Initial Officer Selection

[Ulenspiegel]

Again I would state that the platoon commanding phase of an officers career is merely to provide the grounding and experience at that level to provide an understanding of how wars are fought on the front lines when he (at a higher command) sends soldiers into battle (from afar).

Here we may observe an fundamental difference in leadership culture between German (until 1960) and Anglo-American. The officer losses of the German ground forces in WW2were much higher than US or UK losses of the same rank - generals ~10 times higher. People who know much more about military history than me attribute the leading up-front for both, the higher losses and the higher performance of the German ground forces.

How much time and experience does an officer need at the platoon/company level? Perhaps another subject for discussion. Does an officer need to serve in the ranks before being commissioned? Perhaps another subject for discussion.

Serving with the ranks means an officer applicant has a chance to experience very early how his future subordinates tick. In an all-volunteer force the basic training for OC and enlisted men should have the same quality, so this time is well spent IMHO.
Another side effect is, you could observe wether the officer candidate has leadership potential, maybe a chance for bottom-up selcetion.

A longer time as platoon leader was used to give the officer the opportunity to serve in other units, develope a deeper understanding of the other elements in his regiment or division. The highest priority had the applied tactics, this meant combined arms warefare after 1919.

Regardless of whether the potential officer comes as direct entry or from the ranks my contention is that an accurate initial pre-course selection system will be beneficial and reduce the course attrition rates.

Concur

If I understand you correctly it is the university education which conflicts with platoon commanding and training. Well if so that is why a speak of putting the horse before the cart. Which must be taken care of first? My view is that first you train and test for leadership and officer characteristics (at platoon level) then you select an education route most suited to his branch and career professional knowledge requirements. Remember the big picture. You are training future generals here.

You describe my opinion much better than I could do myself.

[JMA]

Here we may observe an fundamental difference in leadership culture between German (until 1960) and Anglo-American. The officer losses of the German ground forces in WW2were much higher than US or UK losses of the same rank - generals ~10 times higher. People who know much more about military history than me attribute the leading up-front for both, the higher losses and the higher performance of the German ground forces.

A 10 times higher casualty rate for generals? Have you not considered that rather than this being a virtue this may have been a serious problem?

I suggest the initial higher performance of the German Army was due to their being better prepared at the start of the hostilities. But never underestimate the yanks, they a fast learners, which they certainly did after they got a bloody nose at Kasserine Pass. and the rest is history.

Serving with the ranks means an officer applicant has a chance to experience very early how his future subordinates tick. In an all-volunteer force the basic training for OC and enlisted men should have the same quality, so this time is well spent IMHO.

One needs to manage career time very carefully. There is a short 30 years to get to general staff (Brigadier) which would make you 48-50 (which is pushing the limits IMHO). Now if you take four years out of that for officer training and later a university degree and say 15+ years to Lt Col means the brightest would get there at 45-47 while the norm will be to make it just in time and get to stay on for another five years (talking loosely about the US system in terms of age here). Having generals over 60 is ridiculous and they should be put on pension and out to pasture at or before the age of 60.

Having done the 'enlisted' recruit training and then it all again on officers course I see it like this. The principle difference would be that on a recruits course you are taught to be rifleman and how to take part in the various phases of war (as a rifleman) and how to use the various platoon weapons. On the other hand the officer needs to approach all training from the position of commanding a platoon in the various phases of war (through an understanding of the roles and duties of all the ranks in these activities). With weapons he must both learn how to use them as well as how to employ them. I found higher quality (and rank) NCOs as instructors on my officers course which was to be expected.

I don't regret my short time in the ranks before being commissioned (12 months) as I certainly learned a lot and it helped me settle in quickly (quicker) as a 2Lt, but I do believe that officer training should be geared to producing an officer capable of commanding a platoon from day one rather than relying on previous service to give him the confidence to do the job. The training itself must be good enough to achieve that.

Another side effect is, you could observe whether the officer candidate has leadership potential, maybe a chance for bottom-up selection.

A longer time as platoon leader was used to give the officer the opportunity to serve in other units, develop a deeper understanding of the other elements in his regiment or division. The highest priority had the applied tactics, this meant combined arms warefare after 1919.

Who observes? If the man with possible officer potential is in a platoon who is there to observe him? A Lt or 2Lt? Too light for that task. The NCOs? Not sure that NCOs of sergeant down are the best to identify officer potential.

Again IMHO it is a case of how much time you can devote to this preliminary background learning. If on is to set a minimum time served I would say a year (being half training and half in a platoon - hopefully on active service) with a maximum of say three years. (I can explain this another time as |I believe the next entry into the commissioned ranks would be from platoon sergeants of around 7-10 years service through a differently designed course (probably shorter than a year).

If the young officer spends three years with his platoon then he will learn all the stuff you are talking about while being supported by an experienced platoon sergeant. Better to experience the active service as a platoon commander for three years than to have a few years in the ranks and then short time on operations as an officer IMHO. Three years is maximum with a platoon then its time to move on.

[Ulenspiegel]

A 10 times higher casualty rate for generals? Have you not considered that rather than this being a virtue this may have been a serious problem?

I suggest the initial higher performance of the German Army was due to their being better prepared at the start of the hostilities. But never underestimate the yanks, they a fast learners, which they certainly did after they got a bloody nose at Kasserine Pass. and the rest is history.

Here I disagree, the difference in generals becoming KIA is a problem of very low losses on the allied side (only 30 US generals/admirals died). The readiness of the German army was in most fields low in 1939/40, it was outnumbered and outclassed in men and hardware, the only difference was leadership. A very good discussion is Frieser "Die Blitzkrieglegende", IIRC there is an English edition. When this leadership causes acceptable higher losses it is worth to consider IMHO.

[JMA]

Here I disagree, the difference in generals becoming KIA is a problem of very low losses on the allied side (only 30 US generals/admirals died). The readiness of the German army was in most fields low in 1939/40, it was outnumbered and outclassed in men and hardware, the only difference was leadership. A very good discussion is Frieser "Die Blitzkrieglegende", IIRC there is an English edition. When this leadership causes acceptable higher losses it is worth to consider IMHO.

Found the book here: The Blitzkrieg Legend: The Campaign in the West, 1940

I must find a copy and read it to improve my knowledge of that era.

Prepared does not necessarily mean more tanks or planes. From my knowledge of that era I am aware that German officers were trained at a tactical level 'two-up' which would have prepared them for the mssive growth of the army after 1939 and it was probably a contributing factor to their tactical superiority at the outbreak of the war.

[Ulenspiegel]

Found the book here: The Blitzkrieg Legend: The Campaign in the West, 1940

I must find a copy and read it to improve my knowledge of that era.

Prepared does not necessarily mean more tanks or planes. From my knowledge of that era I am aware that German officers were trained at a tactical level 'two-up' which would have prepared them for the mssive growth of the army after 1939 and it was probably a contributing factor to their tactical superiority at the outbreak of the war.

The training level of most German divisions was poor in 1939, improved during the winter1939/40; equipment was often WW1 stuff and all the main issues were, when we use the assessment of the Wehrmacht, only solved around May 1941. Of course, the propaganda photos in 1939/40 showed a "reality" that was only true for 25% of the German divisions.

IIRC the German Auftragstaktik became part of the regulations in 1888.
This concept only worked when leaders were able to clearly understand the intentions of their superiors. Therefore, we found quite early a tendency in the Imperial German army to train leaders who were able to command one or two levels above their paygrade.

Interesting is that the entrance exam for the war academy - the candidate was usually Leutnant or Oberleutnant - comprised applied tactics of combined regiments at the beginning of the 1920ies. My understanding is, that the long service time as Leutnant was used quite efficiently and was not lost time.

The experiences of WWI were brought to paper in the 1920ies and practical conclusions published as Truppenführung around 1934. So I do not have evidence that the leadership principles (for officers) were a result of the small Reichswehr and a planned expansion of the ground forces, but often were in place pre-WW1 and were only refined in the interwar period.

[JMA]

The training level of most German divisions was poor in 1939, improved during the winter1939/40; equipment was often WW1 stuff and all the main issues were, when we use the assessment of the Wehrmacht, only solved around May 1941. Of course, the propaganda photos in 1939/40 showed a "reality" that was only true for 25% of the German divisions.

IIRC the German Auftragstaktik became part of the regulations in 1888.
This concept only worked when leaders were able to clearly understand the intentions of their superiors. Therefore, we found quite early a tendency in the Imperial German army to train leaders who were able to command one or two levels above their paygrade.

Interesting is that the entrance exam for the war academy - the candidate was usually Leutnant or Oberleutnant - comprised applied tactics of combined regiments at the beginning of the 1920ies. My understanding is, that the long service time as Leutnant was used quite efficiently and was not lost time.

The experiences of WWI were brought to paper in the 1920ies and practical conclusions published as Truppenführung around 1934. So I do not have evidence that the leadership principles (for officers) were a result of the small Reichswehr and a planned expansion of the ground forces, but often were in place pre-WW1 and were only refined in the interwar period.

To win in war all you have to be is better 'prepared' than your enemy. This does not mean you need to be 100% prepared as preparation is a journey and not a destination.

Google Books allows one to browse The Blitzkrieg legend: the 1940 campaign in the West to an extent, which is useful.

I have a copy of On the German Art of War: Truppenfuhrung.

The concept of combat power (or fighting power) - Kampfkraft is worthy of greater study in terms of reaching a greater understanding of the role of leadership in this and how to select officers who have the required characteristics to enhance this. Kampfkraft is without doubt a critical force multiplier.

[JMA]

The article The Perfect Officer - by Henrik Bering contains enough to keep an enquiring intellect busy for months.

The key element of fighting power is leadership. In screening for officer material, the German emphasis was on all-around personality, rather than on intelligence and education alone. Intelligence is important, but even more important is character. A man can be clever and a coward. Or he can be indecisive. What the Germans were looking for was determination, the individual’s willingness to assume responsibility, and his ability to handle adversity. Here van Creveld uses the German word: the officer had to be Krisenfest, “crisisproof,” i.e., steady in emergencies.