What Are You Currently Reading? 2012

[carl]

Fuchs:

The author stated the problem the US Army had in a very expressive, pithy way. He said the US Army was a 1914 army fighting against and beside 1918 armies. Those other armies had had time to learn all those lessons and had a greater depth of pre-war small unit leaders to draw from so there would be some left alive to learn and pass on the lessons. According to the book, the US Army didn't. There was a lot covered in the book and it gives a whole lot to think about. If the war had gone on, it seems we wouldn't have done much better and may have done much much worse. The straggling (soldiers going back from the line) problem was getting very bad.

The most surprising thing to me was there was no NCO corp as we would know it.

[Bill Moore]

Carl,

The criticism of the mass and ineffective training may be accurate, but that is what happens when you don't have a standing "professional" army. Instead of overwhelming the enemy with strategy and tactical skill we overwhelmed them with industrial might (at least initially).

I realize you're summarizing the book, but if the author is claiming the European armies were better I would like to hear why he/she felt that way? The French, Italians, and British performed terribly, and while the German Army reformed prior to WWII I haven't seen much in my readings that the other nations have.

Most of my reading has been focused on Pacific region and the Europeans during WWII performed extremely poorly there. Maybe the reality is that most peacetime armies, unless they're deliberately (not in response to a crisis) prepping for an invasion of another nation, are poorly trained?

[carl]

Bill:

The author says that for all the mortal floundering around the US Army did, the strategic effect of its effort was decisive. That effect just cost much more in blood than it could have because of avoidable failures in training and leadership.

The US Army was absolutely less effective than the French, British and German armies...of 1918 and the author does in so many words say that. Those armies were not at all in 1918 what they were in 1914. They had made huge strides in effectiveness, titanic strides. In fact one British officer when he first saw the US Army upon its arrival in France said something along the lines of 'This is Kitchener's army all over again.' The British had come a long long way from Kitchener's army. None of those armies in 1918 could be compared to what they had been 4 years earlier. One example that I recall reading about. In 1918 if you were in a British defensive position and you wanted aerial photos of a German position opposite, you would have them in hand, your own personal hand, in 24 hours. Those 1918 armies were pretty sophisticated in many ways.

If a peacetime army is poorly trained, I think it is a matter of choice. They don't have to be that way. The Germans were fair enough in 1939.

[Tukhachevskii]

Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam

The jurists employ overlapping linguistic, conceptual, and legal parallels between marriage, slavery, and ownership. The contracting and dissolving of a marriage gave rise to the clearest parallels between matrimony and slavery or purchase. The centrality of milk (ownership, control, dominion) emerges as the tie joining the two parties is established or dissolved. These parallels “between the condition of servility and the condition of marriage in Islam” centre on the sexual claims established by the marriage contract. In the words of John Ralph Willis, “A comparison is drawn between the dominion imposed by the husband through which his wife is caused to surrender her sexual self, and the sovereignty established by the master whereby the slave is compelled to alienate his right to dispose.” Willis notes that marriage is “likened to a sale”: “it is said that in the market the master buys his slave, whereas in marriage, the husband purchases his wife’s productive part.” Yet the fact that the wife does not lose her “right to dispose”— that is, her control over property— distinguishes the transactions even as it highlights the sexual character of the own ership conveyed through marriage. More obvious even than parallels between marriage and purchase of a slave are jurists’ frequent analogies between unilateral divorce (talaq) and manumission. Marriage, Willis says, enslaves a “woman’s sexual self”94 through the dower, as a slave comes to be owned through purchase; repudiation frees her just as manumission frees the slave. [p. 50-51]

Gog and Magog in Early Syriac and Islamic Sources
A fascinating examination of the role of the mythical peoples Gog and Magog and of Alexander the “two horned one” in Islamic theology, mysticism and mythology. Alexander is described as two horned because, at least according to at-Tabbari, he went from one end of the world, in the west, to the other end, in the east. The word karn means horn, and the extremities of the world are called ''horns" [p. 57n3].

Islamic eschatology knows ten signs which portend the Last Day, the so-called 'signs of the Hour'. They are:
the coming out of the descendants of Asfar
the coming of the Mahdi [Sunni & Shia differ on his identity/role]
the coming of the dajjal [a figure in Islamic theology homologous with Christianity’s Antichrist]
the descent of 'Isa b. Maryam [Jesus]
the rising of the sun in the West
the coming forth of Gog and Magog
the beast coming out of the earth
the assumption of the Koran into heaven
the smoke
the burning of fire from Yemen, or, the subsiding of the earth. [p.78]


In Arabic sources the name Turk is often said to derive from turika "to be left behind", the passive form of taraka. Originally, it is said, Gog and Magog were 24 or 22 peoples, or, according to Wahb b. Munabbih and Muqatil b. Sulayman 21 peoples. When 'the two-horned one' locked them up behind the barrier, one people were lift behind (turika) because they were absent on a raid, or, according to a less anti-turkish approach, they were left out because they believed in God. On the authority of al-Suddi, Ibn Mardawayh reports that the Turks are a contingent of Gog and Magog who broke out alternately. They had gone out on a raid andthus remained 'on this (i.e. the Arab) side' of the barrier. [p. 83-4]


Mirkhwand and Khwandamir apparently also reckon Gog and Magog among the human beings. They both remark that one of their abominable customs is to devour the body of someone who dies among them. On the other hand, they also write that Gog and Magog cannot be considered as human beings for they have neither law nor religion, do know neither God nor man, and live like animals. For Ibn Khaldun, Gog and Magog are not only human beings, they are also “white”:

The inhabitants of the North are not called by their colour, because the people who established the conventional meanings of words [to them] were themselves white. Therefore the inhabitants of the North, the Turks, the Slavs, the Toghuzghuz, the Khazars, the Alans, most of the Western Christians, Gog and Magog, are found to be separate
nations and numerous races called by a variety of names. [p. 108]

Weapon Systems and Political Stability: A History
Written in the neo/functionalist style of American sociology of the 70s and 80s (I often got the impression that I was reading something written by Pitrim Sorokin or Talcott Parsons) the book offers a number of fascinating affinities/suggestions into the relationship between modes of warfare and political institutions/regime types. Personally, I don’t find the approach wholly convincing. The Weberian breadth of historical exposition often clouds whatever point is being made or pursued. The generational or cyclical approach to politics and warfare is as flawed as the 4GW spiel. The belief, the evidence I’m afraid just doesn’t hold up for it to be anything more, that large numbers of infantry / infantry warfare coincides with democracy and democratic polities too often for the relationship to not be causal still begs the question of what, if any, relationship there is. The Spartan regime was authoritarian/monarchical and its armed forces were based on infantry contrary to Quigley’s assertions. All armies in the First World War were dominated by infantry but not all regimes were democratic thereby. Quigley sketches out the argument that military specialists cause/result from oligarchic/managerial regimes but, due to his unfortunate death, he never explains this more fully. Indeed, my comments may be unduly harsh as the work was never a completed manuscript but published from the authors notes posthumously. However, it does contain some very interesting observations that got me thinking about other things differently. In fact the recent enthusiasm for drones and other remotely piloted death-dealers can be seen as a managerial policy designed to remove one of the Clausewitzian tripods (the “People”) from the decision-making process (by removing the threat of the death of soldiers (drawn from the People) thus enabling a managerial bureaucratic style of war making that favours a technocratic elite.




Early Riders: The beginnings of mounted warfare in Asia and Europe

Although debate continues about the beginnings of pastoral nomadism in the Eurasian steppe, since M.P.Gryaznov first argued the case most steppe archaeologists and prehistorians have been persuaded that it was some time after 1000 BC that a fully nomadic way of life began on the steppe, and that by the end of the eighth century permanent villages had all but disappeared. Because nomadic societies in later periods depended heavily on horseback riding, it is a reasonable assumption that the early nomads too were riders. Why the steppe dwellers abandoned their villages and became nomads is of course disputed. Anatoly Khazanov proposed that a climate shift ca. 1000 BC was responsible: as rainfall declined the steppe dwellers were forced to move their animals through an annual circuit, many hundreds of miles long, of seasonal pasturages. Another possibility (and I think a more likely one) is that a sudden improvement in horsemanship—and the consequent ability to handle a weapon while on horseback—was itself the main motivation for nomadic life. Good riding may have made it relatively easy for “poachers” or “rustlers” to drive off the cattle and sheep that lone herdsmen from the settlements had traditionally taken into the steppe. In that case, to protect their herds the settlement communities may perforce have turned to full nomadism.[p. 63]

[Tukhachevskii]

Death by Theory: A Tale of Mystery and Archaeological Theory, Rev. Ed.
An effective, if sometimes simplistic, introductory text exploring the different theoretical approaches to archaeology through narrative. The slant is very American centred though.

“[...]Events have proximate causes as well as structural ones. Agency theory helps us remember that things happen by people taking action.’’
‘‘Hmm. I see what you mean,’’ said Terry. ‘‘Change can happen when individuals act in weird, idiosyncratic ways, not just how their culture expects them to. But you can take it too far. Old Thomas Carlyle actually believed that ‘history is the story of great men.’ Meaning that what we call history is just the result of conscious decisions made by a few powerful individuals. Men, of course. What an elitist bozo.’’
‘‘OK, but on the other extreme are the determinists. To them history is a matter of huge forces working on each other. The way Dr. Green puts it, a theory’s useful ’cause it helps us understand why things are the way they are. But some of these models fit one situation better than another. Neoevolutionism is about the adaptive qualities of behaviour—but that’s only one reason why things happen, and a long-term, large-scale reason, too. It’s like trying to explain ‘why’ my car is running. I could say it’s because of the way air and gasoline molecules interact. Or because I turned the key. Or because I want to drive home to feed the cat. They’re all right, and none is more right than any of the others.
‘‘In evolutionary terms, religion is just a system that encourages stability and long-term reproductive success for the group. That’s true, and it’s useful to know. But it doesn’t tell you why individual people actually do religion or what it means to them. Theorists come up with generalizations about how societies work. And while they can show us the ultimate outcomes of behaviour, they may not be at all useful in understanding life as people live it. Getting at the root cause of something makes any other explanation seem somehow trivial. Like foam on the top of a wave. Until you realize that the foam is everyday life. And that although evolutionary forces are manipulating us at some deep level, people can and do affect the course of their own histories. Without agency, it’s all pattern and no people.’’
‘‘That’s a catchy phrase,’’ said Alasdair. ‘‘But the whole point of evolution is that the people who have the most efficient adaptation win the prize. That is, they get to replace whatever less efficient group came before them.’’
‘‘Humph, Al’s had a brain freeze. Must be the weather.’’ Dave took another sip from his hip flask.[p. 142]

The Most Learned of the Shi'a: The Institution of the Marja’ Taqlid
Unfortunately the book was not an in depth discussion into the role, function, origin and power of the Marja’ but rather a collection of articles on various themes in Shia’ history. These articles, though interesting in and of themselves (esp. 2, 6, 11, 13), do not make up for the lack of a central guiding theme with which to tie them together. Another case of academic back scratching; publishing a book containing articles that either no-one else wanted to publish or just happened to be lying around and would look good on their CVs. Said Arjomand’s work , IMO, remains one of the first stops for serious examination of matters clerical and theological in twelver Shi’ism.

[Tukhachevskii]

Infantry Combat: The Rifle Platoon
Well I am disappointed to say the least. Regardless of the choices one makes the character then goes and does things you had no intention of doing. For example, early on I noticed that there was high ground on my northern and eastern flanks but only later, after I had chosen my course of action was I given the option of sending out patrols. Secondly, I was not, during this phase at least, given the option of ensuring that my sections and fireteams had mutually supporting positions and fields of fire (I assumed that was given, I now realise I am an ass for assuming that!). Thirdly, no options were given for the placing of mines in relation to avenues of approach or obstacles (which the protagonist Lt. Davis placed at his own leisure). I could go on. Infuriating. One such debacle is followed by a disquisition by Antal on

1. how I should never have chosen to mount a forward slope defence of the wadi (which I didn’t!),

2. on how I should have spread apart my high value weapons to prevent them being destroyed (an option I wasn’t given!),

3.should have conducted active security patrols (which I did only after the position had been established by Davis and not before! Again no option given. )

4. and how I should have used obstacles and mines to cover dead ground, defiles and avenues of approach (over which I had no control given that Antal/Davis placed them where THEY thought they would be most effective thereby undermining the whole point of the exercise).

You get the picture. I know I’m being bitter but I can accept mistakes of my own making, but I won’t be blamed for Davis’ mistakes especially when the option I have chosen is not quite/or never the one Davis/Antal executes. I will persevere though, don’t get me wrong, I’m learning a lot especially about Antal (I think his tacit presupposition is that there is a text book answer regardless of his protestations to the contrary). I wish I had not bought this (or, for that matter, Armour Attacks and Company Team) before taking them out on loan from the library. I could have requested a copy ordered through my local library but, given my skin tone, I was afraid that “the filth” would be knocking on my door wondering what a manual labourer with my skin tone (and a previous trip to Yemen to boot) was doing ordering the thing. We live and learn. We live and learn. I computer game version of this might be better if ALL the decisions can be taken by the player.


However, all is not doom and gloom, I also bought a copy of The Longest Night, which as far as I have read is excellent. And also The Ship who Sang and The Lost Fleet: Dauntless. Both of which are excellent. The latter especially so for it’s extremely realistic (if that’s the word) depiction of what space warfare would resemble. Can’t wait to get the entire Lost Fleet series.

I also got the complete collection of the adventures of Jeeves and Wooster (thanks Mum!) but that’s by the by.

Toodle pip chums.

Happy New Year to you all.

[Tukhachevskii]

Infantry Combat: The Rifle Platoon
Well I am disappointed to say the least. Regardless of the choices one makes the character then goes and does things you had no intention of doing. For example, early on I noticed that there was high ground on my northern and eastern flanks but only later, after I had chosen my course of action was I given the option of sending out patrols. Secondly, I was not, during this phase at least, given the option of ensuring that my sections and fireteams had mutually supporting positions and fields of fire (I assumed that was given, I now realise I am an ass for assuming that!). Thirdly, no options were given for the placing of mines in relation to avenues of approach or obstacles (which the protagonist Lt. Davis placed at his own leisure). I could go on. Infuriating. One such debacle is followed by a disquisition by Antal on

1. how I should never have chosen to mount a forward slope defence of the wadi (which I didn’t!),

2. on how I should have spread apart my high value weapons to prevent them being destroyed (an option I wasn’t given!),

3.should have conducted active security patrols (which I did only after the position had been established by Davis and not before! Again no option given. )

4. and how I should have used obstacles and mines to cover dead ground, defiles and avenues of approach (over which I had no control given that Antal/Davis placed them where THEY thought they would be most effective thereby undermining the whole point of the exercise).

You get the picture. I know I’m being bitter but I can accept mistakes of my own making, but I won’t be blamed for Davis’ mistakes especially when the option I have chosen is not quite/or never the one Davis/Antal executes. I will persevere though, don’t get me wrong, I’m learning a lot especially about Antal (I think his tacit presupposition is that there is a text book answer regardless of his protestations to the contrary). I wish I had not bought this (or, for that matter, Armour Attacks and Company Team) before taking them out on loan from the library. I could have requested a copy ordered through my local library but, given my skin tone, I was afraid that “the filth” would be knocking on my door wondering what a manual labourer with my skin tone (and a previous trip to Yemen to boot) was doing ordering the thing. We live and learn. We live and learn. I computer game version of this might be better if ALL the decisions can be taken by the player.


However, all is not doom and gloom, I also bought a copy of The Longest Night, which as far as I have read is excellent. And also The Ship who Sang and The Lost Fleet: Dauntless. Both of which are excellent. The latter especially so for it’s extremely realistic (if that’s the word) depiction of what space warfare would resemble. Can’t wait to get the entire Lost Fleet series.

I also got the complete collection of the adventures of Jeeves and Wooster (thanks Mum!) but that’s by the by.

Toodle pip chums.

Happy New Year to you all.

Update: have successfully completed mission after a marathon 24 sinceposting the above. I enjoyed learning through my failures!

[Bill Moore]

Just finished the The Fifty-Year Wound, How America's Cold War Victory Shapes Our World. By Derek Leebaert

I think the review provided by Joseph Nye on the cover captured my thoughts on this book perfectly, "Read this book. You will, encounter questions worth pondering, as we enter another long struggle."

The author wrote, "The first justification of any war is that even its horrors are the lesser evil."

The author was rightfully very critical of the CIA's poor performance throughout the war, and in his view their continued incompetence. He cites repeated operations failures and worse signficant intelligence failures throughout the many decades they attempted to gain intelligence on the USSR. According to the author, President Reagan over 8 years only received briefings from the CIA three times due to his low confidence in their work.

Some may be surprised the author suggests both Ike and Reagan were the key architects of the Cold War victory. Very insightful read at many levels.

[davidbfpo]

Moderator at work

New thread created to enable easier searching, so now split into years, started with 2007.