Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
The one thing for certain is that Iraq and Afghanistan will be remembered for IEDs. That such a high percentage of casualties were inflicted through IEDs and that it took so long to make any impression on IED casualties or to alter tactics to reduce the exposure of troops to IEDs will not reflect well on the forces involved. This is such a pity.
Not ENTIRELY true. I know we began working it when they first appeared in '03. IEDs are immensely hard to find. We did counter several rounds of IEDs successfully - Remote controlled morphed to command wire morphed to pressure plate morphed to EFP. Each time they became harder to effectively counter.

That said, our COIN understanding didn't evolve at the same rate as our counter-IED ability. We could defeat the device but not prevent exponentially more from being placed until we changed our methods.



Michael Waltz's article appeals for junior commanders to be "freed" to use their initiative to alter the tactical methods of deployment to ensure they can serve their whole AO. There appears to be too much top down control in his experience.
Perhaps. I haven't served in Afghanistan (yet) but will let you know next summer. I know the unit I am replacing actually allows its soldiers to ride along in the back of Afghan Police Pickup trucks on patrol. Command risk acceptance is highly, highly chain of command driven. Additionally, the unit I will be replacing does a very high amount of dismounted patrols despite being a Stryker element. As will all war accounts, MAJ Waltz (with whom I only partially disagree overall), it reflects his experience in one place at one time, and not the larger picture.


Here's a novel thought... fly. Insert here... uplift there. As Waltz suggests, use initiative.
Damn! We never thought of that!

Would be nice if we actually had enough helicopters. Unfortunately we don't, and won't until Iraq is finished. Iraq sucked down most of the army's Aviation asset. Until 2009-10, Iraq consumed 80% of the U.S. Army's combat forces of all kinds, while Afghanistan remained a secondary effort. We are only seeing change now.

Is he correct?
I don't think so. He is right we need to engage the populace. The as Wilf says above, the vehicles are not the problem. The leadership in such cases is.

In any Army of 400,000 you're going to get a diversity of outcomes. 25% of your commanders will be brilliant and aggressive. 50% will do mediocre or well. and the bottom 25% will not get it or do poorly. In the aggregate, we're doing much, much better in the the tactics department. Afghanistan is finally getting the Army's full attention, and we are seeing marked improvements in performance as a result.

My BLUF is that anytime someone chimes in "all we need to do" or "if just" my BS flag goes up. Most of it has been tried. There are real constraints in the real world - equipment, time, resources, etc. that constrain the optimal solution and walks us to the possible. As resources have been added to Afghanistan you are seeing this uptick.

Ultimately, even if we had the best tactics in the world it really matters little because our strategy is wholly unrealistic. Getting exercised over tactical innovations (which will soon be countered) as "the solution" is silly. People are treating the addition of 14 tanks as some sort of strategic shift? Really? It's a tactical answer to a tactical problem in one region where the tool fits. MAJ Waltz and others are overreacting to their introduction.