Social Media and Unconventional Warfare

[Bill Moore]

http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archiv...ediaAndUW.html

Social media — blogs, social-network sites, information aggregators, wikis, livecasting, video sharing — has decisively altered that most extreme of socio-politico acts: revolution. The 2011 Arab Spring revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East were engineered through citizen-centric computer and cellular-phone technologies that streamed web-enabled social exchanges. The Arab Spring has profound implications for the U.S. special-operations mission of unconventional warfare. This article posits that the study, practice and successful execution of future UW must deliberately account for and incorporate social media.

This excellent article is on the Blog, but due to technical problems with our social media it isn't possible to discuss it there, so I opted to transfer it to the council.

LTC Petit's article is a long overdue discussion topic for the Special Forces community. I recall that the last time it was surfaced it was rapidly dismissed by officers who don't understand the power of this new medium. It is a disruptive technology that allows anyone with access to this medium to not only share tactics, coordinate actions, but to upload multimedia (voice, video, images, text, etc.) to shape the narrative and potentially mobilize people to action. It doesn't mean that older forms of information broadcasting are obsolete, radio broadcasts, T.V. programs, leaflet drops, etc. are still useful means in conveying a message, but more often than not the interpretation of these broadcast messages will formed in the realm of social media. Most in the military understand that government officials (including the military) prefer to get their information from official sources, but the people often distrust these sources and prefer to get their information from their peers (to include fellow social media peers).

I initially had two areas that I was critical of regarding this article, the first was that Brian didn't adequately define social media, yet by accident I discovered the images in the article are links to additional information. To gain a better understanding of social media simply click on the image of the SmartPhone. That left me with on critique, and that was Brian's suggestion that Special Forces soldiers in the future given the authorities and situational awareness could use this medium to support their UW mission.

I don't disagree, and definitely support pursuing this, but offer the following observations. First the authorities issue, as many know we're not agile in the information realm, and decisions on what can and can't be shared are often made several levels of command up in the chain of command by those least aware of what is happening the ground. Social media by definition is interactive, and if you can't interact you can't play. I think if we're supporting a resistance movement or insurgency that is competing the domain of social media we risk formally or informally imposing our restrictive authorities on those we're trying to help. It may be better to informally encourage them to act on their own without asking higher for permission. I tried to get Iraqis to do their own MISO without asking permission from us instead of complaining about our slow approval process and complaining about how the insurgents were running circles around us. I suggested it was their country so of course they could make their own decisions, but they wouldn't, so if even if it isn't our intent to interfer with the resistance use of the social media, it could still happen.

Addressing the second point, situational awareness, it is unlikely that our soldiers will have the SA or language skills (in most cases) at least initially, so the best approach may be to provide the means (technology) and maybe some advise on how to project their message and effectively shape the narrative, but ultimately it is the local with the Smartphone that will engage in this domain instead of the SF soldier. One area I would hope we could help with is monitoring the narrative (an expert cell sitting at Fort anywhere in the U.S. can do this) and provide the resistance what the global perceptions of their narrative is, so they can adjust it if they see fit to do so.

I am just happy that the SF community is exploring this, and regardless of what route they ultimately decide to pursue, I hope at a minimum they add a block of instruction on social media to SFQC, and then advanced courses in ANCOC, WOAC, and NPS/SOF curriculum at CGSC, etc.

Moderator's minor note: the thread's title was Social Media and Unconventional Media till today, but the author noted his mistake and it has been corrected.

[Jimbo Monroe]

[originally sent as an email reply]

This is an interesting read; however, the zeal with which LTC Petit describes the social media ‘revolution’ demands tempering with a few significant caveats. First and foremost, the success the Arab street to mobilize via social media in any country is dependent on the nature of the country’s government. Egypt and Tunisia were soft dictatorships, unwilling to take the steps necessary to protect the regime, e.g., shutting down mobile phones and internet service, let alone a true violent response. Contrast the success in those countries to the events in Syria and Libya, where the regimes took the steps necessary to maintain power: Qaddafi only fell thanks to external military and technological intervention, and Homs has become Bashar’s Hama.

Second, what worked yesterday will not work tomorrow as the remaining regimes are taking notes and action. Look at Iran’s movements toward establishing an insulated national intranet, robust security apparatus, and willingness to shut down networks as needed; as well as, the regime’s use of its own version of social mobilization with the basij to counter anti-regime activity. In the hands of a savvy regime, social media can be as powerful a tool for control as it is for change.

Third, social media is just that, social. It comes with serious security drawbacks for organizing a resistance movement. Just look at Britain’s use of Facebook and Twitter posts in conjunction with a ubiquitous CCTV system to track down key participants in the recent riots. Also look at Britain's recent proposal to give its intelligence service unfettered access to all phone and internet activities. If a democratic state can make such use of social media for legitimate criminal prosecution, it is easy to imagine an autocratic regime doing the same in the face of overthrow. There’s anecdotal reporting China used key word filters on the net and mobile phones to nip discussion of a “Jasmine Spring” in the proverbial bud.

Finally, social media as the organizing tool for a truly acephalous organization offers grand opportunities for deception. The examples thus far have been fairly innocuous--such as the Syrian blogger who was in fact an American ex-pat in Scotland—however, it is not too difficult to see the opportunity for deception on the part of a besieged regime.

Social media is important, and we must take it into account; however, social media like all technology is but a tool, not a panacea.

[Bill Moore]

In response to Jimbo Monroe, I have the advantage of knowing the author, and trust he recognizes all the caveats you have identified. While only time will tell I not inclined to agree with all your points (though in the end you could turn out to be right).

First and foremost, the success the Arab street to mobilize via social media in any country is dependent on the nature of the country’s government. Egypt and Tunisia were soft dictatorships, unwilling to take the steps necessary to protect the regime, e.g., shutting down mobile phones and internet service, let alone a true violent response. Contrast the success in those countries to the events in Syria and Libya, where the regimes took the steps necessary to maintain power: Qaddafi only fell thanks to external military and technological intervention, and Homs has become Bashar’s Hama.

I am beliver in complexity theory (I see it as a law), and in this case that implies social media was one factor of many that shaped the outcome. Soft dictatorships is probably a good description, but I think you may mixing apples and oranges. Revolutions can be relatively peaceful (mass political movement), and in other cases they can be extremely violent and ultimately force will determine the outcome, but in both situations you offered social media was key in mobilizing the populace. Mobilizing the population alone does not cause government's to fall. Another point worth adding is social media facilitated the movement to go viral quicker than it would have prior to the advent of social media. Syria, Iran, and Libya were all outliers (not as bad as North Korea, but still outliers) and they hurt themselves by failing to respond more effectively (modifying the government). For Qadafi it was a fatal mistake, for Syria the outcome is uncertain, and for Iran I suspect there is still an underlying tension that can be mobilized again if they have confidence they can actually overthrow the government. Several social and political conditions must be present or established before the people are mobilized.

Second, what worked yesterday will not work tomorrow as the remaining regimes are taking notes and action. Look at Iran’s movements toward establishing an insulated national intranet, robust security apparatus, and willingness to shut down networks as needed; as well as, the regime’s use of its own version of social mobilization with the basij to counter anti-regime activity. In the hands of a savvy regime, social media can be as powerful a tool for control as it is for change.

My caveat is I don't see the Arab Spring as a victory over Al Qaeda, because I suspect the Islamists will reap the most from these revolts; however, nations have seen the power of social media, social movements, and the global pressure it will bring upon their government and have started reforms. Morocco is one case, but I think we're seeing globally to some extent, and this "may" be one reason the government in Burma is beginning to implement reforms. I agree that governments can use social media to reinforce governance, but a key point is social media is not restricted to national borders. The Egyptian government did shut down many services, but the resistance was still able to communicate. Syrians are still able to get their messages out (may do so through Turkey or other locations), etc.

Third, social media is just that, social. It comes with serious security drawbacks for organizing a resistance movement. Just look at Britain’s use of Facebook and Twitter posts in conjunction with a ubiquitous CCV system to track down key participants in the recent riots. Also look at Britain's recent proposal to give its intelligence service unfettered access to all phone and internet activities. If a democratic state can make such use of social media for legitimate criminal prosecution, it is easy to imagine an autocratic regime doing the same in the face of overthrow. There’s anecdotal reporting China used key word filters on the net and mobile phones to nip discussion of a “Jasmine Spring” in the proverbial bud.

I think there are plenty of methods to remain anonymous, and once the movement starts it can rapidly overwhelm the government's ability to monitor. If I can get a message out and a thousand people read /watch it and share it with three of their friends and their friends do the same before the government removes it, then it is too late. The resistance if needed (after being mobilized) can go underground. The risk of government penetration is real, but it was real long before the advent of social media. The Nazi's were pretty good at penetrating the undergrounds, as were the communists, and to some extent so are we. I think mass mobilization may require a definition for a new category, but it doesn't really fall into the category of underground, auxillary, and guerrillas. I think most revolutions will still require an underground (clandestine element), and they needn't be exposed by social media, but they can leverage it. In some cases prompting a protest that prompts the government to crack down on them is worth millions if it results in foreign aid for your movement.

Finally, social media as the organizing tool for a truly acephalous organization offers grand opportunities for deception. The examples thus far have been fairly innocuous--such as the Syrian blogger who was in fact an American ex-pat in Scotland—however, it is not too difficult to see the opportunity for deception on the part of a besieged regime.

You just demonstrated the power of social media, and just because the head isn't visible doesn't mean there isn't a head. Just like rifles, both sides can employ the weapon, so it is critical are team is armed with this knowledge (in my view).

Social media is important, and we must take it into account; however, social media like all technology is but a tool, not a panacea.

Agreed 100%, I think the author's and my point is if your opponents are using automatic weapons and you're still using bows and arrows with a few muskets sprinkled in, you may want to consider updating your toolbox.

[Dayuhan]

I tried to post this on the blog...

A few points...

This sentence kind of stuck out for me...

The Arab Spring demonstrated how social media can congregate its users digitally, then quickly shift to directing or influencing some form of focused physical mass or swarm.

That seems to suggest that "social media" have a degree of agency and even consciousness beyond that of their users, an idea that I suspect requires a little cautious examination.

Examinations of decentralized, leaderless forms of organization, whether or not they are enabled by social media, need to look not only at the undoubted power these entities have to produce agitation and disruption, but also at the extreme difficulty they have in structuring an aftermath to agitation and disruption. An amorphous, leaderless mass is difficult to counter and can bring a government down - particularly if that government is already regarded as expendable by its own military and other key internal elements - but unlike a "traditional" hierarchical resistance, there's often nobody to step into the breach, leaving a vacuum that may be filled by players with agendas very different from those that started the movement (such as the army (as in Egypt), or potentially any number of extremist elements). This deficiency needs to be understood and anticipated by those within the movement and those who would seek to leverage the movement.

While observation of social media could provide invaluable insight to the intelligence community or to UW operators, I suspect that we need to be very careful about any proposed attempt to proactively manipulate social media to achieve an outcome desired by an external party. We're often dealing with rapidly evolving youth subcultures in foreign lands, and an effort (for example) to pose as a local is likely to be quickly busted, potentially with adverse unintended consequences. Even people who are fundamentally on the same page as us may not take kindly to being manipulated.

Above all we have to remember that social media are a tool, not to be confused with the people using the tool. Revolutions happened before social media; people enable their revolutions with the tools they have available. Where the will is there and the moment is right things will happen with or without the social media. If the will isn't there and the moment isn't right social media alone will not produce revolution or anything else. Social media have the capacity to move the will and the moment, but they are not in themselves the will and the moment, and they are only one part of the process creating the will and the moment. We do not want to confuse the tool with the user, or with the job.

[Backwards Observer]

That's funny, an article on the importance of social media can't be commented on due to technical difficulties, "Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!".

Joking aside, and as others are pointing out, the powers of 21st century social media may well be formidable, but potential 'market saturation' of a bogus and unfocussed narrative can now have theatre-wide, even global negative impact. Naturally, this cuts both ways for any respective participants.

The 21st century mediums might do well to also focus on what they hope to manifest with their strategic ectoplasm, not just how many tables they can turn.

Having said that, studies may indicate that humans tend to prefer bogus narratives that pander to their preconceived notions, thus consigning narrative generation to a subordinate position viz the target audience.

[davidbfpo]

A different angle to the article - which I have yet to fully absorb - and from journalists, complete with podcast and from the summary:

Governments and security forces are becoming increasingly wise to the role of social media in organising and enhancing protest movements. As a result they are developing new ways to block, hack and track citizens tweets, Facebook and other social media tools in order to prevent unrest.

Protesters and citizen journalists the world over are able to stay one step ahead, however with the help of Open Source developed phone apps that allow them to communicate effectively without being tracked as easily. From letting friends know if you've been arrested to getting your story public, there is an app for all possible situations.

Link:http://www.frontlineclub.com/events/...e-media-1.html

[Bob's World]

Of course "social media" are just one arrow in the modern quiver of information tools that are reshaping how seriously governments everywhere have to take the perceptions and concerns of the populaces they affect (their own and those that belong to other nations alike).

To overly focus on "social media" is to miss the larger point. UW is simply leveraging and enhancing the insurgent conditions within some populace or populaces of a country who's government one seeks to coerce, influence, overthrow, etc. We have a traditional bag of tools, tactics, techniques and procedures for doing that based largely upon the lesson's learned from various operations in WWII. Technology has advanced since then, but UW is the same. The question for the US as a whole is "do we appreciate how organizations such as AQ are counducting UW today with more modern tools, techniques and procedures to attempt to leverage conditions of insurgency among many dissatisfied populaces, primarily in the greater Middle East" (or do we simply lump them as a terrorist organization consisting of "Al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents" as in the National strategy for Counterterrorism)?

For SOF, are we updating our own thinking, doctrine, plans, etc to more effectively leverage the tools of our times? For our policy makers are they updating their thinking, policies, programs, etc to more effectively advance US national interests in a manner least likely to provoke popular blowback or trigger a "resistance" effect among the affected popuulaces?

The times are changing, the tools are changing. Governments, Policies, doctrine, plans, etc are all lagging far behind.

[davidbfpo]

An interesting article IMHO, curious to see the references to the FLN in Algeria; this has been copied from the thread on Media & UW.

So does Syria’s uprising need more technologically savvy multimedia activists? Or – to be blunt – does it require more people inside the country blowing things up? In the end, which poses the greater threat to a repressive regime: its atrocities being instantly relayed across the world on Twitter, or a well-armed, tightly organised insurgency?

The 13 months of Syria’s revolt have starkly illustrated the limits of social media as an engine of revolution, and of the claims made for the internet’s transformative power.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ads-hands.html

[Surferbeetle]

David,

Thought you might find this article and link to be of interest, as did I...

Big data is watching you, By Dr. Gillian Tett, August 10, 2012 5:01 pm, Financial Times, www.ft.com

But last week, I took part in a seminar organised by America’s Brookings Institution and Blum Center to discuss development and global economics. And now I am looking at that mobile phone with fresh eyes. For what became clear in discussions with aid workers, healthcare officials and US diplomats is that those oft-ignored mobile devices are not just changing the way the western world lives – but changing the lives of poor societies, too. This, in turn, has some intriguing potential to reshape parts of how the global development business is done.

These days, there are about 2.5 billion people in emerging markets countries who own a mobile phone. In places such as the Philippines, Mexico and South Africa, mobile phone coverage is nearly 100 per cent of the population, while in Uganda it is 85 per cent. That has not only left people better connected than before – which has big political and commercial implications – it has also made their movements, habits and ideas far more transparent. And that is significant, given that it has often been extremely hard to monitor poor societies in the past, particularly when they are scattered over large regions.

Consider what happened two-and-a-half years ago when the Haitian earthquake struck. The population scattered when the tremors hit, leaving aid agencies scrambling to work out where to send help. Traditionally, they could only have done this by flying over the affected areas, or travelling on the ground. But some researchers at Columbia University and the Karolinska Institute took a different tack: they started tracking the Sim cards inside mobile phones owned by Haitians, to work out where their owners were located or moving. That helped them to “accurately analyse the destination of more than 600,000 people who were displaced from Port au Prince”, as a UN report says. Then, when a cholera epidemic hit Haiti later, the same researchers tracked the Sim cards again, to put medicine in the correct locations – and prevent the disease from spreading.

Aid groups are not just tracking those physical phones; they are also starting to watch levels of mobile phone usage and patterns of bill payment, too. If this suddenly changes, it can indicate rising levels of economic distress, far more accurately than, say, GDP data. Inside the UN, the secretary general is now launching a project called Global Pulse to screen some of the 2.5 quintillion bytes of so-called “big data” being generated each day around the world, including on social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook. These sites are strikingly popular in parts of the emerging markets world; Indonesia, for example, has one of the most Twitter-addicted populations on the planet. Thus if the UN (or anyone else) spots a sudden increase in certain keywords, this can also provide an early warning of distress. References to food or ethnic strife, for example, may indicate the onset of famine or civil unrest. Similarly, medical researchers have learnt in the past couple of years that social media references to infection area are powerful early warning signal of epidemics – and more timely than official alerts from government doctors.

Global Pulse, http://www.unglobalpulse.org

Global Pulse is an innovation initiative of the UN Secretary-General, harnessing today's new world of digital data and real-time analytics to gain a better understanding of changes in human well-being. Global Pulse hopes to contribute a future in which access to better information sooner makes it possible to keep international development on track, protect the world's most vulnerable populations, and strengthen resilience to global shocks.

Global Pulse functions as an innovation laboratory, bringing together expertise from UN agencies, governments, academia, and the private sector to research, develop, test and share tools and approaches for harnessing real-time data for more effective and efficient policy action.

[davidbfpo]

This could fit the 'Big Brother' thread and theme, but sits here well IMO. Not surprisingly the examples cited and linked are Anglo-American:http://californiawatch.org/dailyrepo...s-police-17846

I have m' doubts over the value of such tools, do drug suppliers really use Twitter? Can sense be made of the torrent of information, say anger over a police shooting in Chicago?

One thing is guaranteed hi-tech companies will try to sell their products to the police and other agencies who are still trying to get working desk-top computer systems.

[Majormarginal]

That last sentence is exactly correct davidbfpo.

[Lewis341]

Social Media Unconventional warfare is outlined as a method of contention, where the planning of whatever, is to establish control of the nation by gaining control of its online media society.