why not ask for paper that Usefully inform practitioners as to the conduct and understanding of modern conflict.
I am becoming more and more convinced, (by reading these forums) that trying to keep COIN in some box that is distinct from wider aspects of conflict is utterly counter-productive and even delusional. War is war. Conflict is conflict. Trying to create discrete groups of conflict does not help - witness the mess that gets made of it.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The
I would like to read the thoughts of others on the responsibilities of States that embark on small wars - or as seems increasingly common - give the nod to others. How to keep a small war from becoming a long war, several related small wars or just a major conflict.
Looking at Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Somalia my concern is differences between transient political regimes are leading to disproportionate humanitarian crisis for the largely innocent civilian population. Would Ethiopia have invaded Somalia if not given tacit permission by the US, and why would the US back such an adventure if not in the hope of recovering some embassy bombing suspects; was the predictable disaster justifiable given the potential gains? Were the UIC really that big a threat?
So in short ethical questions for nation states and I second,
Selil --ethics in small wars?
Uboat509 --At what point does the state's obligation to protect it's people outweigh moral considerations? [and I would add the state's obligation to protect other civilians from direct and indirect consequences of its actions]
JJ --Rednecks, should they be trusted with guns - discuss?
Intelligence support to small units in urban operations.
Balancing killing and building when conducting SSTRO in a major urban center.
IDPs, refugees, ethnic/sectarian tension and terrorist infrastructure in an urban environment.
Interagency, coalition and host nation cooperation, collaboration and interoperability at the small unit level.
Since war is politics by other means, and we're a democracy, what does the average voter need to know about small wars?
How do we finance small wars? How can we weight the costs versus the benefits?
Last edited by Rank amateur; 01-19-2008 at 03:49 PM.
Originally Posted by SteveMetz
Well - One term is now becoming solidified in my new lexicon - Security Sector Reform (SSR). The new FM on Stability Ops is not too far out - Security Force Assistance (SFA) will be a part of it (big hat tip to SWC member Old Eagle for some damned fine witting!).
I vote one of the topics incorporate the broader topic of SSR - this will allow potential authors to cover everything from Inter-Agency work in SSR to Rule of Law.
Under the broader topic we can also include sub and related topics of: advising, working with/in support of indigenous forces, FID, PRT, building partner capacity, etc. While these are often parts and pieces of the same things, or cross into multiple areas which together work toward stability - they fall under the SFA and SSR umbrellas.
I'll sign up to be on the review board.
It will also help our effort here at JCIFSA (Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance) by identifying folks interested in the topic, and by some possible ideas from those thinking or working in other areas. Some good threads might be spun off from the papers.
Best Rob
Last edited by Rob Thornton; 01-19-2008 at 04:24 PM.
Received from an SWC Member by PM...
...who prefers to remain anonymous for some unknown reason. Author does credit the discussion here for some of the thought.
FYI, I got the dreaded SWJ Server Death Grip when I tried to post this yesterday. Fortunately, I can recognize it and know who to call. Need to change our host, and apologies to all the people who aren't reading this now because they can't get through.
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One characteristic of many small wars is that they are asymmetric: one actor possesses considerably more “hard” or military power than the other. Yet many ostensibly weaker powers seem able to negate this advantage through the use of information. Manipulation of existing news outlets (e.g., newspapers and magazines), and creation of new media outlets (e.g., blogs and websites), may permit weaker actors to achieve end states otherwise unattainable. Under what conditions are such information operations most likely to succeed (e.g, during more traditional military operations, such as the November 2004 assault on Fallujah, or during less traditional military operations, such as the pacification of Anbar)? What are the most efficient ways for weaker actors to use information operations to negate their opponents’ military advantages? Conversely, what are the most efficient ways for stronger actors to deny weaker actors such capabilities (e.g., embedding, foreign-language websites, etc.))? Which branch or branches of the US Government are best able to conduct such operations, and in what ways?
The US military has sought to learn counterinsurgency lessons from the experiences of other militaries as well its own. But to some extent, each military is unique. With respect to the US military, to what extent can lessons from other militaries be applied, to what extent are lessons from other militaries inapplicable, and why? What are the dimensions one should assess when importing lessons from other militaries? What makes such lessons applicable or inapplicable – the nature of the US political system (e.g., division of responsibility for prosecution of wars between Congress and the Executive), the nature of the US military (e.g, dissimilar from the British regimental system), the absence of unity of command within a theatre and separate lines of authority between DOD and State, etc.? For example, to what extent should one apply British COIN lessons from Malaya or Kenya, or Russian COIN lessons from Afghanistan, and what rationales dictate which lessons should be applied when (e.g., British lessons should be applied because the British political system is more similar to the US one, or Russian lessons should be applied because it too lacked a small wars tradition)?
The concepts of guerilla war, unconventional war, insurgency, low-intensity conflict, asymmetric conflict, and terrorism – to name a few – overlap to a considerable degree, but also diverge to a similar degree. Not all insurgencies take place within the context of unconventional wars (e.g., actions during the US Revolutionary and Civil Wars), nor do all asymmetric conflicts necessarily involve insurgencies (e.g., the Israel-Lebanon/Hezbollah 2006 war). Accordingly, distinctions between small wars and large wars may be considerably overstated: a war might be characterized as “primarily” “small” or “large,” but nevertheless contain large components of each. To aid to the complexity, militaries – and organizations more generally – can arguably change only slowly and painfully at best, and/or be capable of doing only one thing. Finally, while the United States is currently waging (at a minimum) two counterinsurgencies, the potential of major or large regional conflicts cannot be discounted entirely. Accordingly, to what extent – if at all – should the US military attempt to organize (or reorganize) itself for small wars? Or, conversely, should the US military be content with the progress it has made in drafting FM 3-24, and reorienting itself toward small wars, and decide its change has been sufficient? What tradeoffs, if any, should be made?
Ya Allah!
I have fundamental problems with the language and logic in use here. "Asymmetric" is meaningless in terms of military thought. It does not usefully describe the phenomena that it claims to.
IMO, the use of the description "Small Wars" is also largely useless, in that it is not a useful description. How do you measure Small versus Large?
What all these bumper stickers manage to avoid is the admission that there are opponents against whom the use of conventional military force is not useful because they shelter and subsist within civilian populations. That's it! It's nothing to do with information or the media. Information and media are not and never can be military ends in themselves. They are activities that create a friction which may negatively impact on military action, because of the political/humanitarian dimension. EG: If military action remains unknown or unreported, (or no one cares) there can be no information dimension.
There are populations who are completely inoculated against information operations, EG - The militant and ultra-orthodox Jewish communities in Israel and the wider world or militant Islam and the Pro/Pan-Arabists anywhere, and people of any extreme position. They only accept information that supports their beliefs. Check out "cognitive dissonance" as a phenomena. These people are not swayed by information. - However a gun in the mouth does get them to take their fingers off the keyboard or stop the interview for the BBC.
To my mind the entire challenge is to make and retain the utility of military force, so that it achieves the decisions we need. You have guerillas and bad people because they believe that power comes from the barrel of a gun. The best and most effective solution is to make such men, fear for all they believe, should they wish to attempt gaining influence by such means.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I'm in general agreement.
Agree totally that 'asymmetric' simply describes the way anyone should ALWAYS fight -- attack ones opponents weakest point(s).
If, for example, the opponent is not able to successfully attack us militarily and as a result turns to successfully using IO to weaken our national resolve for completion of a goal, then our effort should be directed toward undermining the opponents efforts in that regard and destroying his credibility. I do not believe that is a military function, it is a governmental function but the Armed Forces are the absolute wrong agency to prosecute the effort.
Other than to covertly remove some of his messengers and destroy some of his dissemination capability, of course...
Wilf is correct in that:. Yet there are also cases where conventional military force is required for one reason or another to open the window for non conventional force or effort to be applied. That effort will vary considerably dependent on the nation(s) involved and the general situation and success will depend on knowledge of the cultures and forces involved and on good intelligence. We do not do well at understanding the former and we have not done well at obtaining and / or promulgating the latter. Hopefully, both those conditions will see improvement in the future."...that there are opponents against whom the use of conventional military force is not useful because they shelter and subsist within civilian populations.
I do not as strongly agree about 'small wars.' It's a term, no more and some wars are in fact smaller than others. As it is generally applied today, it points toward COIN. I think that the Armed Forces don't “do” COIN, rather they act in support of US Government COIN, they don't conduct COIN but do -- and must be able to -- operate in a COIN environment. I believe that distinction is critical and is not being applied -- and that is why we've been floundering for a while. Volumes have been written about that and about the failure to involve the total government in this effort so there's little to be gained by flogging that stud here.
Oh yeah? I was utterly wrong. Small War is a very useful description when applied within a context of Regular and Irregular threats. Live and learn!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
PMCs in small wars
Not only private contractors, but all non-state armed groups. USG-contracted armed groups fighting ideological or criminal armed groups - sort of like what's happening in Colombia. Is that a small war?
Another idea for an essay prompt. Influence or information operations and strategic communication in small wars - winning minds and wills - both in the area of operations and in the global public square.
One last one, a couple of people have mentioned it. The interagency in small wars, but not just the Federal IA - public, private, nonprofit, and even super empowered individuals in coalitions of the willing. How could we attract all, or many, of the elements for good into a unified effort? should we?
You may want to include an option for people to write whatever they want to keep the new ideas flowing. You never know what you're gonna get.
Last edited by SteveO; 01-21-2008 at 01:10 AM. Reason: typo
Figure 1-1. CA Mission Activities Across the Range of Military Operations
Originally posted by Slapout:
Maybe as an offshoot of the above:4-Economic Targets as The Key to Winning Small Wars.
"Practical Economics For Small Wars" a/k/a "You Can't Live On A Steady Diet of Sand".
This is, IMO, woeful. It is not a spectrum of conflict. It is also inaccurate. I think the old Three Block War is simplistic, but it's more useful than this. This actually implies that there are discreet areas of operation that are distinct and clearly identifiable. However, we know this not to be true, and thus it is misleading.
..and, how does it help to think like this? What use is this type of graphic?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I'm not reading it that way at all. Seems to me that all it's attempting to point out is that CA is involved in military activity all the way from war to peace, but that it's specific functions vary.
Conflict?
What about the simple ones, I'm probably re-hashing some of the things that have been discussed, c'set la vie.
Reconstruction after conflict - an invaders responsibility?
The soldier of the future - a geek, sneak or killer?
I do like the idea about Rednecks and guns, does the use of Monster trucks in modern warfare follow on, or is it assumed?
Cheers
Geoff
On MRAPs and Monster Trucks
At last the mysterious attraction for MRAPS is revealed--Is it the Monster of all Monster trucks?
I was
kinda leanin towards the latter. It only makes sense, not to mention the added benefit of bringing new mods for our current trucks more likelyAt last the mysterious attraction for MRAPS is revealed--Is it the Monster of all Monster trucks?
Military advancements always fortell lots of neat toys for the rest of us
I'd offer a contest for the tactical level.
I would like to see a contest focused to the tactical level - BN and below. We have a plethora of studies, think tank reports, op-eds, etc. on whole of government and larger issues.
What we are not seeing is a large density of high quality work on the small stuff that makes tactical level COIN successful or unsuccessful. For the most part the branch journals have a hard time attracting these sort of articles, and when they are published they don't hit the mainstream.
SWJ should encourage the works of the CPT/LT/SGT level, which aren't as common.
Just my thoughts.
Ditto, all this Strategical Stuff tends to overshadow the fact that sooner or later it gets down to the tactical level of how are you going to do this.
Well said, I know exactly what you mean. In the past few years, I have found in almost every area I have studied this almost irrepressible movement to categorize and separate issues to death. In theory, everything can be separated, analyzed and turned black and white. In reality everything is one big greyish area. To try to "keep COIN in some box that is distinct from wider aspects of conflict" (William F Owen) is akin to not allowing surgeons to consult non-surgical specialties.
Adam L
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