Are snipers and recon still valid in infantry battalions?

[Fuchs]

Infil for 500 km cannot be done with helicopters if the enemy is well-equipped. That's far too risky even over Southern Chinese mountain terrain. The helicopters would take four hours even if they were flying almost directly and few helicopters have the necessary flight radius at all (= some offshore service helicopters and CSAR/SF models).

A more reasonable approach is to infil the first 100-200 km as normal and then simply grab a civilian vehicle as a ride. The force density and threat of police checkpoints will be marginal that deep behind the battlefield.

A helicopter ride for 2x500 km is certainly neither necessary nor worth it.

[Steve Blair]

A more reasonable approach is to infil the first 100-200 km as normal and then simply grab a civilian vehicle as a ride. The force density and threat of police checkpoints will be marginal that deep behind the battlefield.

Really? So you'd toss your recon guys back behind enemy lines and hope that they could find a civilian vehicle? And what happens once you leave Central Europe and the only available civilian vehicle is a donkey? Or a jinga truck? That tactic also ties you directly to improved roads (especially given the state of most civilian vehicles in many less-than-optimal countries in the world).

Sure, ground infil is quite possible, but in unfavorable terrain it takes a great deal of work to accomplish properly (and if you doubt that, go read up on some of the LRS-type activities during Operation Anaconda...your 10km distance estimates were wildly optimistic in that terrain). And in some situations it just isn't an option.

And Fuchs, you might just want to research the command and control of US aviation units in Vietnam before you toss out your statements. I'd direct your attention specifically to the 1st ID, the 23rd ID, and the 4th ID. These were NOT airmobile units, and the 23rd in particular faced some major challenges with their aviation assets. I mention the 1st because they were the first US unit to strip control of the air cavalry troop away from their divisional cavalry squadron and parcel it out to brigades. The air cav troop wasn't large, and had a major impact on operations when it was allowed to function as designed (and that includes lifting in recon elements).

[Fuchs]

You didn't get my "it's luxury" point.

Compare your Vietnam IDs with foreign IDs and you'll see that their army aviation support is anywhere from non-existing to much smaller.

Sure, army Aviation can do much - it better should, for it's very expensive and thirsty - but you can do without. No LRS establishment needs to atrophy only because there aren't enough helicopters.


Besides; speeds are only meaningful in relation. The slowness of high altitude combat affects both friend and foe. This relative slowness in comparison to other operations is ceteris paribus not matched by relative slowness in comparison to the enemy and thus not relevant here.

[Steve Blair]

You didn't get my "it's luxury" point.

No, I saw it. But it felt more like a dodge than a serious point.

And the limiting factor in Operation Anaconda for ground infiltration wasn't as much the altitude as it was the terrain. You'll find the same limitation at lower elevations as well.

And I really think you're missing the point when it comes to distance. Ken's comments are spot on. You state that speed is relative in high altitude operations. You'll also find that distance is relative as well. It's one thing to look at the map and say you understand distance, but until you actually experience it and actually live someplace where "close" translates to 200-300 miles (and there are no towns or settlements within that "close" span) I would contend that you really don't understand distance. And since many of your LRS comments appear to be based on both a good road network and readily available civilian vehicles you're more likely to miss the point that such things are not all that common outside Europe.

Aviation is thirsty and a luxury, sure. But so is motorized transport depending on your location. And when speed's an issue, you can't depend on foot mobility when you're dealing with the sort of space I mentioned above.

[Ken White]

Infil for 500 km cannot be done with helicopters if the enemy is well-equipped....A more reasonable approach is to infil the first 100-200 km as normal and then simply grab a civilian vehicle as a ride. The force density and threat of police checkpoints will be marginal that deep behind the battlefield...A helicopter ride for 2x500 km is certainly neither necessary nor worth it.

In reverse order, METT-TC and you cannot say that as a certainty, only that it is true in your opinion.

I'm dazzled with the thought of five or six big, pale Gweilo scuffing a Lifan 620 and wandering around Guangdong and not arousing the populace to get on their cellphones and call the local Cops. Hopefully, they'll steal one with a full tank of fuel...

Depends on many factors. Again, you state an opinion, not a certainty. Not by any means and that's been proven.

Compare your Vietnam IDs with foreign IDs and you'll see that their army aviation support is anywhere from non-existing to much smaller.

So? That's irrelevant. We should not use a capability we have because others do not have it? Conversely,, the fact that we have many more than most arbitrarily means it's a luxury? Weird logic...

No LRS establishment needs to atrophy only because there aren't enough helicopters.

No one is suggesting that is the case, though I still contend your Eurocentrism is showing. Worldwide terrain and combat demands introduce more variables than a land war in northwestern Europe might require.

Besides; speeds are only meaningful in relation. The slowness of high altitude combat affects both friend and foe. This relative slowness in comparison to other operations is ceteris paribus not matched by relative slowness in comparison to the enemy and thus not relevant here.

Huh? I agree with the first sentence. The rest of it is diversionary. What is relevant here is the time factor, not speed. That time factor depends on ALL aspects of METT-TC, terrain is but one consideration. Distance affects that time factor as much or more than terrain. So to do does the attitude of civilians in the area, they are likely to be a greater concern than troops and checkpoints. Most of the deep LRS penetrations in Desert Storm and in both current wars that were compromised owed that to local civilians. There were bad results in a case or two. ..

[reed11b]

A more reasonable approach is to infil the first 100-200 km as normal and then simply grab a civilian vehicle as a ride. The force density and threat of police checkpoints will be marginal that deep behind the battlefield.

A helicopter ride for 2x500 km is certainly neither necessary nor worth it.

NO ROADS. None where I train, none in A-stan (what we train for). Can take my team several hours to move a few klicks due to terrain, weight of equipment (physical conditioning only helps so much) and, ta-da, the need to not be seen or comprimised (i.e. we are not moving out on trails or roads even if available).
Reed

[PsJÄÄK Korte]

Sorry this raise this thread.
On snipers:
I once borrowed finnish book "Tarkka-ampuja 1 (Sniper 1, but finnish term for sniper translates literally into "sharpshooter)" by Finnish carreer officer Major Pauli Salo. He is sort of authority in snipercraft here in Finland.
He defined three sniper classes by their level of training/skill required
"lowest" class is simple designated marksman at squad and maybe platoon level. they have not camoflage but should have scoped
Then comes "fire support sniper" they is trained in camoflage and sharp shooting, but they don't "roam freely", instead give supporting fire to platoons and companies.
Then at the top of heap are scout/snipers, something in vein of for example scout/snipers of USMC. He lamented in his book that scout/snipers are not trained in Finland.
I know that partially these are similar what I have seen other countries have, but I'd like to hear your opinion. How realistic(Term?) are these definitions.

I skimmed thread but didn't find clear opinion on my though:
If youd have enough decent enough manpower and rifles. Would it make sense to have sniper units at all levels ie.
infatry squad: designated marksman/men
infatry platoon: sniper pair
infatry company: sniper team
infantry battalion: sniper platoon
infantry brigade: sniper company <-of this feasiblity I am espesially interested
I am also partially thinking of point of view of finnish army.
Even though even AR armed soldiers are trained to take carefully aimed shots one would think that snipers would be good and cheap force multiplier for non-professional army like ours.
To be continued...

[PsJÄÄK Korte]

On recon: I wonder wether is based on reality of finnish terrain or misunderstanding of armoured recon but here in finland armoured recon platoons are basicly four reduced strenght foot-recon squads riding in either CV90 or BMP-2. I wonder do other countries have similar systems or do everyone else have dedicated platforms for armoured recon and would our type of armoured recon platoon be uselful in any other kind of terrain.
Also in I know here armoured recon means IFV mounted recon, but I am not sure wether APC mounted recon is armoured recon or is it foot-recon albeit with better protected transport. Is for example stryker recon armoured recon or foot recon?

PS. Had I had motorcyclist licence and better fitness (and insaner attitude) before I did my service I might have applied to armoured recon platoon's motorcycle team. but past is past.

[jcustis]

I wonder do other countries have similar systems or do everyone else have dedicated platforms for armoured recon and would our type of armoured recon platoon be uselful in any other kind of terrain.
Also in I know here armoured recon means IFV mounted recon, but I am not sure wether APC mounted recon is armoured recon or is it foot-recon albeit with better protected transport. Is for example stryker recon armoured recon or foot recon?

The US military has a variety of systems, doctrines, and organizations that conduct reconnaissance. I'd say that the Stryker community, much like the USMC's Light Armored Reconnaissance community, would identify with armored reconnaissance, although dismounted reconnaissance patrolling is practiced to a high level of art for the times when the scouts are on the deck.

Long-Range Surveillance units in the Army, and Reconnaissance Battalion and Force Reconnaissance Company units conduct reconnaissance and surveillance that tends to be oriented of foot-mobility, but they retain the generic skills to operate mounted. They are usually limited by the small-arms weapons systems employed on the vehicles the use for mobility, but they can still fight for information to some degree.

[PsJÄÄK Korte]

By the way was it Wilf or some other who noted that recce should be one of the soldiers basic skill sets? I have no problem with that when talking about professional armies where soldiers sign contracts for x years and thats what was propably talked about. But how would that work for army like Finland's where conscripts serve 6, 9 or 12 months? One would think that if you tried to teach guy serving six months both "line" infantry and recce skills he would have pretty shallow grasp of both. So it would make sense to specialise given short training times.

[Fuchs]

It takes about half a year to train an infantryman fully, including short-range scouting. Make that 9 months in peacetime due to weekends and lower intensity.

The problem with conscript armies is that the army leaders want to use conscripts as active force personnel, they don't consider conscripts to be men who get a training and then leave. As a result, conscript training is cut down to press at least some months of reduced effectiveness active service out of them - and many conscripts are being mis-used as cheap forced labour to be used on the most stupid jobs with minimal training.

The political leadership can force the military leadership to consider conscripts as men to be trained for war, and nothing else. That, after all, is the purpose of conscription in wartime, true to Scharnhorst's idea.

Allow the top brass in uniform to consider conscripts as cheap unfree labour that's available no matter how attractive the service is and you'll end up with a ####ty for of conscription.
Force them to train the conscripts and then release them - you will end up with a huge pool of trained reservists when the #### hits the fan.

[Firn]

The problem with conscript armies is that the army leaders want to use conscripts as active force personnel, they don't consider conscripts to be men who get a training and then leave. As a result, conscript training is cut down to press at least some months of reduced effectiveness active service out of them - and many conscripts are being mis-used as cheap forced labour to be used on the most stupid jobs with minimal training.

The political leadership can force the military leadership to consider conscripts as men to be trained for war, and nothing else. That, after all, is the purpose of conscription in wartime, true to Scharnhorst's idea.

Allow the top brass in uniform to consider conscripts as cheap unfree labour that's available no matter how attractive the service is and you'll end up with a ####ty for of conscription.
Force them to train the conscripts and then release them - you will end up with a huge pool of trained reservists when the #### hits the fan.

I do think you really hit the nail on the head with that post, and have really nothing to add to the intent of it.

[OT:

Having followed the debates in quite some European countries in the last ten years, the most important argument for conscription seems to have been that without it you can not offer civil service as an alternative to it, thus loosing a very important work force for the social sector. So now we finally know the true idea behind conscription, it is a legal move to force young males to work in the social sector for almost nothing.

:end the OT part]

[Fuchs]

There were three more major reasons in Germany:

# A national myth about how conscription ensures that the military is loyal to the democracy (sure, as if Hitler had not re-introduced democracy...).

# The fact that the conservatives fought hard for it in the 50's (it was Germany's first major payment for the Western integration) and treated it as a great party accomplishment.

# The fact that the military is totally inept at recruiting and enlisted soldiers job experience in the military is not really attractive. That, of course, was caused by the fact that military leadership mis-used the almost for free conscripts for decades - and especially so in the last decade of conscription with its very short service period.


There were also some low opinions about foreign professional troops (especially French and British soldiers, who were often characterised as pub brawlers) and their high fiscal cost (especially U.S. troops).
An economist can of course easily point out that conscription has a lot of otherwise avoidable hidden costs (especially the loss of freedom).


Eventually, conscription became so dysfunctional in Germany and conventional warfare defence was lost so much out of sight that conscription went away - without a proper reserve pool generating replacement.

[jps2]

My two cents about conscription and markmanship :

I made my 'National Service' during the end 80's; Main thread was called RED; We were supposed to slow then enough by conventional means to allow NATO strength (US & CAN) avoiding nuke use.
The conscription was, for me, the better way to mix people : farmers and urbans, low and high educated. Social mixing, each with his background to reach a same goal. I'm not naive, even if one tenth of a class was really motivated, these 1/10 could be more than useful as reserve if a major threat happens. Politicians forget that particular conscription's goal, and for electoral and economical (not my point of view) reasons switch to professional army.
We were not, after 12 month, really skilled as today professionals can be, but physical & intellectual requirements wasn't so high as today : 90% were good enough for the job.
Today, with unemployment rates between 8 and 10% (especially for youngs), teaching discipline and community's life will not be a waste of money and time for many young men (an perhaps women).
The loss of freedom is part of living together, "my rights finishes where other's rights began". Nowadays, everyone is focused on his/her rights, none on his duties. Conscription was a way to learn / remember that.

Marksmanship can be learned before enrolling, basics can be acquired with a 22lr between 50 and 200m.
It is a school of self control and mental strength. It does not require some specific physical skills.
Marksmanship is one of the ways to reduce ammunition consumption, improving fire support.

[GI Zhou]

NO ROADS. None where I train, none in A-stan (what we train for). Can take my team several hours to move a few klicks due to terrain, weight of equipment (physical conditioning only helps so much) and, ta-da, the need to not be seen or comprimised (i.e. we are not moving out on trails or roads even if available).
Reed

Getting back to the subject, terrain is the primary key for distance and range is dependent on that. Jungle, urban or mountainous terrain (with without cover), infrastructure and the type of enemy faced, all decide the recon/scout element as well as the use of snipers. It is vital for a battalion commander to have knowledge of the terrain and enemy he faces. Can we stick to ideas on this please. Personally I believe a recon/surveillance platoon organic to the battalion, and a sniper section/squad is an invaluable asset. Their issue/or misuse and continuation training has more effect on the battlefield. There was no section marksmen when I served (and I do not go into combat) but even on peacetime exercises the best shot assumed the role of a squad marksman. Squad and platoon commanders adjusted their structures so that their skills were best utilized.