An Airborne Expeditionary Unit?

[Ken White]

All these large airborne formations are of no use in a real war.
How do you deploy them? Parachuting into a SAM infested red zone? Got some airlifters too many?

That would be sort of dumb. Why would one do that? Why not go where the SAMs are not?

Once they jumped they are just light infantry, since no U.S. airborne unit has BMD style vehicles to make the final dash to the objective.[

One presumes you've never fought good light infantry. They can really ruin your day and contrary to many myths, they do not end up being speed bumps for tanks. As for BMDs, a really poor little vehicle that offers great mobility and little else. I suppose what and where the objective was might determine ones need to dash...

And I don't even start talking about supplying a brigade from the air ...

Why not; with air superiority, it can be done easily today and has been done with difficulty in the past with smaller birds. Though I don't think anyone really contemplates that at this time.

Air-transportable yes (as much as possible).

Bad idea -- then you have the minuses of 'light infantry' and none of the pluses of Armor nor the flexibility of parachutes. Plus, how are you going to initially seize that airfield for your air trans troops to land?

Airborne only up to battalion level (mechanized airborne = cavalry, if possible).

That's the doctrine; higher formations exist for training control, a godfather role (to protect little battalions from those in the system who would hurt them -- or don't know what they can do... ) and limited tactical employment when feasible.

Airmobile - fancy word. Every light infantry unit should be capable of that...

Agreed.

Own dedicated formations? No. And why? Airbornes don't have C-17 attached to them, either.

I have no idea what you meant there.

@ all this "Special" forces thing: What about getting regular infantry units into shape, instead of creating the fifth or six service branch?

That's happening here; how about yours?

But isn't it, that everybody tries to get away from dirty and dangerous and into more technicalized units, and those who can't make it end up in infantry? Negative selection...

Once upon a time; pretty much passe now. We finally realized that Infantry takes as much skill as most; more than many. Your info seems dated in this as well as the foregoing.

...And then if you need infantry units that really do the job you have to start anew (and pin SOCOM on them)?
SOCOM should be really limited to politically/diplomatically/militarily "toxic" missions.

That effectively is the case with only slight exceptions. Most of those exceptions are due to interservice / intraservice turf and political battles more than operational concerns or TODAYS infantry capability. I don't know any Armed forces that escape that foolishness...

[Sean Osborne]

Plus, how are you going to initially seize that airfield for your air trans troops to land?

Ken,

For what its worth.... Early Entry slash Dynamic Entry slash Forced Entry was a theoretical doctrine possibly/probably implemented by the 173rd during OIF-I.

The genesis of this type of op was the concept behind the EMPRS (Enroute Mission Planning Rehearsal System) being tested/developed by Army PEO C3T in conjuction with the 82nd (MG Vines) and possibly the 18th Abn Corps just prior to Millenium Challenge 02 and OIF in 2003. It was a follow-on to the AWE of the Y2K timerame.

EMPRS as an experimental program/system of the vision of Force XXI was nixed just prior to MC-02, but I do believe the overall concept did have life after "death" and was executed by the 173rd in OIF-I.

[William F. Owen]

Err... Patrol based Infantry

So called Elite formations are usually based on a fitness test. Not military skills tests.

I submit if you can run 3,200m in 16 mins carrying a 22kg ruck sack, and then climb a 7m rope, with the 22kg ruck, you are fit enough for purpose.

Testing determination/guts/staying power is a different thing and need to be tested separately.

[Jedburgh]

I think I posted this a bit over a year ago somewhere on the board, but I figure it also fits here as a bit of a reference piece in this discussion:

General Orders No. 10
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 25 September 2006

UNITS CREDITED WITH ASSAULT LANDINGS

II—LIST. The following units were designated by the Senior Army Commander in the theater of operations as having participated in a parachute (to include freefall), amphibious, or helicopter assault landing.

......

b. Helmand Desert, Afghanistan (Parachute), 1845Z-0014Z hours, 19 October 2001 to 20 October 2001.

75th Ranger Regiment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company A, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company C, Detachment

c. In the vicinity of Alimarden Kan-E-Bagat, Afghanistan (Parachute), 1800Z-2334Z hours, inclusive, 13 November 2001.

75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company B, Detachment

d. Near Chahar Borjak, Nimruz Province, Afghanistan (Parachute), 1345Z-1445Z hours, inclusive, 25 February 2003.

75th Ranger Regiment, 2d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 2d Battalion, Company A, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 2d Battalion, Company C, Detachment
504th Infantry, 3d Battalion, Company B, Detachment

.......

w. Bashur Drop Zone in Northern Iraq (Parachute), 1700Z to 1737Z hours, inclusive, 26 March 2003.

1st Special Forces, 10th Special Forces Group, 2d Special Forces Battalion, Detachment
74th Infantry, Detachment
173d Airborne Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Company
173d Support Company
250th Medical Detachment
319th Field Artillery, Battery D
501st Support Company
503d Infantry, 2d Battalion
508th Infantry, 1st Battalion
4th Air Support Operations Squadron (United States Air Force)
86th Contingency Response Group (United States Air Force)

x. Northwestern Desert region of Iraq, in the vicinity of the town of Al Qaim, near the Syrian boarder (Parachute), 1830Z to 2230Z hours, inclusive, 24 March 2003.

75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company C
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
24th Special Tactics Squadron, Detachment (United States Air Force)

y. At H1 airfield in western Iraq, west of the Haditha Dam and the town of Haditha (Parachute), 1835Z to 1200Z hours, 28 and 29 March 2003.

27th Engineer Battalion, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Detachment
75th Ranger Regiment, 3d Battalion, Company A
24th Special Tactics Squadron, Detachment (United States Air Force)

z. Southeastern region of Afghanistan (Free Fall), 1735Z to 1800Z hours, inclusive, 3 July 2004.

75th Ranger Regiment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Regimental Reconnaissance Detachment, Team 3

[Ken White]

S'okay, I forgive you.

You're right on all that. To add to it, airfield seizure used to be a Ranger Regiment primary mission long time ago, they've moved on to other things and the 82d and the two forward deployed airborne brigades have the mission -- and the training to go with it. They always had it as a METL task before there was a Ranger Regiment.

The 173d (a plain old airplane infantry battalion, no SOF outfit) did indeed do that and the single battalion of theirs that had the airfield mission was followed quickly by a dozen C17s with an M1 tank apiece. The other Battalion (-) did other things. Nothing really new, the Oil Slick concept included that and dates from the fifties.

The death of parachute troops has been predicted by many since 1940. Every time a non-airborne CoS Army gets in, destruction on the "Airborne Mafia" is wrought. Fred Weyand, when he took over as Chief of Staff at the death of Abrams called in almost all the Airborne Major Generals and fired 'em. Six years later there were just as many as there had been earlier.

Airborne troopies are sort of like aircraft Carriers; nobody likes the Airborne due to cost and arrogance -- until they need it. That will remain true until we find a better way to transport a large body of troops 5,000 or so miles and put it on the ground ready --and willing -- to fight anything. We will do that someday but not just yet...

[Rifleman]

Distiller,

Take this with a grain of salt, since I readily confess to being branch biased. I think most people are biased though. Sometimes it comes down to which bias is the best bias to be biased with.

Moving on.....

I fail to see how air assault and airlanding operations are any safer than a parachute assault if a SAM threat is present. Either way you've got troops in an aircraft flying through a SAM threat.

Sure, transport aircraft are vulnerable to SAMs; and ships are vulnerable to anti-ship missiles; and tanks are vulnerable to anti-tank missiles; and convoys are vulnerable to IEDs and RPGs; and troops are vulnerable to small arms fire.....

Even if SAMs are not present airlanding operations are not without problems: bottleneck comes to mind, and aircraft make a big targets for guerrillas with RPGs while unloading on the ground. Also, I think the Germans lost a lost of Ju52s at Maleme airfield on Crete due to beginning airlanding operations too soon.

All things considered, if the operation requires moving large numbers of troops long distances by fixed wing aircraft I think it makes sense to drop at least a brigade combat team before beginning airlanding operations.

Consider this: Point Salinas airstrip in Grenada was a cluster; Panama, while not without mistakes, generally went a lot smoother. In Panama the Army parachuted a reinforced brigade combat team from the 82nd and three Ranger Battalions; six infantry battalions, plus support. It made for a rapid build up of combat power.

I don't know about the logistics of supplying a brigade from the air but people more experienced than me don't see it as a problem if the aircraft are available. Does the Berlin Airlift not provide any lessons?

[William F. Owen]

I don't know about the logistics of supplying a brigade from the air but people more experienced than me don't see it as a problem if the aircraft are available. Does the Berlin Airlift not provide any lessons?

There are actually some pretty good numbers on this. The really efficient and effective method is to have a strip that wide body cargo jets (747 or similar) can operate off and the cargo handling kit to unload them.

see here
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2005-02.pdf

[Jedburgh]

I don't know about the logistics of supplying a brigade from the air but people more experienced than me don't see it as a problem if the aircraft are available. Does the Berlin Airlift not provide any lessons?

Army and Joint Doctrine on Airborne ops has addressed that issue clearly since the period of the Berlin Airlift. And we've long had the capability. Simply put, the preferred method to supply the troops that have taken the airfield being landing of supplies by aircraft, with airdropping supplies being the alternative.

[Uboat509]

Ken, I normally agree with a lot of the things you post but I have to say that I totally disagree with you on this one. First of all, cutting the funding and resourcing of the three Ranger Battalions and redistributing it to rest of the infantry battalions isn't going to make that much of a difference and it is just going to dilute those resources. Second, some of the assets and equipment that the Ranger Battalions have is only available in finite amounts so you are either left with diluting it to uselessness or going back to concentrating it into a few chosen units. Third, the Ranger Battalions have one thing that will always give them an advantage, let's call it exclusivity for lack of a better word. To be in the Ranger Battalions you have to pass Basic, AIT, Airborne, RIP and still maintain an extremely high standard each and every day. To be in a regular infantry battalion you have to pass Basic, AIT and not be convicted of a felony. In the Ranger Battalions if you have a weak link then you get rid of him, period. In the regular infantry, if you have weak link then you have a weak link. If it is a Joe you will eat up hours and hours with counseling, retraining, "rehabilitative transfers," nonjudicial punishment, more counseling, multiple trips to JAG and finally, if you are lucky you can chapter him out or push him to S and T platoon. If it is an NCO then you might be able to get him pushed to a staff job but more often then not you will just have to work around him. I was in the infantry for seven years before joining the Special Forces. There are a lot or really good guys in the regular infantry who would probably do well in the Ranger Battalions but there are also a lot who would never make it and I am not just talking about the sh*tbags who need to be booted out, I am talking about otherwise good guys who are just not quite up to Ranger Battalion standards. In Ranger Battalion you don't have the guys who just joined for the college money or because 11B happened to have the best bonus. You don't have the guys who discovered that joining the Army was a bad idea for them and they are now just riding out their time. You don't get the guys who can quote verbatim from AR670-1 and always have perfect uniforms but couldn't lead fat people to a doughnut shop. Most of those guys will never even try to go to Batt and those that do either won't make it or won't last long. One of the SOF truths is that "You cannot mass produce SF." This is absolutely true. You cannot bring everyone up to the same standard as the elite few. If you were to try to bring up all the infantry battalions to the same standards as the Rangers, ignoring the resource shortfalls, you are still going to find that either A) you weed out your units to the point where they are seriously undermanned or B) you will have to lower the standard. I know that it sounds like I am bagging on the regular infantry but I am not. I believe that our light infantry is the best in the world but that does not mean that they all can be as elite as the Rangers.

I'm inclined to think the SF Gps should revert to the Army

No, NO, NO, hell no, *$#@ NO. You do that and Group will be gutted and misused and its budget and resources raided. The mistrust and outright animosity by many big Army commanders is palpable. Ask any SF guy who joined SF out of the 82nd how he was treated after he informed his chain of command that he was going to selection and you will probably hear a story reminicent of how lepers used to be treated. Having said that, SOCOM is not ideal either, dominated as it is by JSOC guys but it is better than the alternative.

SFC W

[Ken White]

Ken, I normally agree with a lot of the things you post but I have to say that I totally disagree with you on this one. First of all, cutting the funding and resourcing of the three Ranger Battalions and redistributing it to rest of the infantry battalions isn't going to make that much of a difference and it is just going to dilute those resources.

Possibly different perspectives at work here; I retired with 27 years 2 years after 1st Batt formed so all the things they were supposed to do for over 25 years of my time in, the two less well resourced and trained Abn Divs provided the muscle for -- acceptably, I believe.

... Second, some of the assets and equipment that the Ranger Battalions have is only available in finite amounts so you are either left with diluting it to uselessness or going back to concentrating it into a few chosen units.

True and as I mentioned, that was one of the prime drivers in their formation. Some of the stuff they have for the msn of a few years ago isn't getting much use now, is it?

My experience with mechanical stuff is that if you don't use it tends to break down...

The non-mechanical stuff? Most, not all, of that is already in most infantry units, is it not?

...Third, the Ranger Battalions have one thing that will always give them an advantage, let's call it exclusivity for lack of a better word. To be in the Ranger Battalions you have to pass Basic, AIT, Airborne, RIP and still maintain an extremely high standard each and every day. To be in a regular infantry battalion you have to pass Basic, AIT and not be convicted of a felony. In the Ranger Battalions if you have a weak link then you get rid of him, period. In the regular infantry, if you have weak link then you have a weak link. If it is a Joe you will eat up hours and hours with counseling, retraining, "rehabilitative transfers," nonjudicial punishment, more counseling, multiple trips to JAG and finally, if you are lucky you can chapter him out or push him to S and T platoon. If it is an NCO then you might be able to get him pushed to a staff job but more often then not you will just have to work around him. I was in the infantry for seven years before joining the Special Forces. There are a lot or really good guys in the regular infantry who would probably do well in the Ranger Battalions but there are also a lot who would never make it and I am not just talking about the sh*tbags who need to be booted out, I am talking about otherwise good guys who are just not quite up to Ranger Battalion standards. In Ranger Battalion you don't have the guys who just joined for the college money or because 11B happened to have the best bonus. You don't have the guys who discovered that joining the Army was a bad idea for them and they are now just riding out their time. You don't get the guys who can quote verbatim from AR670-1 and always have perfect uniforms but couldn't lead fat people to a doughnut shop. Most of those guys will never even try to go to Batt and those that do either won't make it or won't last long.

All true. You take what the pipeline provides and you train it and make it work. It ain't easy, it's often a pain -- but anyone who spends excess time with his slugs instead of training his good people is not doing it right IMO. Been there, done that -- and in my recollection it was not as bad as you seem to recall. I'd also suggest that easily getting rid of problem children is an easy way to be 'elite.' Nobody ever said leadership was easy...

We are still not training Infantrymen properly or adequately and, last time I knew, both BNOC and ANCOC were pretty sad. My contention is that Infantry Battalions are now better trained than they ever have been -- but we can still do better; that's all.

... One of the SOF truths is that "You cannot mass produce SF." This is absolutely true....

True -- and if you'll recall, I've said that here a couple of times. Nor do I suggest that SF doesn't need to exist.

...You cannot bring everyone up to the same standard as the elite few. If you were to try to bring up all the infantry battalions to the same standards as the Rangers, ignoring the resource shortfalls, you are still going to find that either A) you weed out your units to the point where they are seriously undermanned or B) you will have to lower the standard. I know that it sounds like I am bagging on the regular infantry but I am not. I believe that our light infantry is the best in the world but that does not mean that they all can be as elite as the Rangers.

I don't believe I said that they could be as 'elite' as the Rangers; I did say that IMO, the Regiment was unnecessary (and that is partly based on today's missions) -- I don't think those two things are quite the same thing. There is such a thing as over training -- and also overkill...

Best is the enemy of good enough (as the old saying goes...).

No, NO, NO, hell no, *$#@ NO. You do that and Group will be gutted and misused and its budget and resources raided. The mistrust and outright animosity by many big Army commanders is palpable. Ask any SF guy who joined SF out of the 82nd how he was treated after he informed his chain of command that he was going to selection and you will probably hear a story reminicent of how lepers used to be treated. Having said that, SOCOM is not ideal either, dominated as it is by JSOC guys but it is better than the alternative.

SFC W

Hmm. Don't recollect the 77th having much problem with that back in my day. Biggest bitch was having to wear Unassigned brass and having Teal Blue Guidons...

And the Beret, didn't have that then either. Long before Bill Ruddy got to put his on JFK's grave..

I'm fully aware of how the Smoke Bomb Hill and Gela Street view each other, lived on both. Gruber Road does not connect them, nor does Ardennes...

You can ask anyone who's ever left the Eighty Twice for a potentially greener pasture (no pun intended) anywhere aside from SF and that attitude's pretty much the same. You can also ask anyone who left Group of his own volition how he was treated when he announced that he wanted to leave...

I'm also aware of the number of Big Army Gen-Gens who mightily distrust SF; been that way probably back to the time of the Pharoahs. Fortunately, there are always a few smart guys around who control the dumb ones. That antipathy existed back in the day but rarely hampered ops and on the odd occasion when it did, briefly, it got fixed quickly.

As you know, there are also people in the Groups who totally despise the rest of the Army and are not shy about flinging their beret in everyone's face.

Some fault on both sides there, I suspect. Used to be, anyway.

I don't have any hard and fast concerns over it but I do believe that ID and UW are Army and not SOC missions. Aside from the potential budget and staffing issues, I imagine SOCOM if honest would say the same thing -- therein, I think, lies your problem, the JSOC mode will generally win and IMO, SF will lose in the long run; hope I'm wrong. We'll see...