The Roles and Weapons with the Squad

[Ken White]

My understanding is that it is very much a Commander / AO - METT-TC thing and that some units are more Patrol friendly than others (and obviously. location can have a bearing.). I hear a few units are less risk averse than most but that generally, Cav Platoons and Scout Platoons are converted to palace guard or personal protection (which should be a Court Martial Offense for he or she who directs that ) and the use of LRS patrols is 'not robust.'

The OpSec issue bothered me in making my post above and this one -- but the risk aversion is IMO more worrisome. It fascinates - and worries -- me that I had more latitude as a Squad Leader in Korea and as an acting Platoon Leader in Viet Nam than most Company Commanders appear to have today. We should be better trained, more trusting of a professional force and they should have more freedom of action. Sadly, none of those things appear to be true.

[Pete]

I remember in 2003 shortly after the fall of Baghdad when Jake Garner and and his military government crew were said to have been holed up in their compound because there were no force protection escorts to accompany them out the gate. These force protection policies seem to originate at high levels with the intention of preventing little detachments and groups from being picked off by the bad guys. When taken to extremes though it makes one wonder why we bother sending people overseas if we're going to lock them down in FOBs.

[Infanteer]

I routinely deployed 4-6 man patrols for layback, OPs and ambushes. These weren't LRRPs, but I was sending small teams out.

[Ken White]

I routinely deployed 4-6 man patrols for layback, OPs and ambushes. These weren't LRRPs, but I was sending small teams out.

Many do that and for more than a day or two as well but one unit that did not do so would be too many IMO. I hear there's more than one.

The LRS guys should be out for a week or two at a time. There are a lot of reasons why that isn't routinely being done, some good, some not so much...

[BushrangerCZ]

I routinely deployed 4-6 man patrols for layback, OPs and ambushes. These weren't LRRPs, but I was sending small teams out.

Really? You deployed 4-6 man team away from the FB/FOB/COP, where it acted independently for more than couple of hours? I am not talking about cut off/security elements or OPs who are part of the bigger element, I am talking about sending out independent recon/combat patrol, just by itself. LRS units train like that, and organize like that, but never get deployed just like that (current organization of LRS team can be found on their official site in free-to-download presentation). At the end, they drive around stuck in body armor in humwees as whole detachments, not teams (who are supposed and trained to operate by themselves if needed- and I think it´s needed, you can´t hide whole detachment anywhere in that place). I PM´d you the rest od the story.

[Infanteer]

Really? You deployed 4-6 man team away from the FB/FOB/COP, where it acted independently for more than couple of hours?

Yes.

[BushrangerCZ]

Thanks for the info Infanteer, I will try to find out exactly where was stated what I PM´d you, to this point I was sure it was for the whole operation - maybe not.

[Firn]

.. but the risk aversion is IMO more worrisome. It fascinates - and worries -- me that I had more latitude as a Squad Leader in Korea and as an acting Platoon Leader in Viet Nam than most Company Commanders appear to have today. We should be better trained, more trusting of a professional force and they should have more freedom of action. Sadly, none of those things appear to be true.

Indeed and this is far from only true for the US forces, the standard Italian units are subjected possibly to an even tighter leash. From what I have heard first hand a lot of the scouting, infiltration and patrolling which would have done in past wars by simple conscripts with only some if any additional training has been SFed or greatly reduced for the professionals....

The key problem seems to be that the standing of a commander might get harmed far more by a potential disaster then bolstered by the potential success. At least after the political upheaval which followed the last Italian KIA the smart guys should know that they should play it safe and work-to-rule which might even be work-to-the true political intent.

[Pete]

Welcome, BushrangerCZ. In May 1945 my late Dad was in the outskirts of Pilsen with the 97th U.S. Infantry Division when World War II ended. Later when he was in Prague in the 1970s a Communist Party official asked him whether he'd ever been to Czechoslovakia before and he said yes, near Pilsen in May 1945. The official said no, that can't be true, we were liberated by the great Red Army!

[BushrangerCZ]

Welcome, BushrangerCZ. In May 1945 my late Dad was in the outskirts of Pilsen with the 97th U.S. Infantry Division when World War II ended. Later when he was in Prague in the 1970s a Communist Party official asked him whether he'd ever been to Czechoslovakia before and he said yes, near Pilsen in May 1945. The official said no, that can't be true, we were liberated by the great Red Army!

Pete, if I only could, I would buy your father whole crate of Pilsen Urquell. Commies really tried to persuade everybody that US soldiers in Pilsen were in fact soviet soldiers dressed up like Americans. Most people knew the true, but it was not good to talk about it. My grandfather handed some german POWs to US troops in my own hometown, so it is obvious that most people could not be blamed, but for example history teachers who taught about this facts could loose the job. Commies ruined the whole country, and now we are trying to catch up.

[Pete]

Pete, if I only could, I would buy your father whole crate of Pilsen Urquell.

The day before Pilsen was officially liberated by the U.S. Army Dad's division G-2 intelligence officer had Dad drive him in a jeep into downtown Pilsen, where they found no Germans. They went back to division headquarters, which requested permission to occupy the city immediately. Corps and/or Third Army replied that they should stick to the original plan, and accordingly the next day the 16th Armored Division, a unit which had previously seen no combat, entered the city. The 2nd Infantry Division was then on the southern flank of Dad's 97th Infantry -- in fact the 97th ID had occupied positions of the 2nd ID a couple of days earlier so the 2nd ID could shift further south.

[Pete]

Back in the 1970s there was a memoir of the OSS and CIA entitled Germans by one George Bailey, probably a pseudonym. It stated that on V-E day in 1945 there was an OSS team in Prague that included Eugene Fodor, author of the 1960s Fodor's Guide handbooks for American tourists in the countries of Europe. The OSS team also included an enlisted guy who was an old crown prince of the Romanov dynasty.

The book said a group of Soviet soldiers were intrigued to be able to have a conversation with one of their princes, but a self-important U.S. Army colonel butted into the discussion and insisted that he being the ranking officer, the translators present should ignore the enlisted man and tell the Russians the things that he had to say. The translators obliged, and what ensued was one of those "When the general and I were in the whorehouse the other night" kind of discussions. The colonel couldn't understand why the Russian soldiers were laughing at the wrong times.

Those of a conspiratorial mind might want to speculate on how it was that the author of the most popular series of guidebooks for American tourists in Europe in the 1960s was a former OSS guy with CIA associations. "Bill and Susan Smith operate a very nice bed and breakfast in Oxford which I highly recommend ... " It may have been a way of keeping track of American tourists in Europe at the time.