The Army Capstone Concept: the Army wants your comments

[Dr. C]

I just read an article in the September-October 2009 of Military Review by LTC (RET) Tim Challans, Ph.D., "Tipping Sacred Cows: Moral Potential Through Operational Art."

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...031_art006.pdf

"Sacred cows make the best hamburgers. The Aristotelian box includes the uncritically accepted article of faith -- which we take for granted -- that revolves around reasoning about means and ends. The logic of this type of reasoning has burgeoned over the centuries (at an accelerating rate recently) in the form of "problem-solving" enshrined as a sacred principle. . . . Strategy is not about problem-solving" (p. 21).

The author discusses Systemic Operational Design (SOD), and I pointed this article out because of his perspective on problem-solving as a framework.

I think the capstone document would be stronger if a framework other than "problem-solution" was used. I've probably reached my word limit for how many times I can write that in one discussion thread.

I doubt if I'm the only person who will read the capstone and take issue with the framework and how the authors arrived at their solutions. I'm trying to be helpful and suggest how to build a stronger position.

[Steve the Planner]

Michelle:

Agree that we are probably reaching a word (and concept) limit without further input.

By now, I suspect we are debating an early draft that has already cleaned up a lot.

I'm actually looking to understand more about how it deals with the future.

Unspoken in a lot of the discussion is, in fact, how much we are seeking to adapt past solutions to current and future problems. It is both a human and organizational foundation.

My best guess is that when we are in a place with a confused mission, we are always vulnerable. No matter how big or how many resources are committed.

The one question which I feel confident about as a future scenario is neither winning nor losing in long-term festering problems that we, as a nation, will not commit so abundantly to as to pursue a definitive end, but for which we have some minimum objectives that do not fully encompass controlling the people, land and resources, psychologically or physically.

Is that a realistic scenario for the future, and how does the Army prepare for that?

Steve

[slapout9]

I just read an article in the September-October 2009 of Military Review by LTC (RET) Tim Challans, Ph.D., "Tipping Sacred Cows: Moral Potential Through Operational Art."

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...031_art006.pdf



The author discusses Systemic Operational Design (SOD), and I pointed this article out because of his perspective on problem-solving as a framework.

I think the capstone document would be stronger if a framework other than "problem-solution" was used. I've probably reached my word limit for how many times I can write that in one discussion thread.

I doubt if I'm the only person who will read the capstone and take issue with the framework and how the authors arrived at their solutions. I'm trying to be helpful and suggest how to build a stronger position.

I posted that article when it first came out because of his discussion of action theory although he says the theory is not well known any Cop will tell you the motive comes first....even crazy people have a motive. He discusses some of the drawbacks of thinking of Strategy as Ends,Ways and Means. Really Good Stuff in there.

[William F. Owen]

I just read an article in the September-October 2009 of Military Review by LTC (RET) Tim Challans, Ph.D., "Tipping Sacred Cows: Moral Potential Through Operational Art."

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...031_art006.pdf

There are so many things wrong with that article, I hardly know where to begin. Prominent among the errors is the assertion that the Luftwaffe bombed London to force a capitulation. - Completely untrue.

The author also says,

We can avoid the logical error of instrumentalism (that which may work in practice, but not in theory) only by disclosing our paper trail of reasoning.

WHAT? If he seriously believes that, then how does he define the purpose of Strategy? Surely Strategy is INSTRUMENTAL! - It is used to get something done!
If the secret of SOD is merely holding reasoning and assumption to rigour, then why not say that. Theory you cannot put into effective practice or use to inform practice is utterly useless.
The role of "theory" in military thought is to check the relationships between intentions, practices and actions. The primary source of useful military theory is history. - which SOD seems mostly to ignore.

1.) There is no evidence that SOD is any better or more valid an idea than Manoeuvre Warfare or EBO - there is simply no reason (body of evidence) to believe this.

2.) I hate to rain on the author's parade, but there is substantial evidence that the flow down effects of SOD were very much responsible for problems in the Lebanon. He talks of "Israeli SOD Theorists" - I know of only one, and his standing is not high, except in the US SOD commercial consultant world.

3.) There are no "ethics" in military theory. The ethical dimension is merely how well or poorly a course of action sets forth the policy! Killing civilians generally undermines political objectives. - More over this is a bizarrely "White Christian" view of the world. Many many folks in the world consider killing civilians to be the heart of their strategy.

So yes, the article is nice convoluted wordy romp through various philosophy and theory, but so what?