What we support and defend

[Fuchs]

True -- but that's when WW II was 'decided.'

In the American world view ... because they showed up too late to play a role in the widely recognized turning point battles...

Uh, no. That's rather incorrect...

The US had adopted the 90mm as Standard A in late 1943, production started on the 90 mm M3 towed antitank gun, on the M36 Tank Destroyer and on the M24 Tank.

Aside from the M24 being equipped with a 76 mm* (based very much on the first quick-firing gun ever; a rather weak calibre comparable to the T-34 M1940's gun) and 90 mm guns playing no role in U.S. WW2 mediums, I think you read a bit more into "insistence" than I meant to.
The U.S. kept 76 mm as a calibre in the M41 and in some post-war prototypes, and the ~76 mm-equipped Shermans were the almost exclusive medium tank of the U.S. until the Korean War wartime production mode kicked in.

*: I think you meant M26, which saw WW2 only in prototype-like quantities.

[Ken White]

In the American world view ... because they showed up too late to play a role in the widely recognized turning point battles...

Which, aside from Kursk was really what?

Aside from the M24 being equipped with a 76 mm* (based very much on the first quick-firing gun ever; a rather weak calibre comparable to the T-34 M1940's gun) and 90 mm guns playing no role in U.S. WW2 mediums, I think you read a bit more into "insistence" than I meant to.
The U.S. kept 76 mm as a calibre in the M41 and in some post-war prototypes, and the ~76 mm-equipped Shermans were the almost exclusive medium tank of the U.S. until the Korean War wartime production mode kicked in.

]*: I think you meant M26, which saw WW2 only in prototype-like quantities.

I did indeed mean the M26 -- that should also have been M26 and M46 with reference to Korea.. I'm old...

The M26 was indeed only in theater in small quantities but it did see combat and was headed for major production runs when the war ended and Congress stopped the procurement

The M24 didn't have a 76, it had a 75. The M41 did have a 76 but both were light tanks, scouting tanks to some and were not intended to engage other nations main battle tanks -- that was the job of the M26, 46, 47,(90s) 48, 60 (90 / 105) and 1 (105 / 120). We both agree that the Sherman was the principal de facto US tank until mid 1952 -- but that was because there was no war and, in the view of Congress, no need to produce more powerful tanks until then. Korea obviously changed that but still, once again, the US Army went to war with obsolete gear from the last war. My point was and is that is true but it was NOT because the Army wanted it that way and no one was stupid about it -- except Congress.

Nothing new in that.

[Steve the Planner]

I, for one, enjoyed flipping the turrets off of all of those little tanks with 105s and 152s (M60A1s and A2s) at Hohenfels.

Another Old Guy, I guess.

[Ken White]

I, for one, enjoyed flipping the turrets off of all of those little tanks with 105s and 152s (M60A1s and A2s) at Hohenfels.

Another Old Guy, I guess.

How you think an M4A3E8 Gunner and an M41 TC feel...

Not long before I retired, I was a Controller in an exercise and watched one 60A2 knock out two platoons of A1s (with MILES, of course)...

[Fuchs]

Which, aside from Kursk was really what?

Turning points of European WW2:

El Alamein for Commonwealth guys.
D-Day for Americans.
Stalingrad for everyone else.


The war was lost by Germany by late '41, though.
Almost nobody is going to discuss the loss of motor vehicles and quality horses in fall '41 as the final failure that made defeat inevitable, that's too complicated. Most people prefer simple battles (symptoms) as turning point markers.




Fig leaf for on-topic-ness:

The U.S. military expanded, and I see a couple main reasons for why it's not going to shrink to anything similar as envisioned 200+ years anytime soon:
(1) A childish belief that you can go to a war of choice and be better off afterwards than you would be without

(2) An exaggerated intolerance for distant phenomenons (no matter what size; only a handful distant phenomenons have the attention, and it's about the same attention no matter Red Army or a bunch of guys with fertiliser bombs)

(3) Bureaucratic self-preservation instinct

(4) Congressional corruption of the system (exploitation of budgets as a means to funnel money to the own district/state and donors)

(5) True conservatism that prefers the status quo over the experiment of not getting involved in so much (coupled with wild fantasies about the indispensability of U.S. military power)

[wm]

Turning points of European WW2:

El Alamein for Commonwealth guys.
D-Day for Americans.
Stalingrad for everyone else.


The war was lost by Germany by late '41, though.
Almost nobody is going to discuss the loss of motor vehicles and quality horses in fall '41 as the final failure that made defeat inevitable, that's too complicated. Most people prefer simple battles (symptoms) as turning point markers.

WWII was lost for all intents and purposes when Public Law 77-11, the Lend-Lease Act, was signed on 11 Mar 1941. After that, it was just a matter of time before the limited access to the natural resources need to fuel German industrial capability was swamped by the, for all practical purposes, unlimited access available to the US industrial base, which, BTW, was impervious to attack by the Axis powers. A second milestone in the path to victory was the establishment of the Persian Corridor and the deposing of the Shah in 1942 to ensure the path stayed open. The Arctic route to Murmansk/Archangel was open to attack by Germany naval forces and land-based aircraft. Even though the route Vladivostok accounted for over 50% of lendlease shipments to Russia, it was realitively open to interdiction by Japan (had Germany and Japan chosen to cooperate in the war against Russia). The route through Iran was out of the reach of both Japan and Germany.

[Steve Blair]

Fig leaf for on-topic-ness:

The U.S. military expanded, and I see a couple main reasons for why it's not going to shrink to anything similar as envisioned 200+ years anytime soon:
(1) A childish belief that you can go to a war of choice and be better off afterwards than you would be without

(2) An exaggerated intolerance for distant phenomenons (no matter what size; only a handful distant phenomenons have the attention, and it's about the same attention no matter Red Army or a bunch of guys with fertiliser bombs)

(3) Bureaucratic self-preservation instinct

(4) Congressional corruption of the system (exploitation of budgets as a means to funnel money to the own district/state and donors)

(5) True conservatism that prefers the status quo over the experiment of not getting involved in so much (coupled with wild fantasies about the indispensability of U.S. military power)

3 and 4 are the ones that are on-target.

[Ken White]

3 and 4 are the ones that are on-target.

Sadly...

[Fuchs]

Ain't it funny how you like the only two options that absolve you of responsibility for the issue?

[Ken White]

Ain't it funny how you like the only two options that absolve you of responsibility for the issue?

Neither Steve nor I said the others weren't true; they are true to one extent or another -- but 3 and 4 drive those others. Thus what we wrote is correct, it just does not address the other factors. Mostly because they didn't merit a comment IMO...

Your response to our comments is interesting because your presumption of our dismissal of your wisdom and issuing a gratuitous pejorative comment speaks volumes -- not to mention that in any event, neither he nor I are remotely responsible for any of those things.