Quote Originally Posted by COMMAR View Post
The SC MAGTF will deploy Comp-sized Dets aboard Naval GFS widely dispersed thru-out a Theater Command.

These Dets would further deploy Platoons & even Squads to conduct Bi-lateral training mission in neighboring countries coordinated by the MCTAG (small tms of Sr Marines that stay constantly engaged w/Partner Nations, providing a bridge btwn PNs & TComms).
Then I see three issues.

1) A major problem I have with the SC MAGTF planning is the same issue I have with Global Fleet Stations - the dwell time. I am not sure we are going to be able to develop the regional knowledge that makes these missions so valuable if the Marines can't get longer dwell times than the usual 6 month deployments. I have seen some serious discussion on this issue, but it comes and goes.

The Navy has the same problem with Global Fleet Stations.

2) The EMO was developed under conditions of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is being applied to organizational developments intended for assured access in peacetime. The EMO is a really good idea IMO, I'd hate to see it not get serious consideration as part of a MEU - construct including ARG elements. COCOMs are requesting solo LPD/LSD assets for GFS. OK, I get it, but the requests started coming because the ships were available while Marines were in Iraq. I've seen this play before, the Navy is expanding the number of JHSVs to meet this COCOM demand for GFS, so Marines should count on EMO ultimately being a JHSV deployed capability.

This will lead to problems down the road. The JHSV doesn't give the Marines their aviation or amphibious capabilities. The Marines need to get in front of this issue. It serves no ones interest (except the Navy) to make SC MAGTF a capability deployed by pier alone - aviation must be a major consideration and sea based capabilities give SC MAGTF increased options as a MEU reinforcement.

I'd prefer to see some serious intellectual energy put into the EMO as a joint Navy/Marine Corps DO concept from the sea beyond the assured access SC MAGTF construct, in particular as part of the analysis of alternatives for forcible entry that are going to be forced upon the Marines over the coming weeks as the Ray Mabus tries to kill the EFV.

3) The Navy has agreed to 33 amphibious ships out of the 38 the Marines wanted. Instead of 11-11-11, the Navy is saying 10 LHA/Ds -11 LPDs -12 LSDs. All kinds of games being played here by the Navy, and the ultimate result is not even 2 MEB assault. I think this represents how the 3 ship ARG no longer works as an effective organizational model from the sea, but there are other observations that can be made.

The Marines are putting a lot of work into new expeditionary organizational elements, but the absence of dedicated sea based capability as part of the discussion is allowing the Navy to control options for the Marines at sea - and the Marines have not made a compelling argument under this pressure.

General Conway telling Congress the Navy needs to buy more DDG-1000s to provide naval fire support as part of the EFV purchase isn't a compelling argument winning the Marines any credibility. EMO on the other hand represents a very attractive concept that resonates with a national strategy focus and as such, represents a much more compelling reason to listen to Marines regarding their sea based requirements.

I am very much interested in all information regarding further development of EMO. All I have really seen is what is in MC Gazette, here and private conversations - very few discussions or opinions online. If there are well known articles otherwise, links appreciated.