Sub-Saharan Africa is a bit different from the Middle East - it has a lot more Christians than Muslims & Christians tend to be located more in the wealthier, coastal cities.Originally Posted by carl
If they want to provoke a reaction from Christians in Sub-Saharan Africa - eventually they'll get it, but they will regret it.
From what I read, it doesn't seem that Boko Haram is inclined to being talked out of murdering people. Do you think the Nigerian Army can keep them suppressed to the extent that the people won't sort of take things into their own hands in a very big way?
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
to read with caution:
http://dalsanradio.com/articles/1568...rmind-revealedNames of Westgate attack mastermind revealed
According to Channel 4 News in UK the alleged leader of the Nairobi shopping mall attack was born a Christian in Kenya and is a former member of the country's special forces.
The number one Westgate attacker was named as Omar or Umayr, who is believed to have been killed in this week’s siege.
Omar was a Kenyan national, born to a Christian family from Nairobi. He converted to Islam and was also a former member of Kenya’s special forces.
Umayr is understood to have left Kenya for Somalia in 2005, where he joined the Kamboni militant Islamist group. Kamboni later joined with al-Shabaab.
The report said the second man is known as Khadhab, who is a Somali national who worked in an Islamic bookshop in the Nairobi suburb of Eastleigh. He was arrested and imprisoned in Somalia, and it is alleged he was tortured by the CIA while in custody there.
.Somalia: Al-Shabab Finds Fighters Among Somali Youth in Minnesota
Nimco Ahmed, a Somali activist who works for the Minneapolis City Council, says the war and resettlement has fractured the traditional family structure.
"Most of our fathers are either not here or not in the country or dead pretty much. So not having a father figure for boys has been a struggle for us. And it is still a struggle for us," said Ahmed.
Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2007 was viewed by some Somalis as a violation of Somali sovereignty even though the troops intervened at the request of the transitional Somali government and with the backing of the African Union and the U.S.
Using a mixture of religion, nationalism and what some say is deception, the Islamist militant group al-Shabab has recruited at least 20 Somali-Americans to fight against foreign troops in Somalia
http://allafrica.com/stories/201310010226.html
Part of the Nigerian Army strategy seems to be to empower local civilians to take on Boko Haram (hence the "Civilian Joint Task Force"). Boko Haram's most vicious recent attacks have been against these people.
I expect the army to redouble efforts, re-arm the civilians and have them take on Boko Haram again. It will be very messy.
There are two different scenarios in which someone may attack a developed city in this way and while the initial hysterical-phase reaction is likely to be similar in both cases, they are not the same:
1. Some small demented group of crazied (aum whatever or suchlike) gets it into their head to do something spectacular. They kill many people, they get killed, their associates and known members get tracked down and killed or imprisoned, billions or trillions get wasted on new "Mall security" or some such, but its not really a repeatable and constant threat.
2. Some group with a real agenda, a real organization, a real ideology, attacks a developed city because their grievance with country X has reached criticality. The most likely suspect for such an act in the years to come is the jihadis. But even they cannot do this again and again. After the first attack or the third, their goose will be cooked. A sustained campaign needs a base, needs an organization, needs a pipeline of volunteers and trainers and financiers. How long before Pakistan is forced to stop any and all connection with ANY such business (or to die trying to cut them off)? I dont see how it can become a sustained and "normal" threat in advanced countries.
Its a different story for corrupt and incompetent regional powers. THEY should worry.
Repeatability over the long term would likely reduce the efficacy of such attacks. But even without achieving that, constancy of threat is entirely different. That is about perceptions and expectations, fear and concern. And we're not talking about how you or anyone here will appreciate such events - rather, it's about how Joe and Jane Schumackatelli deal with it - which in the short run is not good, and in the long run actually improves. But in that first window of chaos you could see a state or society flail badly, to quite harmful effect.
Does one need to maintain a regular tempo for such attacks to be effective? I think you could manage one or two a year and cause real damage - again, too much frequency allows people to adapt and realize they can prevail. Anyway, I don't think we can apply all of the same rules of warfare as are required in high intensity conventional conflict. There may be more and longer temporal gaps - as the enemy copes with the issues you cite.
And even as they are identified, how much did OEF really do to eliminate AQ's threat? Or the Taliban's? So, even as we might be able to identify who is supporting such groups and where, that does not guarantee that they will be dealt with effectively.
Jill
" how much did OEF really do to eliminate AQ's threat? Or the Taliban's? So, even as we might be able to identify who is supporting such groups and where, that does not guarantee that they will be dealt with effectively."
Well, one could say that OEF was misdirected. Still, there has not been another attack, not just because one group of attackers was disrupted and scattered, and because huge investments were made in security, but also because those states capable of hosting and organizing a really serious group of attackers are now scared of the consequences. Deterrence may have been possible at much less cost, but that is a separate issue. Some deterrence was undoubtedly created by that response..and organized groups with serious and capable backers are still (at least somewhat) scared. Otherwise, they would have tried something by now. Or at least, taken very few steps to prevent an operation being carried out by crazier, smaller, less-sane groups.
An African Khmer Rouge
Two pieces by Aidan Hartley, a white Kenyan reporter, in The Spectator. The first is an account of two white Kenyan survivors, which is grim reading.
From the penultimate paragraph an optimistic note:Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/...te-mall-siege/Both Simon and Amanda stress to me repeatedly that they are proud to be Kenyans. Their origins are British, but Simon’s family arrived here in 1908. ‘Everybody has been so good to us. We are Kenyans, whether we’re Hindus, Christians or Muslims. And we are not blaming Muslims.’
Alongside in the printed edition is a shorter piece, with the title 'An African Khmer Rouge' and the online version is called 'Al-Qa'eda targeted Kenya not because it's a banana republic, but because it's a symbol of African success'.
Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/...t-its-founder/
Note the similarity between this and Steve Metz's recent WPR comment, posted elsewhere and the link is:http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/a...ly-exaggerated
Last edited by davidbfpo; 10-03-2013 at 10:23 PM.
davidbfpo
Who's afraid of the big bad wolf?
There were 8 years between the two WTC attacks. In between there were smaller acts outside of CONUS. AQ has been very active around the globe in the past decade, and have successfully diversified the operational entities into multitudes of wholly owned subsidiary actors. As for sponsorship, I'm not sure I understand exactly who is afraid of whom, but I don't see AQ and the related entities suffering for a lack of safe havens. Finally, the investment in security will, as ever, be gotten around soon enough.
We have done a whole lot with force and not really changed or improved the situation - and given the time and financial resources expended, this is troubling. We have done blessed little in other areas comparatively, and we certainly haven't done much to understand why there is such permissive support for the animosity towards the West. And that, my friends, is why we are in no better place than 13 years ago. Shame.
Jill
That is a classic small war fighting action, arming the local civilians. How is the army going about that? Is there some kind of formally organized entity like the CIDG or RF/PFs in Vietnam, recognizing and supporting something already forming on its own like the Sons of Iraq or is it a more informal thing?
(I expect David may moves this exchange which would be fair enough.)
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Carl, this smacks of reckless desperation.
The key to any grand strategy is to make sure that whatever you do/use/implement during a 'war' it does not lead to greater polarization of groups/factions after the war.
As with anywhere - and most certainly in Africa - vigilantly 'justice' will often lead to scores being settled etc. Soon will get get out of control.
A sure indication the police and military have lost control.
JMA:
You know Africa. I only know a little. But my question and observation were made because this is a classic thing done when fighting a small war, you get the civilians on your side and into the fight in an active way. The best way to my mind is if they are somehow connected to the gov. The way the Thais did it, by putting national policemen in a village and having the civilian effort coalesce around him, is a good way. But I imagine the best way will depend upon the circumstances and place. That the Nigerian army is doing this kind of thing is to be expected but the way they are going to go about it seems to be important which is why I asked.
You know the area well. Do you think the army or gov in Nigeria can do it in such a way that they can keep some kind of control?
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Totally unrelated.
But has it occurred to anyone that "Bin Ladenism" & its manifestations - is essentially a religious movement?
Carl, I don't know Nigeria at all.
But... in general African terms 'decentralisation' is not the norm.
Their hand might have been forced through their inability to protect the population to allow local militias/vigilanties/whatever to operate... and let the future look after itself.
To further elaborate Carl, IMHO the key to long term success as opposed short term gains is to consider - in terms of the grand strategy - what the long term outcome would be as a result of arming village militias.
In the African context the thought of arming village militias makes the hair on my neck stand up. It is IMHO a racing certainty that there will be significant abuses - old scores settled (personal, tribal, religious) - not to mention the roaring trade in weapons and ammunition which will be created (much of which will most likely end up in the hands of the terrorists or other criminals).
Then one wonders if anyone has given any thought on how the weapons and ammunition could ever be recovered at some future date?
The problem that emerges is that the Nigerian military has significant limitations in terms of skills - much like we have seen of the Kenyan army - whereby their previous deployment methods are more of a display of what can be termed "brute force and ignorance" rather than any degree of subtlety or situation refined skills. Brute force and ignorance worked for the Nigerian military in Sierra Leone and Liberia but will not work internally - inside Nigeria - where a shoot first approach would not be readily accepted where the collateral damage would be Nigerian civilians (and not expendable others).
Last edited by JMA; 10-06-2013 at 07:48 AM.
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