Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

Amidst your post was:

Of concern to us was the fact that at one point operational intel was being passed on. For example on one camp attack into Zambia when we were going through the paperwork in their ops room we found a fresh signal they had received that morning saying "You will be attacked at 12h00 today".

I learnt when in Zimbabwe in 1985 that operational security lapses had caused immense concern and aside from the "usual suspects" some thought was given to the regular arrival of external supporters before each major external operation. Supporters who provided the funding and more - they were not identified, but the finger of suspicion pointed northwards to Arabia. Their arrival in executive jets invariably was to Salisbury and could have been monitored.

After 1980 the Rhodesians discovered that some of the lapses could be attributed to the weather station at Salisbury airport, which was all-African and from their position could monitor the build-up of aircraft. Maybe even requests for weather reports? IIRC the Rhodesian Air Force main operating base, New Sarum shared the civil Salisbury airfield.

Security did work and I was told that ZANLA had never worked out where the ammunition was stored for the AML armoured cars; it had been in the squash courts and had been unseen.

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

You cited:

Op Manacle was the name of the Op for the Mozambican bridges and was first in line. But on the 15th November 1979 during the Lancaster House Talks there was a switch and the go ahead was given to take out the Zambian bridges which effectively put ZIPRA out of the war.

As the rush was on to prepare for the Mozambique part of the op the word came through from London that the cease fire had been signed and all external ops were terminated.

In the late-1980's there was a Granada TV series 'End of Empire', with two episodes on Rhodesia (UDI & Lancaster House) and many years later the BBC had another. Dropping the bridges was mentioned IIRC in both and in one, cannot recall which now, a Mozambique government advisor to Samora Machel referred to the intense pressure applied to Mugabe to agree in London. Not sure of the dates, but that may explain why the switch of targets was made to Zambia.

[JMA]

JMA,

You cited:

In the late-1980's there was a Granada TV series 'End of Empire', with two episodes on Rhodesia (UDI & Lancaster House) and many years later the BBC had another. Dropping the bridges was mentioned IIRC in both and in one, cannot recall which now, a Mozambique government advisor to Samora Machel referred to the intense pressure applied to Mugabe to agree in London. Not sure of the dates, but that may explain why the switch of targets was made to Zambia.

Up until Nkomo's people shot down the two civilian aircraft (Viscounts) Smith was in talks with him with a view to an agreement to the exclusion of Mugabe. After that and with Nkomo laughing about it in international TV there was no chance of 'white' Rhodesia accepting an agreement with Nkomo. (In his memoirs, Story of My Life (1985), Nkomo expressed regret for the shooting down of both planes)

Yes it is understood that Machel virtually forced Mugabe to attend to Lancaster House conference and when Mugabe walked out at one point he received a message from Machel stating that if he left London he was not to return to Mozambique.

As far as the switch (of bridge targets from Mozambique to Zambia) was concerned it appears that the Brits realised that the only way to end the war was to hand the country to Mugabe. Nkomo/ZIPRA had maintained a conventional force and had an invasion plan (planned by the Russians) via Victoria Falls. There was still a chance that Nkomo/ZIPRA could use that force to invade after Mugabe won the election so the Brits arranged for the Rhodesians to drop the key bridges and thus put the ZIPRA conventional force out of the war.

To be truly astonished about how the events on the Brit side unfolded one just has to trace Maggie Thatcher's timeline where at one stage she refused to meet "the terrorist" Mugabe and promised to lift sanctions through to when Mugabe was awarded a knighthood and not a sound was made by Britain when Mugabe's North Korean trained 5th Brigade did their little genocide thing on 30,000 Ndebele (the ethnic group represented by Nkomo and ZIPRA) in the early years after independence.

The Brit excuse is that they had to try and show the white South Africans that it was indeed possible to have a peaceful and economically successful African state and news of the genocide would not help with the acceptance of the possibility of benign majority rule. So careful management and aid was supplied to Zimbabwe until South Africa was a done deal and then they cut Zimbabwe loose... the rest is history.

[baboon6]

JMA,

Amidst your post was:

I learnt when in Zimbabwe in 1985 that operational security lapses had caused immense concern and aside from the "usual suspects" some thought was given to the regular arrival of external supporters before each major external operation. Supporters who provided the funding and more - they were not identified, but the finger of suspicion pointed northwards to Arabia. Their arrival in executive jets invariably was to Salisbury and could have been monitored.

After 1980 the Rhodesians discovered that some of the lapses could be attributed to the weather station at Salisbury airport, which was all-African and from their position could monitor the build-up of aircraft. Maybe even requests for weather reports? IIRC the Rhodesian Air Force main operating base, New Sarum shared the civil Salisbury airfield.

Security did work and I was told that ZANLA had never worked out where the ammunition was stored for the AML armoured cars; it had been in the squash courts and had been unseen.

There have also been allegations in the past of a spy or spies within COMOPS. Who they were, how they would have passed on information and whether the allegations have any merit- I couldn't say. I don't know if this is related to the three CIA agents mentioned by JMA above.

[JMA]

There have also been allegations in the past of a spy or spies within COMOPS. Who they were, how they would have passed on information and whether the allegations have any merit- I couldn't say. I don't know if this is related to the three CIA agents mentioned by JMA above.

Yes there was certainly a leak in COMOPS. Later a very strict "need to know" basis was maintained in that only Gen Walls (who had authorised the Op) and the implementing unit knew of the pending Op. There was still some potential for leaks as to get to Lusaka there was a lot of Air Force types in the loop and to get to Maputo (by South African Navy submarine or gunboat) also required a lot of people to know. Apart from that one camp in Zambia where had they had the ability that Op could have been a disaster most of the assassination attempts resulting in the target being called away at short notice for and urgent meeting or other and apart from Mugabe in Maputo, Nkomo left his guards and staff to face the music. Obviously the source did not want to blow his cover if there was a massive welcoming committee when the troops arrived. And yes there were always a number of battle indications when helicopters started to concentrate in one particular area etc etc the key source would always have been if they had someone planted in the Air Force as they were always deeply involved and by necessity a lot of people got to know about what was about to go down.

[baboon6]

Yes there was certainly a leak in COMOPS. Later a very strict "need to know" basis was maintained in that only Gen Walls (who had authorised the Op) and the implementing unit knew of the pending Op. There was still some potential for leaks as to get to Lusaka there was a lot of Air Force types in the loop and to get to Maputo (by South African Navy submarine or gunboat) also required a lot of people to know. Apart from that one camp in Zambia where had they had the ability that Op could have been a disaster most of the assassination attempts resulting in the target being called away at short notice for and urgent meeting or other and apart from Mugabe in Maputo, Nkomo left his guards and staff to face the music. Obviously the source did not want to blow his cover if there was a massive welcoming committee when the troops arrived. And yes there were always a number of battle indications when helicopters started to concentrate in one particular area etc etc the key source would always have been if they had someone planted in the Air Force as they were always deeply involved and by necessity a lot of people got to know about what was about to go down.

Was the leak ever identified?

[JMA]

Was the leak ever identified?

Nobody could understand why Ken Flower was retained as head of the CIO by Smith. Nothing confirmed.

But we have one certainty here: "The secret Zimbabwe policeman's cricket ball"

[baboon6]

Nobody could understand why Ken Flower was retained as head of the CIO by Smith. Nothing confirmed.

But we have one certainty here: "The secret Zimbabwe policeman's cricket ball"

Yes I have read about Danny Stannard before. But would he have been privy to the kind of information we're talking about prior to 1980? As I understand it he wasn't particularly high up in the BSAP.

[JMA]

Yes I have read about Danny Stannard before. But would he have been privy to the kind of information we're talking about prior to 1980? As I understand it he wasn't particularly high up in the BSAP.

Networks, my friend, networks. Different sources corroborate the specific pieces of Intel and they probably don't know of each other.