Design for military operations

[Presley Cannady]

...aren't there a ton of engineering shops littered throughout the military? What do they have to say about "design?"

[Fred Bernh]

Thanks for your thoughts, I would try to explain better my point of view.

1.

Sorry, but the US has grabbed design because it no longer understands Campaign planning. if it did, "Design" would go in the bin. Nothing about Campaign design is anything to do with culture or "meta-cognition". Ask the men who could do it well.

I was referring to meta-cognition because Col. S.J. Banach in his article "The Art of Design" (Military Review March-April 2009) put it at the base of critical thinking:
"Reflective thinking. Reflective thinking draws on research in developmental psychology on the topic of metacognition. Metacognition is defined as “knowledge that takes as its object or regulates any aspect of any cognitive endeavor.”14 This involves two separate kinds of knowledge. The first is knowledge
about cognition—what do I know, what cognitive
abilities do I have, and how does this help me to learn about the situation at hand? The second is knowledge about how to regulate and control cognitive
activity—how do I avoid falling into commoncognitive traps, and how should I balance my cognitive
resources among understanding the environment,
the problem, and the solution? Designers need both types of metacognitive knowledge to become reflective thinkers. Through reflection, designers can continue to improve both their knowledge of their own ability and their capacity to regulate the cognitive focus of themselves and their team.

2. OK, and how do I use this dubious insight to train a Divisional Staff? Bill Slim, and Allenby did not read Miyamoto Musashi, yet were masters of their art.

I completely agree. Design seems to be a human-engineering effort to replicate the genius of Commanders like the ones you mentioned, and make it a "scientific" tool to organize a collective intellectual effort. Nothing bad so far, but the military professionals who are trying to develop and use it should understand the logical framework of this tool, that is the Complex Adaptive Systems Theory. There are thousands of papers already produced to explain this theory, and we are now assisting at the development of this theory in the military thinking. The "void" tells us that changing the name to things does not change their nature. For example, the Santa Fe Insitute, has developed a CAS perspective, the so called "3rd Culture", which could be understood as a way of viewing things between the social scienses and mathematics (for example, using biology to understand social behaviours within a living system). As you can appreciate, meta-cognition and culture matter, expecially in Design, because you can loose the point of origin of what you are talking about.

3. Sorry you've lost me, as does most the writing on "Design." The inability to clearly and simply state the problem and answer the exam question is why "Design" is pseudo-intellectual twaddle.
However, I am not closed minded, and remain open to other points of view, simply and clearly set forth.

To simply state the problem, I would say that Design is a matter of selecting creative people to do it, rather than to believe that it is possible to teach someone to be creative. And, as Bob's World clearly stated, to standardize the tools for creative thinking is simply irrelevant. Gen. Maxwell Taylor once sais that the most important thing for a commander to do is to protect the "mavericks" inside his organisation. Once again, commanders should focus on people rather than Design procedures.

[William F. Owen]

I would say that Design is a matter of selecting creative people to do it, rather than to believe that it is possible to teach someone to be creative.

OK, but the US Army teaches design as a "Process" to be "taught."

Gen. Maxwell Taylor once sais that the most important thing for a commander to do is to protect the "mavericks" inside his organisation. Once again, commanders should focus on people rather than Design procedures.

So basically Commanders should seek to have skilled people on their staff and skilled men as subordinate commanders. When did anyone ever suggest otherwise?

[Fred Bernh]

OK, but the US Army teaches design as a "Process" to be "taught."

So basically Commanders should seek to have skilled people on their staff and skilled men as subordinate commanders. When did anyone ever suggest otherwise?

Owen, thanks for your focused comments.
I believe teaching design as a process is not a bad idea per se, it could be a valid tool to promote critical thinking. But people who master the art of war sometimes simply cannot always have a clear understanding of the overall picture. That's the reason why they need also different perspective, from people who have completely different backgrounds. The UK is one of the most brilliant example of this way of creating a common operational picture from different sources. During WWI and WWII there where thousands of UK citizens living and working oversea. Most of them were not in the military, but contributed through their direct experience to give a better understanding of the human terrain in the different Theaters of Operation, and in some cases they were integrated in an extended net of informal "operational cells" in support of the British Army. The point may be to be able to create focused and ad hoc Strategic or Operational Advisory Group tailored to the specific crisis you need to tackle, rather than create a "one size fits all" process. A basket of human capacity that goes beyond the military domain. It is my understanding that "design" should be careful in determining its relationship with strategy, which is where the operational level finds its roots. And, last but not least, it should try to go beyond the classical and formal organizational structure the military use for their problem solving. This web site is the best example of that.

[William F. Owen]

And, last but not least, it should try to go beyond the classical and formal organizational structure the military use for their problem solving. This web site is the best example of that.

Fred, I'm all for stuff that works, but "Design" simply does not have lineage and there is actually no need to have it. We end up with things like "Design" because soldiers simply do not study their profession, and then end up grappling with the basics. - I could cite 100's of examples.

No one seems to have asked what "Design" brings to the party. If there is no need for it, why does it exist?

[Fred Bernh]

Fred, I'm all for stuff that works, but "Design" simply does not have lineage and there is actually no need to have it. We end up with things like "Design" because soldiers simply do not study their profession, and then end up grappling with the basics. - I could cite 100's of examples.

No one seems to have asked what "Design" brings to the party. If there is no need for it, why does it exist?

I would say, let's give it a try. It's my understanding there's a lot of confusion out there, but if it brings more people to read books on military history is a good thing.
Once General von Moltke divided his officer corps into four distinct types, depending on their mental and physical characteristics. He ended up with 4 types:
type A: mentally dull and physically lazy,
type B: mentally bright and physically energetic,
type C: mentally dull and physically energetic, and
type D: mentally bright and physically lazy.
Which brings us to type D officers; these were the mentally bright who Moltke felt could and should take the highest levels of command. This type of officer was both smart enough to see what needed to be done but was also motivated by inherent laziness to find the easiest, simplest way to achieve what was required. Put in a more positive way they would know how to be successful through the most efficient deployment of effort.
I hope "Design" could be at least a valid tool to select type D officers within the Army education system.

[Ken White]

Put in a more positive way they would know how to be successful through the most efficient deployment of effort.

I hope "Design" could be at least a valid tool to select type D officers within the Army education system.

I suspect that such an effort would select people not in consonance with 'the Army ethos.'

That would be, in my observation, 'do something even if its wrong' (I will not go so far as 'especially if it's wrong...').

Fortunately, the existing selection process picks some Type Ds and thus they will be available when needed. Unfortunately, a flawed personnel system and OPMS XXI dictate equitable selection of Types A-D and while the system generally rids itself the A Models, it sometimes allows those B and C types to be in charge. Regrettably. They really do not like the Type D folks...

[Fred Bernh]

I suspect that such an effort would select people not in consonance with 'the Army ethos.'

That would be, in my observation, 'do something even if its wrong' (I will not go so far as 'especially if it's wrong...').

Fortunately, the existing selection process picks some Type Ds and thus they will be available when needed. Unfortunately, a flawed personnel system and OPMS XXI dictate equitable selection of Types A-D and while the system generally rids itself the A Models, it sometimes allows those B and C types to be in charge. Regrettably. They really do not like the Type D folks...

I would say that we are assisting at the overuse of fancy words such as adaptability, flexibility, living systems, learning institutions etc....In Germany the Whermacht (and maneuver warfare theory) came out from the ahses of WWI thanks to Von Seekt in the 20's but expecially thanks to the Allies who disbanded the General Staff, thus permitting a new generation of officers to grow in a completely different environment. Stalin was much more rough eliminating physically the old mentality. The problem with the existing conflicts is that they don't engage systems as a whole but just part of them, thus allowing the main body to resist the changes. Moreover, I would insist on the fact that Design is at risk of becoming a surrogate of strategy, in precence of a lack of strategic guidances. For example: what if Campaign Design leads to the conclusion that , for a particular crisis, the military option IS NOT the best solution?

[William F. Owen]

I would say that we are assisting at the overuse of fancy words such as adaptability, flexibility, living systems, learning institutions etc....

Strongly concur.

In Germany the Whermacht (and maneuver warfare theory) came out from the ahses of WWI thanks to Von Seekt in the 20's but expecially thanks to the Allies who disbanded the General Staff,

Strongly disagree. No German Officer of the 1920's would have given "maneuver warfare theory" space in his rubbish bin. It's twaddle of the worst sort.

I would insist on the fact that Design is at risk of becoming a surrogate of strategy, in precence of a lack of strategic guidances. For example: what if Campaign Design leads to the conclusion that , for a particular crisis, the military option IS NOT the best solution?

Strongly agree. This is because the bunnies behind design have never adequately studied the problem from a "so what perspective." There is no such thing as the "Operational Level of War." It simply does not exist.

[Fuchs]

In Germany the Whermacht (and maneuver warfare theory) came out from the ahses of WWI thanks to Von Seekt in the 20's but expecially thanks to the Allies who disbanded the General Staff, thus permitting a new generation of officers to grow in a completely different environment.

The Reichswehr actually had a similar situation as the U.S.Army in the late 40's; the demobilisation allowed only the really good officers and NCOs to day, at typically lower rank than they deserved.
The combination of war and wartime experience plus demobilisation also meant that only those would stay who saw the officer corps as their home and the military as their trade.

There didn't really grow a new generation, though. The Entente (not Allies!) only allowed 12-year soldiers in order to prevent short-time service trickery as exercised in Prussia 1806-1812.
This meant that there was no real new generation of soldiers in the whole 20's. It also meant that there was an awful lot of very experienced company NCOs (Spieß) and Colonel+ qualified officers when the expansion began in 1933 (based on plans and preparations from the late 20's).

The Reichswehr (and also the Wehrmacht) was quite conservative. This shows in examples such as the aversion against submachineguns and assault rifles. Submachineguns were developed & procured at first as PDWs for the armour branch and Hitler became a fan (and champion for it). An assault rifle was ready for production by 1938 (Vollmer M35), but it took another five years (mostly wartime) till assault rifles were introduced.

[Polarbear1605]

Strongly concur.

Strongly disagree. No German Officer of the 1920's would have given "maneuver warfare theory" space in his rubbish bin. It's twaddle of the worst sort.

and I have to disagree with you but I want to hear your side. The Germans of WWI changed both their defensive and offensive doctrine in the middle of a war (because of a great necessity BTW). Yes, it was never call Maneuver Warfare but if you look at the "Storm Trooper" changes, for example, all the elements are there. Maneuverist also use the German opening offensive in France as another example. Compare that to the 1990 Kuwait plan (Boyd.s finger prints are all over that one)...???

[Ken White]

Compare that to the 1990 Kuwait plan (Boyd.s finger prints are all over that one)...???

or simple common sense? One can only do so much with a given piece of terrain...

[Fuchs]

and I have to disagree with you but I want to hear your side. The Germans of WWI changed both their defensive and offensive doctrine in the middle of a war (because of a great necessity BTW). Yes, it was never call Maneuver Warfare but if you look at the "Storm Trooper" changes, for example, all the elements are there. Maneuverist also use the German opening offensive in France as another example. Compare that to the 1990 Kuwait plan (Boyd.s finger prints are all over that one)...???

Actually, the Italians did very similar things with their Arditi shock troops.
The Hutier tactics / shock troops / Stoßtruppen thing could also be described as:
"Finally, infantrymen were trained to be infantrymen, not line infantry."

The greatest difference to more general infantry was in my opinion the fact that these troops got trained against dummy fortifications. Most if not all else followed quite naturally (see Arditi for quite the same effect).

The opening offensive against France in 1940 can easily be explained with the classic German Schwerpunkt idea (19th century), classic German emphasis on encirclement (19th, too), specific political circumstances and the idea of one particular general who was known as a operational level wunderkind even before the war.


German officers of the 20's and 30's were driven more by long-cherished tenets and the effect of training and army culture than by Maneuver theory-like theories.

They had their offensive school vs. defensive school debates and an emerging one - the armour school as modern evolution of the offensive school - won long after von Seeckt had prioritised (iirc) the offensive school.
The armour school didn't score a breaktrough before the May 1940 when it proved its ideas in practice, though.

Wartime practice included elements from all three schools - but all three had to be disfigured in 1943-1945 because of the circumstances. The defensive people hadn't enough infantry strength to man a deep 10 km defence, the offensive school had to acknowledge that infantry needs assault gun support on open ground and the armour school had to acknowledge that it lacked the trucks and tank strength for large-scale offensives after Kursk (armour was then increasingly mis-used as quick reaction reserve to fend of one crisis after another while assault guns were turned into tank destroyers mostly).

[Fred Bernh]

"Finally, infantrymen were trained to be infantrymen, not line infantry."

I believe you got the point, especially in an era dominated by power point rangers.

[William F. Owen]

and I have to disagree with you but I want to hear your side. The Germans of WWI changed both their defensive and offensive doctrine in the middle of a war (because of a great necessity BTW). Yes, it was never call Maneuver Warfare but if you look at the "Storm Trooper" changes, for example, all the elements are there. Maneuverist also use the German opening offensive in France as another example. Compare that to the 1990 Kuwait plan (Boyd.s finger prints are all over that one)...???

StormTrooper tactics were just the German expression of various forms of infantry tactics being developed at the time forced upon armies by the trenches. They didn't use the word Manoeuvre and they didn't even think in a way that could be thought distinct or even notable.
Manoeuvre is not a distinct form of warfare, therefore it cannot have distinct tactical behaviours attached to it.

The 1990 "left hook" would have meet and potatoes to any WW2 Div Staff Officer. It was only meant to fool Saddam and fooled no one else. It is nothing to do with a distinct form of warfare. It is completely rooted in the teachings of the French, German and British Staff Collages of 1880-1914.

[Polarbear1605]

StormTrooper tactics were just the German expression of various forms of infantry tactics being developed at the time forced upon armies by the trenches. They didn't use the word Manoeuvre ...

Agree…but let’s not get hung up on the word maneuver here. If we assume the goal of “Boyd Warfare” (Maneuver Warfare defined by Boyd) is to: “Diminish our adversaries freedom –of-action while improving our freedom-of-action so that our adversary cannot cope – while we can cope-with events/efforts as they unfold.” And we accomplish that by “observes-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly and with more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as shape and shift main effort to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other efforts that-tie-up, divert or drain away adversary attention (and strength) else where.” …how is that different from the German WWI Strom Trooper tactics?…or any good infantry tactics or even any good tactics infantry, armor, or otherwise?

The 1990 "left hook" would have meet and potatoes to any WW2 Div Staff Officer. It was only meant to fool Saddam and fooled no one else. It is nothing to do with a distinct form of warfare. It is completely rooted in the teachings of the French, German and British Staff Collages of 1880-1914.

Again, agree… with at least the “rooted in the teaching part” because the Boyd Theory is just that, a synthesizing of those teaching and in order to understand what they were teaching Boyd had to go back to the folks they were studying and talking about, e.g. Rome, Napoleon, Clausewitz, Jomini, Moltke, Schlieffen, Mongols and anyone else he could read about.
I also believe the Desert Storm “Plan” was distinct when compared to something like attrition warfare. I emphasize plan because the execution was lacking especially in the initiative arena.

[William F. Owen]

If we assume the goal of “Boyd Warfare” (Maneuver Warfare defined by Boyd) is to: “Diminish our adversaries freedom –of-action while improving our freedom-of-action so that our adversary cannot cope – while we can cope-with events/efforts as they unfold.”

So Boyd was just saying what every competent military commander has taught for 3,000 years. It was a banal statement of the obvious.
MW was based on fashion and being sexy. It was not based on rigourous examined military history.

And we accomplish that by “observes-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly and with more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as shape and shift main effort to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other efforts that-tie-up, divert or drain away adversary attention (and strength) else where.”

That's a very odd way of saying that surprise is valuable (the result of action for which the enemy is unprepared.) Additionally, the OODA loop does not explain pr assist the activity it supposedly supports.

Again, agree… with at least the “rooted in the teaching part” because the Boyd Theory is just that, a synthesizing of those teaching and in order to understand what they were teaching Boyd had to go back to the folks they were studying and talking about, e.g. Rome, Napoleon, Clausewitz, Jomini, Moltke, Schlieffen, Mongols and anyone else he could read about.

OK, but there is no Boyd Theory. There are some Boyd slides. Boyd was a very bad historian. His "version" of WW1 is simplistic and inaccurate and his analysis of many other events was way off. MW is based in accurate history. It was concept that used arbitrary historical events to push a bad idea. If you knew nothing about warfare and tactics, it all appeared new and wonderful - I personally fell for it. It was a con. We've been conned. We need to get over it.

I also believe the Desert Storm “Plan” was distinct when compared to something like attrition warfare. I emphasize plan because the execution was lacking especially in the initiative arena.

What is attrition Warfare? It doesn't exist. There were times when warfare was done badly, but that's nothing to do with MW v Attrition. It could very well be argued that the so-called "The Storm Troopers" - Operation Michael - failed because of bad tactics and planning. One trick pony. The British Counter-attacks in contrast pushed on and never stopped until the armistice.

[Polarbear1605]

So Boyd was just saying what every competent military commander has taught for 3,000 years. It was a banal statement of the obvious.
MW was based on fashion and being sexy...

No, what Boyd was saying is that despite “what every military commander being taught for the last 3000 years” there is always a winner and a loser (now that is the obviously part)…and what he is presenting are the elements that ensure you are the winner in a very competitive environment. I say competitive because in combat the loser is either dead (my personal preference), captured or headed for the next set of high ground or river as fast as his little enemy feet will carry him.

It was not based on rigourous examined military history...

My only defense here is to review the bibliography of Patterns in Conflict…it is extensive.
and I can only speak for my time in service…in my opinion MW was never “sexy” and if it was ever fashionable, it certainly did not extend outside of Commandant Grey’s tenure… (and shame on you for letting anyone ever convince you to use the words sexy and fashionable.)

That's a very odd way of saying that surprise is valuable (the result of action for which the enemy is unprepared.) Additionally, the OODA loop does not explain pr assist the activity it supposedly supports...

If all you can see is in that statement is “surprise is valuable” … then you must also have trouble seeing the front sight on your weapon. Surprise is very important but I see much more in that statement…it is an entire system that (by US organizational standards) encompasses everyone from the President and Combat Commander to the squad leader and down to the individual Marine/Soldier. It is all the wheels of that system working against the enemy while preventing his wheels from working at all. Idealistic! Yes, but why not. MW requires a system view and that is why they kept saying that no matter where you are in the chain of command, you should be thinking two levels up and two down.

OK, but there is no Boyd Theory

Your right…and I should not use the term Boyd Theory, it is way too sexy and fashionable. Let’s call it what it is “A Discourse on Winning and Losing”.
He provides no version of WW1 but what he does provide is a limited analysis (limited by his thesis) of the von Schlinffen Plan, WW1 German infiltration tactics, and WW1 guerrilla tactics in accordance with Lawrence and von Lettow-Vorberk. Specifically, he observes that we went from a war of movement to stagnation and discusses the reactions to that stagnation, its exceptions and what worked and didn’t work in those reactions via infiltration and guerrilla tactics.

If you knew nothing about warfare and tactics, it all appeared new and wonderful – I personally fell for it. It was a con. We’ve been conned. We need to get over it.

Sorry you feel conned but my personal experience was there were a lot more people telling me MW was a bad idea, compared to the folks encouraging me that it was a good idea. Were you conned or did you have bad teachers?

What is attrition Warfare? It doesn’t exist.

It is exactly that statement that convinces me that attrition warfare does exist. In my mind, attrition warfare is trading resources with the enemy knowing (or at least hoping) you have more resources than you opponent. It does work…Grant in the Civil War and as you stated the British (and American) counter-attacks at the end of WW1…but I also think that the historians of Verdun would also think that it does not works.

At this point, I am waiting for the next salvo to hit

[slapout9]

Compare that to the 1990 Kuwait plan (Boyd.s finger prints are all over that one)...???

This is a good example of why I think Combined Arms is really selection of the Main Effort. The War started as the ME being the Air Force and once they were finished with all they were going to be allowed to do, the ME switched to the Army/Marines for the ground offensive. Maybe Boyd had his fingerprints on it, but is was Warden's hands that planned it

[slapout9]

It is all the wheels of that system working against the enemy while preventing his wheels from working at all. Idealistic! Yes, but why not. MW requires a system view and that is why they kept saying that no matter where you are in the chain of command, you should be thinking two levels up and two down.

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