Training observations

[Granite_State]

An OC of mine used to refer to single file as 'idiot file'.

However, is a single file always necessarily an idiot file? Is it not a matter of balancing pros against cons? I assume (please correct me if this is wrong or simplistic) that a reason for it in Astan was to follow narrow routes, where IEDs were (perceived as) the main threats. Kinda like a cleared route through a minefield.

Terrain can be another reason for using the idiot file, if narrow channels of undulation or vegetation in otherwise flat or open ground provide the only cover or concealment. A double edged knife of course, given that these channels are ideal places for IEDs.

However, I'm still interested to see if my assumption as to why single file was so prevalent in Astan is correct.

Yes, you've pretty much got it. It sometimes is the best tactical option for small patrols. But when it becomes your default formation and you lack the ability to move competently in any other way, that's a problem. Most of Helmand, let alone Afghanistan, is not a minefield.

[Red Rat]

Yes, you've pretty much got it. It sometimes is the best tactical option for small patrols. But when it becomes your default formation and you lack the ability to move competently in any other way, that's a problem. Most of Helmand, let alone Afghanistan, is not a minefield.

I quite agree.

It is a training and education problem to correct an experience mindset. The 'Afghan Snake' developed from the requirement to minimise the threat from IEDs. IED belts tend not to be widespread and tend to be focused around FOB locations, this means that most deployed infantry (in FOBs) will have operational experience of mostly moving in a particular manner - that becomes their default approach. Once you understand the threat then you understand when a particular TTP is relevant and as importantly when not. IED belts are obstacle belts, they are less likely to be found in a highly dynamic environment where locations have not gone static and the Forward Line Own Troops and/or Forward Line Enemy Troops are not well defined; UK training for contingency operations is focusing more on this latter type of operational environment.

I often think that low level tactical training focuses too much on what to do at the expense of why. If you do not understand the why then you cannot easily adapt.

[JMA]

When you restrict soldiers to strictly follow in the "Barma lane" ( as cleared by engineers) they have little choice but to use single file. In addition when ridiculously overloaded soldiers are sent out on 'patrol' what do you really expect?

Back to our discussions on the Afghan thread the question of what was the purpose of sending out these human pack mules? To draw fire from the Taliban so as to allow them to be taken on through an air strike?

It is not the patrol formation that needs to be ridiculed but rather the aimless wondering around. Don't lose sight of the real problem.

(all that said clearly patrol formations must be varied according to the ground/terrain and the proximity to the enemy. This was also discussed at some length in the Afghan thread)

I quite agree.

It is a training and education problem to correct an experience mindset. The 'Afghan Snake' developed from the requirement to minimise the threat from IEDs. IED belts tend not to be widespread and tend to be focused around FOB locations, this means that most deployed infantry (in FOBs) will have operational experience of mostly moving in a particular manner - that becomes their default approach. Once you understand the threat then you understand when a particular TTP is relevant and as importantly when not. IED belts are obstacle belts, they are less likely to be found in a highly dynamic environment where locations have not gone static and the Forward Line Own Troops and/or Forward Line Enemy Troops are not well defined; UK training for contingency operations is focusing more on this latter type of operational environment.

I often think that low level tactical training focuses too much on what to do at the expense of why. If you do not understand the why then you cannot easily adapt.

[Red Rat]

When you restrict soldiers to strictly follow in the "Barma lane" ( as cleared by engineers) they have little choice but to use single file. In addition when ridiculously overloaded soldiers are sent out on 'patrol' what do you really expect?

Back to our discussions on the Afghan thread the question of what was the purpose of sending out these human pack mules? To draw fire from the Taliban so as to allow them to be taken on through an air strike?

It is not the patrol formation that needs to be ridiculed but rather the aimless wondering around. Don't lose sight of the real problem.

(all that said clearly patrol formations must be varied according to the ground/terrain and the proximity to the enemy. This was also discussed at some length in the Afghan thread)

'Afghan snake' is only appropriate to high IED threat areas and British troops are trained to only use it in such areas. Unfortunately the British operational experience is almost exclusively of operating in high IED threat areas - we are all victims of our own experience. I have spoken to plenty of Brit Commanders who have used other patrol formations in theatre, varying according to ground/terrain and enemy threat.

Overloading is an issue. British soldiers have a historical tendency to not trust the supply chain and carry a little bit of everything 'just in case' and always too much ammunition. There is a Risk Management issue as well. Patrol commanders are accountable in a court of law for why they did/did not carry the equipment they did. I've yet to hear a Patrol Commander being held culpable for carrying too much, but I have for not taking something that with hindsight was needed.

Every patrol has a task, no task then no patrol. I'm not denying that some patrol tasks may be abstruse - but they all have tasks.

[Kiwigrunt]

I often think that low level tactical training focuses too much on what to do at the expense of why. If you do not understand the why then you cannot easily adapt.

“Form over function.” - Wilf.

Would it be a shortcoming inherent to the low level, as a result of insufficient contextual insight at that level? Or is it imposed through excessive form from higher levels? My guess, probably a bit of both.

[JMA]

“Form over function.” - Wilf.

With the deepest respect to Wilf who I have found in a different forum where he is up to his usual tricks.

Then in our discussions of a few years ago it was evident that much of the discussion comes from 'theorists' with no combat experience at that level.

Of course all this theorising ceases when war finally arrives and the first combat is experienced and the first casualties are taken.

It is then that one can look back at the futility of the time wasted on this theorising.

Would it be a shortcoming inherent to the low level, as a result of insufficient contextual insight at that level? Or is it imposed through excessive form from higher levels? My guess, probably a bit of both.

Certainly at the 'low level' it will be found that 'contexual insight' with be in short supply - except for those few who are destined for promotion up the ladder - and that is why 'drills' and 'encounter actions' are important - indeed critical - components of infantry training.

This lack of contextual awareness increases in times of mobilisation of reserves and/or civilians to any conflict when fresh semi-trained or untrained people are radpidly processed.

Given the movies and the computer war-games it would be difficult to take the modern junior soldier's eye off what he sees/learns there.

I've used the scenario where you brief platoon level soldiers that they need to think like the enemy on how to take on troops who always move in single file, with the machine gun(s), command groups etc in predicable positions in the formation. With half acting as enemy and rotating it is very soon that they start to make the necessary adjustments themselves. The good thing about this is that they believe they saw the need rather than had it imposed on them. Psychology 101.

[Fuchs]

Then in our discussions of a few years ago it was evident that much of the discussion comes from 'theorists' with no combat experience at that level.

Of course all this theorising ceases when war finally arrives and the first combat is experienced and the first casualties are taken.

It is then that one can look back at the futility of the time wasted on this theorising.

That's incredibly stupid *******.

You can play the veteran card as much as you want, this doesn't change the fact that it's excessively bloody to figure out everything new during a war only.

There wasn't enough theorizing prior to the First World War, and the Second World War showed the power of theorizing done well. Combat experience is no important ingredient; the combat experience was more often than not largely irrelevant to the new challenges, if not misleading.
The US Navy didn't figure out air-sea battles based on North Sea patrols of 1918, nor did the USMC figure out the need for forced landings based on its trench war experience. Guderian didn't figure out the employment of mechanised combined arms formations based on WWI barrages and infantry assaults. Bloch didn't serve ever, but still proved to be a better seer in regard to military affairs than generals and field marshals with decades worth of small wars on their resume.

Nobody ever said "Let's wait till WW3 before we make up our minds on how to deal with a nuclear battlefield" because that would be an extremely stupid and potentially fatal idea.

[JMA]

That's incredibly stupid ********.

In your opinion.

You can play the veteran card as much as you want, this doesn't change the fact that it's excessively bloody to figure out everything new during a war only.

If you had any combat experience you would very quickly identify the nonsense spoken and the time wasted in speculation and guesswork by those who have none.

There wasn't enough theorizing prior to the First World War, and the Second World War showed the power of theorizing done well. Combat experience is no important ingredient; the combat experience was more often than not largely irrelevant to the new challenges, if not misleading.
The US Navy didn't figure out air-sea battles based on North Sea patrols of 1918, nor did the USMC figure out the need for forced landings based on its trench war experience. Guderian didn't figure out the employment of mechanised combined arms formations based on WWI barrages and infantry assaults. Bloch didn't serve ever, but still proved to be a better seer in regard to military affairs than generals and field marshals with decades worth of small wars on their resume.

You are talking of high level so-called 'new challenges'. OK so let anyone who thinks he has all the answers speculate and pontificate on high level 'new challenges'... but leave the know aspects alone and to those who know through - sometimes bitter - experience.

Nobody ever said "Let's wait till WW3 before we make up our minds on how to deal with a nuclear battlefield" because that would be an extremely stupid and potentially fatal idea.

Who said 'let's wait'?

Here's an area for the non-combat experienced to get invoved in - cyber warfare... but for heavens sake leave low level tactics alone.

[Fuchs]

The first problem the armies ran into in 1914 was actually a "low level" tactical problem; firepower either killed or pinned them down if they found no route for flanking, and there was no such route once defensive lines became continuous.

Theorists who knew about the Boer Wars made small notes in published works, pointing out that this was a yet unsolved question - and they did so years prior to the war. No practitioner came up with a solution from previous wars because the problem was new. At least none made a decisive impact. Obviously, his insight would have needed to be distributed through military theory / doctrine, as obviously the NCOs and junior officers who led the men in 1914 did not know how to cope.

A bit more theory progress and armies might have understood before 1914 that the advance to the enemy position not only had to be done with benefit of concealment, but that this actually required small unit manoeuvre instead of unit manoeuvres. This would have saved the bloodletting of the first half of the war, and the war might have ended much, much sooner.

Practitioners know what worked under certain conditions and what not - it takes a theorist to explore what works under different conditions and what not.

The problem isn't the theorizing, but the insufficient quality and quantity of it. Millions of men are employed by Western military forces, but only a few dozen add much to military theory.
Look at the theorist sub-forum; I asked for notable theorists on infantry and other combat arms, and the then still much more active forum knew almost no answers.
THAT is the problem.

[Bill Moore]

That's incredibly stupid *******.

You can play the veteran card as much as you want, this doesn't change the fact that it's excessively bloody to figure out everything new during a war only.

There wasn't enough theorizing prior to the First World War, and the Second World War showed the power of theorizing done well. Combat experience is no important ingredient; the combat experience was more often than not largely irrelevant to the new challenges, if not misleading.
The US Navy didn't figure out air-sea battles based on North Sea patrols of 1918, nor did the USMC figure out the need for forced landings based on its trench war experience. Guderian didn't figure out the employment of mechanised combined arms formations based on WWI barrages and infantry assaults. Bloch didn't serve ever, but still proved to be a better seer in regard to military affairs than generals and field marshals with decades worth of small wars on their resume.

Nobody ever said "Let's wait till WW3 before we make up our minds on how to deal with a nuclear battlefield" because that would be an extremely stupid and potentially fatal idea.

This is an interesting and important post in my opinion. I can understand the different views and think they all can be defended by cherry picking historical examples that fit a particular argument. Nonetheless I agree with Fuchs' assessment on the value of military theorizing, and that many valuable theorists didn't have combat experience. Seems the best theorists don't correlate to combat experience, but correlate instead with high intelligence, curiosity, and creativity (regardless of whether or not the theorist had combat experience). Famed and successful insurgent leaders often developed useful theories/strategies to pursue their ends without the benefit of even previous military experience, much less combat experience. Of course they adjusted their theories as they tested them in the lab of conflict. This is something Western leaders often fail to do, and years later those who blindly followed these theories of Mao, Lenin, etc. were often defeated, as were those who embraced theories to counter these approaches. The world always moves on, unfortunately our institutional thinking doesn't always keep pace.

In the U.S. military there was considerable military theorizing prior to entering WWII which included the use of air power, projecting power via amphibious assaults, the use of armor, etc. which ultimately contributed to victory despite some initial tactical set backs. On the other hand, there didn't appear to be much theorizing at the military level during the short gap between the end of WWII and the Korean War, and we sent an unprepared military that the nation underfunded due to the illusionary peace dividend post WWII. I'm not sure about Vietnam, we may have theorized (special warfare concepts and such), but the theories we applied as well as the way we approached special warfare wasn't relevant to achieving our desired ends. That indicates to me that while theorizing is essential, there is no one size fits all theory that we can build doctrine and strategies on. We clearly theorized after in depth after the Vietnam War and saw great success in both Desert Storm and the initial phase of what was later called ironically Iraqi Freedom based on those theories, to include the air-land battle, cyber, and information operations (smart weapons, not psychological or other influence operations). Yet, once we transitioned into an irregular conflict conventional military theories fell short, and our old (relabeled as new) COIN doctrines proved to be irrelevant. Interestingly enough, those with combat experience are both its biggest advocates despite its many failures and it biggest critics. It is the media in our nation that decides who is correct and they have labeled those opposed to our COIN doctrine as a group of anti-intellectuals who simply don't get it. Something appealing about the language of winning hearts and minds in our culture, the illogic behind it doesn't matter when we manage perceptions through sound bytes.

Getting to JMA's point about training, the U.S. Army in many ways was better trained before 9/11 (at least in our combat arms units), but of course once you start fighting you adapt your training quickly to meet the demands of the current fight (the adversary, the terrain, the ROE, etc.), so for executing our COIN doctrine we're better trained now, but today's Army probably isn't as well trained to conduct major combat operations like the ones that defeated Iraqi's conventional military forces. I don't think peacetime is the sole factor that degrades combat readiness, because in many cases we have ample evidence that our forces retained a high degrade of readiness through long periods of peace, but our readiness was impacted at certain times in our history by insufficient funding to sustain combat readiness (training, equipment, etc.) between the wars. Other factors also contribute to ill-preparedness like political correctness, social engineering, and embracing faulty theories (COIN doctrine).

In the end it is all relative, if we end up transitioning to another COIN/stability operation in the next five years the combat experience we have now will be relevant. If we get into a conventional fight, the combat experience we have now could actually be detrimental to our success, but the young bucks on point will quickly identify what isn't working and will once again challenge the wisdom of their irrelevant seniors and adapt at the tactical level.

When I consider readiness, I try to consider ready for what because the answer will be different. I still embrace what a former team sergeant told me, "we don't know where, who, or how we're going to fight in the future, but the basics will always apply. You need to be physically fit and tough (its different), know how to shoot expertly in all types of conditions, be able to navigate, and use your radios." After that it is identifying the right tactics at the grunt level where it counts. I think we sustain all the above during peacetime in the regular army. I have my doubts regarding the reserves and National Guard. Of course there are other things that must be trained to include collective exercises and joint interoperability, etc., but the basics are essential.

[Tukhachevskii]

That's incredibly stupid ******.

You can play the veteran card as much as you want, this doesn't change the fact that it's excessively bloody to figure out everything new during a war only.

There wasn't enough theorizing prior to the First World War, and the Second World War showed the power of theorizing done well. Combat experience is no important ingredient; the combat experience was more often than not largely irrelevant to the new challenges, if not misleading.
The US Navy didn't figure out air-sea battles based on North Sea patrols of 1918, nor did the USMC figure out the need for forced landings based on its trench war experience. Guderian didn't figure out the employment of mechanised combined arms formations based on WWI barrages and infantry assaults. Bloch didn't serve ever, but still proved to be a better seer in regard to military affairs than generals and field marshals with decades worth of small wars on their resume.

Nobody ever said "Let's wait till WW3 before we make up our minds on how to deal with a nuclear battlefield" because that would be an extremely stupid and potentially fatal idea.

Cant believe nobody has quoted Clausewitz' observation on the importance of theory for critical thinking and as part of historical research into trends in warfare etc (don't have the quote handy unfortunately).

[JMA]

Cant believe nobody has quoted Clausewitz' observation on the importance of theory for critical thinking and as part of historical research into trends in warfare etc (don't have the quote handy unfortunately).

Appreciate it if you can find that one...

[Red Rat]

“Form over function.” - Wilf.

Would it be a shortcoming inherent to the low level, as a result of insufficient contextual insight at that level? Or is it imposed through excessive form from higher levels? My guess, probably a bit of both.

Just a lack of thought. Theorising does not really come into it (the British Army remains largely antagonistic to theorists). The British Army remains a bottom up driven institution for low level TTPs.

[JMA]

The British Army remains a bottom up driven institution for low level TTPs.

Interesting comment. Care to elucidate?

[Red Rat]

Interesting comment. Care to elucidate?

There are debriefs after every incident, operation and tour. Lessons are identified and where appropriate TTPs and equipment are changed. It is a very dynamic system and allows for very rapid knowledge and lesson dissemination inter and intra Theatre. Key point is that the lessons process starts at the bottom with those at the sharp end and a frank assessment of what worked and did not work.

[JMA]

OK thank you... if you follow my other posts I question how readily and how comprehensively feed back systems such as these are actually carried out if indeed read at all.

There are debriefs after every incident, operation and tour. Lessons are identified and where appropriate TTPs and equipment are changed. It is a very dynamic system and allows for very rapid knowledge and lesson dissemination inter and intra Theatre. Key point is that the lessons process starts at the bottom with those at the sharp end and a frank assessment of what worked and did not work.

[jcustis]

I quite agree.

It is a training and education problem to correct an experience mindset. The 'Afghan Snake' developed from the requirement to minimise the threat from IEDs. IED belts tend not to be widespread and tend to be focused around FOB locations, this means that most deployed infantry (in FOBs) will have operational experience of mostly moving in a particular manner - that becomes their default approach. Once you understand the threat then you understand when a particular TTP is relevant and as importantly when not. IED belts are obstacle belts, they are less likely to be found in a highly dynamic environment where locations have not gone static and the Forward Line Own Troops and/or Forward Line Enemy Troops are not well defined; UK training for contingency operations is focusing more on this latter type of operational environment.

I often think that low level tactical training focuses too much on what to do at the expense of why. If you do not understand the why then you cannot easily adapt.

That ingrained behavior is going to be a hard one to shake--like most behaviors that are not necessarily born of careful reflection, but more of mimicry. The same can often be said of weapons manipulation techniques, choice of weapons caliber, and on and on. As an example the FBI is looking at going back to 9mm for its service pistols (from the current .40 caliber) and it is causing the interwebs to go absolutely bat#### crazy with opinion. Very few of them are based on scientific fact...