Ah the gas issue.
Perhaps now we can return to the earlier defence of Germany's strategic decision to place reliance on energy from Russia.
A massive strategic error. Who was responsible and whose heads should roll?
Originally Posted by Dayuhan
Ah the gas issue.
Perhaps now we can return to the earlier defence of Germany's strategic decision to place reliance on energy from Russia.
A massive strategic error. Who was responsible and whose heads should roll?
Last edited by JMA; 03-27-2014 at 07:10 AM.
Did anyone defend that decision?
The Nordstream pipeline was first conceived in the late 90s, I believe... no idea if the risk of over-reliance on Russia was part of the discussion at that time. Fuchs might know. The individuals who made the decision are likely long since retired.
I find it quite strange that a country that consumes as much gas as Germany doesn't have a single LNG terminal. Japan has (from memory, could be a bit off) something like 30 of them. Pipelines are great, but tie to a specific source, while an LNG terminal can take tankers from anywhere. Norway can pick up some of the difference, but not all, and pipelines from Norway can't deliver gas from any other source. LNG terminals in France and Belgium can bring some, but capacity is limited and they have to balance German demand with that of other customers. Europe isn't using all of its LNG terminal capacity and could bring in more... but none of those terminals are under German control. Whether or not the Germans could tap that capacity and whether existing internal pipeline networks could deliver the gas from the pipelines to Germany) is another question. It could probably be done, but it would take time.
Germany's dependence on Russian gas is sometimes overstated: gas accounts for about 21% of Germany's primary energy supply and Russia provides about 35% of the gas. Losing that would still cause considerable pain, especially given the decision to shut down German nuclear plants.
The point I was trying to make is that relieving German dependence on Russian gas is not just a matter of finding gas suppliers. The replacement gas (from Qatar, the US, or almost any other potential supplier) would arrive as LNG, and Germany will need to invest in the infrastructure needed to support a switch from pipeline delivery to LNG tanker delivery.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
A couple promises were broken, but this is incorrect. An association treaty (which wasn't even ratified) isn't the same as integration and IIRC the promises were actually about NATO expansion and Western troops in the former Warsaw Pact.
The only permanent Western troops presences in the former Warsaw pact that I know of are
* East Germany, which within limits was part of the agreement.
* Those two much criticized U.S. BMD installations
* the tiny air policing fighter flight NATO countries provide for the Baltic countries
* embassy-, liaison-, officer exchange- and intel-related personnel
Here comes the pain, as promised. From Reuters:
Kiev opened the way for the IMF deal by announcing on Wednesday a radical 50-percent hike in the price of domestic gas from May 1 and promising to phase out remaining energy subsidies by 2016, an unpopular step Yanukovich had refused to take.
It also accepted a flexible exchange rate that is fuelling inflation, set to hit 12-14 percent this year, according to Yatseniuk, and a central bank monetary policy based on inflation targeting.
The prime minister, who took on the job a month ago saying his government was on a "kamikaze" mission to take painful decisions, said the price of Russian gas on which the nation depends may rise 79 percent - a recipe for popular discontent.
When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot
Both makes sense. They can set up a welfare program to help the poor if the heating costs go through the roof.
It's better to let the people feel the true price of energy than to shield them against it. They would otherwise never go for more efficiency.
Same problem in Iran; not understanding opportunity costs, oil-rich countries insist that oil ought to be cheap for their consumers - and end up with a horribly inefficient domestic oil consumption.
You need to rein in on this; the medium and long term benefits of letting markets force people into more efficient consumption are huge.
The exchange rate thing is even more important; a weak national currency makes imports and vacations abroad very expensive, but it boosts exports. An artificially strong currency only accumulates problems and pains over time. So far no country has sustained an artificially strong currency for long without showing great distress. Look at Southern Italy; it had an artificially strong currency for decades because its currency union with North Italy, and it never seems to be able to catch up.
They could... but they won't. Austerity is not a humanist program. It's not even intended to salvage sinking economies; the economic literature and recent experiences in Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, UK, and US all make this clear. It's meant to secure whatever remains in a dying economy for the creditors... at the expense of pensioners, the poor, the sick, workers, veterans, the unemployed, and so on. Even the IMF's own economists admit as much. Austerity will not save Ukraine.
But now that Yatseniuk has decided on this path, we're now left with the political question of who will survive to govern Ukraine after it's all said and done. Combined with Moscow's pressure on Kiev, Yatseniuk's position is untenable in the long-term. Someone will break and it won't be Putin.
When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot
Reality is much more complicated than that, and "austerity" is a poor description of many reforms.
The IMF's admission about the multiplier of government spending is not relevant to the Ukrainian situation, as it's about a specific set of economic conditions - many of which are not met.
It's complicated.
The Ukraine, Iran, Turkey, Greece, Spain, Portugal, United States - all of them have moved into economic traps from which it's very hard if not impossible to escape without major scars. Yes, I included the bubble in Turkey even though it did not burst yet.
A long period (5+ years) of bad economic policies can create such traps, and it's not helpful to point out that a particular recipe for leaving the trap is painful while all the other recipes don't work well either. It's a trap!
It is of course true that the policies that created the situation have to change, the gas subsidy in particular standing out as something unsustainable. Whether it's wise to simply drop them all at once, rather than phasing them out over a period of time, is another question.
I'm just recalling Manila in '86... when Marcos finally fled, the IMF came in and insisted that a Government that was barely functional had to drop a huge range of subsidies on basic goods (food, electricity, and fuel in particular) overnight. Prices soared, and the reaction on the street was not pretty. No question that the subsidies had to go, but there has to be some consideration for the need to avoid imposing massive political shocks on a government that is still trying to figure out which drawer the paper clips are in and where all the money went.
The Ukraine is of course a different place and a different situation, but I would think that the IMF might at least consider a phased reduction in subsidies rather than an outright cutoff.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
I note with some interest that where you have been a loud and vocal champion of International Law when it came to US / NATO involvement on Libya, Syria etc you are quiet on the Russian invasion of Crimea.
Also of course what comes to mind is your earlier defence of the German strategic decision to accept energy reliance on Russian oil/gas.
Have you changed your position on these issues?
American Pride---all necessary if I heard his speech correctly due to the former President and his group of cronies that raped the Ukrainian economy to the tune of between 36 and 40B USD.
Am more concerned that Russia is going to indeed pull the trigger---based on unnamed US/European intel sources Russian troop count is now up to 30K this week up from 20K last week.
There have been extensive sightings of Spatnaz and especially GRU/FSB security forces without uniform markings.
IF one is to believe Putin's statements in the Duma and in TV he is not moving on the Ukraine --then why the sudden buildup in one week?
Since Russian divisions are basically smaller than US he has right about now 5-7 depending on the count in a "CPX type field exercise".
Based on the article yesterday indicating the open window is closing in the next six weeks for an Russian invasion---Putin I think has made the decision that 1) western initial responses and sanctions were weak and ineffective even though S&P/Fitch has downgraded a large number of banks/companies to negative and 2) if he is going to take an economic hit then it is better to get it over with and argue in a nationalist form to his population they will have to suffer through as the West does not understand them but hey all Russians are now in the Federation--Hitler use to call that the "Heim ins Reich" program.
The last sentence in the article is the important one---"an invasion at this moment cannot be excluded"---sounds right out of what we used to call a Indications and Warnings briefing given to the National Command Authority.
Taken today from the German Focus Online:
12.53 Uhr: Russland treibt den Truppenaufbau an der Grenze zur Ukraine westlichen Sicherheitskreisen zufolge weiter voran. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass mehr als 30.000 russische Soldaten dorthin verlegt worden seien, heit es aus europischen und US-Sicherheitskreisen. In der vergangenen Woche lag die Zahl Medienberichten zufolge noch bei 20.000. Unter den an die Ostgrenze der Ukraine verlegten Truppen seien Spezialeinheiten und Milizen mit Uniformen ohne Hoheitsabzeichen, verlautet es weiter aus den Kreisen. Auch die Einheiten, die die Kontrolle ber die ukrainische Halbinsel Krim bernommen hatten, seien nicht eindeutig als russische Soldaten zu erkennen gewesen. Die Eingliederung der Halbinsel in die russische Foerderation loest im Westen Befrchtungen aus, dass Russland auch in der Ost-Ukraine intervenieren koennte. Wie auch auf der Krim gibt es dort einen groessen russischstaemmigen Bevoelkerungsanteil. In US-Regierungskreisen heit es, es sei unklar, welches Ziel der russische Prsident Wladimir Putin mit der Truppenverlegung an die Grenze verfolge.
Eine Militraktion koenne nicht ausgeschlossen werden.
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 03-27-2014 at 02:20 PM.
30k is not an awful lot, even if it's reinforcements only.
The Russians remember the Chechnya insurrection and how much personnel it took to drown it.
A 400k troop concentration would be a decent start for an invasion, but they won't be able to mass that many for months.
Fuchs---5-7 divisions fully manned, equipped and critically having the necessary supplies in place for a quick charge to Moldavia and into the eastern portion is a breeze when the Ukrainians cannot get more than 20K together at any given time.
What the I&W guys look for is not the troop count but do the Russians have the supplies in place for extended operations and the answer is yes they do and in really large amounts which would be necessary for extended operations into the summer.
So the next question is if in fact it is just a CPX to exercise their staff as they claim then ending a CPX and heading home would be "normal"---but instead they are still increasing-and they no longer speak of a CPX in any PR releases via Interfax--so it is no longer in the realm if a "CPX"---so what is it then?
This small PR comment came in via Interfax:
14:18 Zyuganov: Russia should foster unity of Ukrainian forces resisting fascist nationalists
So when dealing with Russian OSINT and reading between the lines "what is fostering unity of Ukrainian forces resisting fascist nationalists" really mean?
So who then links up with those "unity forces resisting fascist nationalists"---and who are those "unity forces"--what the Ukrainian Army or Spatnaz and the GRU?
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 03-27-2014 at 02:53 PM.
They don't have all that much in the Western Military District.
About seven brigade equivalents and one or two brigade equivalents airborne.
An equivalent force is at the Caucasus, but largely fixed there due to no less than four regional hot spots, two of which require military and not only paramilitary presence.
And an invasion would not be about facing the Ukrainian military only.
The utility of a troops concentration is that it could embolden Russians in Eastern Ukraine and deter Ukrainians from putting them down. It's also completely legal and legitimate and thus comes at no real political price.
I suppose that's what Putin is really doing. He looks like he's collecting bargaining chips for a border redefinition treaty that includes Ukrainian neutrality and trade provisions.
None of his recent coups de main had a published force build-up, after all.
A quick charge to Moldavia????-
From where? Certainly not Western Russia-t'would require crossing at least 2 significant water obstacles. If you really view this as a possible option then I suggest you assess the status/concentration of Russian tank/tracked vehicle transport assets--wheeled HETs and rail flatcars--in the area of the exercise force buildup. Then consider the road/rail networks to see how easy your sprint to Moldova or Donets might be.
If your exercise forces all crossed over into Crimea, then we might have a different scenario to consider.
Perhaps a better alternative possibility for the force/supply buildup is to provide emergency relief to Crimea if Ukraine cuts the utility cords.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
There is no doubt that Yanukoych was corrupt. But in the context of Ukrainian politics, that does not make him unique. Whatever his merits and transgressions, were his policies any worse than austerity? You express your outrage about his corruption and political practices - why is there no moral offense to austerity? But since Yatseniuk has already made his decision, the question really now is which political officials in the new Kiev government will survive the coming storm with their legitimacy and reputation intact. Yatseniuk has stated his belief that his political career will not last this episode; so that makes him a useful idiot for Washington since he can push whatever policies, no matter how radical or absurd, without regard for his own future. It makes me wonder what's in it for him. Firing Tenyukh from the Defense Ministry could be a blessing in disguise for Svoboda if this new government collapses under the weight of popular discontent due to the coming austerity measures since they will not be associated with the failure.
When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot
And all of that makes no difference at all about what to do when Ivan rolls west.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
I doubt that he will. He doesn't need to. I suspect that political agitation will continue. At this moment, as far as Russian-Ukrainian relations are concerned, Moscow has all the cards. It physically occupies Ukrainian territory. It has 30,000+ troops massed on the border. It has provocateurs throughout the country. Ukraine has no allies. It's entering into an unstable economic period. It's army is virtually non-existent. Yatseniuk was unelected and has no care about the future - he's the perfect man to push as far as possible in implementing the Washington Concensus in the short window that the West has to do so. For both Washington and Moscow, this is about securing of much as Ukraine as possible before the music stops.
When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot
Sorry, here I disagree. An EU association of an European country always include the (slim) danger, that this country becomes a second Poland and will apply for full membership in around 15 years. And please do not tell me, we would and could object then. EU association is for me a red line, as it has hidden military implications. :-)
As Germans we should admit that one part of the deal with Gorbachow was the preservation of a glacis, something that was eroded in the last year. We can only discuss the motivations to do so, not the fact.
The correct sequence IMHO would have been to offer Russia NATO membership, then offer EU association to Ukraine.
Last edited by Ulenspiegel; 03-27-2014 at 03:19 PM.
This I agree with to a large extent., though I think the window for NATO membership was in the 1990s before the Putin assumed office with his nationalist-realist allies. Here's why:
Some other obstacles:Most important, Russian membership in NATO would all but mean the end of Russia’s dream of restoring its former superpower status. By joining NATO, Russia would effectively become “just another large European country” on the same level as Germany, Britain or France — a “sacrilege” for the derzhavniki, or great-power nationalists, who remember when the Soviet Union was much larger and more powerful than these three countries combined.
1.Due to NATO's consensus-based decision-making, Russia would have to accept the terms that the alliance's East European novices would throw in as prerequisites for Russia's admission.
2.Switching to NATO's standards would cause huge damage to Russia's own military-industrial complex.
3.Georgia and Japan would certainly take advantage of Russia considering that a NATO candidate must be free of unsettled territorial disputes with its neighbors.
4.Russia's own turn to NATO would render meaningless its endeavors to debar a number of post-Soviet republics – Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan – from the alliance.
When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot
Outlaw 09:
When the Russians roll into eastern Ukraine, what will Poland do? I mean specifically other than going bonkers. Will they start some kind of UW campaign? Will any of the other frontline NATO states?
How much of the Russian army is fully manned equipped and trained? In the old days I believe they had reserve, skeleton type divisions. Is that still the case?
Last edited by carl; 03-27-2014 at 04:05 PM.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks