Public Papers of JFK 1961

[Bill Moore]

New ideas from 1961

http://www.jfklink.com/speeches/jfk/...jfk205_61.html

Nation building

We would be badly mistaken to consider their problems in military terms alone. For no amount of arms and armies can help stabilize those governments which are unable or unwilling to achieve social and economic reform and development. Military pacts cannot help nations whose social injustice and economic chaos invite insurgency and penetration and subversion. The most skillful counter-guerrilla efforts cannot succeed where the local population is too caught up in its own misery to be concerned about the advance of communism.
But for those who share this view, we stand ready now, as we have in the past, to provide generously of our skills, and our capital, and our food to assist the peoples of the less-developed nations to reach their goals in freedom - to help them before they are engulfed in crisis.
This is also our great opportunity in 1961. If we grasp it, then subversion to prevent its success is exposed as an unjustifiable attempt to keep these nations from either being free or equal. But if we do not pursue it, and if they do not pursue it, the bankruptcy of unstable governments, one by one, and of unfilled hopes will surely lead to a series of totalitarian receiverships.

Expanding the Network

The center of freedom's defense is our network of world alliances, extending from NATO, recommended by a Democratic President and approved by a Republican Congress, to SEATO, recommended by a Republican President and approved by a Democratic Congress. These alliances were constructed in the 1940's and 1950's - it is our task and responsibility in the 1960's to strengthen them.

Security Force Assistance

The main burden of local defense against local attack, subversion, insurrection or guerrilla warfare must of necessity rest with local forces. Where these forces have the necessary will and capacity to cope with such threats, our intervention is rarely necessary or helpful. Where the will is present and only capacity is lacking, our Military Assistance Program can be of help.
But this program, like economic assistance, needs a new emphasis. It cannot be extended without regard to the social, political and military reforms essential to internal respect and stability. The equipment and training provided must be tailored to legitimate local needs and to our own foreign and military policies, not to our supply of military stocks or a local leader's desire for military display. And military assistance can, in addition to its military purposes, make a contribution to economic progress, as do our own Army Engineers.

Nice prose, sounds great, but we saw all this in practice during the Vietnam War and since. Much more at the site.

Modernization

In line with these developments, I have directed a further reinforcement of our own capacity to deter or resist non-nuclear aggression. In the conventional field, with one exception, I find no present need for large new levies of men. What is needed is rather a change of position to give us still further increases in flexibility.
Therefore, I am directing the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reorganization and modernization of the Army's divisional structure, to increase its non-nuclear firepower, to improve its tactical mobility in any environment, to insure its flexibility to meet any direct or indirect threat, to facilitate its coordination with our major allies, and to provide more modern mechanized divisions in Europe and bring their equipment up to date, and new airborne brigades in both the Pacific and Europe.

And secondly, I am asking the Congress for an additional 100 million dollars to begin the procurement task necessary to re-equip this new Army structure with the most modern material. New helicopters, new armored personnel carriers, and new howitzers, for example, must be obtained now.
Third, I am directing the Secretary of Defense to expand rapidly and substantially, in cooperation with our Allies, the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of non-nuclear war, para-military operations and sub-limited or unconventional wars.

In addition, our special forces and unconventional warfare units will be increased and reoriented. Throughout the services new emphasis must be placed on the special skills and languages which are required to work with local populations.

Fourth, the Army is developing plans to make possible a much more rapid deployment of a major portion of its highly trained reserve forces. When these plans are completed and the reserve is strengthened, two combat-equipped divisions, plus their supporting forces, a total of 89,000 men, could be ready in an emergency for operations with but 3 weeks' notice - 2 more divisions with but 5 weeks' notice - and six additional divisions and their supporting forces, making a total of 10 divisions, could be deployable with less than 8 weeks' notice. In short, these new plans will allow us to almost double the combat power of the Army in less than two months, compared to the nearly nine months heretofore required.

Finally, to cite one other area of activities that are both legitimate and necessary as a means of self-defense in an age of hidden perils, our whole intelligence effort must be reviewed, and its coordination with other elements of policy assured. The Congress and the American people are entitled to know that we will institute whatever new organization, policies, and control are necessary.

History may not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.

[slapout9]

Nice find Bill. So after all your experiences in SF which of our past and present administrations have had the best Policies with regard to UW/COIN/IW or what ever it is being called now.

[Bob's World]

In JFK's era we were focused as our primary mission on stopping the spread of the Sino-Soviet sphere of influence. That focus totally biased how we thought about and how we approached the many nationalist movements that took place in the contested spaces of the "third world."

Today we are excessively focused on AQ in a very similar way; and equally it has placed a bias on our understanding and our approaches to the many nationalist movements underway in the contested spaces and populaces.

When one seeks to leverage someone else's nationalist insurgent energy for their own larger purposes, it rarely works out well for the people who's movement has been hijacked by these outside forces. But there is indeed a "rhyme" between to two eras; Now to find a better "reason" that has been largely missing. (as in "no rhyme nor reason...")

[Bill Moore]

Originally Posted by slapout9

Nice find Bill. So after all your experiences in SF which of our past and present administrations have had the best Policies with regard to UW/COIN/IW or what ever it is being called now.

Slapout,

A quick response at the end of my lunch break. First off I think that is a great question that deserves more than a quick response, but until I can dwell on it longer the quick answer is President Bush Sr. For every administration it is easy to find fault in many decisions in hindsight, so I try to focus on I think they knew at the time and their rationale for making the decision. President Bush Sr was very cautious and deliberate, and in my opinion professionally managed the Kuwait and Panama scenarios. Avoiding a quagmire in both scenarios, and a couple of smaller contingencies. Obviously a bit of mis-step in Somalia (or maybe the military mis-stepped by proposing we take sides and diverted a humanitarian assistance mission into something else).

Both President Bush Sr and President Carter saw combat during WWII, but in my opinion Carter didn't make decisions based on global realities, but rather the way he hoped the world was, and he was constantly disappointed. Bush Sr was a realist.

Reagan did a lot in the UW realm, and while there were victories, especially in Afghanistan, I'm not convinced it was as well done as it could have been if we looked beyond the short term goal of ousting the Soviets, but then again that all seems so clear in hindsight.

[jmm99]

He certainly served during WWII (midshipman at Navy, 1943-1946), and then active duty until his father's death caused his return to Plains in 1953; but I see no combat (link and link). From the second link:

Entertainment was hard to come by in the rural Georgia of the 1930s, and for Jimmy his mother's brother offered a glimpse of the outside world. Uncle Tom Gordy had joined the United States Navy, and sent postcards to the Carters from around the globe. His nephew was fascinated with all the exotic places depicted in the cards and began to tell his parents that someday he'd be in the Navy, too. Before he even entered high school he had written the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, to ask for a catalogue. In 1941, he graduated as class valedictorian of his tiny high school.

Navy Career and Marriage

The events of World War II (1939-45) motivated many American patriots like Jimmy to enter the military service. There was stiff competition for admission into Annapolis and thus, Carter flung himself into his coursework, studying for a year at Georgia Institute of Technology in 1942. Carter was admitted to Annapolis in 1943 and graduated in the top ten percent of his class in August 1946, just after the end of the war.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Mike,

Thanks for popping my bubble . The good news is that his lack of combat experience helps explain his naivism to some extent. The bad news is my memory is failing me. I could of swore I saw commercials during the election of him manning a AAA weapon and firing at Japanese Zeros. That begs the question how many Presidents have actual combat experience? I'm thinking at a minimum you have George Washington, Teddy Roosevelt, Ike commanded in combat, not sure he saw any, JFK, and Bush Sr.

Definitely not a requirement, and the impact of the experience doesn't seem to be consistent. Washington and Bush emerged from combat and other life experiences more cautious and mature politically, while both Teddy Roosevelt and JFK remained risk seekers while serving as President.

[jmm99]

I have to mention our first 100% Scots-Irish president, Andrew Jackson (parents from Carrickfergus, County Antrim), who had a lot of combat experience - in and out of military service - starting as a 13-year old militiaman in the Revolutionary War.

My memory conflates a lot of things, but it's been doing that for a number of decades.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

http://www.jfklink.com/speeches/jfk/.../jfk23_61.html

Special Message to the Congress on Gold and the Balance of
Payments Deficit. February 6, 1961

To the Congress o f the United States:
The gold outflow of the past three years has dramatically focused world attention on a fundamental change that has been occurring in the economic position of the United States. Our balance of payments - the accounting which shows the result of all of our trade and financial relations with the outside world - has become one of the key factors in our national economic life. Mainly because that balance of payments has been in deficit we have lost gold.
This loss of gold is naturally important to us, but it also concerns the whole free world. For we are the principal banker of the free world and any potential weakness in our dollar spells trouble, not only for us but also for our friends and allies who rely on the dollar to finance a substantial portion, of their trade. We must therefore manage our balance of payments in accordance with our responsibilities. This means that the United States must in the decades ahead, much more than at any time in the past, take its balance of payments into account when formulating its economic policies and conducting its economic affairs.
Economic progress at home is still the first requirement for economic strength abroad.

Certain firm conclusions follow:
1. The United States official dollar price of gold can and will be maintained at $35 an ounce. Exchange controls over trade and investment will not be invoked. Our national security and economic assistance programs will be carried forward. Those who fear weakness in the dollar will find their fears unfounded. Those who hope for speculative reasons for an increase in the price of gold will find their hopes in vain.
2. We must now gain control of our balance of payments position so that we can achieve over-all equilibrium in our international payments. This means that any sustained future outflow of dollars into the monetary reserves of other countries should come about only as the result of considered judgments as to the appropriate needs for dollar reserves.
3. In seeking over-all equilibrium we must place maximum emphasis on expanding our exports. Our costs and prices must therefore be kept low; and the government must play a more vigorous part in helping to enlarge foreign markets for American goods and services.
4. A return to protectionism is not a solution. Such a course would provoke retaliation; and the balance of trade, which is now substantially in our favor, could be turned against us with disastrous effects to the dollar.

Bill C. will love bullet number 3

[Bill Moore]

http://www.jfklink.com/speeches/jfk/...jfk435_61.html

Letter to President Ngo Dinh Diem on the Sixth Anniversary of the Republic of Viet-Nam.
October 26, 1961

Mr. President, America is well aware of the increased intensity which in recent months has marked the war against your people, and of the expanding scale and frequency of the Communist attacks. I have read your speech to the Vietnamese National Assembly in which you outline so clearly the threat of Communism to Viet-Nam. And I have taken note of the stream of threats and vituperation, directed at your government and mine, that flows day and night from Hanoi. Let me assure you again that the United States is determined to help Viet-Nam preserve its independence, protect its people against Communist assassins, and build a better life through economic growth.

I am awaiting with great interest the report of General Maxwell Taylor based on his recent talks and observations in Viet-Nam, supplementing reports I have received from our Embassy there over many months.

I will then be in a better position to consider with you additional measures that we might take to assist the republic of Viet-Nam in its struggle against the Communist aggressors.

[Madhu]

Actually, for most Foreign Policy and Military Affairs, you can read documents right out of the post World War II period and pretty much sum up the current conventional wisdom.

For my particular hobby horse, American policy toward South Asian countries, it's even more maddening. Not a new thought in decades and decades, despite evidence to the contrary. IMO.

PS: Okay, I don't really know that for everything. I am such an exaggerator. Amend that to, "for the few things I read, it seems like nothing new under the sun...."

[Bob's World]

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

http://www.jfklink.com/speeches/jfk/...jfk435_61.html

Letter to President Ngo Dinh Diem on the Sixth Anniversary of the Republic of Viet-Nam.
October 26, 1961

Dejavu. Change a few words and this could be a letter from President Obama to Mr. Karzai on the 6th anniversary of the Republic of Afghanistan...

In both cases, it was US action by the previous US President that both created the republic in question and elevated that partner President into power. This then left to the successor US president the difficult task of sustaining a system so illegitimate in its roots against a growing opposition by those disposed of a power they had earned through warfare.

We intervene for our interests, then confuse the picture when we attempt to justify our actions in the context of the interests of the systems we create. But for Ike's intervention there would most likely have been a fairly stable, unified Vietnam by 1961, albeit with a communist system of governance, under a president with local legitimacy. This independent country would most likely have turned to the US to help protect it from unwanted controlling influence out of the Soviet Union or China. But our opposition to that served to push them into those very camps to generate sufficient capacity to stand up to what the US brought to the fight.

Inevitably the best interests of the people caught in the middle of such internal and external power plays are the ones who suffer most.

Are we similarly pushing Afghans deeper into the arms of those we intervened to block the influence of in the first place? I doubt many Pashtuns would have been willing to support an AQ operation against a foreign target prior to 9/11. After the past 11 years of US intervention in Afghanistan I suspect that is no longer the case.

Tactically, the conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan are/were two very different places (though very similar programs have been tried in both). Strategically, however, they are/were very similar and we have made many of the same strategic decisions for very similar rationale that led framed an unwindable situation in Vietnam to frame an equally unwindable situation in Afghanistan. This the problem of focusing on tactics (programs, actions, lessons learned, metrics, etc). It detracts from the larger issues that frame from the outset the conditions those tactics will take place within.

Vietnam was lost in the 50s, not the 70s. Everything in between was in many ways as unnecessary as it was ineffective. Similarly Afghanistan was lost in '02-'04 in how we framed both the problem and the solution strategically. We need to get better at strategy, and studying paper such as these shared by Bill with an open mind are a critical step in that process.

I am finding a wealth of strategic products organized by administration here:

https://www.hsdl.org/?collection/stratpol&id=pd&pid=rr

[Steve Blair]

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Mike,

Thanks for popping my bubble . The good news is that his lack of combat experience helps explain his naivism to some extent. The bad news is my memory is failing me. I could of swore I saw commercials during the election of him manning a AAA weapon and firing at Japanese Zeros. That begs the question how many Presidents have actual combat experience? I'm thinking at a minimum you have George Washington, Teddy Roosevelt, Ike commanded in combat, not sure he saw any, JFK, and Bush Sr.

Definitely not a requirement, and the impact of the experience doesn't seem to be consistent. Washington and Bush emerged from combat and other life experiences more cautious and mature politically, while both Teddy Roosevelt and JFK remained risk seekers while serving as President.

There's also Grant (2 wars), Garfield, McKinley, Truman...

Eisenhower was a politician in uniform...one of the reasons he was selected to command Allied ground forces in Europe. His foreign policy judgement was always hazy, and we continue to pay for how he framed issues to this day. TR's risk seeking is in some ways over-emphasized, as he seemed to have a good instinct for when NOT to get involved with overseas things.

[Bob's World]

Don't forget Private Buchanan (war of 1812) and several others...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of..._military_rank

[slapout9]

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Slapout,

A quick response at the end of my lunch break. First off I think that is a great question that deserves more than a quick response, but until I can dwell on it longer the quick answer is President Bush Sr.

Yes, when you get some time I look forward to your longer answer. Bush the first was the only President ever to be Director of CIA before becoming President, do you think that helped his more realistic world view?

[ganulv]

Originally Posted by slapout9

Yes, when you get some time I look forward to your longer answer. Bush the first was the only President ever to be Director of CIA before becoming President, do you think that helped his more realistic world view?

He also served two terms in the House, was U.N. Ambassador, and envoy to the PRC prior to becoming DCI. I think it is fair to say that he was/is the best prepared U.S. President as far as experience goes.

[Bill Moore]

Originally Posted by Steve Blair

There's also Grant (2 wars), Garfield, McKinley, Truman...

Eisenhower was a politician in uniform...one of the reasons he was selected to command Allied ground forces in Europe. His foreign policy judgement was always hazy, and we continue to pay for how he framed issues to this day. TR's risk seeking is in some ways over-emphasized, as he seemed to have a good instinct for when NOT to get involved with overseas things.

Steve,

I have a couple of friends that are historians of note that also critical of Ike as President, but based on my limited studies I think if we followed his guidance not to over hype the threat (though hard to over hype the very real threat of the USSR, but we could control how we responded to it), and to live within our means we would be in a better place today. Below an interesting excerpt from one of his speeches after he left office.

Excerpts from pages 40-42

http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/a...l_speeches.pdf

Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, January 31, 1962

Should the majority of our citizens abandon or surrender to the State their personal responsibilities, the state itself cannot, for long, sustain the restraint which its citizens have foregone. In such circumstances, if we and our government lack the political courage either to raise taxes or to limit spending only to the necessary, deficits are inevitable. Long pursued, such a policy invites retribution. Inflation appears, with all its evil effects both on our economic health and on our national character. The dollar is depreciated at home and abroad. If we do not discipline ourselves and put our domestic fiscal affairs in order, we must suffer both in credit and in prestige.

For a trustworthy currency is more than a mark of solvency; it is one aspect of sovereignty and evidence of national self-respect. And perhaps we should emphasize more the mutual dependence between self-respect and self-reliance, both individually and nationally.

It is sometimes the fashion for critics to deprecate these qualities of character which helped shape our past. We hear it said that the extraordinary complexities of modern life - the Cold War, accelerating technology, urbanization - all make obsolete the strengths of the past. Such critics do not over-estimate the difficulties of our times. But they have lost faith in the ability of the American people to overcome the intricate problems confronting us - and conclude that we must rely more on a powerful, dominating, central government rather than on the strength of the nation’s character. Such critics are defeatists. The problems are complex - but it is only a resolute, resourceful, responsible people who can provide their ultimate solution.

So, as a people, I devoutly hope we will always be vigilant in detecting and breaking up monopoly or concentrated power of every kind. I likewise trust that we will make it our business to repudiate feather-bedding and to glorify hard work at all levels; to rely on ourselves rather than seek selfish advantage from a compliant government; to pay our way rather than pile up mounting debt on our children; to draw inspiration from freedom’s accomplishments rather than to fear its future; to be alert in combating weakening trends in the national character. Above all, may we never be tempted, on any excuse whatever, to belittle or demean our nation and her accomplishments and power. America is not merely a continent filled with teeming millions - it is a way of life that commands the best efforts and everlasting devotion of every loyal citizen.

Theodore Roosevelt put it this way: “Americanism means the virtues of courage, honor, justice, sincerity and hardihood - the virtues that made America. The things that will destroy America are prosperity-at-any-price, peace-at-any-price, safety-first instead of duty-first, the love-of-self-living and the get-rich-quick theory of life.”

[Bill Moore]

Originally Posted by slapout9

Yes, when you get some time I look forward to your longer answer. Bush the first was the only President ever to be Director of CIA before becoming President, do you think that helped his more realistic world view?

President Bush Senior was well groomed to lead the nation based on his military experience, assignment to China, Director of the CIA, and 8 years as VP. Just finished reading the chapter in Kofi Annan's book "Interventions," that stated the first part of the mission to Somalia (under President Bush) went off very well. I was the subsequent mission under Clinton that was problematic. He didn't describe it that way, but on the other hand he didn't hold back when discussing Clinton and Albright. Anyway I think Bush did O.K. with Somalia policy.

JFK wrote and spoke well about special warfare, but in practice I didn't see his administration as very effective based on my studies. Maybe given more time he would have proven himself to be strategically competent. His flame was exguished pre-maturely.

I don't know if you can look at each administration strickly from optic of UW/FID/IW, but you have to look at their foreign policy as whole. In some cases avoiding engagements proved to be a good decision and of course in others we probably needed to get involved but failed to do so. Those good at miniminizing our involvement were Ike and President Bush Sr. Bush Sr. When Bush Sr did engage he almost always ensured the military objectives were clear and achievable.

He learned as he went, but overall I'm fan of President Reagan for a lot of reasons. Although Congress did the heavy lifting he authorized the formation of USSOCOM which literally transformed our Special Operations Forces which significantly enhanced our ability to conduct FID/UW/IW. I doubt we would have seen the successes that SOF has had if it wasn't for Reagan.

Bush Jr aggressively employed SOF, but it is still debatable (in my opinion) if his strategy was effective or simply made the problem worse? He certainly didn't have an end game in mind.

Obama in the future when we have the ability to look at his administration with less emotion may prove to be one of the best for effectively waging FID/UW/IW. I know that comment will draw fire, but I'm calling it the way I see it.

[slapout9]

Bill, very thoughtful response. You did a pretty Objective analysis IMO.