OSINT Assessment of the Afghan War

[jmm99]

from JR
But the ultimate question that I think JMM is asking is whether we could apply the Strategic Hamlet program to Afghanistan.

Not a success in SVN; and even a less likelihood in Astan.

Your concern was security for villagers who decide to co-operate. Marine CAP in Nam was the closest thing I thought of (absent an effective police force) to provide that security, bringing together a regular mainforce unit and a locally-recruited militia force.

I'm not suggesting CAP as the Holy Grail. First, it was a pilot program (some 800 villages and hamlets were "capped" - the highest number at any one time was just over 100 - a very small % of SVN's villages and hamlets); and a good pilot program does not mean a successful macro program. Second, its "success metrics" varied, depending on whether the ville was anti-VC, neutral or pro-VC, and the motivation of both Marine and village leadership. Third, not everyone is cut out to be a CAPer - so, recruitment was a problem.

Our reference library has a number of articles on the CAP program (in lower 1/3 of screen), which in turn cite more sources. They start with LTG Krulak's "A New Kind of War" and go down the page.

A short article is a CETO seminar with one of the CAP Marines, "Personal Experiences with the Combined Action Program in Vietnam", which does give us some rough metrics to work with. Here are some snips from the article:

p.1
The guest speaker was Mr. Ed Matricardi, currently an attorney in Northern Virginia, who was a U.S. Marine corporal and served as a CAP squad leader in Vietnam during 1967.

p.7
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. Mr. Matricardi was assigned to a stationary CAP which was responsible for a village and several small hamlets. There were only four trails leading to his village.

p.2
In Mr. Matricardi’s village there usually were 12 people assigned to a CAP squad, with two squads in the CAP unit.[*]

p.8
CAPs would always take a corpsman on nighttime patrols and ambushes. There were two corpsmen assigned to Mr. Matricardi’s CAP....

p.2
Each stationary CAP established a permanent location for its command post. It patrolled and performed all of its missions from a central, unmoving location. Because of their fixed nature, the command post and patrols attached to stationary CAP sites were more vulnerable to planned, coordinated attacks by various means.

Location of a stationary CAP site was dependant on the level of local support, needs, and makeup of the area. To be successful, the CAP teams needed to be widely dispersed and intertwined among local inhabitants and structures. Fire teams were spread widely throughout villages and hamlets.

Defensive wire and munitions encompassed the entire hamlet, not only the U.S. Marines. Segregation of CAP Marines in a separate compound or location, away from locals, was avoided as it made the Marines an easy target for mortars and rockets. CAP Marines occupied local dwellings and buildings, paying rent, rather than constructing their own living quarters.

Based on the surrounding area and local populace, stationary CAPs presented an easier target to the enemy than roving CAPs. This liability was offset by the unit’s ability to fortify and establish permanent defensive perimeters and check-points more substantial than those established by roving CAPs. Stationary CAPs were also better able to build relationships that provided them with intelligence on enemy actions and intentions.

Because of the permanent location of stationary CAPs and the continuous day-to-day interaction Marines had with the locals, personal friendships developed between them. The nature of the stationary CAP enhanced the ability of Marines to assimilate with the local community and individuals, to create dual missions, and to share responsibility to complete the needed tasks and missions.

Note that CAPs (even more so, the later mobile CAPs) were a military security program - clear, hold and provide local security. They were not intended, as such, to administer the "build" phase. Thus, from Williamson:

p.19
Growth in the CAP encouraged development of the program's objectives, and resulted in a formalized mission adopted from the PF's six rules:

1) Destroy the Vietcong infrastructure within the village or hamlet area of responsibility.

2) Protect public security and help maintain law and order.

3) Protect the friendly infrastructure.

4) Protect the bases and lines of communication within the villages and hamlets.

5) Organize the people's intelligence nets.

6) Participate in civic action and conduct propaganda against the Vietcong.[34]

[34] William R. Corson, The Betrayal (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1968), 184.

The bottom line (where CAPs were successful) hinged on:

p.20
Beginning at the lowest level, that of benefiting the peasant, the CAP achieved noteworthy impact for three reasons, according to Colonel William R. Corson, a retired Marine and author of The Betrayal:

1) Small numbers of Marines do not agitate hamlet life or create xenophobic reactions to military forces

2) The Marine squad had adequate tactical firepower to convince peasants of their military competence,

3) The rank, age, attitudes made it easy for peasants and the Popular Forces to identify with the Marines as individuals.[35]

[35] Corson, 190.

Going back to the first article, a village with several small hamlets had two CAP squads (roughly 30 Marines). In SVN, about 10 million rurals were spread in some 10,000-20,000 villages and hamlets (I haven't turned up definite metrics, which probably exist somewhere). The 1967 DoD study cited by Krepinevich suggested that about 170,000 CAPers would do the entire country - so, 1 trooper per 60 inhabitants. That is in line with the 30 Marines for a village with several small hamlets.

Now, as to Pashtuns, we have these metrics:

Pashtuns comprise over 15.42% of Pakistan's population or 25.6 million people.[1] In Afghanistan, they make up an estimated 39%[21] to 42% of the population or 12.4 to 13.3 million people. The exact numbers remain uncertain, particularly in Afghanistan, and are affected by approximately 3 million Afghan refugees that remain in Pakistan, of which 81.5% or 2.49 million are ethnic Pashtuns.[2]

[1] Population by Mother Tongue, Population Census Organization, Government of Pakistan (retrieved 7 June 2006)

[2] Census of Afghans in Pakistan, UNHCR Statistical Summary Report (retrieved 10 October 2006)

[21] Dupree, L.. "Afghānistān: (iv.) ethnocgraphy". in Ehsan Yarshater. Encyclopædia Iranica (Online Edition ed.). United States: Columbia University.

Not to rain on the parade, but handling, say, 12 million Pashtuns in Astan - and then there is Pstan - would require some 200K "on point" CAPers. Not an easy sell in this current environment.

I hope this clarifies where I was coming from.

-----------------------
[*] TOE called for 15 Marine per CAP squad (3x4 fireteams, squad leader, asst squad leader, and corpsman), which would have allowed a number of different structures for operations. TOE was the theory; reality was less.

PS: political action

from JR
But unless that initiative is accompanied by political reform that gives the hamlets' populations some kind of a stake in the success of their government, all you're going to end up doing is creating a political underclass that will have even more reason not to like you.

No argument here, but as noted above the CAP program was not a political action program. If the governance is on a par with the GVN - see my thoughts on that here - the best that a COIN force can do is to clear, hold and provide security.