The Sole Survivor

[JeffC]

The math as you pose it is irrelevant; it is not only hindsight, it presupposes committing a war crime. Bill is absolutely correct.

Tom

The Taliban leader who was their target was actively involved in launching attacks on coalition forces as well as killing other Afghans who weren't part of the Taliban. Every time an operation against him was aborted, more people died. So let's expand the math to include them as well. You're probably now in the hundreds, particularly civilian loss of life. When does the math add up? 2 lives for 100? 2 lives for 1000?

In addition to that issue, do you make a distinction for enemy spies who aren't carrying a rifle? Does the fact that they're spies "arm" them in the eyes of the Geneva Convention?

[Sargent]

The Taliban leader who was their target was actively involved in launching attacks on coalition forces as well as killing other Afghans who weren't part of the Taliban. Every time an operation against him was aborted, more people died. So let's expand the math to include them as well. You're probably now in the hundreds, particularly civilian loss of life. When does the math add up? 2 lives for 100? 2 lives for 1000?

In addition to that issue, do you make a distinction for enemy spies who aren't carrying a rifle? Does the fact that they're spies "arm" them in the eyes of the Geneva Convention?

It doesn't matter. It's a slippery slope, so there's a reason you stay firmly at the top, a good few steps away from the edge.

And take a look at your logic: the Taliban are killing folks who won't join (or who work against them), so we need to start killing folks who work for the Taliban so we can defeat them.

[mmx1]

The Taliban leader who was their target was actively involved in launching attacks on coalition forces as well as killing other Afghans who weren't part of the Taliban. Every time an operation against him was aborted, more people died. So let's expand the math to include them as well. You're probably now in the hundreds, particularly civilian loss of life. When does the math add up? 2 lives for 100? 2 lives for 1000?

In addition to that issue, do you make a distinction for enemy spies who aren't carrying a rifle? Does the fact that they're spies "arm" them in the eyes of the Geneva Convention?

I have read the Washington Post piece on Luttrell. If you feel I am missing any relevant details please feel free to present them, but I believe the gist of the situation is clear enough.

In this case, the central issue is the ethical status of intentionally killing civilians. I firmly believe that it is wrong, regardless of the calculus of lives in the balance. You attempt to cloud the issue by painting them as spies. but the SEALS didn't know that and even in hindsight you can't say with reasonable certainty if they were willing collaborators with the Taliban.

Would you shoot 3 random passerby's in your neighborhood in the anticipation (since this calculus is based on estimates and predictions, not certainty) that it would save 10 or 100 lives? In what way does moving the venue to Afghanistan change the ethics of such a decision?

[JeffC]

I have read the Washington Post piece on Luttrell. If you feel I am missing any relevant details please feel free to present them, but I believe the gist of the situation is clear enough.

In this case, the central issue is the ethical status of intentionally killing civilians. I firmly believe that it is wrong, regardless of the calculus of lives in the balance. You attempt to cloud the issue by painting them as spies. but the SEALS didn't know that and even in hindsight you can't say with reasonable certainty if they were willing collaborators with the Taliban.

Would you shoot 3 random passerby's in your neighborhood in the anticipation (since this calculus is based on estimates and predictions, not certainty) that it would save 10 or 100 lives? In what way does moving the venue to Afghanistan change the ethics of such a decision?

--- First, an article on what happened doesn't do it justice. Read the book, or don't read the book, but don't imagine that you know what happened without reading the only existing record of what happened (i.e., Luttrell's account).

--- Second, in this particular case, they were clearly Taliban supporters. Revealing the existence and position of this SEAL team makes them the equivalent of spies in that information served as a weapon.

--- Finally, the example you present in your last paragraph isn't remotely equivalent to what happened in those mountains. You're welcome to your opinion of what's right and what's wrong, of course, but without at least taking the trouble to understand Luttrrell's experience and perspective is, in my opinion, the wrong way to go about it.

[Ironhorse]

Concur, Sargent & mmx1. Very well said, mmx1.

There's a difference between
a) the Law of War
b) the ROE for a specific theater, situation, or mission profile
c) the decisions that individuals make within the context of both those -- blindly abiding by them, heinously violating, or just applying them in thier infinitely sticky imperfection.

I'm not sure which one of these we're talking about here. Maybe it will all be clear to me after I read the book. If so, I'll bottle it and be rich.

I would note that there's a path of moderation which might claim a reasonable middle ground, though a bit Buck Rogers-y. Some form of self-limiting detention mechanism, e.g. a timed self-releasing gag & handcuff, or even a good solid dose of anesthesia, might stay within the high ground of the Law of War (a), be feasible within or with reasonable mods to acceptable ROE (b), and could give the operators the flexibility they need to accomplish their important mission while reducing some of the dilemna (c).

But even that won't eliminate the dilemnas, just move them around a bit.

"Shepherd gnawed to death by wolves while sleeping off SEAL's injection, leaves 8 fatherless."

At least that's more reasonable bad luck interpretation of collateral damage (with some military necessity and proportionality), than an "OK to blast 'em, if you think its really important" footnote in the ROE. That's not collateral damage, that's Sargent's slippery slope in full effect.

[William F. Owen]

I am reading this book at the moment, and just read the discussion about killing the goat herders. I was pretty troubled that this even became a discussion, so consulted SWJ and found this thread.

I have no wish to second guess the men on the ground at the time, but I was both horrified and intrigued that they even discussed killing un-armed civilians, in those circumstances.

...but I have no problem with shooting some one with a cell phone who is correcting mortar fire, detonating an IED or using a TV camera as a cover for the same. As fare as I can see, it's all about the nature of the intent.

I have to say this issue vexes me to some great degree, so opinions would be very welcome.

[tequila]

Again, don't want to second-guess the guys on the ground. But I've read the book as well and Luttrell does not at all make clear that the SEALs know for sure the Afghans (including a 14-year-old boy) were Taliban supporters. He only reports that the Afghans were not friendly to the SEALs, to which I would ask you - would you be friendly to a bunch of heavily armed foreigners who appeared on your land pointing weapons at you?

The book also points out that killing the Afghans would hardly assist that much in avoiding discovery, as the Afghans were accompanied by their flock of livestock who would certainly wander all over the place without herders and be instantly conspicuous, as well as instigate a search by the villagers for their missing men. Strangely the SEALs were not carrying zipties or 550 cord to simply detain the herders, which would have had roughly the same value as killing them as far as concealment was concerned.

IIRC, the SEALs did not attempt to continue w/the mission, since it was blown anyway, but tried to evac and establish comms. The Taliban ran them to ground before they could do so.

[Abu Buckwheat]

In this case, the central issue is the ethical status of intentionally killing civilians. I firmly believe that it is wrong, regardless of the calculus of lives in the balance. You attempt to cloud the issue by painting them as spies. but the SEALS didn't know that and even in hindsight you can't say with reasonable certainty if they were willing collaborators with the Taliban.

This is the heart of the problem we are having at many levels in the military. One time there was a pretty broad ethical line that COULD NOT be crossed. Did it happen outside of the sight of higher headquarters, yes. Did it happen when overzealous officers took orders as authorization from higher headquarters. Yes. However my contention for the last seven years is that there is no authority to commit war crimes because the GWOT is considered (by guys like Douglas Feith) as "A new type of war." Hitler told the German Army before Operation Barbarossa that the German army had to abandon its usual adherence to chivalry and the laws of war. We cannot continue to go there. Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban sympathizers are combatants when on the battlefield. Unarmed civilians who may rat your mission out are part of the game. In the first Gulf War several SOF OPs on key lines of communication were compromised by kids with goats or kids playing. We cannot get into the killing civilians game.

We cannot second guess their moral struggle on the battlefield but the fact that he said military training was not a factor in his reasoning for voting against killing the civilians is indicative that the system has gotten so far off the rails that we need to re-institutionalize our own sense of honor and chivalry.

I think the wild west like "War on Terror" has really badly damaged our image as professionals. Its being run too much like the Indian Wars where the indiginous population are considered non-humans. There have been too many incidents of murder (as many as 100 cases), abuse and random "screw it I'll just shoot them, its a different war and these aren't humans" have been seen and we will hear MANY more reported in the post-conflict period. This is an anathema to COIN. Paticularly in the Pashtunwali-soaked areas of the Lower Hindu Kush. Ask Kipling for examples.

Worst yet, there is also a visceral dis-respect of the enemy G's knowledge of his own game on his own home court. In this case the Gs adhered to Sun Tsu's "If you know the enemy and know yourself ..."

Before the first Gulf War General Schwarzkopf sent a message out to all unit ordering the ban on the use of Death Cards, which I had seen MANY guys carrying, all ready to play Colonel Kilgore. Schwarzkopf said we cannot debase ourselves and act like our enemies.

Should they have let the HVT get away and abort? Only they could make that call. However, I see it this way -we are the greatest goddamn combat power in the world ... we CAN re-sked missions without committing war crimes and we WILL get our target.

Someone in the next DoD needs to be tasked to bring the nation's Honor and adhering to laws and humanity back as a core value (AGAIN) at the troop level. God bless all of those team guys. They are asked to do hard things, but the issue is not about the ROE, its about the ROL, Rule of Law.

We have some major league recalibration to do after this war.

[Rank amateur]

I agree 100%. It'll be much easier for the military to recalibrate if the country does, but I think the country is looking at it as a political/values issues as opposed to what's the most effective way to fight the GWOT.

[marct]

This is the heart of the problem we are having at many levels in the military. One time there was a pretty broad ethical line that COULD NOT be crossed....However my contention for the last seven years is that there is no authority to commit war crimes because the GWOT is considered (by guys like Douglas Feith) as "A new type of war."....We cannot continue to go there. Al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban sympathizers are combatants when on the battlefield. Unarmed civilians who may rat your mission out are part of the game.

This has been a concern of mine for quite a while now in more than just a purely military setting. I must admit that one of the reasons why I dislike Feith so much is because, IMO, he embodies the ideology of the ends justify the means without regard to what those means do to the people and their social system. As with many theologians, both "secular" and "sacred", he appears to live in an illusory world which, because it is "true", requires that everyone must accept it and, if they do not, be made to accept it "for their own good". In this way, he is similar to UBL and other brands of fanatics.

Abu, you mentioned "honour" and "chivalry" and they are important in this respect - they are lodged inside individuals. This is something that fanatic ideologues cannot accept - for them, "truth" must be given from a central system - it cannot be contained within individuals and serve as a source of opposition to that central system. This is all about a fight between types of power: "power within" and "power over" as Miriam Seimos would say.

We cannot second guess their moral struggle on the battlefield but the fact that he said military training was not a factor in his reasoning for voting against killing the civilians is indicative that the system has gotten so far off the rails that we need to re-institutionalize our own sense of honor and chivalry.

I think the wild west like "War on Terror" has really badly damaged our image as professionals....There have been too many incidents of murder (as many as 100 cases), abuse and random "screw it I'll just shoot them, its a different war and these aren't humans" have been seen and we will hear MANY more reported in the post-conflict period. This is an anathema to COIN. Paticularly in the Pashtunwali-soaked areas of the Lower Hindu Kush. Ask Kipling for examples.

Leaving aside the actual efficacy of it, and I agree it is about as useful as sending a package of Twinkies to a famine zone, there are other, more important issues. The "War on Terror" has done more than "damage" the US military's "image as professionals" - it appears to have damaged, at least in some cases, your self-image; in theological terms, your souls. It has done so by putting you in what Bateson called a "double bind"; a situation where you are squeezed between two conflicting and contradictory positions. Pulled apart a bit further, think of the "debate" over waterboarding with some ideologues saying that it is not torture while knowing that it is. The "solution" being offered to this double bind by certain ideologues - "it's not torture, just a necessary tool in the War on Terror" - is not a solution that can be accepted while retaining honour.

Someone in the next DoD needs to be tasked to bring the nation's Honor and adhering to laws and humanity back as a core value (AGAIN) at the troop level. God bless all of those team guys. They are asked to do hard things, but the issue is not about the ROE, its about the ROL, Rule of Law.

We have some major league recalibration to do after this war.

While I agree, I would go further that saying it is about ROL - I would say I is about basic philosophy in the original meaning of that word; it is about "knowing yourself". Institutional "recalibration" is a good start to that; even St. Paul managed to realize that one when he noted that "I had not known sin but by the law" (Romans 7:7), but that is only the start - it is still basing individual ethics, "honour" as it were, on some system external to the individual which is amenable to manipulation by ideologues. Honour (and ethics) must be internal even if they are shaped by external (actually inter-personal) systems. If they don't live within you, then you are "just following orders" - a "defense" that I doubt will be accepted by any sane court or deity.

Marc

ps. Yes, Wayne, I am a radical immanentalist

[Entropy]

Well, I have read Luttrell's book, was in Afghanistan at the time, played a very small role in his recovery and have read most of the AAR's, etc. That said, the events that day cannot be singly traced to the decision to let the goatherders go - there were other factors at play which I won't get into. The point being, it wasn't ultimately a simplistic question of "kill the civilians, save the Americans" vs "let the civilians go, let the Americans die." What happened with Operation Redwing was a wake-up call to many and served as the catalyst for a variety of changes at various levels of command. And so I agree completely with the others in here who warn of monday morning QB'ing that one decision and the danger of what amounts to murdering unarmed civilians. Besides the legal and ethical considerations, there are practical ones as well including ramifications. For example, would the friendly villagers have taken Luttrell in, protected him, and contacted US forces for him had he killed the civilians? Probably not.

BTW, Luttrell's target, Mullah Ismail, aka Mullah Ahmad Shah, was killed in Pakistan about two weeks ago when he tried to run a Pakistani Police checkpoint in the NWFP after kidnapping some poor Afghan refugee.

[oblong]

http://www.newsday.com/news/local/lo...,7551760.story

Murphy's father wasn't happy with Luttrell's book.

In the NBC interview and in the book, Luttrell describes a discussion by the four SEALs and then a vote to let the herders go. That account, said Daniel Murphy, a former Suffolk County prosecutor and now a law clerk in State Supreme Court in Riverhead, is a far cry from what he said Marcus told the Murphy family not long after the death of their son.

"That directly contradicts what he told [Murphy's mother] Maureen, myself and Michael's brother John in my kitchen," said Murphy, who watched Luttrell on television but said he hasn't read the book. "He said that Michael was adamant that the civilians were going to be released, that he wasn't going to kill innocent people ... Michael wouldn't put that up for committee. People who knew Michael know that he was decisive and that he makes decisions."

Luttrell suggests that he sugar-coated the story later in a visit to Long Island, where he met Murphy's mother Maureen. She asked, he writes, "He didn't suffer, did he? Please tell me he didn't suffer."

[Eden]

I read Luttrell's book before I discovered this thread, and my reaction to the incident being discussed was a little bit different. Like most of you, it disturbed me that US soldiers could be so cold-bloodedly discussing murder of non-combatants; to me it is clearly a no-brainer that you abort at that point, and that killing is simply not on your options list. But that is not what disturbed me most. Two other things bothered me long after I put the book down.

1. Luttrell is brutally honest about his thought processes. As he reflects on his internal struggle, he continuously refers to his military training which he says clearly calls for killing the shepherds who have stumbled upon his team. Part of his burden of guilt rests on his not having followed his military training. Clearly this superbly trained warrior, a true elite member of the US armed forces, has either:
a. completely misunderstood whatever training he has received on this subject, or
b. has been trained in a way that undermines our common understanding of the law of war and its effect on military operations.

2. The fact that his lieutenant completely abdicates his leadership role and allows his subordinates to make such a momentous moral choice. It would have been fine, even wise, to ask their opinion, but to put it to a vote was wrong. It was a form of morale cowardice, and I do not say that lightly of a fallen soldier who displayed such formidable physical courage. He shifted a terrible moral burden from his own shoulders to those of his subordinates, a burden that still haunts Luttrell by his own admission.

I encourage all to read the book - you can't fully grasp the incident unless you have all the background - and I hope this incident will be used as a case study in the terrible choices men have to make in war a hundred years from now and how we prepare them to face those choices.

[Ken White]

if applied to a conventional unit, for some SOF missions one simply has to apply a different standard and Luttrell's quandry is but one example of many where there are differences in approach and training that must be applied.

Is it morally acceptable to shoot an innocent (if he is in fact 'innocent') shepherd, perhaps a child? Dunno. Is it moral to NOT shoot said child if his life being spared results in losing four or six or ten of your own people? Dunno the answer to that, either. METT-TC applies and I suggest that each person has to make their own decision when they are actually in such a situation. That creates a quandry and there is no 'right' answer.

You cite Luttrell's military training being abrogated and I agree -- if applied to conventional forces. In SOF operations of many kinds different rules apply; have to apply -- that's part of why they are called 'special operations.' You may disagree that such operations are conducted or that such organizations can have different rules. That is your prerogative but it doesn't change reality. Such organizations do exist, such operations are conducted, the rules ARE different and such quandries are a part of them.

You also condemn "his Lieutenant" for abdicating his leadership role. In most SOF units that line is not and absolutely cannot be as distinct as it is in a conventional unit. That, too is reality.

All the above factors are some of the many reasons there's a disconnect between the 'big Army' and SOF. You mention the incident as a "...case study in the terrible choices men have to make in war a hundred years from now and how we prepare them to face those choices." Good idea. Part of that case study could be used to educate the conventional force on some of the very knotty problems faced by their SOF brethren that conventional units rarely if ever face. We have not done that at all well.

[trident86]

1. he continuously refers to his military training which he says clearly calls for killing the shepherds who have stumbled upon his team.


2. The fact that his lieutenant completely abdicates his leadership role and allows his subordinates to make such a momentous moral choice.

This is what happens when you let a civilian write your story. I can assure you neither SEALs nor any other US SOF are taught that deliberately killing unarmed civilians is an option. In fact, the contemplation of this in the training pipeline or on actual operations would ensure dismissal from the unit and the SOF community.

What IS emphasized is that SOF are held to a higher standard, and we are a much more surgical option because of our discretion and judgment on the battlefield.

Having served with Michael Murphy and personally watched his development as a junior SEAL officer, I can assure you that once again, something was lost in the translation between Marcus and the author. I cannot imagine Murph "abdicating his leadership" under ANY circumstances. More likely and in accordance with Marcus' debrief to our Team once he returned from his convalescent leave, Murph polled his guys when he ran out of easy answers in order to gather any information he might not have previously considered, and in turn make the best decision under the circumstances.

This is where we cross the line--where we judge the men on the ground based on the (now obvious) turn of events. The operation should no doubt be thoroughly analyzed with the intent of educating our younger troops and making better decisions (if that's even possible in this case) on the battlefield.

As pointed out by several others, this single decision was only one of many made by the team on the ground and the leadership in the forward headquarters at several levels that ultimately led to the failure of the mission.

Regarding the Iridium Sat phone--it was a back up means of communication, rather than the primary means as implied in the previous post. In my experience, cell phones are normally an administrative vice tactical form of communication.

[Ranger94]

From the accounts that I have read, Lt. Michael P Murphy, displayed the type of physical courage that deserves our respect and honor. I am humbled each time I read his story.http://www.navytimes.com/news/2007/1...l_moh_071011w/

I have not read Lettrell's book. I am completely hung up on one point of the mission. During the planning stage, was compromise by a non-combatant covered?

My head spins when I think of a Long Range Surveillance team leader (and this is how the Seal team was functioning) debating with his team on how to act given a common situation that must ALWAYS be accounted for PRIOR to movement.

Compromise on a RECON mission is a contingency plan/immediate action drill not a debate. Input from the team on how to handle this situation should have come during the planning phase.

If it was considered during the planning phase, I doubt very much, the Op-Order said "shoot the unarmed civilian and continue to observe"

I think the comments on training have been the most productive in this thread.

[Kiwigrunt]

My head spins when I think of a Long Range Surveillance team leader (and this is how the Seal team was functioning) debating with his team on how to act given a common situation that must ALWAYS be accounted for PRIOR to movement.

Compromise on a RECON mission is a contingency plan/immediate action drill not a debate. Input from the team on how to handle this situation should have come during the planning phase.

Fully agree.
Indeed, Bravo Two Zero went through the same thing in '91 and everyone knows the story. Should be discussed under 'actions on'.
'Higher command' should take responsibility for troops on the ground not knowing how to react to 'unexpected' situations like these, especialy where those situations are to be so clearly expected.

[IntelTrooper]

Someone in the next DoD needs to be tasked to bring the nation's Honor and adhering to laws and humanity back as a core value (AGAIN) at the troop level. God bless all of those team guys. They are asked to do hard things, but the issue is not about the ROE, its about the ROL, Rule of Law.

We have some major league recalibration to do after this war.

Uh, what?

Edited to Add: Nevermind, that was an extremely old post.

[goesh]

This is a hell of a thing to have to think about. The senior man should have made the decision. The last thing to go before the collapse of an entrprise be it a combat patrol or a hot dog stand is discipline. Adrenaline, instincts and psychological stress makes a bad admixture that even good discipline can hold together for only so long. We all chose this path and we are haunted at times by making the right decisions and the wrong decisions and IMO only discipline keeps the score even. These men did no right or wrong, they died and 1 walked away from it. Let it be knowing we could have done no better or worse had we been there ourselves.

[Ken White]

In most any SOF or SF units, if things get rough, leaders tend to ask what others think and to discuss the possibilities. Generally, no one has any problems saying exactly what they think -- and no one has any problems with what the boss decides after asking. That's what everyone then does, even if they had a different idea. Like any generalization, I'm sure there are exceptions but I've never seen one and I've seen a few confabs, even held a couple. It's not a breakdown in discipline. The contrary, in fact.

What happened out there we'll never know. We know what one guy might have said. Editors want to sell books, sometimes thing in books get modified to do that...

In the end, what really matters is that you're right:

These men did no right or wrong, they died and 1 walked away from it. Let it be knowing we could have done no better or worse had we been there ourselves.