Listen Up Marines, We Belong at Sea

[Bob's World]

I have never seen anything a Ranger Battalion does that the 82nd didn't used to do before we had Ranger Battalions and still could do. It is the Ranger training that is important and should be spread through all Infantry units like it used to be.

Are you saying the Ranagers could have handled the Mayaguez incident any better?

The Marines would probably say......can you say "Black Hawk down!"

No tab, badge or brand makes a man or unit the end all, be all for every situation. That is why we have a mix of types of units, each with its own unique advantages and disadvantages for a savvy commander to mix and match as necessary for best effect.

The problem of the conflicts of recent years is that they came to call for a lot of a couple different types of activity, and units all started abandoning their respective bases of specialization and expertise to fall in on some degree of competence on those common themes.

Pick your metaphor. From a sophisticated tool box into a bag of hammers; or from a symphony orchestra into a brass band. May meet the current requirement (as defined), but is not a good long-term solution.

Time for everyone to get back to their core competencies. Then, it is time to balance the relative size of each of those capacities to challenges of the modern era. We have been a military in conflict, but we are a nation at peace. Time to re-size and re-focus for the real challenges that are out there, not for the noises we hear in the dark.

For conventional ground forces this probably means we need a lot less, with most warfighting capacity relegated to the National Guard, and a smaller, more expeditionary capacity retained in the active component. Marines should pick up the lion-share of expeditionary missions as they invoke far less strategic risk for the nation when they are employed. SOF also provides an effective peacetime engagement tool, from building relationships and cultural understanding in critical locations, to taking out point targets on rare occasion. The Navy is the Navy. We are a maritime nation. Nuff said. The air force? Born of the Cold War we don't really have a model for what to do with these guys in the real world. We need to figure that out. They play a critical part of our deterrence mission, as well as our ability to move forces quickly and secure the airspace of critical locations for critical periods of time (not all air space all the time as the A2AD crowd seem to imply).

But DoD needs to take this serious. It is not our job to be as big as possible and do our job, it is our job to be as small as possible and do our job.

[slapout9]

Pick your metaphor. From a sophisticated tool box into a bag of hammers; or from a symphony orchestra into a brass band. May meet the current requirement (as defined), but is not a good long-term solution.

In the end the value of a soldier is what he can "do to his enemy." So Bob..... what can a Ranger do to the enemy that a Regular Soldier or Marine can not do?

The Marine Corps disbanded the Raiders because they had a General staff that asked that question and in the end they told the Raiders that their is nothing you can teach the raiders that you shouldn't be teaching to the rest of the Marine Corps. It's the same way with the Rangers, it is to costly and unnecessary duplication. The Ranger skills should be taught as widely as possible through the entire Infantry just like it used to be.

[Bob's World]

Rangers, 82nd, Marines all work various aspects of the same mission set. You don't just have one screwdriver in your toolbox, nor does one just put trumpets in their brass section. Can you get by with just one flavor? Sure, but it will sometimes be the inappropriate tool for the job, and the job will take longer or be messier because of it.

Our problem is not that we have Ranger Battalions, I think they provide a valuable option to senior leaders. A bigger problem is how we have morphed Ranger Battalions and tailored them to the job of hunting HVTs From highly effective raiders of battalion-sized targets we have turned them into a vast pool of squad/platoon-sized assassins and kidnappers. Not sure we need an entire regiment dedicated to that latter mission as we move forward.

So, to my point, we need to re-balance and right-size the force, and we need to make it as small and efficient as possible. Our geostrategic place on the planet allows us a luxury of being able to assume risks that other nations cannot. We need to leverage that once again.

[reed11b]

In the end the value of a soldier is what he can "do to his enemy." So Bob..... what can a Ranger do to the enemy that a Regular Soldier or Marine can not do?

The Marine Corps disbanded the Raiders because they had a General staff that asked that question and in the end they told the Raiders that their is nothing you can teach the raiders that you shouldn't be teaching to the rest of the Marine Corps. It's the same way with the Rangers, it is to costly and unnecessary duplication. The Ranger skills should be taught as widely as possible through the entire Infantry just like it used to be.

They say it, but the reality has shown this to be wrong. You simply can't be good at everything all the time. If the Raiders were such a bad idea, why has USMC currently embraced MARSOC? Look at some of Ken Whites arguments about what the military expects of officers and why it is unrealistic, for it is applicable to units as well. None of this is meant as a dig on Marines, they have an aggresive warfighting culture and some very good infantry tactics and better combined arms doctrine then the Army, but there decision to have no (few) "elite" Marines since all Marines are "elite", was a poor choice IMNSHO.
Reed

[ganulv]

If the Raiders were such a bad idea, why has USMC currently embraced MARSOC?

Greenbacks, maybe?

Is there some way in which MARSOC is not redundant within USSOCOM? Mine is a non-rhetorical question—I am not clear on what they do.

[BayonetBrant]

Is there some way in which MARSOC is not redundant within USSOCOM? Mine is a non-rhetorical question—I am not clear on what they do.

Each service has their 'part' of USSOCOM. So you have MARSOC as the Marine part of it, ARSOC as the Army part of it, etc.
USSOCOM is the overall HQ, but under that, each branch has a piece.

[slapout9]

They say it, but the reality has shown this to be wrong. You simply can't be good at everything all the time. If the Raiders were such a bad idea, why has USMC currently embraced MARSOC? Look at some of Ken Whites arguments about what the military expects of officers and why it is unrealistic, for it is applicable to units as well. None of this is meant as a dig on Marines, they have an aggresive warfighting culture and some very good infantry tactics and better combined arms doctrine then the Army, but there decision to have no (few) "elite" Marines since all Marines are "elite", was a poor choice IMNSHO.
Reed

Nothing I said was meant to be a dig at the Rangers either. What I am saying is when the next election happens and it dosen't really matter which side wins there is going to be some major cuts to certain units because of what is considered to be duplication. You are going to see the Harvard Business School approach used on the military and The Army and the Marines are likley to get cut the worst and any sort of duplication will land right in the middle of their sites.

[gute]

I was thinking about the future of the Corps and the Marine Special Operations Battalions - it seems to me that the MSOB organization with some CS and CSS attachments would be ideally suited to be a smaller MEU(SOC). You could place this organization on one LPD-17 with a LCS and DD-51 in support. Or a combination of a MSOB and regular rifle battalion. Just trying to think outside the box.

[major.rod]

Bob - Just joined the forum and interested in some stimulating conversation. Happened upon this one and I read your posts with interest.

I'd like to contest some of your points with historical lessons that got us to where we are and likely provide some sound reasons why we shouldn’t make the same mistakes again.

First the Army made a conscious decision to place half its combat units in the guard so that we may never participate in another unpopular war like Vietnam.
Second we didn’t place more than half of our combat units in the Guard because of the determination that we need to place large numbers of soldiers in harm’s way in a short period of time (e.g. 30 days). We learned during Desert Storm that even with 90 days of training our best Guard units were not prepared for high OPTEMPO operations and while the Guard has done a magnificent job in the low intensity conflict we have fought in for the last decade an unmentioned fact is the large majority of conventional guard units were given security type missions as opposed to the varied mission set typically assigned active formations.

I would disagree that Desert Storm was a war of choice. There was really not much choice but to eject Saddam from Kuwait to secure Saudi oil. A permanent heavy mechanized presence was not going to be possible either economically or politically.

I also reject the common assumption that the next war is going to be like the last one. A strong Army tends to dissuade conflict. The middle east remains a hot spot. A resurgent Russia, a problematic N. Korea and most importantly the myriad of threats we can’t foresee are reasons to maintain a sizeable Army which given today’s technology and equipment is not something that can be grown overnight as many think. Even WWII with a nation mobilized for war took us years to equip and train several divisions. The seas and a strong British Army bought us time then. Our situation is much different. It seems that lesson has been forgotten in a decade of low intensity conflict.

Now to return to the thread's subject, I look forward to seeing the Marines return to a versatile expeditionary force capable of independent action for 30 days until the Army can reinforce or to reinforce the Army that might get there first as it did in Korea and Iraq (DS). It has in effect become a second Army and is strugling to do Army missions with the formation of law enforcement BN's and its interest on civil affairs type units. The capabaility to float a max of 30k Marines makes it tough to understand why it maintains a force in excess of 250k except that it is the only service that has its size stated in law (no less than three divisions and three air wings).

Looking forward to some enlightening responses!

[Bill Moore]

Posted by major.rod

Second we didn’t place more than half of our combat units in the Guard because of the determination that we need to place large numbers of soldiers in harm’s way in a short period of time (e.g. 30 days). We learned during Desert Storm that even with 90 days of training our best Guard units were not prepared for high OPTEMPO operations and while the Guard has done a magnificent job in the low intensity conflict we have fought in for the last decade an unmentioned fact is the large majority of conventional guard units were given security type missions as opposed to the varied mission set typically assigned active formations.

Well said and factually accurate. Bob's proposal dismisses the view of deterence in my opinion, and while maintaining the force structure is expensive I suspect it is ultimately more cost effective than not deterring a conflict or launching into a conflict ill prepared which would not be acceptable to the American people. Bob still makes good points, but the reality concerning NG limited capabilities is ignored, and replaced with an illusionary history of Guard performance.

[gute]

It has in effect become a second Army and is strugling to do Army missions with the formation of law enforcement BN's and its interest on civil affairs type units. The capabaility to float a max of 30k Marines makes it tough to understand why it maintains a force in excess of 250k except that it is the only service that has its size stated in law (no less than three divisions and three air wings).

I realize its onoly one or two battalions, but I don't understand the need for law enforcement battalions or an emphasis on civil affairs type units. Is the Marine Corps trying to make itself irrelevant as a fighting force or does Quantico see this as a good mix for future "banana wars"?

[Ken White]

First the Army made a conscious decision to place half its combat units in the guard so that we may never participate in another unpopular war like Vietnam.

That's close but not totally accurate. The "half" part is incorrect but fairly close however the "never participate in another unpopular war,,," isn't. That structure was decided by a whole lot of political infighting between the Army, the Guard, the Army Reserve, the Governors and Congressional delegations. It was a very complex compromise that satisfied no one. It has also since been modified by the same pressures exerted by new actors.

We learned during Desert Storm that even with 90 days of training our best Guard units were not prepared for high OPTEMPO operations...

That's not correct. The Active Army absolutely did not want the Guard combat units in Theater for several reasons. Carl Vuono and Binny Peay, then CofSA and DCSOPS, fought quite hard to prevent deployment of the Guard Brigades that Congress insisted be called up. They were driven partly by future budget concerns, partly by pure parochialism -- Peay's famous "...not in My army..." comment comes to mind -- and hit upon the brilliant scheme of running all three Bdes through the NTC (where then Cdr Wesley Clark was a willing accomplice and thus 'justifying' the NTC which was under Congressional pressure for closure due to excessive costs) to obtain the required certification by the Active Army that the Bdes were 'combat ready' -- a statutory requirement the active Army wanted to avoid for several reasons. In the event, Commander Second US Army certified the 48th Bde of the GA ArNG as combat ready at the completion of their NTC rotation but was overruled by DA due to the fact that the Armistice had been signed and the issue was thus moot.

...an unmentioned fact is the large majority of conventional guard units were given security type missions as opposed to the varied mission set typically assigned active formations.

That's as much parochialism and continued budget battle as anything. It's also a protective device to avoid a number of casualties from one small town -- as occurred in previous wars when Guard units deployed (to include Viet Nam when one KY Guard Arty By was overrun with heavy casualties -- that caused the requirement for the Active Army to certify 'combat readiness' of Gd units.

I would disagree that Desert Storm was a war of choice. There was really not much choice but to eject Saddam from Kuwait to secure Saudi oil. A permanent heavy mechanized presence was not going to be possible either economically or politically.

That's arguable but irrelevant, DS/DS happened. The 'fact' that Saudi oil is needed by the rest of the world does not give the US reason to insure its provision except for US domestic political reasons.

Our situation is much different. It seems that lesson has been forgotten in a decade of low intensity conflict.

Agreed. It's not that much different but it is different enough to require a larger standing force -- for training purposes among other things.

...The capability to float a max of 30k Marines makes it tough to understand why it maintains a force in excess of 250k except that it is the only service that has its size stated in law (no less than three divisions and three air wings).

Not hard to understand -- the Marines try to keep Congress happy; the Army goes out of its way to pick fights with them over inconsequential issues -- or to just foolishly resist their pressure on sometimes needed reforms (foolishly in the sense that while that Army is sometimes correct, the 'battle' is poorly fought by the Army, generally due to excessively rapid rotation of key players).

[Fuchs]

I would disagree that Desert Storm was a war of choice. There was really not much choice but to eject Saddam from Kuwait to secure Saudi oil.

Look, I'm not from an anglophone country, but I know for certain that you have no clue what "war of choice" means.

"Choice" is not about comfort or avoiding an undesirable state in this case, it's about the absence of being forced into war.
Iraq did not force any country into war in 1990/91 but Kuwait. All others had the choice whether to do something about it or not (Saudi-Arabia being next in Saddam's line was propaganda).


I recommend strongly (to more than just one or a dozen people at SWC) to think about whether their default position of "in case of doubt we are right" shouldn't better give way for a default position of "in case of doubt we respect others and rules we agreed to collectively".

ODS was authorized by UNSC, but the simple fact that anyone could consider the choice to meddle in far away affairs as anything other than a choice should press home the insight that the default position, the default stance, in foreign policy is still unhinged.