The Counterinsurgency Cliff Notes

[Jason Pape]

Craig -

One other thing came to mind...something worth talking about at the platoon level: FORCE PROTECTION.

My concern is that some young leaders in today's environment might believe their primary goal is to protect their Soldiers even more than it is to accomplish their mission. ie. I worry that we are placing force protection above mission accomplishment. While they are not mutually exclusive, you cannot always have both.

As an example, and perhaps as a tangent - I worry about the politicization of the MRAP fielding in Iraq. I worry even more about people who implicitly support the "more protection is better" argument. I'm an Armor Officer, and I love the Abrams MBT, but I did everything I could to stay off off tanks in Iraq. When I was almost blown up by a massive IED and my commander tried to get me back on "track," I refused because it would not allow me to do what I needed to do in COIN. I worry about reinforcing a "commute to work" mentality with the MRAP, etc. and wonder whether more (as in Frag Kit 6 & gunner's 'cloches') is really better, or if force protection might become such a concern that it is a detriment to successful COIN Ops.

I think we need to have candid conversations with our junior leaders about how accepting risk, or better - mitigating risk in a deliberate manner, rather than risk-avoidance is the right mentality. Even deeper...the discussion that MAYBE, by taking greater risk now (ie. staying closer to the ground rather than climbing onto MRAP elephants) we might be negating risks to come...

To me (Armor-Cav guy), moving dismounted is A technique with several advantages but also very limited (in speed, distance and support). The MRAP, to me, represents the latest chapter in a vicious cycle of pursuing protection rather than fighting smarter, harder, and LIGHTER. Previous chapters in the protection novel included Frag Kit 6 and gunner's 'cloches' (see Maginot Line for illustration) on M1114s...both responses to an enemy TTP that, in my mind, don't make enough of a difference to justify the drawbacks (weight, obscuration, etc.)

I'm a huge fan of the M1114. But not what I see now. You might as well put the gunner inside with the rest of the crew, or go with the MRAP. But most people seem very satisfied with more armor, more stuff on the cupola, and heck...even a new vehicle altogether...the MRAP. But 1. how many lives will it save? 2. How much will it hamper our agility, ability, and mentality to get at COIN the right way?

I'm still not getting to my point. Let me try it this way...
1. More is not always better! More armor (usually) = more weight = less mobility and less agility. And if it doesn't REALLY mean better protection (if a catastrophic IED is still a catastrophic IED) then it isn't worth the baggage.
2. More protection (often) encourages less thinking. I've personally seen units (leaders) lulled into thinking their C-IED or armor package "protect" them like a magical cloak, thus forgetting about patterns, CREW fratricide, etc. There are some places we MUST go REPEATEDLY and REGULARLY...we need CREW, armor, and deliberate clearance techniques to do that. But we should not adopt that mentality for ALL operations.
3. In the end, we are part of a profession that requires us to be prepared to take casualties. We owe all that we have to protecting our Soldiers and setting them up for success. But we cannot forsake mission accomplishment for protection. Sometimes...SOMETIMES...taking risks, and taking causalities as a result of these risks, means more Soldiers are saved in the long-run due to mission accomplishment. This is the hard-smart-counterintuitive discussion I'm most eager to have with junior leaders. So...instead of providing more protection that allows us to do routine missions and get the most guys back for refit & Cinnabon...we need to be willing to go light, stay out longer, and take reasonable risks that make us more effective. Ironically, if our #1 concern is saving Soldiers lives, I worry that we will lose more Soldiers in the long run...

[Ron Humphrey]

know into context when describing it to others. Thats part of what SWJ gives is a way in which varying experiences and knowledge from others comes together in a picture which kinda makes sense.

Thanks for your efforts.

This kinda reminds me of a discussion I was in where the best I could do to describe what your speaking of was the following.

If the population in your AO do not feel secure than you the counter insurgent aren't secure no matter how much armor you wrap around yourself.

It ain't perfect but I think it reflects some of what Galula, Kilcullen, and others have stated. And you having lived it can represent the validity of it by simply sharing your experience.

[Ken White]

Though I have to say your last three paragraphs above are, IMO, particularly good and very much correct.

[William F. Owen]

Craig -

One other thing came to mind...something worth talking about at the platoon level: FORCE PROTECTION.

My concern is that some young leaders in today's environment might believe their primary goal is to protect their Soldiers even more than it is to accomplish their mission. ie. I worry that we are placing force protection above mission accomplishment. While they are not mutually exclusive, you cannot always have both.

The term and concept of "Force Protection" is UK in origin. Anyone who reads Leonhard will know that you balance security against activity, so the ultimate logic of force protection is to nothing other than protect the force.

Thus - their primary goal is to protect their Soldiers even more than it is to accomplish their mission.

IMO the concept of Force Protection verges on silliness, (like IPB) if explicit in nature, rather than implicit. It's a statement of the obvious (like hearts and minds) which has taken on a life of it's own.

The primary means of creating force protection is to defeat the enemies core functions. (This has recently become the "onion layers of defence" which is entirely passive and thus not useful) - the best force protection is to the defeat/suppress/exhaust the enemy. It is the heart of the so-called COIN mission.

[Cpt C]

Jason and Will,

Thank you for your comments. i wasn't going to spill over into this subject in detail, but you both mentioned something that is a very important issue to me. I briefly mentioned in an earlier post "patrolling to survive." This is what I use to refer to the techniques that many units are currently using in Iraq. Basically, it consists of "buttoning up" in your brad/hmmwv/tank/etc, doing a few laps through the major roads in your AO, and calling that your patrol. And I'm not talking out of my ass here- I could write an alarming long list of battalions that i personally witnessed doing this when I was in iraq (just a few short months ago). This technique is used by units who don't necessarily want to get into any real #### and just want to get home (not that you can really blame anyone for that). However, this technique is flawed in that the exact opposite occurs. It allows the enemy safe haven to build his engagement areas, coerce the populace, and study and patternize the counterinsurgent. And then all of a sudden that unit will realize that their AO has gone to #### and they are having mass-casualty engagements because of it. And so will everyone else who has to travel through that AO to get to somewhere else (I was often that guy).
Too much emphasis on Force Protenction can encourage "patrolling to survive." And sometimes at no fault of the soldier; too much armor and weight can make it almost imposssible to patrol on foot and engage the populace in the middle of an iraqi summer. The american public doesn't want to see american casualties, so they hammer politicians to give us more armor, who in turn hammer the army to give us more armor, who do, and then eventually the soldier is so overburdened that he cannot perform his infantry (or other) tasks. it is a vicious and unfortuante cycle. But we also do it to ourselves. I have seen units affix bullet-proof glass to their vehicles that completely surrounds the soldier in the hatch (without even a gun port). This is claimed to be a Force Protection measure, but it completely prevents the soldier in the hatch from returning fire. I can't even begin to count how many times I had to return fire from the hatch of my stryker and I can't imagine what it would be like if i wasn't able to do so. A Force Pro measure such as this is going too far and stifles not only the ability of the soldier but also the warrior ethos within that soldier. It is a careful balance that leaders must figure out, regardless of which vehicle platform they have.

I guess the message that I want to get out to people is that sometimes the best Force Protection measure is actually to sacrifice some Force Protection in order go get into the populace and eradicate the enemy. Instead of just focussing on protecting yourself from that IED blast, stop it from ever occuring in the first place. That is how you will win the fight.

Craig