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Thread: Insurgents vs Terrorists -- Is there a difference?

  1. #21
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    You could try an LE model the group is usually identified by a leader or group title (Gotti,Crips,MS13,etc.) from there it is categorized by Motive(cause,ideology) Method(Terrorist,Insurgent,Robbers,Drug dealers, etc.) Opportunity(Time and Location) ??What say ye??

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    I like descriptive models as well, although my historical background makes me somewhat wary of predictive models.

    I've always considered criminal activity of the sort we were discussing as a tactic. Organized crime refers more to the group that is using the tactic, and the fact that it has become their preferred tactic (indeed, possibly their main method of operations). What got me interested in this was the blanket use of the word "terrorist," often with a total ignorance of anything that came before Sept. 11. Trans-national insurgent groups are certainly vulnerable to COIN, and can be defeated by ideas. In my view, the hardline terrorist group is pretty immune to this approach, especially once they've entered their third generation of recruits. You may be able to isolate them from their recruiting sources, but the violence they cloak with ideological labels will normally attract more from other places.

    When you face a mix of TNI and TGs (terrorist groups), targeting the TNI for COIN is certainly the way to go. TGs can use the goals of TNIs as a cloak for their activities, but if the TNI is defeated or changes its basic goals the TG is exposed.

    Like I said, my framework is historical and not based in anthropology. The techniques are somewhat different. Not to say either is better, mind...just different.

  3. #23
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    You could try an LE model the group is usually identified by a leader or group title (Gotti,Crips,MS13,etc.) from there it is categorized by Motive(cause,ideology) Method(Terrorist,Insurgent,Robbers,Drug dealers, etc.) Opportunity(Time and Location) ??What say ye??
    This is actually close to the premise I was working from, but centered more on ideals and goals than actual leader. Terrorist groups can have very elastic leadership chains, where a classic insurgency will often have a charismatic leader(s). The group framework (MS13 and so on) is most likely a better LE approach to take.

    LE ideas and techniques are critical to COIN, so keep those ideas comin'!

  4. #24
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Steve,

    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    I like descriptive models as well, although my historical background makes me somewhat wary of predictive models.
    ....
    Like I said, my framework is historical and not based in anthropology. The techniques are somewhat different. Not to say either is better, mind...just different.
    I've got nothing against descriptive models per se either - I just get a touch worried when they are taken as if they were predictive models, which the press has a tendency to do <wry grin>.

    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    When you face a mix of TNI and TGs (terrorist groups), targeting the TNI for COIN is certainly the way to go. TGs can use the goals of TNIs as a cloak for their activities, but if the TNI is defeated or changes its basic goals the TG is exposed.
    I agree. Your point about multiple generations is also taken as well which, by the way, also gives us the timeline to shift perceptions - 3 generations <sigh>.

    Marc
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    Council Member Stan's Avatar
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    Default Criminal Enterprises

    Criminal enterprises...now there's an interesting one. Terrorist groups use these sorts of activities to finance their operations, so the two clearly mix. I do feel that there is a difference between an organized criminal activity (such as the Mafia or larger cartels) and smaller ones that crop up in unstable locations. Perhaps "organized crime" might be a better term for the "criminal enterprises" in disorganized territories, with the enterprise term limited to the criminal tactics and not the organization.
    Steve,
    The Estonian Central Criminal Police use that term even to this day to describe not only organized elements in disorganized territories (Russia) but concluded after an FBI course in NOV 05, that the locations no longer need to be unstable (although easier to maneuver and recruit), the tactics simply change to mesh with the operational area.

    Why then would it be any different for a somewhat organized terrorist cell working abroad ?

    I would think it would be much the same, a little homework (afterall, time is on your hands) and objective.

    Yes, I have a rather modest view, less complicated and what I think is logical (I function, not operate the very same way).

    Regards, Stan

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    I agree. Your point about multiple generations is also taken as well which, by the way, also gives us the timeline to shift perceptions - 3 generations <sigh>.

    Marc
    It's an even shorter timeline than you might think, Marc. Terrorist generations are defined by the members. Any time the majority of a group's founders are killed/captured/drop out, the next wave is referred to as the next generation. The German RAF went through 2-3 generations in about 4 years.

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default Agree on Extremists and Relevance of GWOT

    COIN can work very well with Muslims, but it will have no impact on RAF/IRA-type groups.
    I agree, Steve. In that realm I look at them as extremists and you cannot alter their mindsets. Certainly terror and terrorism, and terrorists are terms that predate what is called GWOT now. I also agree that GWOT is not the proper term; as you probably recall, there was a brief period where the White House actually started to use extremist. That soon stopped.

    But we deal with those same terms as they applied in current context, as the terms terrorist and insurgent were juxtaposed to begin this thread.

    My point is simply that the terms terrorists, terrorism, and terror have been used on so many contexts that their meanings muddle rather than clarify. And that confusion seeps into our strategy.

    Best
    Tom

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    Here is quite good article, which is trying to define difficult (often emotional) terms.

    http://ictconference.org/var/119/170...az%20Ganor.pdf

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    Default Insurgents vs Terrorists -- Is there a difference?

    The article you referenced "Defining Terrorism:
    Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?
    by Boaz Ganoris"
    is accurate in its definition of Terrorists and groups of Terrrorists. The article rightly defines Terrorism based on three critically important elements:
    1. The essence of the activity—the use of, or threat to use, violence. According to this definition, an activity that does not involve violence or a threat of violence will not be defined as terrorism (including non-violent protest—strikes, peaceful demonstrations, tax revolts, etc.).
    2. The aim of the activity is always political—namely, the goal is to attain
    political objectives; changing the regime, changing the people in power,
    changing social or economic policies, etc. In the absence of a political aim, the activity will not be defined as Terrorism. A violent activity against
    civilians that has no political aim is, at most, an act of criminal delinquency, a
    felony, or simply an act of insanity unrelated to terrorism. I also add ideological aims to the list of political aims. The motivation—whether ideological, or political is relevant for the purpose of defining terrorism. In this
    context, the following statement by Duvall and Stohl deserves mention:
    Motives are entirely irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism. Most
    analysts fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives as
    logical or necessary aspects of terrorism. But they are not. At best, they are
    empirical regularities associated with terrorism.
    3. The targets of terrorism are always "strategic" and aimed at innocent people (civilians, noncombatants, public servants, military not engaged in hostililites e.g. 'USS Cole'.) Terrorism is thus distinguished from other types of political violence (guerrilla warfare, freedom fighting, civil insurrection, etc.). Terrorism exploits the relative vulnerability of the civilian “underbelly”—the tremendous anxiety, and the intense media reaction evoked by attacks against strategic civilian targets.
    4) Terrorist activities transend boundaries where as insurgencies are local within kilometers of the insurgent's base of operation.

    The paper does not discuss insurgencies but makes reference to violent activity against civilians that have no political aim as acts of criminal delinquency, a felony, or simply an act of violence aimed at chaos.
    1. The essence of the insurgency activity—the use of violence to create chaos and to disrupt lawful activities within a community. According to this definition, an activity that does not involve violence, extortion or a threat of violence will not be defined as an insurgency (including non-violent protest—strikes, peaceful demonstrations, tax revolts, etc.).
    2. The aim of the insurgent activity is never political —namely, the goal is not to attain political objectives; changing the regime, changing the people in power, changing social or economic policies, or even winning the "war." It is however, aimed at protractedness and disrupting the lawful act of governance. A violent activity against civilians that has no political aim is included in the definition of insurgency. It is never an ideological struggle. Most analysts fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives (sectarian, religious, tribal) as logical or necessary aspects of insurgencies. They are not. At best, they are attempts to incite others into the chaos by breeding hatred, mistrust and playing on strongly held belief systems such as religion. That is why religious entities are often targets.
    3. The targets of insurgencies are targets of opportunity and "tactical" and although aimed at those that are associated with restoring law and order --they will include attacks on innocent people (civilians, noncombatants, public servants inorder to ensure protractedness. It is the protractedness that provides "Utility" to the insurgent population. Insurgency must also be distinguished from other types of violence (guerrilla warfare, freedom fighters, etc.) and others that have political aims. Insurgencies exploit the vulnerability of security and lack of security for civilians given that a government cannot secure the entire community at the same time.

    In the end, it is important that we separate the two in order to effectly understand and engage each.

  10. #30
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Default What?

    Quote Originally Posted by GPaulus View Post
    In this
    context, the following statement by Duvall and Stohl deserves mention:
    Motives are entirely irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism. Most
    analysts fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives as
    logical or necessary aspects of terrorism. But they are not. At best, they are
    empirical regularities associated with terrorism.
    This is nonsense! There is always a motive. You may not understand it, but it is there. It answers the question who benefits.

  11. #31
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by GPaulus View Post
    2. The aim of the insurgent activity is never political —namely, the goal is not to attain political objectives; changing the regime, changing the people in power, changing social or economic policies, or even winning the "war." It is however, aimed at protractedness and disrupting the lawful act of governance. A violent activity against civilians that has no political aim is included in the definition of insurgency. It is never an ideological struggle. Most analysts fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives (sectarian, religious, tribal) as logical or necessary aspects of insurgencies. They are not. At best, they are attempts to incite others into the chaos by breeding hatred, mistrust and playing on strongly held belief systems such as religion. That is why religious entities are often targets.
    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    This is nonsense! There is always a motive. You may not understand it, but it is there. It answers the question who benefits.
    And, I have to say, that a broad generalization of "The aim of the insurgent activity is never political" is equally nonsense. GP, do you think that Ganoris ever bothered to read Lenin, Mao or Guevera? I find it incredible that anyone who had, or had had studied any history, could make such an outrageous claim.

    Quote Originally Posted by GPaulus View Post
    In the end, it is important that we separate the two in order to effectly understand and engage each.
    I certainly agree with the sentiment . I would, however, add in the caveat that such a separation does require that the terms not be completely redefined.

    Marc
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    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  12. #32
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    And, I have to say, that a broad generalization of "The aim of the insurgent activity is never political" is equally nonsense. GP, do you think that Ganoris ever bothered to read Lenin, Mao or Guevera? I find it incredible that anyone who had, or had had studied any history, could make such an outrageous claim.



    I certainly agree with the sentiment . I would, however, add in the caveat that such a separation does require that the terms not be completely redefined.

    Marc
    I'm with the Canadian...I have no idea where this definition of insurgents is going sir. Maybe it's just not getting through my thick head, but are you really arguing that insurgents do not have political goals?

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    Default Terrorists Vs. Insurgents

    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    I'm with the Canadian...I have no idea where this definition of insurgents is going sir. Maybe it's just not getting through my thick head, but are you really arguing that insurgents do not have political goals?
    Yes that is what is going around in my head--insurgents (at least in Iraq)are apolitical. I believe that insurgents have motives but that their motives are much more primal. I believe that others like freedom fighters, terrorist and others have more of self actualizing goals whereas the insurgents are much more fundamental in their needs. This population can be likened to the criminal gang and organized crime elements more then conventional war fighters or terrorists. The insurgency in Iraq is composed of primarily men 18-40. They tend to be local within a very small territorial range Km from the homes, and recruit their fighters from local talent. When the group gets too large (100+), there may be internal violence, mass killings and rival rifts as members compete for upward mobility. Their “Cause to Die For” is the failure of the government to meet the most basic levels of life. They almost always spawn from decapitated states especially if the levels of basic services do not improve with time. Their cause is never an ideology or idealistic dogma, and therefore they will have the propensity to ebb and flow based on the need of the day and the targets of opportunity. Because they are not driven by a single ideology, members can quickly apostatize. I believe that Insurgency warfare is not politically, ethnically or religiously motivated. Notice how this flies in the face of the conventional war fighter’s paradigm proposed by Clausewitz, “War is the extension of politics by other means.” If a word could describe insurgents, it is self-serving—power, money, lawlessness, food, freedom from oppression, survival, etc., and once spawned, their aim is protractedness; it is not about winning. Simply stated, insurgencies are protracted because that provides the most utility to the insurgents; they are not protracted because it is an insurgency. Insurgents don’t have a goal of winning although they would not mind seeing their enemy fail. They win if the struggle continues to gain momentum and they draw others into the fray—that breeds chaos. In addition, and contrary to popular belief, insurgencies are not religiously motivated; in as much as “they” want to present the appearance that they are religious in nature. This is in direct conflict with the traditional paradigm that the war fighter is accustomed. It is important to recognize that religion is ideological; an insurgency is not. This is not to say that religion and religious rhetoric is not important--it is to the insurgents because it gives the appearance of broad support, and it quickly organizes society for them into “us against them.” They gain if they breed hatred and distrust among other religious groups: Sunni, Shiites, Muslims and Christians. It is an attempt to give the appearance of unification of one large group against another of a large scale struggle. In some cases they will also turn the ends against the middle if that is the only way to disrupt recovery. After serving in the war that is the only thing that makes sense to me regarding the events in Iraq. You have a right to call me on it as I try to piece together my experiences. I saw insurgency targets change from government, to religious, to security, to military, American Journalists, to tribal targets--this tells me that they are attacking for the purpose of instability and not strategic and/or political.

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    GPaulus said:

    I believe that others like freedom fighters, terrorist and others have more of self actualizing goals whereas the insurgents are much more fundamental in their needs.
    GPaulus, what do you think about Jewish armed organisations (for example Lehi) that fought for independent Israel. If you find out facts about assassination of Lord Moyne, Cairo-Haifa train bombings, assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte etc. Those acts were clearly targeted against civilians. Where those acts not very fundamental. I think they were. Were those acts terrorist acts?

    GPaulus, to define what is fundamental and what is not, you need to define what is politics. Bard O'Neill in his book "Insrugency and Terrorism" defined (if I remember correctly) it as process which decides who gets what, when, how, where and why. Those are very fundamental questions and I think that those are issues that terrorists are fighting for, also.

    Terrorism is very often 1. step in insurgency strategy, which aim is to gather support, make propaganda (to recruit members, to inform national, international oppinion etc). This tactics is very often choice of weaker side because of security problems. Organisation has to live in hostile environment which is crowded with hostile security organisations. It is very hard to organise conventional batallion on the first day of your activity. Bla-bla-bla, i need to go back to work now

  15. #35
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    I saw insurgency targets change from government, to religious, to security, to military, American Journalists, to tribal targets--this tells me that they are attacking for the purpose of instability and not strategic and/or political.
    I regret that I did not see this same sort of transition across my time there. Perhaps Rob Thornton or RTK could weigh in with their observations. I saw the targets often become a target as a matter of timing (as they presented themselves), or often being attacked simultaneously.

    I'm not sure I would classify former regime loyalists (FRLs) as lacking a political bent, or that they strive solely for instability. They may, for a limited time, seek instability for the purpose of reaching other goals, but I have a hard time seeing them perpetuating violence just because they can.

    power, money, lawlessness, food, freedom from oppression, survival, etc., and once spawned, their aim is protractedness
    I'd offer that freedom from oppression is itself an ideology (political), and the FRLs hold on to the belief that the best form of government for Iraq is neither Shi'a-dominated, coalition influenced, or Kurd-dominated. That drives them to attack these other formations, in addition to your more primal incidents, like the righting-or-wrongs, or honor attacks.
    Last edited by jcustis; 01-30-2007 at 01:03 PM.

  16. #36
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default Slap You Got It!

    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    This is nonsense! There is always a motive. You may not understand it, but it is there. It answers the question who benefits.
    Agreed, Slap.

    If you do not look at motives you will always be reactive, serving as a news reporter or a historian. And as for the latter, I always considered motives in writing history; that is one of the joys of contemporary history. You can talk to the participants versus looking at diaries, letters, and official records (which are never complete).

    This also goes straight to Rule #2: They have an agenda in everything they do with you. That is, what is their motive in their interactions with you? If you do not ask that simple question, you cannot forecast where their motives (or their relationship with you) will take you next--or how you can steer the direction it takes.

    Best

    Tom

  17. #37
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Insurgents are certainly NOT apolitical. They may wish you to believe that they are, but that contention is untrue.

    And Tom, good historians always look at motive. One of the problems I have with contemporary history is that the people you're talking to can easily spin their own actions and motives. The best history examines motive and uses all available sources. Anything else is a sham, or has an agenda of its own. Good examples of this are the "instant histories" that came out after Vietnam, as well as the flood that's being produced by Iraq. Some of them are good, others are not.

    Insurgents don’t have a goal of winning although they would not mind seeing their enemy fail.
    -from GP's post

    This is also certainly untrue. The majority of insurgencies have the goal of winning; that is, meeting their own political goals and objectives. That can be something as mundane (to us) as securing voting rights to something as major as carving out their own nation or "homeland" within an existing nation.

    Where I think you're confusing things is that in Iraq you have insurgents AND fellow-travelers who happen to be terrorists. Terrorists thrive on chaos and bloodshed (in many ways it's the only actual goal they have). The two often exist side by side (and within the same umbrella group), and it isn't always possible to get a clean separation between the two.

  18. #38
    Council Member AdamG's Avatar
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    Default Derka Derka Bubba Jihad

    Bizarre tale of Shia messianic cult plot
    By Roger Hardy
    BBC Arabic Affairs analyst

    More details have emerged about the shadowy cult whose followers fought Iraqi and US forces in a day-long battle in southern Iraq on Sunday.

    Iraqi officials say 200 members of the group - which calls itself the Soldiers of Heaven - were killed in fierce fighting near the Shia holy city of Najaf.

    A well-armed group, a charismatic leader and an audacious plot to attack a holy city and kill its religious leaders.

    If a novelist had invented the story of the Soldiers of Heaven, it might have been dismissed as a dark fantasy.


    But an account of the bizarre drama in southern Iraq, albeit with puzzles and inconsistencies, has now emerged from Iraqi officials and eyewitness accounts.

    Messianic belief

    A young Shia leader, Dia Abdul-Zahra, had gathered hundreds of his followers, including women and children, in an encampment a few miles north of Najaf.

    They were well armed and had come to believe that Abdul-Zahra - also known as Ahmed Hassan al-Yamani and Samer Abu Kamar - was the Mahdi.

    According to Shia belief, the Mahdi is a Muslim messiah who disappeared hundreds of years ago and whose return will usher in an era of peace and justice before the end of time.

    Abdul-Zahra and his followers regarded the religious leadership in Najaf as illegitimate.

    Iraqi officials say their extraordinary plan was to enter the city in the garb of pilgrims, declare that the Mahdi had returned, and assassinate Ayatollah Sistani and other senior clerics.

    All this was to happen on Ashura, the holiest day in the Shia calendar.

    Instead, the Iraqi authorities seem to have had a tip-off. According to their account, they attacked the encampment and foiled the plot.

    At least 200 of the Soldiers of Heaven were killed. Officials insist these included the group's leader, though some clerics dispute this.

    Among those captured were Sunnis as well as Shia and foreign fighters as well as Iraqis.

    Unholy alliance

    Iraqi officials have claimed the group had links with the militant jihadists of al-Qaeda.

    Given that Sunni jihadists are fiercely anti-Shia, this seems unlikely.

    They also say the group was working with former Baathists.

    It seems the former Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein did try to use a Mahdist faction as a weapon against the traditional religious leadership in Najaf, whom he saw as a threat.

    Whether those links survived the fall of Saddam is not clear.

    Shia divisions

    Iraq's Shia-led government may have an interest in promoting the idea of such an unholy alliance.

    It may want to deflect attention from the embarrassing fact that the majority Shia community is riven with factions and divisions.

    The authorities may also have exaggerated their own military success.

    The signs are that they underestimated the strength of the Soldiers of Heaven and had to call for urgent American air support.

    History of the Mahdi

    There are both Sunni and Shia versions of the Mahdi tradition.

    Throughout Islamic history, Muslim leaders have risen up in rebellion claiming to be the Mahdi or to be acting in his name.

    Britain's General Gordon was killed in Sudan in 1885 during a Mahdist insurrection.

    In Saudi Arabia in 1979, Sunni militants took over the Great Mosque in Mecca, claiming the Mahdi had returned.

    But Shia attachment to the Mahdi tradition is particularly potent.

    One of the most powerful Iraqi militias (which has no known link to the Soldiers of Heaven) is the Mahdi Army of the radical cleric Moqtada Sadr.

    For many Shia, the idea of a Muslim saviour who will end suffering and oppression has a special appeal.

    At moments of crisis and chaos, they are more susceptible to the idea that the end of time is at hand.

    Iraq is experiencing just such a crisis.

    And in current circumstances southern Iraq - the Shia heartland and traditionally the poorest and most neglected part of the country - seems fertile soil for zealotry.

    Story from BBC NEWS:
    http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/h...st/6313433.stm

    Published: 2007/01/30 13:22:46 GMT

    (And the latest addition to FM 22-5 is "Front rank, kneel! Rear rank, stand!")
    Last edited by AdamG; 01-30-2007 at 02:51 PM.

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    The fact that "All" human behavior ihas a motive and is motivated by one thing and one thing only "Self-interest" does not make all struggles the same. The major difference as I see it between the insurgency in Iraq, and other acts such as rebellions, civil war, freedom fighting and terrorists, and the reason that I content insurgents are apolitical is that the insurgents are all about them--WIFM. They want protractedness because that provides Utility for them, they want lawlessness because that provides utility--money, power, wealth, control for them.

    Other struggles such as rebellions, terrorist operations, etc believe that their cause is a "Public Good" and that they are doing it for the good of all --selfactualizing, ideological, altruistic--selfless regard and acting for the well-being of others. These struggles are much more of an ideological struggle. Consider this difference--Using the Maslow Hierarchy --the terrorists operate at the Self-actualizing level (Political, Regime Change, Religious Freedom, selfgovernance) whereas the Insurgency, at least in Iraq, are at the Physiological level--food, water, money, selfcontrol, lawlessness.

    I believe that the insurgents' fight is not a political, religious or ideological manifesto like the media leads us to believe. As a result, the insurgency in Iraq wins if the struggle is protracted. They want to keep the intensity up for as long as they can using every method available. And against anyone who strives to bring order--the local marketer who refuses to withhold produce from the market, the religious leader calling for peace, the ISFs, the Military, anyone who oposes them getting their primal needs for power, money...met.

  20. #40
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default Politics

    And Tom, good historians always look at motive.
    True, Steve, but there is a large body of historians out there who greatly prefer to wait until all participants are dead. Then their examination of things like motive is through letters, diaries, etc.

    And yes a source in an interview can lie; a diary or letter can be a lie as well. That is why we source and we try and confirm with other sources.

    What a diary or a letter cannot do is even approach human emotion as measured face to face. Charlie Laurent (retired Belgian Major General and former commander of the Paracommandos when they jumped on Stanleyville) was as hard as they come; 20 years after the jump, he cried when he talked to me about losing young soldiers in the operation. His combat diary simply listed names with KIA or WIA beside them.

    The same dynamic plays between SIGINT and HUMINT; when you can look in their eyes you can assess veracity as you go. You can't do that very easily in SIGINT.But I wander.

    Getting back to the point: to describe an insurgent as non-political in a struggle for the support of the population is to ignore the very origin of the word political, the body politic, the people.

    Best

    Tom

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