How to Think, Not What to Think at Leavenworth

[Granite_State]

A thought: when General Caldwell mentions giving serving officers experience working on Capitol Hill, isn't there a real danger of them learning Washington's lessons too well? By which I mean the budget game, the way in which the different services get their share of the pie, most often through big-ticket procurements that can farm out pork to Congressional Districts. I would think that getting officers more involved on the Hill may give them valuable experience "outside the box," but at the risk of dragging them further into the corrupt game that sees us spending hundreds of billions on weapons that won't help us in the wars we're fighting now, and most likely won't help us much down the road either.

[Rob Thornton]

Hey GS,

I got to meet a couple of officers working the Hill recently (we were doing an Inter-Agency Staff ride as part of the BSAP (FA 59) curricula) . While one of them did spend some of his time discussing Army budget with Hill staffers and members, they seemed to spend the bulk of their time working to get Congressional answers on the war from the Army staff, or about soldiers from their districts/states. I'd also mention that during and between, they spent time educating both Congress and staffers on the Army - its culture, history, etc.

Overall, I think the amount of officers that cold actually work on the Hill at any given time is probably pretty small, but the opportunity to bring knowledge in and also take knowledge of Congress out is healthy - it helps leaders understand civil military relations and to be able to articulate that back into the mainstream Army is probably worth the investment. However, you bring up a very valid concern, these days to get the most out of our people we should ask why we want to do something - and what are the good and bad consequences of doing so.

Best Regards, Rob

[SteveMetz]

A thought: when General Caldwell mentions giving serving officers experience working on Capitol Hill, isn't there a real danger of them learning Washington's lessons too well? By which I mean the budget game, the way in which the different services get their share of the pie, most often through big-ticket procurements that can farm out pork to Congressional Districts. I would think that getting officers more involved on the Hill may give them valuable experience "outside the box," but at the risk of dragging them further into the corrupt game that sees us spending hundreds of billions on weapons that won't help us in the wars we're fighting now, and most likely won't help us much down the road either.

The Air Force had a program (I don't know if it still exists) where they picked really elite captains, assigned them to Washington for two years, but moved them to a different job somewhere in the NCR every few months. When they later came back as colonels, they kind of knew how the place worked.

I've heard lots of Army generals brag that they never served in the Pentagon until they were a flag. The Air Force would never do that. That is one of the reasons that, for decades, the Air Force has whupped the Army in political/budget battles.

[Ski]

I'm afraid that I have become completely cynical when it comes to this axiom of "How to think, not what to think."

I've heard since I was a cadet in the early 90's, and still rarely encounter officers of a higher rank who actually allow this to occur.

The OER is a sliver of the problem, the bigger problem is the Army culture. Until the culture is fixed so trust becomes a two way street between commander and subordinate, I fear the phrase of "How to think, not what to think" is just empty speech.

Is the entire MDMP process telling us how to think, or what to think? I'd be interested in hearing some responses on this.

[Ken White]

I think the answer to your question is tha MDMP tells us how to think BUT that it also allows the unimaginative, noninnovative, hesitant, over-cautious and / or just plain lazy to fudge by gaming the system and thus using the 'what to think' mentality -- and they get away with it because they "...tried to do it right..."

The education an training porcess needs to change; the rating an promotion systems do as well -- knew a MG once who had as a COL been the Chief OPD at then MilPerCen. He and another guy designed an OER that had all a board needed to know on the front page; names and signature of rater and senior rater on the back page. Idea was to show Boards only the front page. Great idea. It lasted in review until it hit the first GO...

Young MAJ I knew told me his Dad, a retired COL told him when he went in the Army to "...be good but not too good; if you are, your contemporaries will see you as a threat and kill you on the way up..."

One of the better Generals I knew told me he was mediocre, "...all Generals are mediocre; the reallysmart one hide their smarts or the system will eject them..."

I always found it fascinating that I was more trusted as young Marine Corporal in 1950 than I was as a fairly Senior DAC Manager in 1990...

The culture is the problem.

[Rob Thornton]

Ski,
I can tell you the way I see it, but ultimately how you (or a CDR) uses any tool (planning, management or otherwise) depends on you/them. I'll try and lay it out for the broader audience.

MDMP is a good analytical construct for gathering lots of information, framing a problem and thinking about the consequences. The actual value of the process depends upon how the steps are carried out, always balancing the time available to plan with the options you'd like to explore. The analysis portion - or the "so what" is what lays out choices in the context of how you think things are, or will be in the future tense.

If done right, you transition from an analytical mode to a recognitional mode where things move from how you thought (hoped, feared, etc.) they would be, to how they actually are. Recognizing that things are different and when they are different, and what are the consequences because they are different (articulating it to the CDR for a decision) is where staffs earn their keep and help the CDR make the type of timely decisions (even deciding to do nothing is still a decision) that retain the initiative and keeps the enemy at a disadvantage. Side note - the enemy is dynamic and always reassessing his situation at well.

We often build this into a plan through branches - "if this happens here we might have to do this", and while they can be useful, not every situation will be addressed, or the change may equal something different then it was thought and may require a very different action - again staffs who are abreast of the situation, share that understanding with related echelons and the CDR, and can provide options with understood and likely consequences make the difference. The staffs job has only just begun when they issue the OPORD - its the execution of the OPORD - complete with the FRAGOs that come because the conditions with all their fog, friction, and chance arise, that continually synchronize the available resources in support of the fight.

I want to emphasize that the staff should not only be considering when there are problems with the base plan, but when there are opportunities. This requires (IMHO) more creativity out of the staff then just seeing where things are wrong - but exploiting an opportunity can save lives and further disadvantage the enemy.

The MDMP is a starting point. It is a way to express the initial conditions for the purpose of synchronizing operations across the echelons of CMD and beginning movement toward a purpose. It is built for tactical operations at the BN/TF level and above - below were we have less info to collect and analyze (because the higher echelon does it for us and has the staff to do so), we use TLPs (Troop Leading Procedures - for those outside the ground services) which are far less cumbersome and are meant to take advantage of situations and react to FRAGOs at a much faster rate. Both planning constructs IMO have utility across the range of military operations because they are just that - framework - yes they must be adapted, but this where people/staffs count most - so its not the rigidness of the construct that confines people -its self imposed constraints.

As for the OER - I have had good an bad experiences with it. It never hurt me professionally, but it did not always work to provide me the means of self-development either. The best experiences I had were as CO CDR - I had a senior rater who was all about leader development and the OER was just one more tool available to counsel and get feedback. I tried to emulate him. My rater was also a great CDR, but his style was different - more of an informal wherever and whenever the opportunity arose. Both were effective and helped me greatly. So when it comes down to it, at the R/SR levels - the OER is just another tool and how the leader uses it is a personal decision.

As for big Army using it to make personnel decisions - well, it is what it is, a sheet of paper that is supposed to indicate potential over a rating period, but is not always captured well, or considered equally across its breadth and scope. However, we have to have some management tool and this is just the latest incarnation.

Hoped that helped.
Best Regards, Rob

[120mm]

But now I are one.

I am currently going through the FDP-1 ILE instructor training module, and have received some fascinating training material that is being presented to us. Here's a link to what we're learning:

http://teaching.berkeley.edu/bgd/collaborative.html

http://www-distance.syr.edu/andraggy.html

Collaborative Learning and Andragogy appear to be very promising methods of instruction, especially when directed toward Field Grade Officers in the US Army.

However, are their future raters ready for independent thinkers who are "raised" to collaborate instead of directing military planning and operations?

[Rob Thornton]

However, are their future raters ready for independent thinkers who are "raised" to collaborate instead of directing military planning and operations?

I think so. More and more I'm coming into contact with COLs and BGs and MGs whose thoughts have been influenced by OEF and OIF. War has provided the means to examine our leadership and decision making unlike any well resourced training event could ever do. I think in fact that these leaders will come to expect and rely upon the type of junior leaders we've developed over the last 4 years. As more and more leaders ascend to more senior positions they will look for those qualities which help organizations adapt and overcome adversity in the most complex/interactive and changing conditions. I think the greater conditions which gave rise to these positive changes are going to be with us for awhile. These leaders understand that in order to get the most out of people and prevail in the environments we'll operate in they are going to have to decentralize authority to make decisions and empower lower echelons with resources.

I think we unerstand better then we have in a long time that leadership in war entails a certain ammount of risk - and as long as that risk is undertaken with moral and ethical underpinnings, and good common sense as a foundation, it should be supported. Things will not always turn out sunny, but its a process - and even the absolute best decisions that could be made will not always produce optimum results under those conditions. However, good leadership can often produce results where all obvious indications pointed to the probability of failure.

So while a leader who accepts risk may make a decision that creates a temporary setback, we want leaders will only see it as such and figure out a way to achieve the objective. To get there we have to support the type of leaders we've identified we want to build. It takes time, and those leaders are shaped by both command and staff positions - in fact they will spend the preponderance of their career on staff - then one day they will take on BDE or 2, 3 and 4 star commands and have to make decisions that will have long lasting implications.

Best Regards, Rob

[Eden]

It has always amazed me that an institution that produces so many bright, innovative young officers was so incapable of actually brightly innovating. That is, until I passed from my life as a 'regimental' officer to work at higher levels. Then I discovered that it is virtually impossible to bring bright ideas - of which we had rucksacks full - to the attention of decision makers.

The fundamental problem is that leaders are far too busy. Therefore, their immediate staffs make sure that their time is never wasted. The typical chief of staff would count as time wasted presenting the commander any idea that - in the judgment of the chief - the commander would reject or disapprove. Therefore the bright, young thinker has a huge numbers of hoops to jump through before his idea can reach the ear of the decision maker. In the process, the idea is chopped, graded, returned for editing, and all nuance and depth stripped away. If it gets through, it is no longer innovative or bright or very different from the staus quo.

As an example, the typical planner in, say, Afghanistan, has at least three and possibly four levels of bureaucracy to get through before he can lay his scheme before the commander. At every level he will hear how the commander won't like this, has already rejected that, doesn't want to hear the other. After a while, most bright, young thinkers just start censoring themselves.

SO the problem is not our military education system. We do teach critical thinking; we do stress the importance of independent thought, and we do so with a great deal of skill. We educate our officers to be thinkers; the problem is we train them to be groupthinkers.

I agree with the previous post, however. Things will get better when today's generation of majors and captains become generals, but not before.