The Army: A Profession of Arms

[jmm99]

as to this:

from 120mm
It would also help if we actually conducted diplomacy, and had a robust diplomatic corps, and used the DoS instead of the DoD to elminate the need to constantly "nip things in the bud" militarily.

but, given DOD Directive 3000.05 (Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations) and its progeny, the military has been (and into the foreseeable future, will be) tasked not only with the "M" component, but with the "DIE" components as a practical matter.

Tomorrow's armed forces will have to deal not only with the military "struggle" (the continuation of Politik by other means - mainly military, the "M" component), but also with the political "struggle" (a different continuation of Politik by still other means - mainly political, the "DIE" components). The injection of the political struggle into the mix will certainly impact the "moral-ethical and political-cultural domains" of our (US) armed forces.

We (US) have (doctrinally) apolitical armed forces. Moving aspects of the political struggle into their tasked missions will most probably give rise to moral-ethical and political-cultural issues which in the past have been consigned to the non-military side of the ledger - and which generally have been considered "political questions" constitutionally.

The general question, in a "DoD 3000.05 world", is how deeply do our armed forces become involved in "Politik" - that is, in formulating the policies that are the driving engines behind both the military struggle and the political struggle ?

More specifically, how deeply should individual members of the military, because of ""moral-ethical and political-cultural" concerns, become involved and respond to policy decisions made by the National Command Authorities ?

E.g., a decision to go to war ("Jus ad Bellum" for those who prefer Latin), where arguments are made for and against characterizing the decision as an aggressive war, a preventive war, a preemptive war (different, BTW, from a preventive war), a just war, etc., etc.

What should happen to "PVT-GEN Jakola", if (after he has considered all of the "jus ad bellum" arguments) he says "Hell no, I won't go" ?

Regards

Mike

[Chris Case]

as to this:



but, given DOD Directive 3000.05 (Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations) and its progeny, the military has been (and into the foreseeable future, will be) tasked not only with the "M" component, but with the "DIE" components as a practical matter.

Tomorrow's armed forces will have to deal not only with the military "struggle" (the continuation of Politik by other means - mainly military, the "M" component), but also with the political "struggle" (a different continuation of Politik by still other means - mainly political, the "DIE" components). The injection of the political struggle into the mix will certainly impact the "moral-ethical and political-cultural domains" of our (US) armed forces.

We (US) have (doctrinally) apolitical armed forces. Moving aspects of the political struggle into their tasked missions will most probably give rise to moral-ethical and political-cultural issues which in the past have been consigned to the non-military side of the ledger - and which generally have been considered "political questions" constitutionally.

The general question, in a "DoD 3000.05 world", is how deeply do our armed forces become involved in "Politik" - that is, in formulating the policies that are the driving engines behind both the military struggle and the political struggle ?

More specifically, how deeply should individual members of the military, because of ""moral-ethical and political-cultural" concerns, become involved and respond to policy decisions made by the National Command Authorities ?

E.g., a decision to go to war ("Jus ad Bellum" for those who prefer Latin), where arguments are made for and against characterizing the decision as an aggressive war, a preventive war, a preemptive war (different, BTW, from a preventive war), a just war, etc., etc.

What should happen to "PVT-GEN Jakola", if (after he has considered all of the "jus ad bellum" arguments) he says "Hell no, I won't go" ?

Regards

Mike

These are questions that the military needs to address.

I would argue that the Army is already involved in formulating policies that drive political struggle. In fact, I think it has been involved in it for a long time. Even setting aside the Generals from World War II and prior, consider the role of people like Generals Taylor, Abrams, Powell and Petraeus. They all made decisions that influenced political struggle both internally and externally.

Now it seems that what has been happening has just been made more explicit. Many of the futures concepts that the Army has published seem to entail the collapse of the distinction between the ad bellum and in bello.

A few more questions:

Does this mean that the Army needs to consider something like selective conscientious objection for a professionalized force? Or does being a "professional" remove the ability to choose not to fight?

Is the military professional the sort of professional who does not have the autonomy to exercise their own expert judgment in refraining from doing harm?