Vietnam War Collection: books plus

[Steve Blair]

Already read the article. Once again it's a case of "either/or" thinking with no real attempt to find a good middle ground. Westmoreland was "right" in a sense, but he was also "wrong" in a sense. He was correct in that larger units were needed to break up the main force VC units and to keep them away from populated areas (although the only real way to do that would have been to physically cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail...an option that was never really on the table), but he was wrong in his lack of attention to population security (leaving that mostly for ARVN after the force had been configured by its advisors to fight a regular enemy...even though as I recall their own leadership had hoped for training oriented more toward dealing with insurgent forces). Westmoreland paid lip service to finding a balance, but in practice he failed to do so. Most people were looking at a Korea scenario and past what they were actually facing on the ground. That is the truth of that situation. Korea and the Chinese intervention colored the majority of policy thinking in the Johnson administration, and a lack of attention to anything other than conventional war colored the evaluation of many military thinkers, to include Westmoreland. Vietnam required a blended solution, and that's something that I'm not sure we could come up with even today.

I also found Andrade's use of the communist histories interesting, as their current spin is to deemphasize the role of the VC in operations. This has more to do with the political and social split that existed between Northerners and Southerners at the time than actual objective history. It's easy to forget that they have an interest in presenting the history of the War of Liberation to fit their own domestic goals...not unlike the motives often attributed to Western commentators writing about the war.

If there's a flaw, it's the same one that we seem to be incapable of escaping...the "either/or" mindset. Vietnam was a blended situation. We missed that then, and we seem to be missing that again.

Cavguy...you should be able to log into the article through the library there without giving up any information. If not, PM me.

[Cavguy]

Cavguy...you should be able to log into the article through the library there without giving up any information. If not, PM me.

COL Gentile and Shek both sent me copies - Share many of the same opinions of the article. There is some merit to the argument that development is impossible without baseline security, and security requires force. Therefore, the author's argument is that Westmorland was right to do 'search and destroy', and his 'search and destroy' ops enabled Abrams to focus on pacification.

He gets to it in the last paragraphs when he states the main takeaway:

Counterinsurgency is not only about good planning, it is also about numbers. Without sufficient forces to dominate the operational area on a constant basis, there is simply no way to disrupt the guerrillas and at the same time foster pacification programs. This is as true today as it was then.

I disagree with his conclusion here. My personal experience in Ramadi and Tal Afar suggest that it is not sequential but somewhat parallel, or at least intersecting curves - you have to do both LOO's (security and development) simultaneously. You never get real security without development/pacification and you can never do effective development without a minimum level of security that interdicts enemy freedom of movement.

What is the bio/background of the author?

[Steve Blair]

COL Gentile and Shek both sent me copies - Share many of the same opinions of the article. There is some merit to the argument that development is impossible without baseline security, and security requires force. Therefore, Westmorland was right to do 'search and destroy', and his 'search and destroy' ops enabled Abrams to focus on pacification.

Sure, but again I tend to think the discussion is another case of "either/or" thinking. Westmoreland was right to use 'search and destroy' to push main force units back from the population centers, but he was also remiss in not focusing some real priorities on population security or at the very least insuring that ARVN could do so (which its training effectively precluded since it was focused on main force combat).

Andrade is one of the historians at the CMH and has written on both the Phoenix program and some aspects of SOG. He also wrote a good study of the Easter Offensive. Steve (Metz, that is) might be more familiar with him.

[Cavguy]

Sure, but again I tend to think the discussion is another case of "either/or" thinking. Westmoreland was right to use 'search and destroy' to push main force units back from the population centers, but he was also remiss in not focusing some real priorities on population security or at the very least insuring that ARVN could do so (which its training effectively precluded since it was focused on main force combat).

Andrade is one of the historians at the CMH and has written on both the Phoenix program and some aspects of SOG. He also wrote a good study of the Easter Offensive. Steve (Metz, that is) might be more familiar with him.

I think we're in violent agreement. I can't subscribe to his assertion that pacification and security must happen in parallel and not sequentially (though targeted and scaled).

[Ken White]

...Therefore, Westmorland was right to do 'search and destroy', and his 'search and destroy' ops enabled Abrams to focus on pacification.

Not really; nor did Tet and the general VC (the very few left) and NVA (lots and lots of them replacing those killed) toll allow it as some postulate; Abrams simply changed the emphasis as Palmer had been urging all along. Westmoreland could have done it two years earlier; he chose not to do so.

...My personal experience in Ramadi and Tal Afar suggest that it is not sequential but somewhat parallel, or at least intersecting curves - you have to do both LOO's (security and development) simultaneously. You never get real security without development/pacification and you can never do effective development without a minimum level of security that interdicts enemy freedom of movement.

Exactly.