Abandon squad/section levels of organization?

[Steve Blair]

SOG teams tended to travel fairly light (so you're correct there)...basic weapon was the AK or CAR-15/XM-177E2. The Hatchet Force was obviously heavier and did carry LMGs. SOG did have tons of air ordnance on call, so that to a degree offset their light organic weaponry (note that it's to a degree, but their basic mission was recon/targeting).

During Vietnam the SEALs tended to operate in teams ranging from 3-7 men, if memory serves. They had heavier weapons, in part due to their use of the Stoner system that allowed for a fairly light LMG-type weapon. SEALs didn't tend to do tons of long range patrolling, so they could go heavy on weapons and light on other stuff. Platoons tended to break into two sections for operational purposes...one "on" and one "off" if memory serves (although I could be suffering from CRS, so any corrections are appreciated).

On a related note there was a fascinating article that came out a couple of years ago (don't remember the journal title, but I do have a copy of it in the files) that involved a conference of old SOG 1-0s (team leaders) meeting with current SF personnel at Bragg. Some very interesting "compare and contrast" stuff in there, including the SOG guys feeling that they had much more control over mission planning than units do today.

[Norfolk]

On a related note there was a fascinating article that came out a couple of years ago (don't remember the journal title, but I do have a copy of it in the files) that involved a conference of old SOG 1-0s (team leaders) meeting with current SF personnel at Bragg. Some very interesting "compare and contrast" stuff in there, including the SOG guys feeling that they had much more control over mission planning than units do today.

Hmmm...Steve, that last is rather intriguing...if you had time, some time, to dig it up and either post it or PM/E-Mail it, I would be most grateful.

OH PLEASE, PRETTY PLEASE, WITH SUGAR AND A CHERRY ON TOP!

[Steve Blair]

Hmmm...Steve, that last is rather intriguing...if you had time, some time, to dig it up and either post it or PM/E-Mail it, I would be most grateful.

OH PLEASE, PRETTY PLEASE, WITH SUGAR AND A CHERRY ON TOP!

I'll dig it up. They didn't go into tons of detail because it was an unclassified forum, but there was some sweet stuff in there.

The sad part is that no one had bothered to do this until only a few years ago. Some of the 1-0s indicated that no one had EVER talked to them in an attempt to gather some lessons. And these are guys who were running the Trail at the height of the Vietnam War....

[Norfolk]

I'll dig it up.

The sad part is that no one had bothered to do this until only a few years ago. Some of the 1-0s indicated that no one had EVER talked to them in an attempt to gather some lessons. And these are guys who were running the Trail at the height of the Vietnam War....

Thanks Steve!

[Steve Blair]

It's in the Summer 2000 issue of Special Warfare. The title is "One Zero Conference." I've got a pdf version if needed.

[Rifleman]

On a related note there was a fascinating article that came out a couple of years ago (don't remember the journal title, but I do have a copy of it in the files) that involved a conference of old SOG 1-0s (team leaders) meeting with current SF personnel at Bragg. Some very interesting "compare and contrast" stuff in there, including the SOG guys feeling that they had much more control over mission planning than units do today.

I wonder if CSM (Ret.) Samuel Hernandez was one of them. CSM Hernandez was with both B-52 Project Delta and MACVSOG CCN. I know he was on RT Florida for the first HALO jump. I don't know what other teams he went "over the fence" with.

I'm just asking out of curiosity, since he was my battalion CSM from '84-'88, both at Ft. Bragg and Vicenza.

[Steve Blair]

I wonder if CSM (Ret.) Samuel Hernandez was one of them. CSM Hernandez was with both B-52 Project Delta and MACVSOG CCN. I know he was on RT Florida for the first HALO jump. I don't know what other teams he went "over the fence" with.

I'm just asking out of curiosity, since he was my battalion CSM from '84-'88, both at Ft. Bragg and Vicenza.

I'm actually not sure. The article didn't go into much detail, and didn't discuss the 1-0 participants in terms of names. It's certainly worth a read, though. Some very good stuff.

[Adam L]

I’ve been following this thread and the “Rifle squad composition“ and I just have to point out/ask a few things.

• What type of operation is the best “squad” being created for, or is it a “one size fits all.” Can one size fit all? Is there a better fit depending on service or section there of.
• I have been seeing a big range in size of platoons, squads, etc. and I am wondering if it is even reasonable to compare and 8, 13, 17 man squad. Are they even the in the same ball park?
• Should the concept be better trained fireteams 3-7 men (for the sake of argument 4) with the capability to be combined into squads of different sizes and capabilities based on the demands of the operation. What I am really asking is should there be “sub” parts to squads and platoons to enhance flexibility. Should a 16 man squad be able to break down into 2 x8 man squads, or take 2 x 16 man squads and break it into 2 x 12 man squads + and 8 man squad. My point and question is should there be more of a move away from doctrine that will never meet every requirement and towards a more flexible system?

Now, please tell me whats wrong with this.

[jcustis]

What type of operation is the best “squad” being created for, or is it a “one size fits all.” Can one size fit all? Is there a better fit depending on service or section there of.

I would like any squad to be capable of accomplishing the various roles found in MCWP 3-11.2, The Marine Rifle Squad. I forgot to reference that pub as a little evidence that the Corps has applied a lot of thought to the business of fighting the squad.

[Norfolk]

I’ve been following this thread and the “Rifle squad composition“ and I just have to point out/ask a few things.

• What type of operation is the best “squad” being created for, or is it a “one size fits all.” Can one size fit all? Is there a better fit depending on service or section there of.
• I have been seeing a big range in size of platoons, squads, etc. and I am wondering if it is even reasonable to compare and 8, 13, 17 man squad. Are they even the in the same ball park?
• Should the concept be better trained fireteams 3-7 men (for the sake of argument 4) with the capability to be combined into squads of different sizes and capabilities based on the demands of the operation. What I am really asking is should there be “sub” parts to squads and platoons to enhance flexibility. Should a 16 man squad be able to break down into 2 x8 man squads, or take 2 x 16 man squads and break it into 2 x 12 man squads + and 8 man squad. My point and question is should there be more of a move away from doctrine that will never meet every requirement and towards a more flexible system?

Now, please tell me whats wrong with this.

Adam L, I think we're looking for a basic and generic rifle squad to build upon. I might be wrong, but it seems that a rough consensus is emerging in favour of larger squads. Tom, Ken, jcustis, and I like 13-14 men in a squad, and Rifleman likes it too, but would settle for the old 11-man if he could get it. And the reason for that preference seems to comes down to three major things.

The first is a preference for "1 Up, 2 or 3 Back" formations, especially in the attack, in order to maximize suppression of the enemy and minimize friendly losses. Of course you can get away with just two fire teams in a squad in a company or a platoon attack, but it's harder to do in an independent squad attack, since you don't have that third team to perform the assult while the other two suppress.

The second is the size of the rifle squad after sustained battle attrition. Cleary, an 8 or 9 man squad doesn't have to lose very many people before it becomes just a fire team, whereas a 13 or 14 man squad may still muster two small fire teams after suffering very heavy losses.

The third is that the 3-fire-team squad seems to naturally lend itself to adaptation, either by detaching fire teams out, or receiving attachments from elsewhere; the 3-team squad's triangular structure is shared more or less all the way up the hierarchy of echelons, where all sorts of task-organizations and cross-attachments occurr as a matter of course. And with this concept of the 3-team Squad in mind, it only seems natural that the Squad can likewise be task-organized when tactically appropriate. So, it can be expanded by adding fire teams or heavy weapons teams, or it can reduce or split up as needed (patrols, OPs/LPs, guard duties, etc.) But the 3-team structure always acts as the base, a basis for change. The 2-team squad seems a little more rigid in some ways, not least because if it detaches just one of its teams, it's reduced to a single team itself.

As for your "mix'n'match" proposal Adam, there's nothing particularly wrong with that. I don't see any particular difficulty in reorganizing a platoon or its squads as its commander sees fit to meet the tactical situation. But it seems that a large squad, of 3 teams, and a large platoon of 3 such squads, normally organized along the lines the USMC prefers, works quite well for most conventional infantry combat with little or no major modification.

And in those situations where major reorganization is required to meet less conventional (unconventional?) tactical situations, this organization provides a good, solid base upon which to make necessary changes. I think that a smaller squad, and a smaller platoon might be much more hard-pressed to make such changes out of hide, not least because it's starting out with less, and with only 2 rather than 3 teams per squad, it has less flexibility to begin with.

[Rifleman]

As for your "mix'n'match" proposal Adam, there's nothing particularly wrong with that. I don't see any particular difficulty in reorganizing a platoon or its squads as its commander sees fit to meet the tactical situation. But it seems that a large squad, of 3 teams, and a large platoon of 3 such squads, normally organized along the lines the USMC prefers, works quite well for most conventional infantry combat with little or no major modification.

And in those situations where major reorganization is required to meet less conventional (unconventional?) tactical situations, this organization provides a good, solid base upon which to make necessary changes. I think that a smaller squad, and a smaller platoon might much more hard-pressed to make such changes out of hide, not least because it's starting out with less, and with only 2 rather than 3 teams per squad, it has less flexibility to begin with.

I know I'm going off topic here, but read what Norfolk wrote substituting brigade for squad and battalion for team.

There have always been times when two battalions were enough. There have always been times when four were needed. Hasn't a three battalion brigade proved to be a good, common sense sized base element to task organize up or down from? I'm talking about line battalions in a brigade. I'm not counting the cavalry squadron.

I remember reading somewhere that in light units some of these new two battalion brigades have deployed with a third battalion attached.

[Coldstreamer]

Since when did military logic dictate the size of a force?

[William F. Owen]

Adam L,

1. I think we're looking for a basic and generic rifle squad to build upon.

2. I might be wrong, but it seems that a rough consensus is emerging in favour of larger squads.

Why? What is so important about squads/sections. How is 30 men organised as 2 x 15 man squads different from 3 x 10 man squads? These squads are not normally acting in isolation of each other, so where do we see clear blue water between the Squads and 30 men (or whatever number you choose) as being 6 x 5 man teams able to form 15 man or 10 man sections or teams?

The 1936-1983 UK Section was a 8-10 man formed into two Fireteams - except they were called the Rifle group (5-6 men) and the Gun Group (3-4men). Occaisonally, when operating in Jungle, the 10 man sections composed three groups - usually a Gun group x 4 men, and two 3 man scout groups.

I hope I'm making sense.

[Distiller]

Why? What is so important about squads/sections. How is 30 men organised as 2 x 15 man squads different from 3 x 10 man squads? These squads are not normally acting in isolation of each other, so where do we see clear blue water between the Squads and 30 men (or whatever number you choose) as being 6 x 5 man teams able to form 15 man or 10 man sections or teams?

The 1936-1983 UK Section was a 8-10 man formed into two Fireteams - except they were called the Rifle group (5-6 men) and the Gun Group (3-4men). Occaisonally, when operating in Jungle, the 10 man sections composed three groups - usually a Gun group x 4 men, and two 3 man scout groups.

I hope I'm making sense.

How do you see the question of keeping the squad small enough to fit "as one piece" into APCs (provided you procure/design one that can take 9+crew) and UH-60-type air assault helicopters?
You might be able to pack 14 men (another nice number for a 3 team squad) into a helicopter, but never into an APC.

[Rifleman]

Why? What is so important about squads/sections. How is 30 men organised as 2 x 15 man squads different from 3 x 10 man squads? These squads are not normally acting in isolation of each other, so where do we see clear blue water between the Squads and 30 men (or whatever number you choose) as being 6 x 5 man teams able to form 15 man or 10 man sections or teams?

The 1936-1983 UK Section was a 8-10 man formed into two Fireteams - except they were called the Rifle group (5-6 men) and the Gun Group (3-4men). Occaisonally, when operating in Jungle, the 10 man sections composed three groups - usually a Gun group x 4 men, and two 3 man scout groups.

I hope I'm making sense.

Wilf,

You're articulating your position very well, so yes, you are making sense.

It's just that if I was a green 2d Lieutenant and you gave me six fire teams, some heavy and some light, I would be tempted to habitually group the same teams together into defacto squads of two or three teams each, instead of mixing and matching differently for each contact.

I don't think I'd be alone in doing that either, so now we're back to where we started from.

[Ken White]

talks to those guys, the even more devastating item is your comment that I highlighted below. The trend is, apparently in the direction of OVER control -- when it should be just the opposite.

Sad.

...
. . .
... Some very interesting "compare and contrast" stuff in there, including the SOG guys feeling that they had much more control over mission planning than units do today.

(emphasis added / kw)