Point/Counterpoint: Are the Service Academies in Trouble?

[Schmedlap]

The service academies have Burger King and Rip-Its?

Well, kind of. During my freshman year I considered transferring to West Point, but it seemed over the top to me. Their chow hall made ours look like a soup kitchen. Their athletic facilities/gym/etc made ours look like a small town high school. Their barracks rooms made ours look like a homeless shelter. In hindsight, perhaps my school was more austere than necessary. But, being a 19-year-old who had willingly been brainwashed by Drill Instructors and a handful of grizzled Vietnam War vets who worked at my school, I thought that anything was too soft if it didn't involve crawling through mud and broken glass.

[MikeF]

During my freshman year I considered transferring to West Point, but it seemed over the top to me.

Why is the Junior Varsity always so damn jealous of the Varsity team ?

Did you have to walk uphill both ways to class too? Sounds like you went to school in a northwestern mountainous part of a state where they dig banjos, sleeping with cousins, and the legal age for marraige is 16.

[John T. Fishel]

Wilf, it's hey day - just kidding. You have a serious question there. Back in 1802 when WP was founded it was THE engineering school in the US. For 50 years +/- it has been a highly selective undergraduate university that produces a significant minority of army officers. Generally, those officers collectively are promoted at a higher rate than their peers from other commissioning sources making up about half the generals the army promotes. Historically, the leaders on both sides of the Am Civil War were from WP. The leaders of the US army in WWII were mostly from WP and many key leaders were from the WP class of 1915. One exception was G. C. Marshall who graduated from VMI.
The modern US military requires all its officers to have an undergraduate degree. Some National Guard officers can still be commissioned without it but they can't be promoted with Federal recognition until they have a degree. So, the question is how WP stacks up against other universities. Academically (based on selection test scores - the SAT) WP is not as good as Harvard or other Ivy League schools but it is near the top of the second tier and better than most state universities and a lot of private ones. It is also more selective in looking for leadership skills, some athletic ability and other attributes that are deemed desirable in a military leader.
While a majority of Academy grads leave service after their obligation is over, many of those made mistakes as LTs that other LTs receive forgiveness for. Many of those who leave active service do stay in the reserve or National Guard and tend to do very well assuming real leadership positions. And many assume leadership roles in civilian life.
So, the bottom line is that WP and the other service academies serve the nation in many ways and provide more than their fair share of leaders both military and civilian. Is it the best way? the most efficient way? Who knows. It is consistent with American culture and does produce some of our best combat leaders (also some not so good).
Don't know if that answers your question. But also think about some of the folk who contribute to this forum. Some of the most thoughtful - more than what we have any reason to expect - are academy grads.
(Not me, of course!)

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

John T. Fischel - many thanks for that.

I have to say I have pretty utilitarian views of Officer training.
The Royal Marines train their own officers, with none of the Sandhurst type performance and produce a pretty high standard. They also do it at minute cost compared to others. Their system fails badly in terms of Command Experience, because they produce too many officers, but raw product is generally good.
The IDF produce generally very competent officers, with a great deal of command experience, if you get slated for the Command stream. I know one guys who has commanded 3 Battalions and 2 Brigades - all for 3 years!
All Majors are now expected to go and get a Masters Degree - why I do not know!
The German Army of the 1930's - 50's 60' and into the 1980's produced above average combat officers, by the accounts of the men who have studied them.

My point, and nothing to do with US Service Academies, is that there is a good body of evidence that says you can produce very good officers without too much cost, time or process. Surely that is the requirement?

[Infanteer]

John T. Fischel - many thanks for that.

I have to say I have pretty utilitarian views of Officer training.
The Royal Marines train their own officers, with none of the Sandhurst type performance and produce a pretty high standard. They also do it at minute cost compared to others. Their system fails badly in terms of Command Experience, because they produce too many officers, but raw product is generally good.
The IDF produce generally very competent officers, with a great deal of command experience, if you get slated for the Command stream. I know one guys who has commanded 3 Battalions and 2 Brigades - all for 3 years!
All Majors are now expected to go and get a Masters Degree - why I do not know!
The German Army of the 1930's - 50's 60' and into the 1980's produced above average combat officers, by the accounts of the men who have studied them.

My point, and nothing to do with US Service Academies, is that there is a good body of evidence that says you can produce very good officers without too much cost, time or process. Surely that is the requirement?

There are obviously two factors here with an officer's development:
1. Professional Development - Professional knowledge base, critical thought; and
2. Technical Development - Fieldcraft, Command, Troop leading SOPs/TTPs.

Is one more important then the other? Can the first factor be "pushed off" or "spread out"?

Wilf speaks to lack of command time and too many officers - something we're seeing in Canada as the recruiting system opened up to try and fill a gap in the Senior Captain/Major rank levels (a gap that comes, in large part, from a creation of a plethora of new strategic-level HQs). Problem is too many officers for too little command billets.

I'd venture that a hard cap, based off available commands at each rank level, should be put on the size of a Corps to avoid creating a bunch of commissioned bureaucrats.

[Schmedlap]

I'd venture that a hard cap, based off available commands at each rank level, should be put on the size of a Corps to avoid creating a bunch of commissioned bureaucrats.

If the US Army had done that, a lot more of us would have stayed in.

[Infanteer]

If the US Army had done that, a lot more of us would have stayed in.

We are seeing this up here, where many officers can expect, at most, 6 months of Command time for their entire career.

[baboon6]

The IDF produce generally very competent officers, with a great deal of command experience, if you get slated for the Command stream. I know one guys who has commanded 3 Battalions and 2 Brigades - all for 3 years!
All Majors are now expected to go and get a Masters Degree - why I do not know!
The German Army of the 1930's - 50's 60' and into the 1980's produced above average combat officers, by the accounts of the men who have studied them.

My point, and nothing to do with US Service Academies, is that there is a good body of evidence that says you can produce very good officers without too much cost, time or process. Surely that is the requirement?

The German officer training system of those eras (it has I believe changed a bit now) and that of the Israelis is quite similar in some ways, requiring short service in the ranks, passing junior NCO courses etc. Do you know if the Israelis consciously modeled their system on the German one (seems unlikely but you never know) or if it just developed that way?

[William F. Owen]

Do you know if the Israelis consciously modeled their system on the German one (seems unlikely but you never know) or if it just developed that way?

From my own enquiries, it appears that the idea that officers have to prove themselves in the ranks comes from Palmach.
Because the Israelis lacked the British "class" and private education system, you had to prove yourself to be a leader. They were also strongly socialist in ideology, so merit was strongly emphasised. All that conspired into the modern system you see today.

[slapout9]

Why is the Junior Varsity always so damn jealous of the Varsity team ?

Did you have to walk uphill both ways to class too? Sounds like you went to school in a northwestern mountainous part of a state where they dig banjos, sleeping with cousins, and the legal age for marraige is 16.

It's 14 not 16

[John T. Fishel]

that you can produce good officers by other systems. there is much to be said in favor of the IDF's every officer has previously served in the ranks approach.
The American system as I suggested is driven by history and culture and its multiple commissioniing sources produces good officers for a very large military as OE and I argued. Most of the criticism I heard in the 70s and 80s was that our advanced officer education - CGSC (now ILE) and war college was of the MacDonalds variety. However, it looks a lot like its civilian counterpart Masters programs.

Cheers

JohnT

[JMA]

that you can produce good officers by other systems. there is much to be said in favor of the IDF's every officer has previously served in the ranks approach.

Served in the ranks for how long and doing what?

[William F. Owen]

Served in the ranks for how long and doing what?

Depends on the unit, and branch. Reuven Gal's "Portrait of an Israeli Soldier" describes the whole process in detail. - (and book recommended to me by General Sir John Kiszely)

Essentially, you have to pass out of basic training with a good score, be selected to do the JNCO course, and the best of those go on to be officers, while having served as JNCOs in the unit, to the satisfaction of the Commanding officer. It's very much about character, and ability.

The current COS, Gabi Askenazi comes from an very impoverished and disadvantaged back ground. It is said, his introduction to combat and vigilance, was guarding the family's one chicken! Maybe an apocryphal story.

[Red Rat]

Just for information I have copied below the Training Objectives (TO) for the Commissioning Course at Sandhurst. Sandhurst remains different from other military academies in that it is a one year course focused on producing leaders to fill platoon command slots; it is not academically orientated.

TO1 Demonstrate combat fitness
TO2 Handle and fire platoon weapon systems
TO3 Navigate across country
TO4 Apply battlefield first aid
TO5 Carry out basic fieldcraft
TO6 Operate in a CBRN environment (Chem, bio and nuclear)
TO7 Officership Ethics, integrity, values and standards
TO8 Command
TO9 Perform Military Duties (including drill)
TO10 Communicate Effectively
TO11 Spare
TO12 Lead Individual and Team Training (adventure training, cadet platoon projects, sports et al)
TO13 Spare
TO14 Operate IT/IM Equipment
TO15 Lead a Platoon
TO16 Operate Tactical Communications Systems
TO17 Apply knowledge of Tactics
TO18 Analyse British Military Doctrine
TO19 Analyse Military performance in Current Conflicts
TO20 Analyse the Current Political and Strategic Context
TO21 Describe Structure and Roles of the British Armed Forces
TO22 Explain the Capabilities And Operating Environment of a Battle Group


Exercises take up 43% of programmed time. Exercises are the vital tool as vehicles both to support lessons taught under the majority of the TOs , for cadets to display the skills of leadership and command and for the DS to assess those skills and the cadets’ suitability for a commission.

It is accepted wisdom that it is only by placing cadets in conditions of physical and mental stress that their endurance and resilience can be properly tested. Whilst the exercise programme is heavy and resource intensive it should be remembered that for the majority the realities of operations are imminent on completion of Course.

The cadets also do a staff ride in Normandy which gives the cadets the chance to practise estimate and decision making against the backdrop of a past campaign. This is a challenging exercise which sees the integration of civilian and military staff at its best.

[JMA]

Depends on the unit, and branch. Reuven Gal's "Portrait of an Israeli Soldier" describes the whole process in detail. - (and book recommended to me by General Sir John Kiszely)

Essentially, you have to pass out of basic training with a good score, be selected to do the JNCO course, and the best of those go on to be officers, while having served as JNCOs in the unit, to the satisfaction of the Commanding officer. It's very much about character, and ability.

The current COS, Gabi Askenazi comes from an very impoverished and disadvantaged back ground. It is said, his introduction to combat and vigilance, was guarding the family's one chicken! Maybe an apocryphal story.

Thanks, amazing what can be found in google books.

It seems as follows (depending on what arm you are in):

Basic training 3-4 months
Service approx 13-14 months
Officer training 4-6 months

Then this:

“Those who complete the officer courses will be commissioned as 2nd lieutenants and will return to their units (generally the same units where they served as regular soldiers and NCOs) and will be assigned to the position of platoon commander. The IDF officer is thus commissioned after twenty to twenty-four months military service, and with his acceptance of his commission, he acquires an additional twelve months of active duty time beyond the usual three years mandatory service. Accordingly the IDF can count on having these new officers for approximately two years of active duty after commissioning…”

[Ken White]

It's 14 not 16

Durn, I am sure missing a lotta changes...