Terrorist Prisoners and Deradicalization

[Bob's World]

As I read this thread I didn't know if I should laugh, cry, or simply pound my head against my desk until the pain went away. I think I'll just go hit the gym and run a few miles.

I can't decide which is greater when it comes to this concept of "Deradicalization": The Ignorance of the program, or the Arrogance.

First, it is founded in the popular, but baseless "Pied Piper Theory of Insurgency" (My name for it, I'm sure it has a more official name elsewhere), that presumes that some dynamic leader comes along with a magical flute of ideology and that he somehow bewitches (radicalizes) young men to follow him to their doom. Now if we simply expose the Pied Piper as a fraud, they will see the light and settle down and become good citizens once again.

First, this totally absolves the government giving rise to these young insurgents of any responsibility for contributing to the causation for the insurgency through their failures of governance. As I have stated several times before, and will continue to state, dynamic leadership and effective ideology are both critical requirements to a successful insurgency; but neither will resonate with a target populace unless conditions of poor governance (defined as dissatisfaction within a significant segment of the populace that is so great it demands action, and no legitimate means to resolve the failures exist for that segment) exist first.

Causation and Motivation are two very different things, and should not be confused. Causation typically lies in poor governance. Motivation is typically some inspiring ideology or big event, or both. Addressing motivation without publicly recognizing and addressing causation is a fraud on the populace.

The duty of government is not to fix the thinking of its populace, the duty of governance is to fix its governance of the populace.

I am picturing King George sending a deradicalization team to the Colonies back in 1775, offering "athletic competitions, to lectures, writing contests, and public information campaigns" to the citizens of Boston. Not bringing any changes to governance to address the grievances of the populace, but instead a program designed to distract them from their shortfalls and convince them why they should be satisfied.

Total BS. I think the North Koreans had a similar program for POWs back in the 50s.

Personal opinion, this is a very, very disturbing trend, and we should have no part of it.

[davidbfpo]

This issue appears fairly reglarly, usually with a lurid news headline and then disappears. The link goes to an article which takes a longer view, the author works in a London "think tank" IISS: http://raffaellopantucci.wordpress.c...rism/#more-112

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

(Partly quoted) I can't decide which is greater when it comes to this concept of "Deradicalization": The Ignorance of the program, or the Arrogance....First, it is founded in the popular, but baseless "Pied Piper Theory of Insurgency". Now if we simply expose the Pied Piper as a fraud, they will see the light and settle down and become good citizens once again....Causation and Motivation are two very different things, and should not be confused. Causation typically lies in poor governance. Motivation is typically some inspiring ideology or big event, or both. Addressing motivation without publicly recognizing and addressing causation is a fraud on the populace....The duty of government is not to fix the thinking of its populace, the duty of governance is to fix its governance of the populace.

Typically Bob's World comments have led to some hard thinking about policy in the UK and in a May 2008 government paper on our nationals strategy: http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ne...sm?view=Binary

I found this described as an objective: 'support individuals who are at risk of radicalisation'. On Bob's criteria we have failed IMHO. So back to thinking again.

davidbfpo

[Bob's World]

In my experience, politicians in particular, and governments in general, do not take responsibilities for their failures well. Far easier to blame the effects of those failures on some third party.

This is why most counterinsurgency efforts are such long, drawnout affairs. The effort is usually focused on defeating the illegal element of the populace that is acting out, as opposed to fixing the failures of governance that led to the illegal activities in the first place.

The book "1776" is a great case study in this phenomena. The King of England had so many opporutinities to offramp the growing insurgency in America, but could not get past the fact that he was in the right (legally, and logically), and recognize the much more emotional, subjective factors of poor governance that typically give rise to insurgency.

[Jedburgh]

ICSR, Apr 09: Incredible Dialogues: Religious Dialogue as a Means of Counter-Terrorism in Yemen

In 2002, Yemen, a country known to have been a breeding ground for al-Qaeda members, initiated a project to use dialogue as a means to alter the ways of suspected militant Islamists held in the state’s prisons. The project received international attention for its bold attempt to use their common reference to Islamic law as a peaceful means for the state to impact the militants. However, the actual implementation of the strategy was steeped in arbitrary arrests, indefinite detentions, torture and other violations of human rights. Furthermore, it was unclear what the charges against the detainees were and what impact the dialogue sessions had. The project was discontinued in 2005.

This paper examines the Yemeni experience of dialogues with Islamists it concludes that, though such a strategy might be a useful means for counter-terrorism, an environment for genuine dialogues cannot be established without taking into account wider issues of the state’s legitimacy vis-à-vis its citizens.

[davidbfpo]

A good book on this theme is: 'Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement', edited by Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan (Pub by Routledge 2009). Some theoretical and general chapters, then case studies and not just featuring Islam. Took time to read and worthwhile.

I will copy this to the main reading thread.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

A different aspect to the traditional 'rehab' policy in Saudi Arabaia: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ourt-case.html

davidbfpo

[Rex Brynen]

Recent publication on this topic, focusing on the Egyptian and Algerian cases:

Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London: Routledge, 2009).

This book is the first detailed study of the causes of de-radicalization in armed Islamist movements. It is based on frontline research that includes interviews with Jihadist leaders, mid-ranking commanders, and young sympathizers, as well as former security and intelligence officers and state officials.

Additionally, it is also the first book to analyze the particular conditions under which successful de-radicalization can take place. The current literature on Islamist movements attempts to explain two principal issues: their support of violence (radicalization) and their changing attitudes towards democracy and democratization (moderation). However, the reasons behind renouncing (behavioural de-radicalization) and de-legitimizing (ideological de-radicalization) violence have not been evaluated to date. The author provides an in-depth analysis of the de-radicalization processes of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers (1951-73), former allies of al-Qa'ida, such as al-Gama'a al-Islammiyya (Islamic Group of Egypt, 1997-2002) and al-Jihad Organization (2007- present), as well as of Algerian Islamist groups (1997-2000). The book also analyzes cases of de-radicalization failure.

The two questions that the book highlights and attempts to answer are Why? and How? For example, why do radical Islamist militants revise their ideologies, strategies and objectives and initiate a de-radicalization process; and what are the necessary conditions behind successful de-radicalization? De-radicalization of Jihadists shows how a combination of charismatic leadership, state repression, social interactions and selective inducements can ultimately lead jihadists to abandon 'jihad' and de-legitimize violence.

This book will be of great interest to students of radical Islamist movements and Islamic Studies, terrorism and political violence, security studies, and Middle Eastern politics.

Omar Ashour is a Lecturer in Politics in the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter. He has a PhD in International Relations from McGill University in Canada.

[davidbfpo]

CT Blog pointer to a WINEP report starts with:

In December 2001, Sajid Badat and Richard Reid, two young Muslims from England, were scheduled to blow up two U.S.-bound planes by using explosive-laden footwear, Jacobson writes. Reid -- like Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, al-Qaeda's most recent alleged plane bomber -- made the attempt and failed. Badat, however, abandoned the plan, later telling prosecutors he wanted to "introduce some calm" into his life. What led Badat to choose an alternative path? (My emphasis)What can we learn from his case and from the many other terrorist "drop outs" who have left al-Qaeda? In a newly released Washington Institute study, I explore these difficult but important questions.

I have asked about those who have given up the fight, not necessarily the cause and few academics appear to have considered this - so even if I've not read the report yet - I welcome this and will return when read.

The link to full report:
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/p...-who-have-left

[davidbfpo]

I suppose this was to be expected and appearing in The Daily Telegraph is no surprise.

In short:

Saudi Arabia says it will not give up a controversial rehabilitation programme for Islamist radicals heavily criticised in the US after former inmates set up an al-Qaeda cell in neighbouring Yemen.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...on-scheme.html

Note a 20% recidivism rate is cited by the Saudis (not seen that before).

[Charles Martel]

First, it is founded in the popular, but baseless "Pied Piper Theory of Insurgency" (My name for it, I'm sure it has a more official name elsewhere), that presumes that some dynamic leader comes along with a magical flute of ideology and that he somehow bewitches (radicalizes) young men to follow him to their doom. Now if we simply expose the Pied Piper as a fraud, they will see the light and settle down and become good citizens once again.

First, this totally absolves the government giving rise to these young insurgents of any responsibility for contributing to the causation for the insurgency through their failures of governance.

We have to do both, push the governments that restrict human rights and opportunity (pick any gov't in the Middle East as a prime example) to change as well as deradicalize the environment. Radical Imams do in fact gather followers by building layers of legitimate-sounding religious discourse on the substrate of resentment against the effects of those governments until the followers believe violence is not only their sole option but their sacred duty.

Many non-violent (I hate the word moderate) Imams simply do not have the education in Islamic jurisprudence to counter radicals in a manner that appeals both intellectually and emotionally to the target population. The radicals have built an intellectually solid, albeit narrowly based, argument that justifies violence against both infidels and innocents, who are tools in that fight. Deradicalization efforts have to tip the radical argument off that narrow base by exposing its nihilism and by promoting alternative, broader interpretations that attract wider support.

Midnight basketball won't do it. We have to both change the underlying conditions and undermine the efforts that capitalize on the resentment. Neither is sufficient by itself.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World,

Causation and Motivation are two very different things, and should not be confused. Causation typically lies in poor governance. Motivation is typically some inspiring ideology or big event, or both. Addressing motivation without publicly recognizing and addressing causation is a fraud on the populace.

The duty of government is not to fix the thinking of its populace, the duty of governance is to fix its governance of the populace.

The so called Pied Pipers have always been critical to any social movement. Once the movement has started it may be possible to have a leaderless jihad or other revolt, but I remain skeptical of how effective that will actually be. I think you give way too much credit to the power of good governance to prevent conflicts and radicalization. States are not composed of like minded people who all have the same vison of good governance (not even when Mao attempted to force this type of belief on his people with mass re-education), but rather states are composed of groups/individuals with different ideas of what good governance is. Was it a failure of the U.S. government and Western European governments to provide so called good governance that led to the radicalization of a few extreme leftists who resorted to terrorism? Should we have changed our form of government from a Republic to communism in order to please them? Why did foreign fighters from Morocco, Libya, France, etc. travel to fight in Iraq? Was it a failure of their local governments to provide "good" governance? Or did they travel to Iraq to fight because Pied Pipers on the internet and in their Mosques provided (created) the cause and motivation? Your argument assumes that their own government has failed, so they went to Iraq to fight. I assume our government has failed also, and that is why American kids are going to Somalia and Pakistan to join the jihad? UBL is effective because he is a good leader (many attempted to be Pied Pipers and failed) that provides his followers a vision (sick as it may be), and he comes across as genuine so people who are like minded follow him, and they will continue to follow him (his ideology) after he dies.

As for State reform in the Middle East, just be careful what you ask for. Democracy in countries where the majority live in poverty and are poorly educated, and deeply segregated could and have resulted in radical governments and mass violence. I can't recall who said it, but there is a popular saying the current government in Saudi is terrible, but it is better than any alternative.

Everyone is fighting for what they think good governance means.

Posted by graphei,

I always found it deeply ironic that the Saudis of all people are rehabilitating jihadis.

Why? The jihadis are actual a threat to the Saudi's existence. The jihadis want nothing more than to rule over their holy land.

[jmm99]

We agree that leaders are important. So are cadres (we middle-rankers) and also the mass of the populace. I believe a fair generalization (yes, there are exceptions) is that leaders are more motivated by ideology, cadres more by perceived opportunity, and the masses more by perceived security (or more realistically in these screwed-up environments, the better perceived insecurity - credit: M-A Legrange).

I believe that COL Jones has refined his position on Causation, Motivation and Causes (as contained in the Narratives) - see Distinguishing "Causes" from "causes" and Agreed as to what a cause is.

I have no position about the Saudi program cuz I don't have enough knowledge about it and no experience with it. I do know that the Saudi ideology is not that far removed from UBL's; but the "Causes" in their "Narratives" are quite different. As you correctly state:

The jihadis are actual a threat to the Saudi's existence. The jihadis want nothing more than to rule over their holy land.

The Powers That Be in the Kingdom are betting that their Narrative will beat AQ's Narrative. In confined conditions, that probably is a good bet; but whether that will stick once people are out of the program is something else.

In a way, this reminds me of our Socialist allies in the Cold War (certainly Marxist-based, but with a different Narrative than the Coms). That alliance won a few political battles and avoided some military battles.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

We agree that leaders are important. So are cadres (we middle-rankers) and also the mass of the populace. I believe a fair generalization (yes, there are exceptions) is that leaders are more motivated by ideology, cadres more by perceived opportunity, and the masses more by perceived security (or more realistically in these screwed-up environments, the better perceived insecurity - credit: M-A Legrange).

I believe that COL Jones has refined his position on Causation, Motivation and Causes (as contained in the Narratives) - see Distinguishing "Causes" from "causes" and Agreed as to what a cause is.

Mike, what I read on BW's post was that deradicalization was sheer arrogance and laughable. While I agree attempting to change a rational man's position through a re-education program (much like the communists tried with their prisoners and their conquered populations, and if they didn't pretend to change their mind they were often killed) on which form of governance is arrogance to the extreme. However, radicalization is different from political grievances. Kids and adults are frequently brainwashed through sosphisticated methods and often with the help of narcotics to weaken their resistance. They are isolated from alternative views and feed a diet of hatred based partially on truth, but largely on lies.

I see radicalization being closer to kids getting sweep into a religious cult than an insurgency. Most insurgents are not radicalized, but are fighting for several reasons. Kids and young men who travel from Morocco or elsewhere to conduct a suicide attack have probably been radicalized.

The assumption of de-radicalization programs is if these "victims" are exposed to a different interpretation of Islam and taught that killing innocent civilians is a sin, etc., and they're given alternative ways to vent their anger, etc. they "may" shed their radical views. For instance let's take the kid who attempted to blow up the NW flight on Christmas. He grew up in a very moderate family with means and had a good education, yet somewhere along the line a "leader" persuaded him to conduct a suicide attack that would kill over 200 innocent non-combatants. I'm sorry, but that isn't a failure of good governance, there is something else going on here.

The stats I have seen have shown that about 30% of those who been through these programs return to jihad over time (how much time?). Like all stats this leaves a lot unanswered questions. My point is I think it is bit simplistic to boil everything down to good governance. That Nigerian kid declared his own personal jihad on the U.S. and it had nothing to do with governance and everything to do with "Pied Pipers".

[jmm99]

in any sort of generalized way that would make that term useful for doctrinal guidance.

To me, the quality of governance requires reference to the specific context and some measurement (even if only qualitative and a "fuzzy pattern") of the People's perception of that governance.

What goes on with suicide bombers has to end up with a belief strong enough to die for - with the certain knowledge that no possibility exists for survival. How they get there must be by varied paths (probably too many or too deep to apply any sort of generalized preventive program).

In any event, focusing on them is akin to focusing on a cruise missile (9/11) or mortar shell (suicide bombings) - they are the means to project explosive power (as well as personalizing the attack - to create a Wind of Hate in Dave Grossman's terms). So, I'd look to the people that send them.

As to them, kill, detain or convert are the options. Convert is probably not a good option for leaders; possibly an option for middle-level cadres; and probably an option for many low-level doggies. As I said, I've little knowledge and no experience with the Saudi program.

Regards

Mike

[graphei]

Why? The jihadis are actual a threat to the Saudi's existence. The jihadis want nothing more than to rule over their holy land.

Some jihadis are a threat to them, but I wouldn't say all. Wahhabism is the theological backbone for many jihadi groups and for decades Saudis disavowed knowledge of many of these groups while quietly pumping their coffers full. Many of these men know their bank balances down to the penny (I heard the stories from their kids/relatives at school in London) and all of a sudden they either can't account for a couple million and/or they are duped into giving millions to a front charity for a militant group?

While I don't doubt there are many Saudis- even in the royal family and government- who are legitimately trying to do their part, I'm not quite convinced everyone is on board.

[Bill Moore]

While I don't doubt there are many Saudis- even in the royal family and government- who are legitimately trying to do their part, I'm not quite convinced everyone is on board.

Agreed, there are very few instances where everyone is on board in any country, which is why I think the good governance will solve all problems card is danagerously over played.

In the U.S. there was huge opposition to both WWI and WWII, and more recent time while it was official policy not to support terrorists, many Americans donated money to the IRA. In any democracy you have left leaning, center leaning, and right leaning groups and individuals and variations within those groups. Each has their own interpretation of good government, and some will resort to violence to pursue their ideal form of government.

What does the average American, the average German, the average Mexican, the average Nigerian, really think about various issues? I think the term average used in this fashion is an illusion at best. For those who accept the argument that good governance is the cure for all global ills, it would seem that they would accept that the government should fold everytime an armed group challenges its policies. Obviously it must be a "popular uprising". Seems like a receipe for chaos and failure to me. Principles are worth fighting for, and groups opposed to my and perhaps our principles feel the same way. If there are groups out there opposed to a particular government, then it is highly probable that there are groups opposed to those groups (as both Afghanistan and Iraq "clearly" demonstrate).

Eventually you have to take a stand, and "sometimes" the political process will be violent as it has been throughout the history of mankind.