorder (as opposed to my dyslexia)?
Which director happened to make that comment exactly?
Maneuver Warfare theory states that one of it's goals is to generate confusion and disorder in the enemy system until it can no longer effectively respond. So how do you do that.
4 steps to do a Boyd Slap on a whole country
1-Demoralize
2-Destabilize
3-Crisis
4-Normalize
Link to video on how to brainwash a nation
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zeMZG...eature=related
What step is America in?
We generate our own confusion and disorder on a daily basis, therefor we are constantly in all those states. That's a design feature, not a bug.
Of course, as it is a feature, the level of those states changes fairly frequently in an almost random pattern and it is my considered opinion that we concurrently and as is normal occupy all four states. However, by a slight margin our highest state at this time is just below 'Destabilize' to which we recently moved from full 'Demoralize.'
The question now is whether we will descend to 'Crisis' or raise to 'Normalize.' That will likely take about a year or two to be accurately determined.
My belief and bet would be we're headed yet again to 'Normalize.'
Gotta love Roller Coasters...
Here is what Boyd actually said from The Polarbear Tapes(sounds like a spy novel) " Create a mismatch between what he should respond to, as opposed to the actual reality he should respond to in order to survive." That is the Real Boyd Loop and it has been hidden by default or by design for a long time. We have been Boyded (distracted and disoriented) by this OODA stuff.
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